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What is Religion? 185
we have any spiritual sense or any great hopes for the future of the nations, we ought to realize that Tennyson's way of letting the ape and tiger die, as expressed in the epithalamium with which he closes his "In Memoriam," is by no means the shortest way. The simpler and the swifter way in modern times, would be that of making room for nature's monks. Some of us may still embrace the doctrine of the great nineteenth century poet, who was all too sensitive to the materialism of his age. Some of us may still feel that the submissive animal within us is yet so strong, that the best things cannot be realities to us. But we ought to remember that the wisest Teacher whom the world has ever known said-"In the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven. He that is able to receive it, let him receive it."
M. E. ROBINSON.
LONDON.
WHAT IS RELIGION?
THF (^) divergent and contradictory uses of the word religion are due, one feels, not only to the difficulty of comprehending the nature of religion but also to the disposition of those who have written upon the subject to further an ulterior purpose by the definitions they propose. The Evangelical controversial- ist, for instance, seems bent on excluding by his definition what he calls the superstitions of man, or of sharply distinguishing between the so-called natural (^) religions and revealed (^) religion. The moralist seeks apparently to disparage the reputed influence of religion on conduct, and the thorough-going secularist to put religion in the way of inevitable extinction. When the sub- ject is approached, as at present, with a purely scientific inter- est, all such purposes of doctrinal and philosophical strategy must of course be relinquished. We cannot concern ourselves, either with the relative superiority of a particular form of re- ligion or even with the fate of religion itself. Our only legiti- mate purpose is to ascertain and express the truth. Although there cannot be two opinions with regard to the
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motive which ought to prompt an inquiry into the nature of religion, it may be said that, owing to the incompleteness of the sciences dealing with (^) the subject, the time has not yet come when an attempt to formulate a definition of religion should be made, or, indeed, can be made with a fair prospect of success. This is true so far as a final scientific definition (^) of religion is concerned. We must, indeed, await further progress in ethnographical (^) and psychological knowledge before we may hope to condense the quintessence of religion into a final defini- tion. Certainly the present writer has a far less ambitious pur- pose. The need of a more exact definition of religion than is commonly given is not confined, however, to sociology, ethnology, psychology or the philosophy of religion. The greatest demand is in the field of popular discussion, where the utmost confusion reigns in regard to the question of the sta- bility and permanence of religion, and its relation to science and morality. Now that the church statistics of the census of i900 are made public, the regular decennial debate upon the question of the growth or the decadence of religious interest will doubtless begin. The slightest improvement on current definitions of religion may therefore prove to be of some im- mediate popular value. The first step toward a clear understanding of religion is to distinguish carefully between religion and religions. Religion is the root, the source, the parent of religions. It bears about the same relation to the various religions as a genus to its species. A definition which applies only to one religion is no more a definition of religion than the definition of a particular person is a definition of the genus homo. This is so obvious that it is hard to understand why so many definitions are pre- sented which apply to nothing but Christianity. There is no religion which can be absolutely separated from all others, and a definition that is worth anything at all must apply to all forms of religion from the lowest to the highest. Current definitions of religion, especially those of a theolo- gical character, are usually expressed in terms of belief. Occa- sionally religion is defined in terms of feeling, and sometimes in terms of conduct or conation, but the popular idea is that re-
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form of belief. This narrows the scope of religion, and in an age of uncompromising criticism, stakes its life upon the accur- acy of an intellectual formula. For, considering the present state of knowledge, what formulated^ belief^ can be said to be absolutely permanent? None.^ To base religion^ upon belief, therefore, is to build the house of religion upon the sand, and when the rain descends, and the floods come, and the winds blow and beat upon it, what assurance can we have that it will not fall? To say of current definitions of religion, however, that they present it as an unstable and vanishing^ phenomenon^ is not necessarily to offer against them a fatal objection.^ The end or purpose of a definition, like that ascribed by Hamlet to playing, is "to hold, as 'twere, the mirror up to Nature." If the truth is reflected, that is all we can demand, whatever be the fate of the thing defined. But the quickest way, perhaps, to show that an error is involved in considering^ religion as a matter of belief is to point out some of the consequences of accepting the common definition. If we accept the definition,^ for instance, that religion is belief in one all-wise personal Being, we commit ourselves to the view that the great majority of the human race have lived without religion. For nothing is clearer to those who have any familiarity with the religious ideas of man- kind than that the belief in many gods has been far more preva- lent than the belief in one.^ Monotheism^ is a comparatively re- cent development in the history of^ religious^ thought.^ It^ is sometimes said, to be sure, that "all human beings have the idea of God,"* but this is a pleasant fiction invented for theological purposes. "There is no evidence," says Darwin, "that man was aboriginally endowed with the ennobling belief in the exist- ence of an Omnipotent God. On the contrary there is ample evidence, derived not from hasty travelers, but from men who have long resided with savages,^ that numerous races have ex- isted, and still exist, who have no idea of one or more gods, and who have no words in their languages to express such an idea."t Again, Sir John Lubbock, after citing a score or more *Outlook, December, i900, p. 9i9. t"Descent of Man" (HumboldtLibrary), p.^ 5I.
