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The potential use of air power in UN peacekeeping operations, focusing on the benefits and practical considerations. With the increasing complexity and number of peacekeeping missions, US policymakers are exploring the role of air power to enhance the capabilities of UN forces. The document also touches upon the historical background of peacekeeping and the limitations of using force in these operations.
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THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES, MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, ACADEMIC YEAR 1992–93.
Air University Press 401 Chennault Circle Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-
June 1994
This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views ex- pressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government.
This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release.
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Abstract
In the aftermath of the cold war, the world is witnessing a dramatic increase in regional conflict and associated United Nations peacekeeping operations. Recogniz ing this trend and the fact that peacekeeping can serve US national security inter ests, US policymakers have earmarked military peacekeeping involvement, the employment of air power will be a natural consideration. Unfortunately, there is little practical or doctrinal guidance outlining the benefits and limitations of air power within the peacekeeping paradigm. To remedy this situation, this study first provides a general discussion of peacekeeping and constructs a comprehensive framework to categorize and analyze the role of air power in peacekeeping. Next, several recommendations are presented concerning command and control, doctrine, and organizational issues. In the end, this study concludes that the role of air power in peacekeeping is primarily auxiliary. Nevertheless, among the potential US contri butions to UN peacekeeping, air power may be the best medium as it offers capabili ties different from those currently available to UN forces. Moreover, the use of air power, as opposed to ground peacekeeping forces, will reduce the risk to American lives. Finally, the expanded use of air power in UN peacekeeping presents an oppor tunity to demonstrate US leadership and resolve while avoiding the perception of dominating the show.
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About the Author
Maj (Lieutenant Colonel select) Brooks L. Bash (BS, USAF Academy; MS, Central Michigan University; MA, Naval War College) is an Air Force senior pilot with nearly 5,000 hours of experience in the C-141. A recent graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, he is assigned to Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base (AFB), Illinois. An honor graduate of the Naval Command and Staff College, his previous assignments include Prime Nuclear Airlift Force program manager at Travis AFB, California; Air Staff Training (ASTRA) officer at The Penta gon; C-141 Standardization and Evaluation pilot at McGuire AFB, New Jersey.
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Introduction
The United States is ready to do its part to strengthen world peace by strengthening international peacekeeping. For decades the American military has served as a stabi lizing presence around the globe. And I want to draw on our extensive experience in winning wars and keeping the peace to support U. N. peacekeeping. —President George Bush Address to the UN General Assembly 21 September 1992
A repercussion of the collapse of Communism is a dramatic increase in regional conflicts and associated United Nations (UN) peacekeeping opera- tions.^1 Since the beginning of 1992 new peacekeeping missions were created in the Balkans, Cambodia, Somalia and Mozambique. Indeed, during the past four years more peacekeeping operations were created than in the previous 43-year history of the United Nations.^2 During the zero-sum game of the cold war, the superpowers were reluctant to provide direct support of peacekeep ing operations as their respective efforts would automatically arouse suspi cion and mistrust of nonaligned powers.^3 In fact, during the first 45 years of the UN there were 279 vetoes in the Security Council, yet there have been none in the past three years.^4 Recognizing this postcold war opportunity and the prospect that peacekeep ing can serve US national security interests, President Bush ordered greater peacekeeping efforts: “I have directed the United States Secretary of Defense to place a new emphasis on peacekeeping.”^5 Unfortunately, the United States has little operational experience in peacekeeping, and a current dilemma is to determine the role of US military forces in general and specifically air power. The air power debate concerning the Bosnia quagmire has brought recent attention to air power, but there are several fundamental changes in the peacekeeping environment that also suggest the need for an in-depth evalu ation of the potential role of air power. The first change is the increasing availability of superpower technology to the UN due to end of the cold war. Technologically advanced air assets were previously unavailable by the inhi bitions associated with superpower involvement, and the call for air power is a delayed integration of technology within the peacekeeping paradigm. As the means of waging war over the past four decades increased, the technological aids for peacekeeping remained noticeably static.^6 Therefore, as combatants or aggressors gain technological military capability, there will be a need for commensurate advances in peacekeeping technology. A second fundamental change involves the very nature of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping missions today have broadly expanded roles and objectives,
Haiti; providing humanitarian assistance in Cyprus and most recently in Somalia; and the disarmament of insurgents in Nicaragua and Cambodia.^7 Peacekeeping has evolved into a permanent process within the UN.
