Download X Marks the Spot: Miscalculations in Civil War Cartography | HIST DI and more Papers World History in PDF only on Docsity!
X Marks the Spot: Miscalculations in Civil War Cartography Ethan McClelland The Civil War affected every aspect of American life. Across the nation, north and south, homes and families were destroyed. In the south, the once fertile landscape was laid to waste, and an entire region was stripped of its ability to foster any type of economy. As war broke out in 1861, there was a serious lack of reliable maps. General George McClellan poignantly tells of maps, “correct local maps were not to be found, and the country, though known in its general features, we found to be inaccurately described in essential particulars, in the only maps and geographical memoirs or papers to which access could be had; erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, and no dependence could be placed on the information thus derived.”^1 In short, maps and mapmakers came into great demand, and focus shifted towards advancing the field of cartography. Today, historians are fortunate enough to have extensive records providing an incredibly detailed story of the war. Maps provide historians with a relatively accurate depiction of the landscape a particular general was looking for, as well as any special landmarks that might have deserved special reference on the map, thus implying an importance to the army itself. The mapmakers of the Civil War possessed many tools and methods that are used today. Appraisals of these Civil War maps are varied among those who analyze them, generally depending on the specialty of the critic. David Bosse writes on the varied opinions: “To further complicate matters, the informational requirements of
(^1) Richard Stephenson, Mapping the Civil War (Library of Congress: Starwood Publishing, 1992), 9.
the local historian, the military historian, and the historical geographer vary, and so will their opinion of any given map’s utility.” 2 Like all maps, Civil War maps are entirely relative to one man: the cartographer himself. It is true that the technology used to produce these maps was quite advanced, yet it all had to be processed by the one man heading the mapmaking team, and the man putting pen to paper. This produces many problems that are often overlooked by modern historians. These maps are incomplete, estimated, and relative reproductions of a man or team of men partial to the desires of an army, and a limited amount of time. Thus, things on the maps carry a twisted sense of importance. For instance, someone who is merely an overseer of fifty acres may find his name referenced on a map, while his employer, a man owning one thousand acres, is omitted. Why the inconsistency? If a mapmaker is searching for the important residents of an area, why would an insignificant farmer be marked while his powerful employer is not even mentioned? What were the priorities of the passing cartographers? Postwar accounts detail a decimated landscape marred with a lack of resources, indicating that the moving armies lived extensively off of the land. If the maps were meant to show resources, why was the listing of the resource controllers so sporadic? Without answers, what degree of credibility can be given to these maps? The Map of the Country North of Grand Junction, Tennessee, referred to here as the “Ames Map” (and attached at the end of this paper), provides an example of the complicated nature of Civil War maps. It is an archive that allows for modern comparison because of the area on which it focuses. The area featured in the map almost exactly overlays the land boundaries of the modern day Ames Plantation, an 18,600 acre land base in Fayette and Hardeman counties of western Tennessee. The plantation, currently (^2) David Bosse, Civil War Newspaper Map (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 45.
The answers to these questions can be traced back to the original issue: perspective. In order to determine just how accurate a depiction of life during the Civil War these maps provide, they must be examined from the perspective of the cartographer.