What is Religion? I
of illustrations to prove the point, says that "those who assert that even the lowest savages believe in a supreme Deity, affirm that which is entirely contrary to the evidence."* This is a different question, of course, from that of the universality of religion, with which we are not at present concerned. All we are now trying to show is that by defining religion as the be- lief in a Supreme Being we exclude from the category of relig- ious the vast majority of the human race. Not only do primi- tive religions fall outside of the definition, but also one of the world's great religions, namely Buddhism, which numbers more adherents than any other. Sir Monier Monier-Williams, the learned professor of Sanscrit at Oxford, does indeed de- clare that Buddhism is not a religion; but this surprising opin- ion must be due to his desire to be consistent, for he holds that "a religion, in the proper sense of the word, must postulate the existence of one living and true God of infinite power, wisdom and love, the Creator and Designer and Preserver of all things visible and invisible," and that it "must take for granted the immortality of man's soul or spirit." "Christianity," he as- serts, "is a religion, whereas Buddhism, at least in its earliest and truest form, is no religion at all."t If Buddhism is not a religion, pray what is it? Of what value is a definition of re- ligion which includes only Christianity? However convenient it may be for controversial purposes, it does not satisfy the re- quirements of science. If, instead of the belief in a Supreme Being, we accept the view that belief in immortality is identical with (^) religion, we are confronted by the same (^) difficulty. The idea of an un- ending future existence "does not belong to the lower forms of religion, but is a comparatively recent extension of the early idea of a future life."% Mr. John Fiske in the book entitled "Through Nature to God," does indeed assert that "belief in the Unseen world in which human beings continue to exist after death," is an indispensable element of religion, and he
*'"Prehistoric Times," p. 579. tQuoted by Dr. Carus, "Buddhism and its Christian Critics," p. 290. tProf. Lester F. Ward "Dvnanmic Sociology," Vol. 2, p. 280.
What is Religionf I
permanent. But many of the greatest thinkers have aband- oned this conception.* If the belief in immortality is suggested as one that is un- likely to pass away, we are confronted by the fact that some profound thinkers have ceased to hold it. Prof. (^) Haeckel, for instance, in his recent book on "The Riddle of the Universe," dismisses (^) this dogma as hopelessly inconsistent with the most solid (^) truths of science. When Giordano Bruno, whose love for the truth brought him to the stake three hundred years ago, faced his accusers, he was unsupported by either the belief in a personal deity or the belief in immortality. Must we say, then, that this martyr to the truth was (^) an irreligious man? Such must be our conclusion if we accept the idea that belief in immortality is essential to religion. A writer in the Con- temporary Review said, (^) some years ago, "If for any reason, mankind does, at any time cease to believe in its own immor- tality, then religion will also have ceased to exist as a part of the consciousness of humanity."t There is no need, however, for linking the fate of religion to belief (^) in immortality or to any other specific belief. Whatever (^) religion may be, no unprejudiced student of the subject will contend that it may properly be identified with the higher and derived beliefs, like the belief in a personal God or the belief in immortality. The necessity of some more general conception will at once be recognized. We find, (^) therefore, that the ethnographer, while defining (^) religion as belief, seeks the rudimentary and common form of belief from which all others may be derived, and identifies religion with that belief. We shall see, however, that the lower we descend among be- liefs for an inclusive definition of religion, the more precarious the situation of religion becomes. The broadest definition of religion (^) that has ever been given in terms of belief is that of Prof. Tylor, that is, the belief in
*"Dieu," (^) says De Greef, to quote but a single author, "est un personnage historique, susceptible de naissance, de croissance (^) et de mort, comnme les dieux, les fetiches et les (^) esprits en (^) general."-Introduction a la Soci- ologie, Tome 2, p. 2i8. tRev. T.^ W.^ Fowle, quoted by Professor Ward, "Dynamic (^) Sociology," II, (^) 253.
