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646 OCTOBER TERM, 1994
Syllabus
VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J v. ACTON et ux., guardians ad litem for ACTON
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 94–590. Argued March 28, 1995—Decided June 26, 1995
Motivated by the discovery that athletes were leaders in the student drug culture and concern that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury, petitioner school district (District) adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy (Policy), which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of students who participate in its athletics programs. Respondent Acton was denied participation in his school’s football program when he and his parents (also respondents) refused to consent to the testing. They then filed this suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the Policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend- ments and the Oregon Constitution. The District Court denied the claims, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Policy vio- lated both the Federal and State Constitutions. Held: The Policy is constitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 652–666. (a) State-compelled collection and testing of urine constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 617. Where there was no clear prac- tice, either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted, the “reasonableness” of a search is judged by balancing the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Pp. 652–654. (b) The first factor to be considered in determining reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest on which the search intrudes. Here, the subjects of the Policy are children who have been committed to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster; in that capacity, the State may exercise a degree of supervision and control greater than it could exercise over free adults. The requirements that public school children submit to physical examinations and be vaccinated indicate that they have a lesser privacy expectation with regard to medical examina- tions and procedures than the general population. Student athletes have even less of a legitimate privacy expectation, for an element of communal undress is inherent in athletic participation, and athletes are
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Cite as: 515 U. S. 646 (1995) 647
Syllabus
subject to preseason physical exams and rules regulating their con- duct. Pp. 654–657. (c) The privacy interests compromised by the process of obtaining urine samples under the Policy are negligible, since the conditions of collection are nearly identical to those typically encountered in public restrooms. In addition, the tests look only for standard drugs, not medical conditions, and the results are released to a limited group. Pp. 658–660. (d) The nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue, and the efficacy of this means for meeting it, also favor a finding of reasonableness. The importance of deterring drug use by all this Nation’s schoolchildren cannot be doubted. Moreover, the Policy is di- rected more narrowly to drug use by athletes, where the risk of physical harm to the user and other players is high. The District Court’s conclu- sion that the District’s concerns were immediate is not clearly errone- ous, and it is self-evident that a drug problem largely caused by athletes, and of particular danger to athletes, is effectively addressed by ensuring that athletes do not use drugs. The Fourth Amendment does not re- quire that the “least intrusive” search be conducted, so respondents’ argument that the drug testing could be based on suspicion of drug use, if true, would not be fatal; and that alternative entails its own substan- tial difficulties. Pp. 660–664.
23 F. 3d 1514, vacated and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Gins- burg, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 666. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Souter, JJ., joined, post, p. 666.
Timothy R. Volpert argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Claudia Larkins. Richard H. Seamon argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Leon- ard Schaitman, and Edward Himmelfarb.
Cite as: 515 U. S. 646 (1995) 649
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Between 1988 and 1989 the number of disciplinary referrals in Vernonia schools rose to more than twice the number reported in the early 1980’s, and several students were suspended. Students became increasingly rude during class; outbursts of profane language became common. Not only were student athletes included among the drug users but, as the District Court found, athletes were the leaders of the drug culture. 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (Ore. 1992). This caused the District’s administrators particular concern, since drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Expert testimony at the trial confirmed the delete- rious effects of drugs on motivation, memory, judgment, re- action, coordination, and performance. The high school foot- ball and wrestling coach witnessed a severe sternum injury suffered by a wrestler, and various omissions of safety proce- dures and misexecutions by football players, all attributable in his belief to the effects of drug use. Initially, the District responded to the drug problem by offering special classes, speakers, and presentations de- signed to deter drug use. It even brought in a specially trained dog to detect drugs, but the drug problem persisted. According to the District Court:
“[T]he administration was at its wits end and... a large segment of the student body, particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion. Disciplinary actions had reached ‘epidemic proportions.’ The coincidence of an almost three-fold increase in class- room disruptions and disciplinary reports along with the staff ’s direct observations of students using drugs or glamorizing drug and alcohol use led the administration to the inescapable conclusion that the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as the student’s misperceptions about the drug culture.” Ibid.