Peacekeeping Defined
In simplest terms, peacekeeping is primarily a diplomatic tool used to stimulate the peaceful resolution of conflict and is not an end in itself. Since the existence of peacekeeping was not foreseen in the UN Charter, there is no internationally accepted definition of peacekeeping. Consequently, this study will use a synthesis of the International Peace Academy and historical United Nations outlooks:
Peacekeeping is an international technique used in conjunction with diplomacy for the purpose of conflict management. Peacekeeping operations employ voluntary military and diplomatic personnel from one or more countries to either create the conditions for conflict resolution or to prevent further hostilities through the super- vision of an interim or final settlement of conflict. Peacekeeping forces are impar tial and exist only with the consent of all disputing parties; therefore, peacekeeping forces do not interfere with the internal affairs of the host countries or use coercion to enforce agreements— the use of force is limited to self-defense.^8
The above peacekeeping definition embodies a number of principles or foundations which set peacekeeping apart from other international methods of conflict control or resolution. These principles are
The first three principles of “the use of force for self-defense,” “consent,” and “impartiality” are considered prerequisites for a peacekeeping operation. The principle of “effective military support” will be the crux of the next chap ter’s analysis of the role of air power in peacekeeping. The final three princi ples, if followed, will enhance the prospects for a successful operation.
The Use of Force for Self-defense
The first and the most defining peacekeeping principle specifically limits the use of force to self-defense. Historically, peacekeeping evolved due to the deliberate effort to avoid enforcement as outlined in chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, due to the changing international environment, there is increasing pressure to relax this principle. Indeed, the UN itself is blurring the distinction between self-defense and enforcement. For example, the Secu rity Council authorized peacekeepers in Bosnia to use force to stop any inter ference with their mission. Commenting on this situation, David Scheffer, an
international lawyer, claims the UN is using this action “as a pretext to avoid the kind of [enforcement] force necessary” as outlined in chapter VII of the UN Charter.^9 Furthermore, Donald Snow correctly criticizes this trend: “The danger is in thinking peacekeeping forces can be inserted into peace-enforce ment situations; that somehow these situations represent a linear extension of one another.”^10 This principle represents a symbolic barrier, which, if bro ken, will at the very least cause significant operational problems; and at worst, could allow application of military force to theoretically become unlim ited. Therefore, the consequences of blending peacekeeping and peace enforce ment can be significant.
The first consequence is the increased difficulty of the international peacekeeping agency to control the actions of the individual national forces. Although not a peacekeeping operation, the activities of the United States in postwar Iraq are representative of this. In January 1993, the US unilaterally destroyed a suspected Iraqi nuclear production facility without UN approval. The UN was impotent in the face of this action and had international criti cism as the only recourse. A second consequence of using force is that the peacekeeping operation may become identified with the policy of the nation leading the effort rather than the international community as a whole. Again, US postwar actions in Iraq are illustrative—where the US attempted to en- force UN resolutions by destroying Iraqi air defense radars. Although compli ance was achieved, the action generated sympathy among the Arab nations and further identified UN action with US policy.^11
Political considerations aside, there are also practical limitations to using force in a peacekeeping operation.^12 First, the use of force in peacekeeping operations is associated with past failure. The UN intervention in the Congo in 1961 and the Multi-National Force (MNF) in Lebanon are examples of the negative effects of using firepower to enforce the authority of an interposi tional force.^13 Both operations resulted in significant UN casualties and left behind a situation which was worse than before intervention. Secondly, the UN does not have the planning capability, experience, or infrastructure to command and administer military force in a proactive manner. Consequently, home governments will increase their involvement to decrease the risk to their troops. Finally, UN forces are often inferior in strength and armament to the parties in dispute. Therefore, the line between self-defense and proac tive military action may become very fine.