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Spiritual Beings. "The first requisite in a systematic (^) study of the religions of the lower races," he says, "is to lay down a rudimentary definition of religion. By requiring in this defi- nition the belief in a Supreme Deity or judgment after death, the adoration of idols or the practice of sacrifice, or other par- tially diffused doctrines or rites, no doubt many tribes may be excluded from the category of religious. But such narrow definition has the fault of identifying religion rather with par- ticular developments than with the deeper motive which under- lies them. It seems best to fall back at once on this essential source, and simply to claim as a minimum definition of religion, the belief in Spiritual Beings." This belief is supposed to be universal. "So far as I can judge from the immense mass of accessible evidence," says Prof. Tylor, "we have to admit that the belief in Spiritual Beings appears among all low races with whom we have attained a thoroughly intimate (^) acquaintance; whereas the assertion of (^) absence of (^) such belief must apply either to ancient tribes or to more or less imperfectly described modern ones."* (^) Prof. Tylor's definition leaves nothing to be desired, then, so far as inclusiveness is concerned. Like other definitions of religion in terms of a specific belief, however, it is fatal to the claim that religion is a permanent (^) reality. To realize the truth of this we have only to consider the evolution of modern religious beliefs. The study of the evolution of modern religious conceptions teaches plainly that they are the natural outgrowth of the primi- tive conception of Spiritual Beings. The montheistic conception of to-day, for instance, is logically related to polytheism, and is the result of a gradual integration of (^) the God-conception, as science has progressed toward the idea of a unitary cause. The orthodox theory of inspiration, to use another illustration, is the natural product of the primitive idea of souls and posses- sion. Hence religion, if it means primarily a belief, whether high or low, must stand or fall with the belief in (^) Spiritual Beings. Let us examine the validity of this belief. The belief in Spiritual Beings is derived from two sources.
*"Primitive Culture," Vol. I, pp. 424, 425.
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Indeed, it is even now contended that by the very nature of our intelligence we are bound to represent the cause of things in terms of ourselves.* Darwin, in opposition to Mr. (^) Spencer, thought that this personification of the causes of nature pre- ceded the belief in a double.-t (^) Here, then, are the two bases which support the belief in Spiritual Beings. Remove (^) these and religion, as defined by Mr. Tylor, falls to the ground. We have only to consider for a moment the effect of modern science upon these two ideas which support the belief in ques- tion, to appreciate the precarious condition of religion when it is regarded as the belief in Spiritual Beings. No modern psychologist, for instance, would accept the idea of a double to explain the phenomena of dreams, swoons, apoplexy, etc., nor does anyone now believe that the forces of nature may prop- erly be interpreted as invisible personal agencies. Prof. Ward in dismissing the idea of the first, or subjective, view of the origin of the belief in question, says, "Does the reflection of a man's face in a pool really indicate that the man possesses two faces, a bodily and a spiritual face? Does the shadow (^) that he casts, or the echo of his voice, really prove that he. has an immaterial double? Does a dream or a trance, in which an alibi is proved to the mind of the ignorant savage really demon- strate that his other self exists and has been wandering about, while all his friends declare that his proper self has remained in the same place? (^) Is there any fallacy by which, on this view, the (^) fundamental conception of religion has been arrived at? All will, of course, admit that the premises are utterly false in all these cases. If even the very root of the tree consists wholly of error, is it not reasonable to suppose that the branches and the fruit will (^) partake of the same nature?" And the same writer ends his inquiry in regard to the second or objective view, as follows: "Is the wind really an immaterial (^) spirit? Are the sun, moon and stars actual verities? Is the rainbow a goddess or a bridge connecting earth and heaven, or was it placed in the heavens by a Deity (^) as a covenant between him and man? (^) Are meteors 'excrements of dirty little star gods'?
*See Crozier, "'Civilizationand Progress," p. (^) 232. t"Descent of Man," (Humboldt Library), (^) p. 5i, footnote.