The War in the West
In order to establish the background of the Ames Map, a brief overview of the events that led up to the map’s production will be provided. As the Civil War commanded focus in the eastern half of the United States, the two sides began clashing for control of the numerous waterways of the west. The rivers were vital to the southern economy, as their comparatively underdeveloped railroad system left much of the Confederate war machine relying on shipping via rivers. Likewise, the underdeveloped infrastructure meant that in order for an effective invasion of the Southern states, the Union needed to control those same waterways. The sheer size of the south, coupled with the thinly spread population, meant the Union had to wage a different type of warfare than in the more urban east. This mindset would eventually lead to “total war,” the involving of an entire population in the military strategy, making everything capable of supporting the southern war effort a target. Some of the war’s most famous names emerged from the war in the west: Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, and Nathan Bedford Forrest. These three would clash on numerous occasions throughout the war, and would leave a legacy of both honor and destruction throughout the Confederacy. Official western conflicts began in Missouri where, on August 10, 1861 a Union force under Nathaniel Lyon attacked a band of Confederate sympathizers near Wilson’s
Creek in southern Missouri.^3 Lyon and the Union soldiers were defeated, marking the beginning of Missouri as a constant battleground between the two sides. Quite early in the conflict, both the Union and the Confederacy recognized the importance of the Mississippi River for control of the Confederacy. The first conflicts over the waterway began in Cairo, Illinois, and Columbus, Kentucky. Both cities were Union territory, and asked for help from the federal government. In Columbus, Confederate troops occupied the city after moving up from northern Tennessee. The Kentucky state legislature asked the federal government for help, and Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant soon arrived and occupied Paducah, Kentucky with a force of about 4000 men.^4 He would later move towards Belmont, Missouri just across the Mississippi River from Columbus. A battle occured in the middle of the two cities. It was Grant’s first battle of the war. From Belmont, Grant’s army began moving along southern Kentucky and into northern Tennessee. At first, the western theater was made up of minor skirmishes. Grant’s bulky army was hampered down by his superior, Henry Halleck, who continued to withhold permission for an all-out invasion of Tennessee.^5 Once the word came in January of 1862, Grant moved against his targets, first at Forts Henry and Donelson in northern Tennessee.^6 Fort Henry was captured quickly, and Donelson was eventually captured after an intense four day stand by Confederate troops.^7 From Fort Donelson, Grant had
(^3) Col. R. Ernest Dupuy and Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, The Compact History of the Civil War (New York: Warner, 1960), 49-50. (^4) “American Civil War,” Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2007 http://encarta.msn.com © 1997-2007 Microsoft Corporation. All Rights Reserved. (^56) Ibid. Warner, 1960), 57-58.Col. R. Ernest Dupuy and Col. Trevor N. Dupuy,^ The Compact History of the Civil War^ (New York: (^7) Ibid., 58-59.
of its location at the crossroads of the Memphis and Charleston railroads. The major east- west and north-south railroad crossing in Tennessee had fallen into Union hands. Grand Junction and LaGrange are also important to the present study because they are the two cities closest to the modern day Ames area. James Wilson, who was mentioned on the Union Army’s map of this area, was transferred to the company of Major-General John A. McClernand, who participated in the capture of Grand Junction and LaGrange. 11 Reconnaissance of the area surrounding the cities would have most likely occurred shortly after their capture; with Wilson present and intelligence needed, is likely that the Ames Map was produced sometime shortly after the capture of Grand Junction and LaGrange in late 1862. The Union army, now controlled by General W.H. Halleck who superseded Grant after Shiloh, moved south towards the Confederate stronghold at Corinth, Mississippi. Like Grand Junction, Corinth was of great importance to both armies because of its strategic railroad junction. Halleck said of Corinth: “Richmond and Corinth are now the great strategic points of war, and our success at these points should be insured at all hazards.”^12 The plan was for Grant to march south from Memphis and rendezvous with General William Tecumseh Sherman who was proceeding by water to the Chickasaw Bluffs, just north of Vicksburg.^13 Grant hoped that the two armies combined would be able to overwhelm the heavily fortified city.
(^11) John A. McClernand to E.M. Stanton from Washington, City, October 15,1862: “Please assign Liet. James H. Wilson, Engineers, U.S. Army, who is now here, for duty as a member of my staff.” Taken from War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (The National Historical Society: Broadfoot Publishing, 1971), 277-278. (^12) Rogers, Margaret Green. 2002. Corinth 1861-1865. Corinth, MS: Corinth Tourism Council. On-Line. Available from Internet, http://www.corinth.net/NEW%20SITE/History/1861_1865.htm, accessed July 18 th, 2007. (^13) “American Civil War,” Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2007 http://encarta.msn.com © 1997-2007 Microsoft Corporation. All Rights Reserved.