At that point, District officials began considering a drug- testing program. They held a parent “input night” to dis-
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cuss the proposed Student Athlete Drug Policy (Policy), and the parents in attendance gave their unanimous approval. The school board approved the Policy for implementation in the fall of 1989. Its expressed purpose is to prevent student athletes from using drugs, to protect their health and safety, and to provide drug users with assistance programs.
B The Policy applies to all students participating in inter- scholastic athletics. Students wishing to play sports must sign a form consenting to the testing and must obtain the written consent of their parents. Athletes are tested at the beginning of the season for their sport. In addition, once each week of the season the names of the athletes are placed in a “pool” from which a student, with the supervision of two adults, blindly draws the names of 10% of the athletes for random testing. Those selected are notified and tested that same day, if possible. The student to be tested completes a specimen control form which bears an assigned number. Prescription medi- cations that the student is taking must be identified by pro- viding a copy of the prescription or a doctor’s authorization. The student then enters an empty locker room accompanied by an adult monitor of the same sex. Each boy selected produces a sample at a urinal, remaining fully clothed with his back to the monitor, who stands approximately 12 to 15 feet behind the student. Monitors may (though do not al- ways) watch the student while he produces the sample, and they listen for normal sounds of urination. Girls produce samples in an enclosed bathroom stall, so that they can be heard but not observed. After the sample is produced, it is given to the monitor, who checks it for temperature and tampering and then transfers it to a vial. The samples are sent to an independent laboratory, which routinely tests them for amphetamines, cocaine, and mari- juana. Other drugs, such as LSD, may be screened at the
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gon Constitution. After a bench trial, the District Court entered an order denying the claims on the merits and dismissing the action. 796 F. Supp., at 1355. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, hold- ing that the Policy violated both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, § 9, of the Oregon Constitution. 23 F. 3d 1514 (1994). We granted certiorari. 513 U. S. 1013 (1994). II The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the Federal Government shall not violate “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures... .” We have held that the Fourteenth Amend- ment extends this constitutional guarantee to searches and seizures by state officers, Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 213 (1960), including public school officials, New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 336–337 (1985). In Skinner v. Rail- way Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 617 (1989), we held that state-compelled collection and testing of urine, such as that required by the Policy, constitutes a “search” subject to the demands of the Fourth Amendment. See also Treas- ury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656, 665 (1989). As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ulti- mate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is “reasonableness.” At least in a case such as this, where there was no clear practice, either approving or disap- proving the type of search at issue, at the time the constitu- tional provision was enacted, 1 whether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard “ ‘is judged by balancing
(^1) Not until 1852 did Massachusetts, the pioneer in the “common school” movement, enact a compulsory school-attendance law, and as late as the 1870’s only 14 States had such laws. R. Butts, Public Education in the United States From Revolution to Reform 102–103 (1978); 1 Children and Youth in America 467–468 (R. Bremner ed. 1970). The drug problem, and the technology of drug testing, are of course even more recent.