What is Religion? (^) I
Or is an eclipse a result of the defecation of the divine orb of day? Does the plant grow, or the tide ebb or flow, or rain descend or the lightning flash, in obedience to spiritual powers above, and outside of nature, having distinct personalities? All these phenomena are now satisfactorily explained on strictly natural principles. Among peoples acquainted with science, all such supernatural beings have been dispensed with, and the belief in them is declared to be false, and to always have been false."* Thus we see that Prof. Ward rejects the two ideas upon which the belief in Spiritual Beings is based, and it hardly will be denied that both are erroneous, and under the influence of scientific criticism have gradually crumbled away. What then becomes of religion as defined by Mr. Tylor? Ob- viously it is left without a support. Mr. Spencer does indeed try to save it by his favorite method of finding a "soul of truth in things erroneous." Like Prof. Ward, he discards both the idea of a double and the idea of invisible personal agencies^ in nature, but "at the outset," he says, "a germ of truth was con- tained in the primitive conception-the truth, namely, that the power that manifests itself in consciousness is but a differently conditioned form of the power that manifests itself beyond con- sciousness."t As he does not interpret this power in terms of personality, however, he does not save religion as the belief in Spiritual Beings. Incidentally we may remark that in the idea that religion is a form of belief we have an explanation of the supposed con- flict between science and religion, and of the confidence ex- pressed by some writers in the present decay and final disap- pearance of^ religion. Regarding religion as belief,^ and wit- nessing the destructive effects^ of^ scientific^ criticism^ in every department of knowledge, many thinkers have regretfully, or gleefully, acknowledged that religion must decrease as science increases, and that there will come a time when religion will have entirely disappeared.^ "The^ progress^ of^ religion,"^ says De Greef, "is in the reduction^ of religion to an absurdity.":
*"Dynamic Sociology," Vol.^ 2,^ pp.^ 266,^ 268-9. t"Principles of Sociology," Vol. 3, pp.^ I70-I. i"Introduction a la Sociologie," Tome^ 2,^ p.^ 208.
What is Religionf (^197)
primitive, and all mankind, however enlightened, have univer- sally recognized. This fact is that there is a power outside of themselves which is beyond their control. Rude peoples, liv- ing as they always do, in direct contact with (^) nature, are con- stantly brought into relationship with this power and made to feel much more strongly than do civilized races their complete subjection to it." To the primitive man, therefore, the world is full of mysteries. He perceives that there is something be- yond himself which acts as a cause. He believes, therefore, in the existence of a powerful and mysterious something. What this something is he knows not, but that is one of the first questions for which he sought an answer. (^) The earliest philosopher provided him with a theory, and that theory was the existence of invisible, humanlike agencies. This interpre- tation, however, was not religion but philosophy. Religion was the antecedent phenomenon. Thus, man was religious prior to the formulation of a specific belief in Spiritual Beings. He recognized vaguely and (^) indefinitely a (^) mysterious power in nature before any definite theory was formulated concerning it. Beyond this vague recognition or perception of a mysterious power in the world, it is impossible to trace religious belief. The element of belief, or perception, then, is at the beginning of religion, as a specific belief in Spiritual Beings is at the be- ginning of theology. The final element in an analysis of re- ligious beliefs, whether of the individual or of the race, is a perception in the individual consciousness of an unknown power or powers operating in nature. Are those writers correct, then, who define religion, not as a specific belief, but as a mere perception of the Infinite, or the "perception of^ man's^ relation^ to^ the^ principles of the uni- verse" ?t We do not think so. (^) Perception is not the only ele- ment in religion. Let us proceed to inquire what other ele- ments are revealed by an analysis of religion. It will generally be admitted, perhaps, that the very word
*Among those who have defined religion as perception are Max Muller and (^) Jevons. Shelley, in his notes to "Queen Mab," defined it as "percep- tion of the relation^ in which we stand to the principle of the universe." Vol. XIII.-No. (^2 )
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religion implies (^) restraint upon conduct, and the direction of individual activities. A religious man must be to some ex- tent guided by his religion. He must needs have "scruples." This is illustrated in all religions, from the primitive forms which induce sacrifices and obedience to the will of the gods, to (^) Christianity, which authoritatively declares, for instance, that "If^ any man thinketh himself to be religious, while he bridleth not his tongue but deceiveth his heart, this man's re- ligion is vain."* And it is illustrated as well in the individual, for who could properly be called religious who does not act to some extent in accordance with the principles of his religion? Prof, Lester F. Ward, in a profound article on the "Essential Nature of Religion,"t and Mr. Henry Rutgers Marshall, in his book on "Instinct and Reason,?" which is mainly devoted to re- ligion, bring out with great clearness and power this feature of religion and pronounce it its characteristic element. Prof. Ward's thesis is that "religion is a substitute in the rational world for instinct in the subrational world." "In- stinct," he says, "may be looked upon as a device of nature to make the organism desire to perform acts that subserve func- tion, but which would not otherwise be desired." So religion is a device to restrain the individual from activities harmful to the race and to direct him to the performance of safe ones. In tracing the development of organisms from the lowest (^) forms to man, he finds that there have been, at least, three critical periods when the existence^ of organisms was threatened. "The first of these was when plastic organisms were created, en- dowed with locomotion, and dependent for subsistence upon organic matter, the condition to the existence of (^) which was feeling.^.^.^.^ This^ was^ the origin of mind. The sec- ond ordeal was when (^) the will had so strongly asserted itself that existence was put in jeopardy. This was remedied by the development of instincts. Passing over minor ones, we come at last to an ordeal still more severe than any of the previous ones. In the natural (^) upward march (^) of the psychic faculty feeling became at length so potent and its demands so impera- *Jas. I: 26. tINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF^ ETHICS, January, (^) i898.
