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The Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy Vol. VIII, 1°, 2014, pp. 32‑
WHY QUEERNESS IS NOT ENOUGH :
AGAINST MORAL ELIMINATIVISM
**David K R E T Z *** Abstract : Moral error theorists often claim to be strongly anti‑metaphysical in their moral scepticism and atheistic naturalists. This paper argues that pre‑ cisely this becomes a problem for them, when their metaethical and ontologi‑ cal commitments clash. I first outline how the known arguments against error theory face a problematic, yet rarely considered trade‑off : either they are very strong, then they are also very demanding in their assumptions or they are less demanding in their assumptions but rather weak in their conclusions. In re‑ sponse to this challenge I then develop a new argument against error theory that exploits an overlooked inconsistency in the error theorists’ standard line of argumentation. I conclude that the implications of this inconsistency are less of a problem for fictionalist error theorists, but will render any eliminativism based on error theory circular. Keywords : metaethics, error theory, moral fictionalism, moral eliminativism, Argument from Queerness, J. L. Mackie. I. INTRODUCTION More than 30 years after J. L. Mackie introduced moral error theory as a metaethical view, his theory still sparks discussion^1. Moral error theorists of‑ ten claim to be strongly anti‑metaphysical in their moral scepticism and athe‑ istic naturalists. This paper argues that precisely this becomes a problem for them, when their metaethical and ontological commitments clash. I first out‑ line how the known arguments against error theory face a problematic, yet rarely considered trade‑off : either they are very strong, then they are also very demanding in their assumptions or they are less demanding in their
- David KRETZ, ECLA of Bard (Berlin, Germany). Contact address : d.kretz@berlin.bard.edu. (^1) See, for example, Finlay (2008, 2010) ; Joyce (2011, 2012) ; Olson (2010) ; Daly & Liggins (2010) and different contributions in A World Without Values , ed. R. Joyce and S. Kirchin.
Why Queerness is not Enough : Against Moral Eliminativism assumptions but rather weak in their conclusions. In response to this chal‑ lenge I then develop a new argument against error theory that strikes a bal‑ ance between strength and frugality by exploiting an overlooked inconsisten‑ cy in the error theorists’ standard line of argumentation. I conclude that the implications of this inconsistency are less of a problem for fictionalist error theorists, but will render any eliminativism based on error theory circular. II. MACKIE’S ERROR THEORY AND ITS CRITICS Moral error theory claims that moral judgments (‘It is good to do X’) are uniformly and systematically false (Mackie, 35). It rests on two claims. Firstly, the conceptual claim that moral judgments entail a reference to what Mackie calls objective values. Objective values according to Mackie are cate‑ gorically prescriptive entities that determine the truth and falsehood of mor‑ al judgments. What does it mean for something to be categorically prescriptive and ob‑ jective? For Mackie, saying that something is prescriptive is to say that it is action‑guiding (Mackie, 23/4)^2. Objective values „tell us how we ought to act, (…) they give us reasons for acting“ (Miller 2003, 115). To be categorical‑ ly prescriptive means that this prescriptivity does not depend on an agent’s particular desires (see also Kant 1997, 25‑7 & Finlay 2008, 4). It is a bit hard‑ er to determine what exactly Mackie means by objective. Miller gives an im‑ pressive list of Mackie’s usages of the term. Among other things, the term objective in Mackie seems to denote entities that are part of the fabric of the world, extra‑mental, independent of our attitudes, that can be an object of knowledge, and that can be perceived, to name just a few (Miller 2003, 116). The second claim, which is often called the ontological claim, is simply that such objective values do not exist. Mackie then combines these claims and argues that all moral judgments are wrong, since a) objective values do not exist but b) all moral claims or judgments erroneously entail a reference to them. The conceptual claim makes error theory a form of cognitivism, be‑ cause it entails that moral judgments are truth‑apt, their truth depending on precisely those objective values whose existence is denied by the ontological claim. Due to the ontological claim moral error theory is usually also seen as a form of moral anti‑realism (Miller 1977, 112 ; Joyce 2009, 1).^3 As Richard Joyce puts it, error theory „combines a rich view of moral concepts with a meager ontological view of the world“ (Joyce 2013, 6). As Mackie himself remarks, moral error theory is strongly anti‑common‑ sensical (Mackie 1977, 35) and thus needs to be backed up by very good arguments. One such argument that Mackie offers is the argument from (^2) See also Walter Sinnott‑Armstrong (2010, 56‑60). (^3) Pace Jamie Dreier (2010).