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its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ” Skinner, supra, at 619 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 (1979)). Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrong- doing, this Court has said that reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant, Skinner, supra, at 619. Warrants cannot be issued, of course, without the showing of probable cause required by the Warrant Clause. But a warrant is not required to establish the reasonableness of all government searches; and when a warrant is not re- quired (and the Warrant Clause therefore not applicable), probable cause is not invariably required either. A search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional, we have said, “when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause re- quirement impracticable.” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 873 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have found such “special needs” to exist in the public school context. There, the warrant requirement “would un- duly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and infor- mal disciplinary procedures [that are] needed,” and “strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause” would undercut “the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools.” T. L. O., 469 U. S., at 340, 341. The school search we approved in T. L. O., while not based on probable cause, was based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. As we explicitly acknowledged, however, “ ‘the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such sus- picion,’ ” id., at 342, n. 8 (quoting United States v. Martinez- Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 560–561 (1976)). We have upheld sus- picionless searches and seizures to conduct drug testing of railroad personnel involved in train accidents, see Skinner, supra; to conduct random drug testing of federal customs officers who carry arms or are involved in drug interdiction,
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ter is the very prototype of that status. As Blackstone de- scribes it, a parent “may... delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.” 1 W. Blackstone, Com- mentaries on the Laws of England 441 (1769). In T. L. O. we rejected the notion that public schools, like private schools, exercise only parental power over their stu- dents, which of course is not subject to constitutional con- straints. 469 U. S., at 336. Such a view of things, we said, “is not entirely ‘consonant with compulsory education laws,’ ” ibid. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 662 (1977)), and is inconsistent with our prior decisions treating school officials as state actors for purposes of the Due Process and Free Speech Clauses, T. L. O., supra, at 336. But while de- nying that the State’s power over schoolchildren is formally no more than the delegated power of their parents, T. L. O. did not deny, but indeed emphasized, that the nature of that power is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of super- vision and control that could not be exercised over free adults. “[A] proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult.” 469 U. S., at 339. While we do not, of course, suggest that public schools as a general matter have such a degree of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional “duty to protect,” see DeShaney v. Winne- bago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U. S. 189, 200 (1989), we have acknowledged that for many purposes “school au- thorities ac[t] in loco parentis, ” Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 684 (1986), with the power and in- deed the duty to “inculcate the habits and manners of civil- ity,” id., at 681 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, while children assuredly do not “shed their constitutional
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rights... at the schoolhouse gate,” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969), the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school. See, e. g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 581–582 (1975) (due process for a student challenging discipli- nary suspension requires only that the teacher “informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred”); Fraser, supra, at 683 (“[I]t is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse”); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260, 273 (1988) (public school authorities may censor school-sponsored publications, so long as the censorship is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”); Ingraham, supra, at 682 (“Imposing additional administrative safeguards [upon corporal punishment]... would... entail a significant intru- sion into an area of primary educational responsibility”). Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Four- teenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere; the “reasonableness” inquiry cannot disre- gard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children. For their own good and that of their classmates, public school children are routinely required to submit to various physical examinations, and to be vaccinated against various diseases. According to the American Academy of Pediatrics, most public schools “provide vision and hearing screening and dental and dermatological checks.... Others also mandate scoliosis screening at appropriate grade lev- els.” Committee on School Health, American Academy of Pediatrics, School Health: A Guide for Health Professionals 2 (1987). In the 1991–1992 school year, all 50 States re- quired public school students to be vaccinated against diph- theria, measles, rubella, and polio. U. S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, State Immunization Requirements 1991–1992, p. 1. Particularly with regard to medical examinations and proce-