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to the treatment of religion in Mr. Marshall's book. After (^) a long but (^) inconclusive argument to show that religion is in- stinctive, he concludes by defining religion as a suppression of our fallible wills to what we conceive of as a higher will. "Under my view," he says, "what is here called the suppression of our will to the higher will, may be expressed in psychologi- cal terms as the restraint of the individualistic (^) impulses to racial ones; that such restraint has effect upon the moral char- acter being, of course, granted. This restraint seems to me to be of the very essence of religion. The belief in the Deity, as usually found being from the psychological view an attach- ment to, rather than of the essence of, the religious feeling; and this, (^) whether as me-taphysicians we may or may not be com- pelled to the belief in this Absolute Deity."* In another pas- sage he speaks of this restraint as "the very core and essence of religious functioning." Undoubtedly both Prof. Ward and Mr. Marshall are correct in assigning to religion the element of restraint, (^) or, viewed positively, a directive power in human action; but in the final analysis this element is merely restraint and not social restraint. Social restraint (^) does not appear until the social group, or its leader, becomes conscious of the value of religion as an instru- ment of restraint and a means of securing from the individual socially (^) beneficial activities. It is, therefore, highly probable from the available evidence that religion arose not as a social, but as a psychological necessity. As a spontaneous variation in the character of the individual it may not have been an ad- vantage to him, but the incipient social mind soon perceived its possibilities as a social instrument and preserved it as such. (^) If the primitive individual, thrown into an environment of mani- festations of a mysterious power, perceives the existence of such a power, and realizes his dependence (^) upon it, and strives to propitiate it, he becomes religious (^) whether the activities fol- lowing from his religion are socially beneficial or not, Prob- ably many individuals and many groups were extinguished by their undirected religious activities before a consciousness of the social value of religion arose. Natural (^) selection of indi-
*"Insinct and Reason," p. 329.
What is Religion? 201
viduals and of social groups would alone in time adapt relig- iotus functioning to social survival. But it is doubtless true, as Prof. Ward suggests, that religion as a social phenomenon was the product of both natural selection and reason. The point to be noticed here, however, is that the origin of religion is independent of its social value. Its appearance in the world is an individual phnomenon; its persistence, a social one. Religion, then, cannot be correctly defined as a particular form of restraint, any more than it can be correctly defined as a particular form of belief. It is not "being good and doing good," as Dr. Chalmers asserted, nor "loving obedience to God's commandments," as Dr. Deems used to say, nor "moral- ity touched with emotion," as Matthew Arnold defined it. Re- ligion and morality are two genetically distinct phenomena. "Religion," says Mr. John Fiske, "views the individual in his relations to the Infinite Power manifested in a universe of casually connected phenomena, as Morality views him in his relation to his fellow-creatures."* Prof. Tylor tells us that "The relation of morality to religion is one that only belongs in its rudiments, or not at all, to rudimentary civilization." And again he says, "One great element of religion, the moral element, which among the higher nations forms its most vital part, is indeed little represented in the religion of the lower races."t And Mr. J. Deniker in his "Races of Man," (p. 220) declares that "Animistic religion is destitute of a moral ele- ment, which many persons consider inseparable from religion." : Morality implies not merely restraint, but social and conven- tional restraint, and may be based upon pubilc opinion and social conventions as well as upon religious beliefs. As Mr. John Fiske somewhere says, the reason why religion and moral-
*Cosmic Philosophy," Vol. 2, p. 357. t"Primitive Culture, Vol. 2, pp. 326-427. tThe separate origin of religion and morality is, of course. not gener- ally admitted. Pfleiderer, for instance, denies that they stood originally in no connection with each other. "It is an (^) incontrovertible fact," (^) he says, "that the primitive (^) morality stands in very close connection with the primitive religion."-"Philosophy and Development of Religion," Vol. (^) s, Chap. 2.^ On a question of this kind, however, the opinion of an eth- nographer is more valuable than that of a theologian.