Why Queerness is not Enough : Against Moral Eliminativism of the essential theoretical virtues. Accordingly, the proponents of these kinds of attacks argue that their respective theories are superior to error theory be‑ cause they are simpler, more elegant, honest, charitable, conservative, natu‑ ralistic, or economical, to name just a few examples^8. These arguments can be seen as a response to the problems of direct attacks. Instead of arguing that error theory is wrong, they only aim to establish that error theory is unattrac‑ tive because it lacks some essential theoretical virtue. As such, they are less demanding than direct attacks but they are also weaker. Even if error theory is an unattractive, ugly truth, it could still be a truth. At the same time they are not entirely frugal in their assumptions and thus still force their propo‑ nents to endorse other metaethical positions which are also usually debated. Attacks against moral error theory of the third and last category try to solve this problem by being aimed neither at the premises nor at the con‑ clusions but at the way the latter is derived from the former, i.e. it questions the argument’s validity. Aiming to exploit an irreconcilable, inner tension or contradiction of the error theory, they are potentially devastating, while also being very frugal in their demands and do not force their proponents to committing to any controversial metaethical view of their own. Yet it is of course very hard to find such irreconcilable tensions or contradictions in the error theory and a compelling argument of this kind has not been made yet. (^9) Following Miller, I will refer to this category of attack as an internal or in‑ direct attack against error theory (Miller 2003, 118). In the next section of this paper I will develop an argument that is de‑ signed to combine the advantages of all three categories and simultaneously addresses their various problems, i.e. a strong argument against error theory that is also very frugal in its assumptions. It will be aimed at the error theo‑ rists arguments for the ontological claim (first category), and largely remain neutral about the conceptual claim. Secondly, rather than claiming that er‑ ror theory is false, it will suggest that error theory is unattractive to ontolog‑ ical naturalists (second category). Thirdly, it will offer an indirect line of at‑ tack (third category) against the argument from queerness that is accessible to proponents of a wide range of metaethical and philosophical positions. III. A NEW OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT Recall that the argument from queerness has two aspects : a metaphysical and an epistemological. The metaphysical argument from queerness runs as follows (Mackie 1977, 38‑42 ; Lillehammer forthcoming, 2/3) : (^8) Daly and Liggins in their 2010 defence of error theory deal largely, though not exclusively, with these attacks. They concluded that all of the charges considered are either ill‑motivated, false, or otherwise fail to provide compelling arguments against error theory (ibid. 21). (^9) A prominent objection that falls into this category is the familiar charge that error theory con‑ tradicts the Law of the Excluded Middle. The issue has been discussed among other by Olson (2010) and Pigden (2010, 27‑32). I agree with both that error theorists can meet this charge.