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IV Having considered the scope of the legitimate expectation of privacy at issue here, we turn next to the character of the intrusion that is complained of. We recognized in Skinner that collecting the samples for urinalysis intrudes upon “an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy.” 489 U. S., at 626. We noted, however, that the degree of intrusion depends upon the manner in which production of the urine sample is monitored. Ibid. Under the District’s Policy, male students produce samples at a urinal along a wall. They remain fully clothed and are only observed from behind, if at all. Female students produce samples in an enclosed stall, with a female monitor standing outside listen- ing only for sounds of tampering. These conditions are nearly identical to those typically encountered in public rest- rooms, which men, women, and especially schoolchildren use daily. Under such conditions, the privacy interests compro- mised by the process of obtaining the urine sample are in our view negligible. The other privacy-invasive aspect of urinalysis is, of course, the information it discloses concerning the state of the subject’s body, and the materials he has ingested. In this regard it is significant that the tests at issue here look only for drugs, and not for whether the student is, for exam- ple, epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. See id., at 617. More- over, the drugs for which the samples are screened are standard, and do not vary according to the identity of the student. And finally, the results of the tests are disclosed only to a limited class of school personnel who have a need to know; and they are not turned over to law enforcement authorities or used for any internal disciplinary function. 796 F. Supp., at 1364; see also 23 F. 3d, at 1521. 2
(^2) Despite the fact that, like routine school physicals and vaccinations— which the dissent apparently finds unobjectionable even though they “are both blanket searches of a sort,” post, at 682—the search here is under- taken for prophylactic and distinctly non punitive purposes (protecting
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Respondents argue, however, that the District’s Policy is in fact more intrusive than this suggests, because it requires the students, if they are to avoid sanctions for a falsely posi- tive test, to identify in advance prescription medications they are taking. We agree that this raises some cause for concern. In Von Raab, we flagged as one of the salutary features of the Customs Service drug-testing program the fact that employees were not required to disclose medical information unless they tested positive, and, even then, the information was supplied to a licensed physician rather than to the Government employer. See Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 672–673, n. 2. On the other hand, we have never indicated that requiring advance disclosure of medications is per se unreasonable. Indeed, in Skinner we held that it was not “a significant invasion of privacy.” 489 U. S., at 626, n. 7. It can be argued that, in Skinner, the disclosure went only to the medical personnel taking the sample, and the Govern- ment personnel analyzing it, see id., at 609, but see id., at 610 (railroad personnel responsible for forwarding the sam- ple, and presumably accompanying information, to the Gov- ernment’s testing lab); and that disclosure to teachers and coaches—to persons who personally know the student—is a greater invasion of privacy. Assuming for the sake of argu-
student athletes from injury, and deterring drug use in the student popula- tion), see 796 F. Supp., at 1363, the dissent would nonetheless lump this search together with “evidentiary” searches, which generally require probable cause, see supra, at 653, because, from the student’s perspective, the test may be “regarded” or “understood” as punishment, post, at 683–
- In light of the District Court’s findings regarding the purposes and consequences of the testing, any such perception is by definition an irratio- nal one, which is protected nowhere else in the law. In any event, our point is not, as the dissent apparently believes, post, at 682–683, that since student vaccinations and physical exams are constitutionally reasonable, student drug testing must be so as well; but rather that, by reason of those prevalent practices, public school children in general, and student athletes in particular, have a diminished expectation of privacy. See supra, at 656–657.
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terest in ensuring fitness of customs officials to interdict drugs and handle firearms). Relying on these cases, the District Court held that because the District’s program also called for drug testing in the absence of individualized suspi- cion, the District “must demonstrate a ‘compelling need’ for the program.” 796 F. Supp., at 1363. The Court of Appeals appears to have agreed with this view. See 23 F. 3d, at
- It is a mistake, however, to think that the phrase “compelling state interest,” in the Fourth Amendment con- text, describes a fixed, minimum quantum of governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case by answering in isolation the question: Is there a compelling state interest here? Rather, the phrase describes an interest that appears important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy. Whether that relatively high degree of government concern is neces- sary in this case or not, we think it is met. That the nature of the concern is important—indeed, per- haps compelling—can hardly be doubted. Deterring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren is at least as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation’s laws against the importation of drugs, which was the governmental con- cern in Von Raab, supra, at 668, or deterring drug use by engineers and trainmen, which was the governmental con- cern in Skinner, supra, at 628. School years are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe. “Maturing nervous systems are more critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are; childhood losses in learning are lifelong and profound”; “chil- dren grow chemically dependent more quickly than adults, and their record of recovery is depressingly poor.” Hawley, The Bumpy Road to Drug-Free Schools, 72 Phi Delta Kap- pan 310, 314 (1990). See also Estroff, Schwartz, & Hoff- mann, Adolescent Cocaine Abuse: Addictive Potential, Be- havioral and Psychiatric Effects, 28 Clinical Pediatrics 550