What is Religion? (^) 203.
pulse, are questions of psychology. It is to this science, and not to theology or ethnology, therefore, that we must look for a final definition of religion. The final word, however, on the nature of consciousness has not been said. But there seems to be a consensus of opinion among the later psychologists on one point, namely, that it is impossible to break up the individual consciousness into the two or three wholly separate processes of (^) knowing, feeling and willing. "The psychic life," says Ribot, "is a continuity beginning with sensation and ending with movement,"* and this assertion is the working hypothesis and keynote of the new psychology. From sensation to per- ception, perception to the higher phases of knowledge, and knowledge to action there is no break, and feeling is an inevit- able accompaniment of all. If this is true, if it is true that the religious consciousness is a unity embracing knowledge, feel- ing and the tendency to act, it does not seem that we ought to identify religion with any one of these mental phenomena. "To speak of any whole manifestation of life," says Prof. Leuba, "as being in its 'essential' nature intellectual or affective or volitional, is to misconstrue the facts, for, although it is ad- mitted that any expression of conscious life can be analyzed into its successive moments (sensation, reflective ideation, de- sires, impulses, will's determination, etc.,) and that one or the other of these constituents can be at times preponderantly present to the subject's consciousness, it does by no means fol- low that that particular pulse of life is an idea, or a volition, or a feeling, or that one or the other of these part-processes can properly be looked upon as the essential nature of the whole. A time sequence may exist, and as a matter of fact, does exist: volition (^) follows upon sensation and ideation. But this fact does not constitute volition the essence of psychic life."t Psychology thus seems to estop us from identifying religion with the perceptive, the affective or the conative element, and to demand a form of (^) definition which will include them all. Such a demand may be met, perhaps, by defining religion in
*"German Psychology of To-day," p. 7. t"Introduction to a Psychological Study of^ Religion," The Monist, (^) Jan- uary, (^) i9oi.
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terms of desire. Desire plainly implies both perception and feeling, and where these are present, action follows, for all mental states produce bodily activity of some sort. If it is considered that there might^ be a religious^ desire the influence of which would fall short^ of^ producing^ what^ is usually^ re- garded as religious activity, the defect may possibly be reme- died by the use of the word effective. A desire which produces religious activity may be called an effective desire. Religion, then, may be defined in terms of effective desire. But desire for what? We have, already, referred to the universal perception of a power not ourselves, which perception lies at the basis of all specific religious beliefs. This power is the objective factor in religion. The conscious recognition of this objective factor, the feel- ing of dependence upon it and the resultant activity^ are the in- dispensable elements of religion. What this^ objective^ factor or power is called is not of primary importance. That is a matter of intellectual interpretation. To the primitive man it is ghosts, to the modern theologian it is a personal God, and to the evolutionary philosopher it is "an Infinite and Eternal Energy." All philosophy from the crude explanations of the savage to the profoundest Welt-anschauung of the modern savant is but a series of partial interpretations, and no one can say what the final world-conception or God-idea will be. A definition of religion, therefore, should^ offer^ no^ interpreta- tion of this universal power. Given the perception of a power manifesting itself in the world, and a feeling of dependence upon it, an inevitable result will be the desire of the individual to be in right or personally advantageous relations^ to^ that^ power.^ Conscious^ religious activity is always in obedience to this desire.^ What^ is sacri- fice, fasting, prayer, and all the other forms of propitiation, but the effort of men to put themselves in right relation to the power which they apprehend, but do not comprehend?^ The desire of religion, therefore, is a desire for rightness, for ad- justment to the universal order, for harmonious^ relations with a power objectively conceived.