Before he left for Vicksburg, Grant dispatched General Benjamin H. Grierson’s cavalry division from La Grange on a diversion raid throughout the south, hoping to divert Confederate attention from Vicksburg. 14 Grierson made an enormously successful ride through the south to Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 15 Grant’s plan for a diversion did not work, as both Generals were met with heavy resistance and the plan to take Vicksburg failed. Grant’s supply base of Holly Springs, Mississippi was destroyed when Confederate General Earl Von Dorn moved in on his rear. Calls arose again in the north that Grant was reckless and an irresponsible defender of his advances. Sherman was eventually repulsed at the Battle of Chickasaw Bluffs, sending back the poignant report of, “I reached Vicksburg at the time appointed, landed, assaulted, and failed.”^16 Grant formulated a new plan to force the Confederates inside of Vicksburg and lay a classic siege. He would march on the western side of the Mississippi River and cross it south of Vicksburg. After crossing the river, he marched to Jackson, the capitol of Mississippi, which held the only Confederate force that could prevent a challenge of Vicksburg. He captured Jackson on May 12, 1863. After the Jackson triumph, Grant was relatively free of Confederate opposition to his rear, Grant turned west towards Vicksburg. At Champions Hill, a point halfway between Jackson and Vicksburg, two of Grant’s commanders were attacked by Confederate General John C. Pemberton.^17 The Union generals forced Pemberton to retreat, and after a secondary battle at Big Black River, Pemberton held stubbornly to Jefferson Davis’s orders to hold Vicksburg at any
(^14) Col. R. Ernest Dupuy and Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, The Compact History of the Civil War (New York: Warner, 1960), 256. (^15) Ibid. (^16) “American Civil War,” Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2007 http://encarta.msn.com © 1997-2007 Microsoft Corporation. All Rights Reserved. (^17) Col. R. Ernest Dupuy and Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, The Compact History of the Civil War (New York: Warner, 1960), 257.
Wilson was born in 1837 in Shawneetown, Illinois. In 1860, he graduated from The United States Military Academy at West Point, and entered the Army as a topographical engineer.^20 His first assignment was at Fort Vancouver, Oregon, as Assistant Topographical Engineer.^21 In April of 1862 he was promoted to Major and transferred to the Regular Army, specifically the Army of the Potomac. It was there he became a reliable aide to General George McClellan.^22 Wilson frequently saw combat with the Potomac troops, showing the duality of a cartographers place in the army. They were expected to create and understand complicated maps, while at the same time giving direction to the generals who oversaw the military operation. As Wilson and others held the key knowledge of the landscape, they were expected to be near to the center of control and also the center of action. Wilson was transferred to Ulysses S. Grant’s Army of the Tennessee, still as an engineer.^23 It is likely that the map of Grand Junction was created while Wilson was with Grant after the Battle of Shiloh as he moved southwest towards the Mississippi river and eventually Vicksburg. Wilson participated extensively in the Vicksburg campaign as an engineer, and produced what is perhaps his most widely recognized
map, a map of the Vicksburg area. (^24) 1 James H. Wilson, ca. 1864
(^20) Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton Rouge and London:
McElfresh, Maps and Mapmakers of the Civil War (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1999), 123.
Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 566. (^21) Ibid., 567. (^2223) Ibid. (^24) Earl B.Ibid.
Wilson’s success during the Vicksburg Campaign and his entire stay with Grant as ma
ooga,
64, Wilson changed his duties from engineering to the cavalry. General
ut
son embarked on Wilson’s Raid, an incredibly successful
to
w rked by his numerous promotions during the time. During the Vicksburg Campaign, he was appointed to the position of General Inspector of Grant’s Army. On October 30, 1863, he was promoted to Brigadier General of Volunteers,^25 and was the only officer in Grant’s regular staff to be promoted to troop command.^26 Wilson remained in command still doubling as an engineer, through the Battle of Chattan and collaborated with General William T. Sherman in his capture and defense of Knoxville. In 18 Grant had Wilson appointed Brigadier General of Volunteers and placed him with a cavalry command under General Sherman.^27 On November 30, 1864 Wilson was instrumental in saving the Union army during the Battle of Franklin. The Battle of Franklin was marked by repetitive Confederate frontal assaults at the Union lines. General Nathan Bedford Forrest attempted to flank the Union forces on their left, b Wilson repelled the attack. 28 On March 22, 1865 Wil cavalry march through northern Alabama. Wilson led 13,500 men primarily against General Forrest. Wilson defeated Forrest near Montavello, and marched uncontested Montgomery, which he occupied on April 12th.^29 He then pursued Forrest to his
rner, (Baton Rouge and London: J. Eicher, The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War (New York: Simon & Schuster,
(^25) John H. Eicher and David J. Eicher, Civil War High Commands (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 574. (^26) Ezra J. Wa Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 567. (^27) Ibid. (^28) David 2001), 772. (^29) Ibid., 837.