David Kretz PM1 Objective values would be metaphysically queer, utterly different from anything else in the universe. PM2 According to our naturalist worldviews we do not find such queer entities in the world. CM Therefore objective values do not exist. The first premise, which is just stating the queerness of objective values, can take on different forms, depending on how exactly this queerness is to be thought. The second premise is a commitment to a naturalist worldview. The epistemological argument from queerness runs similarly (Mackie 1977, 38‑42 ; Lillehammer forthcoming, 9/10) : PE1 Objective values would be epistemologically queer, i.e. they would place strange demands on our epistemic faculties. PE2 We are most likely unable to epistemically meet these strange de‑ mands. CE We should not believe in the existence of objective values. There are four logically possible permutations about the soundness of those two arguments. Either (1) both are sound, or (2) the metaphysical ar‑ gument is sound and the epistemological argument is unsound, or (3) the epistemological argument is sound and the metaphysical argument is un‑ sound, or (4) both are unsound. In case 4, objective values exist and we are able to acquire knowledge about them. This means that the ontological claim of error theory is defeat‑ ed and the road is open for moral realism. A direct attack on the ontologi‑ cal claim will most likely proceed by arguing for this case. However, I want to suggest another kind of attack that tries to exploit a tension between the other three cases. Let us now look at the two cases in which the epistemological argument is sound, case 1 and case 3. If the epistemological argument is sound than PE is true. However, this makes it undecidable for us whether the metaphysical argument is sound or not. PM2 states that we do not find metaphysically queer objective values in this world. Yet there are two possible reasons for why this is so : it could either be that PM2 is true because there really are none and fur‑ thermore we would be unable to epistemically detect them anyway (i.e. case 1). Our situation would then be similar to the situation of a blind person in an empty, dark room. Or – the second option – it could be that there are in‑ deed objective values in the world and PM2 is false but we are just unable to epistemically detect them (case 3). In that case our situation would be like the situation of a blind person in a bright room filled with objects. In nei‑ ther case do we find objective values but the reasons for that are completely
David Kretz to liken their non‑existence to the non‑existence of pink, invisible unicorns. The notion of a pink, invisible unicorn is the notion of something a priori and necessarily impossible because it entails a contradiction in terms. A part of what it means to be pink is to be visible. Thus, in no possible world can there be entities that are at the same time pink and invisible, and unicorns of this kind are a priori and necessarily impossible. Sophisticated error theorists like Richard Garner and Richard Joyce re‑ ject, of course, at least the first part of this comparison. Objective values are not merely queer the way unicorns are but they are „unusual in an unusual way“ as Garner puts it (Garner 1990, 143). The metaphysical argument can take different forms, each focusing on a different kind of queerness, and it is often hard to see whether the error theorists intend their arguments to show the contingent non‑existence or the necessary impossibility of objective val‑ ues. I will, however, not go through all the variations of the metaphysical argument here, because there is a more general point to be made why any given argument for the a priori and necessary impossibility of objective val‑ ues will not be readily available to the error theorist. Due to its conceptual claim error theory is a form of cognitivism, i.e. it views moral judgments as truth‑apt. But if objective values cannot possibly exist and moral judgments can be true only if objective values do exist, then moral judgments cannot possibly be truth‑apt. An argument that establishes the a priori and neces‑ sary impossibility of objective values will thus be too strong to be compati‑ ble with the conceptual claim of error theory. Instead of merely erroneous, our use of moral language would be truly paradoxical. This turn from an er‑ ror theory to a ‘paradox theory’ would be quite a radical departure from the entire metaethical view that error theorists are trying to establish. With such implications looming, the second and perhaps better way of