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(Dec. 1989); Kandel, Davies, Karus, & Yamaguchi, The Con- sequences in Young Adulthood of Adolescent Drug Involve- ment, 43 Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 746 (Aug. 1986). And of course the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational process is disrupted. In the pres- ent case, moreover, the necessity for the State to act is mag- nified by the fact that this evil is being visited not just upon individuals at large, but upon children for whom it has under- taken a special responsibility of care and direction. Finally, it must not be lost sight of that this program is directed more narrowly to drug use by school athletes, where the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly high. Apart from psychological effects, which include impairment of judg- ment, slow reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain, the particular drugs screened by the District’s Policy have been demonstrated to pose substantial physical risks to athletes. Amphetamines produce an “artificially induced heart rate increase, [p]eripheral vasoconstriction, [b]lood pressure increase, and [m]asking of the normal fatigue re- sponse,” making them a “very dangerous drug when used during exercise of any type.” Hawkins, Drugs and Other Ingesta: Effects on Athletic Performance, in H. Appenzeller, Managing Sports and Risk Management Strategies 90, 90– (1993). Marijuana causes “[i]rregular blood pressure re- sponses during changes in body position,” “[r]eduction in the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood,” and “[i]nhibition of the normal sweating responses resulting in increased body temperature.” Id., at 94. Cocaine produces “[v]asocon- striction[,] [e]levated blood pressure,” and “[p]ossible coro- nary artery spasms and myocardial infarction.” Ibid. As for the immediacy of the District’s concerns: We are not inclined to question—indeed, we could not possibly find clearly erroneous—the District Court’s conclusion that “a large segment of the student body, particularly those in-
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testing is imposed. And not least of all, it adds to the ever- expanding diversionary duties of schoolteachers the new function of spotting and bringing to account drug abuse, a task for which they are ill prepared, and which is not readily compatible with their vocation. Cf. Skinner, supra, at 628 (quoting 50 Fed. Reg. 31526 (1985)) (a drug impaired individ- ual “will seldom display any outward ‘signs detectable by the lay person or, in many cases, even the physician’ ”); Goss, 419 U. S., at 594 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“There is an ongoing relationship, one in which the teacher must occupy many roles—educator, adviser, friend, and, at times, parent- substitute. It is rarely adversary in nature.. .”) (footnote omitted). In many respects, we think, testing based on “suspicion” of drug use would not be better, but worse. 3
VI Taking into account all the factors we have considered above—the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative un- obtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met
(^3) There is no basis for the dissent’s insinuation that in upholding the District’s Policy we are equating the Fourth Amendment status of school- children and prisoners, who, the dissent asserts, may have what it calls the “categorical protection” of a “strong preference for an individualized suspicion requirement,” post, at 681. The case on which it relies for that proposition, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), displays no stronger a preference for individualized suspicion than we do today. It reiter- ates the proposition on which we rely, that “ ‘elaborate less-restrictive- alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers.’ ” Id., at 559, n. 40 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 556–557, n. 12 (1976)). Even Wolfish ’s arguendo “assum[ption] that the existence of less intrusive alternatives is relevant to the determination of the reasonableness of the particular search method at issue,” 441 U. S., at 559, n. 40, does not support the dissent, for the opinion ultimately rejected the hypothesized alterna- tive (as we do) on the ground that it would impair other policies important to the institution. See id., at 560, n. 40 (monitoring of visits instead of conducting body searches would destroy “the confidentiality and intimacy that these visits are intended to afford”).
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by the search—we conclude Vernonia’s Policy is reasonable and hence constitutional. We caution against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other con- texts. The most significant element in this case is the first we discussed: that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government’s responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care.^4 Just as when the government conducts a search in its capacity as employer (a warrantless search of an absent employee’s desk to obtain an urgently needed file, for exam- ple), the relevant question is whether that intrusion upon privacy is one that a reasonable employer might engage in, see O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709 (1987); so also when the government acts as guardian and tutor the relevant question is whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake. Given the findings of need made by the District Court, we conclude that in the present case it is. We may note that the primary guardians of Vernonia’s schoolchildren appear to agree. The record shows no objec- tion to this districtwide program by any parents other than the couple before us here—even though, as we have de- scribed, a public meeting was held to obtain parents’ views. We find insufficient basis to contradict the judgment of Ver- nonia’s parents, its school board, and the District Court, as to what was reasonably in the interest of these children under the circumstances.
(^4) The dissent devotes a few meager paragraphs of its 21 pages to this central aspect of the testing program, see post, at 680–682, in the course of which it shows none of the interest in the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment displayed elsewhere in the opinion, see post, at 669–671. Of course at the time of the framing, as well as at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, children had substantially fewer “rights” than legislatures and courts confer upon them today. See 1 D. Kramer, Legal Rights of Children § 1.02, p. 9 (2d ed. 1994); Wald, Children’s Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U. C. D. L. Rev. 255, 256 (1979).