cartogr
s on
es historians with one of the most well documented conflicts in Am dvances in technology became applied to the field of servation
r put
aphers were expected to have. A man who could be one of the most effective mapmakers and cavalry generals of the American Civil War shows how skilled the profession was. His quick promotions also allude to how important skilled mapmaker were. As an engineer, Wilson was quickly promoted up through the ranks of the Uni Army. Grant must have recognized his capabilities and valued him as a mapmaker.
Civil War Maps
The American Civil War provid erican history. A record keeping and journalism, thus an emphasis was placed on the con of all information detailing the course of the war. As a result, a comprehensive account of the war is available, featuring order records, photographs, diary entries, and maps. Each of these archives are looked upon by historians to learn just what life was like during the war. At first, many of those pieces of information were taken by historians as the truth. Few questions were asked about photos from Matthew Brady; rather his photographs were considered to be the accurate depiction of the battlefield. As time went on, historians have come to find many faults in the literal interpretations of these Civil Wa documents. For instance, many of Brady’s photographs were staged, bodies were together to create a more gruesome scene or actors were used to give Brady complete control of the shot. In truth, some of Brady’s photos did not depict reality at all, and consequently historians learned to read Brady’s photos with the consideration of perspective in mind.
Maps are reliable in telling the story of a battle or the goals of a general m towards a particular ar
oving ea. These are all on a large scale. On the small scale though, the difficul d ar
orical
ue. The Ames Map can be conside ns are
ion,
e map, or there are no sites in the map’s empty spaces.
ties of technology and the use of guesswork become more apparent. For the purposes of an advancing army, a set of slave cabins being off by a hundred yards woul not usually slow them down much. For modern-day archaeologists treating a Civil W map as their main source on an area, a hundred yards could set them back months. This consideration must be applied to all Civil War documents. As is the case with primary documents, they were created by an author not intending to keep a hist record, but one with an agenda. Letters home to families were coming from people, on whom the war has had a profound effect, thus creating a tone with which the letters were written. This tone must be taken into consideration. The same is true for maps. Maps are rarely looked at critically, and when they are used as primary sources, are usually taken at face val red evidence of what was believed to be an accurate depiction of the life and landscape of the Civil War on the Ames Plantation. Often times, many assumptio made about the maps practical applications, whether it is a search for resources or a means of organizing and directing travel. David Bosse writes on the complicated nature of Civil War maps: “Because the various representations on a map (of roads, vegetat terrain, etc.) coincide to greater or lesser extents with reality, different levels of accuracy exist within a single map.”^32 Archaeologists may look at a map and assume that a site is present in the vicinity with which it is portrayed on th
(^32) David Bosse, Civil War Newspaper Maps (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 45.
The men who created these maps did so under unique circumstances with unique challenges. Some maintained regular relations with their respective armies; others were employees of the governments. A few engineers, such as Jed Hotchkiss of the Confederate army, and D.H. Strother of the Federal army, maintained their positions throughout the war.^34 For others such as James H. Wilson or George Custer, engineering was either a hobby or a stop on the way to regular commands. Regardless of their eventual destiny with the army, topographical engineers were highly valued by both sides.^35
Mapping Technology
The industrial revolution that had reached the United States by the mid 19th century had been applied to cartography. Compared to wars past, the technology on hand for cartographers had made one of the greatest advances in history. Railroads allowed for maps to be shipped across the country in a matter of days, while the telegraph allowed for intelligence and orders to be wired from Washington to the front in minutes. The revolving cylinder press allowed for mass production and distribution of maps.^36 As for field tools, the transit had caught on in popularity in the mid-19th^ century, making distance surveying easier. The production of these technologies was something that required industry, a key advantage held by the Union army.