meeting the new challenge would be to forego the metaphysical argument completely and merely defend the epistemological argument : objective val‑ ues would be queer entities, and we have problems with epistemically detect‑ ing such queer entities. Thus, the error theorist could argue, there might or might not be objective values, but either way we cannot tell and thus should not believe in them. However, as we have seen, if we assume that the episte‑ mological argument holds then the metaphysical argument is rendered un‑ decidable. Thus, the naturalist’s scepticism about objective values is not well justified but, the question of their existence being undecidable, the error the‑ orist rather has to assume a weaker, merely agnostic position on the question about the existence of objective values. The strong ontological claim would have to be given up in favour of a weaker epistemological claim. If we can‑ not know whether objective values exist, and if knowledge about the exist‑ ence of objective values is necessary to determine the truth and falsehood of moral judgements, it follows that we cannot make any claims about the truth and falsehood of moral judgments. Error theory thus would be a form
Why Queerness is not Enough : Against Moral Eliminativism of moral agnosticism that cannot establish the falsehood or truth of any mor‑ al judgment and thus fails in its central aim. Having to endorse agnosticism about objective values rather than a well‑founded scepticism would be quite a disappointment for the error the‑ orist, who, as it is sometimes put, takes a position towards morality that is analogous to an atheist’s position towards religion (Joyce 2011, 1 ; Joyce 2010, xii ; Garner 2010b). The distinction between atheism and agnosticism is a sub‑ tle but nevertheless important one, the latter being a considerably weaker position. In an ontologically naturalist framework, i.e. an ontological frame‑ work that denies the existence of supernatural entities (Daly & Liggins 2010, 19 ; Miller 2003, 178‑80 ; see also Papineau 2009), the question about the ex‑ istence of objective values should be decidable, thus justifying either scep‑ ticism or realism (see also Mackie 1977, 17/8). Yet, if I am right, scepticism about objective values is not an option for the error theorist, who can at best establish agnosticism about objective values. If we cannot know whether ob‑ jective values exist, and if knowledge about the existence of objective val‑ ues is necessary to determine the truth and falsehood of moral judgements, it follows that we cannot make any claims about the truth and falsehood of moral judgments. Error theory thus would be a form of moral agnosticism. As such it cannot establish the falsehood or truth of any moral judgment and thus fails in its central aim. In pointing out a conflict between error theory and ontological naturalism we also find an element of the second category of attacks in this new argument.^10 Not being able to make claims about the truth or falsehood or moral judg‑ ments might be more problematic for certain kinds of error theorists than oth‑ ers. A distinction is often drawn between eliminativists, or moral abolition‑ ists, on the one hand, and moral fictionalists on the other. Both eliminativism and fictionalism are forms of error theory and both agree that the positive, atomic propositions of our moral discourse are uniformly false. However, they differ in their opinion on what consequences should be drawn from this with regards to moral discourse. The eliminativist recommends that mor‑ al discourses should be abandoned completely „just as we have abandoned phlogiston‑talk“ (Daly & Liggins 2010, 2). The fictionalist, on the other hand, argues that we should stop believing the erroneous propositions of the mor‑ al discourse but rather choose to merely accept them, without committing (^10) Daly and Liggins in their 2010 defence of error theory consider attacks that claim an incom‑ patibility between error theory and methodological naturalism (Daly & Liggins 2010, 19‑21). Simply put, methodological naturalism holds that science is the best way to find out about the world, whereas ontological naturalism is an ontological view that denies the existence of super‑ natural entities (Daly & Liggins 2010, 19 ; Miller 2003, 178‑80 ; see also Papineau 2009). My argu‑ ment is concerned with the latter, because it claims that error theory is not well justified in de‑ nying the existence of supernatural, queer objective values, but it does not make claims about the former. Hence, Daly’s and Liggins’ objections do not affect my argument.