(^3435) Earl B. McElfresh, Maps and Mapmakers of the Civil War (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1999), 23. 36 Ibid., 23-25.David Bosse, Civil War Newspaper Maps (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 21.
Federal Advantages
After the secession of the southern states, the Federal Army maintained an enormous advantage with its organization. With a few exceptions, their entire Corps of Topographical Engineers remained intact, along with the United States Coast Survey, Smithsonian Institution, Naval Hydrographic Office, and the Pacific Wagon Road Office.^37 The federal engineers, (or Topogs as they were called by the soldiers^38 ) also had at their disposal the resources of the federal government. Mapmaking supplies were expensive, particularly in the blockaded Confederacy. Confederate engineer Jed Hotchkiss writes in his diary that pencils cost $1 in Richmond. The cost of hiring an engineer for one day was about $3, so supplies were at a premium. 39 These resources went towards things like the reproduction of maps. Maps were difficult things to make accurate copies of, and the industrialized Union held a significant advantage over the Confederacy in their ability to mass produce maps. In short, as with the Federal armory the Federal topographers were vastly more prepared materially than their Confederate counterparts.
Confederate Advantages
In the typical discussion of Civil War advantages, the one Confederate advantage that invariably comes up is that “the Confederates knew the lay of the land.” Nowhere is this more apparent than in the field of Topography. Federal topographers were faced with (^37) Earl B. McElfresh, Maps and Mapmakers of the Civil War (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1999), 29. (^3839) Ibid. Ibid.
Union topographers were in unfamiliar territory, meaning their maps must be looked at with an even more critical eye. McElfresh writes that the topographers would know the exact size of familiar objects to provide reference points from distances, for example “he would know what a church steeple looked like from ten miles away, what a house looked like from five miles away.” 42 The territorial disadvantage comes into play again because of the differences in the atmospheric conditions in the north versus the south. “It was noted that in the extremely dry atmospheric conditions prevailing in the West, Easterners would misjudge badly, thinking objects ten miles away to be only two or three miles away.” 43 While the Confederacy did hold an advantage because they were in familiar territory, that advantage was entirely relative. While a Virginian was a southerner, his territorial advantage was completely gone once he left Virginia. Confederate General Richard Taylor notes that his cartographers “knew no more about the topography of the country than they did about Central Africa.” 44 It took time to train and equip these cartographers, and their skill level should be considered while analyzing their maps.
Why They Mapped
In order to understand the maps of the Civil War, one must understand why the maps were commissioned, the specific details of the orders, and how the maps were used by the armies. An understanding of a map’s purpose can allow for a reevaluation of the maps status as a primary source. By looking at the map itself and pairing it with the
(^4243) Ibid., 33. 44 Ibid.Richard Stephenson, Mapping the Civil War (Library of Congress: Starwood Publishing, 1992), 9.
desires of the commanders who commissioned their creation, we can begin to place the maps’ within a context with the rest of the relevant Civil War primary sources. Maps were used in battle as a means of designing and executing attacks. The most famous Civil War maps are almost always of famous battlefields, depicting troop positions or movements. These were used by Generals to create battle plans. As this was the case, the cartographers who created these maps included only what would prove necessary for a battle map. The maps then represent the landscape accurately, but accurately only in relation to what is useful in a battle. Things such as elevated areas, waterways, forests, roads and fields become the important items represented on the map. Specifics about those areas suffer.
Pillaging
One reason the Ames Map was produced was possibly due to the need of the Union Army to procure food and shelter after their successful campaign at Grand Junction. The war brought devastation to the area. Pillaging was a major problem, and the official record reflects that the army took conflicting steps to deal with it. One order written November 23rd, 1862 from J.H. Hammond, Assistant Adjunct General reads: “Pillage or robbery by the soldiers or subordinate officers must be promptly checked and punished.”^45 While another, given one month earlier by Hammond, reads: “Subordinates and privates must not pillage, but commanders may do anything necessary to impress upon the people the guerillas must be driven from their midst, else they must necessarily
(^45) Hammond, J.H. General Order No. 94. taken from War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies 1971), 359.. (The National Historical Society: Broadfoot Publishing,