Why Queerness is not Enough : Against Moral Eliminativism ply with. Empirical, a posteriori evidence would then be the right kind of ev‑ idence to support eliminativism in just the same way that experimental evi‑ dence in physics is the right kind of evidence to justify an error theory about phlogiston. The implications of such a move are significant. Firstly, this would not only make a posteriori evidence the right kind of evidence but also completely change the problem in question. Error theory is a theory about the truth and truth‑aptness of moral judgments. Yet, no matter whether the eliminativists see themselves as moral sceptics or agnostics, they cannot, by their own stand‑ ards , hope to learn much about the truth of moral judgments from empiri‑ cal research. The only question they can hope to solve empirically is whether or not the use of moral language does more harm than good (in a non‑mor‑ al sense). This question is relevant for the debate between fictionalism and eliminativism; it is not relevant for the debate about error theory. Embracing a conception of metaethics as an empirical disciprand thus makes eliminativ‑ ism lose its error theoretic underpinnings: it might save eliminativism, but it is not a reasonable option for an error theorist. This also means that – although eliminativists would not have to defend error theory anymore, which has al‑ ways been tedious – their theory would not have any answer to the question whether moral judgments are sometimes true, which significantly reduces the explanatory powers and philosophical richness of their views. The po‑ tential incompatibility between error theory and eliminativism is an impor‑ tant, overlooked, and uncomfortable implication for the eliminativists, yet it is unavoidable if they should choose to embrace a conception of metaethics as an empirical discipline. Moral fictionalism might be less affected by the argument of this paper because the consequences that it draws from error theory are less radical. Agnosticism might serve it well for its purposes. Most importantly, more‑ over, it does not beg the question the way eliminativism does through ar‑ guing for the abolition of metaethical discourse on a posteriori grounds. Nevertheless it might, of course, face other problems and be philosophical‑ ly unattractive for other reasons.^13 Thus, there is a tension between the metaphysical and the epistemolog‑ ical strands of the argument from queerness that threatens the ontological claim. The error theorist cannot reinforce the metaphysical argument be‑ cause such a reinforced argument is incompatible with her commitments to cognitivism. The only other option for the error theorist is to rely exclusive‑ ly on the epistemological argument and embrace an agnosticism about mor‑ al judgments. This means that moral error theory cannot establish a claim about the truth and falsehood of moral judgments. While this might be less (^13) See, for example, Joyce 2013, 2 ; Oddie & Demetriou 2010 ; Garner 2010.
David Kretz of a problem for the fictionalist, it will render any eliminativism based on moral error theory circular.^14 REFERENCES Daly, Chris & Liggins, David. 2010. „In defence of Error Theory“ in Philosophical Studies , (149). Dreier, Jamie. 2010. „Mackie’s Realism : Queer Pigs and the Web of Belief“ in A World Without Values , Eds. Joyce, Richard & Kirchin, Simon. Berlin : Springer. Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2011 „Are there uncontroversial error theories ?“ in Philosophical Pathways (162) Finlay, Stephen. 2008. „The Error in the Error Theory“ in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (86/3). <URL= http ://commonsenseatheism.com/wp‑content/ uploads/2009/09/Finlay‑The‑Error‑in‑the‑Error‑Theory.pdf> Finlay, Stephen. 2010. „Errors Upon Errors : A Reply to Joyce“ in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (89/3). Garner, Richard. 1990. „On the genuine queerness of moral properties and facts“ in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (68/2). Garner, Richard. 2010. „Abolishing Morality“ in A World Without Values , Eds. Joyce, Richard & Kirchin, Simon. Berlin : Springer. Garner, Richard. 2010b. „Morality, the Final Delusion ?“. <URL=http ://beyon‑ dmorality.com/morality‑the‑final‑delusion/>. Joyce, Richard. 2009. „Moral Anti‑Realism“ in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. Joyce, Richard. 2010. „Introduction“ in A World Without Values , Eds. Joyce, Richard & Kirchin, Simon. Berlin : Springer. Joyce, Richard. 2011. „The Error in ‘The Error in the Error Theory’“ in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (89/3). <URL=http ://www.victoria.ac.nz/ staff/richard_joyce/acrobat/joyce_error.in.the.error.theory.pdf Joyce, Richard. 2012. „Enough with the Errors! A final reply to Finlay“. Unpublished. <URL=http ://www.victoria.ac.nz/staff/richard_joyce/acro‑ bat/joyce_enough.with.the.errors.pdf> (^14) I would like to thank Velislava Mitova and Diana Plutis for invaluable, generous criticism. I profited greatly from debate and discussion at the 6th Conference of the Dutch‑Flemish Association for Analytic Philosophy for which I would like to thank the participants.