The Principles of Consent and Impartiality
Also paramount to the concept of peacekeeping are the principles of “con- sent” and “impartiality.” First, consent is a measure to avoid the suggestion of enforcement as defined in chapter VII of the UN Charter. Clearly, the pre- meditated use of force would not garner the consent of the parties in dispute and the operation could not be established. Unfortunately, the principle of consent is not always cut and dry. In cases of cease-fire or transfers of power,
part of the international conflict resolution process and cannot be undertaken without consideration for the complete process as depicted in table 1.
Table 1
Stages of Conflict and Techniques Available^18 Conflict Stages Techniques Pre–War Preventive Diplomacy Wartime Peacemaking Peace Enforcement Post–War Peacekeeping Peace Building
First, the concept of preventative diplomacy encompasses purely dip lomatic actions taken in anticipation of, or during a dispute between par- ties before armed conflict has occurred. A natural outcome of this diplomatic action may be the introduction of peacekeeping forces to facili tate peaceful negotiation between the parties. Preventive diplomacy is gov erned under the auspices of chapter VI of the UN Charter.
Peacemaking is the next step in conflict resolution and occurs after the failure of preventive diplomacy and armed conflict has begun. Peacemak ing is diplomatic action to bring the hostile parties to permanent resolution or temporary cessation of hostilities through peaceful means. Peacemaking efforts may be concurrent with a peacekeeping operation. The primary difference between peacemaking and peacekeeping is that peacekeeping attempts to provide the atmosphere in which the peacemakers can negoti ate and arbitrate for peace. Peacemaking is clearly more difficult.
After the failure of peacemaking efforts, peace enforcement attempts to coerce the disputing parties into agreement. Peace enforcement differs from peacekeeping primarily through the use of force and the lack of con- sent among the disputing parties. This technique clearly indicates an esca lation of the conflict resolution process; within the UN context, peace enforcement is governed under the auspices of chapter VII of the UN Char ter.
Finally, if peacekeeping or peace enforcement is successful, the conflict resolution process can turn to postconflict peace building. This term de- scribes the efforts of the international community to resolve underlying problems and raises the chances for a stable and long-lasting peace. Peacekeeping operations may continue for an indefinite period while peace- building efforts are under way. An example of this situation is the UN peacekeeping force established in Pakistan in 1949, which continues to this day.
In summary, peacekeeping is a complicated mechanism most notably rec ognized through the nonuse of force. Although past peacekeeping efforts have used coercive force, these situations are not the ideal and must be recognized as departing from the peacekeeping paradigm into another method of conflict resolution.
Peacekeeping in the 21st Century
United States participation in peacekeeping is at a crossroads. The end of the cold war enables and also demands the direct involvement of the US and other Security Council members. In addition, there are several international and domestic trends further modifing the character of peacekeeping and re- quire greater US participation—in the form of air power. The first international trend is the proliferation of technology and weapons among the less-developed nations of the world. As weapons and technology become cheaper and easier to obtain, peacekeepers will find their job more difficult. The ability of peacekeepers to effectively monitor accords will de- crease as disputing parties increase their tempo of operations through im proved mobility and communications. Peacekeepers will, in turn, be exposed to greater risks due to the increased range, accuracy, and lethality of today’s weapons; eventually resulting in an erosion of operational effectiveness. Ac cordingly, peacekeepers will need advanced military equipment, including air power, to help offset the negative consequences of this trend. The next international trend is the increased responsiveness and mutual cooperation of the international community towards conflict resolution and peacekeeping. More and more, the international community is using economic and political pressure to coerce disputing parties to begin peace negotiations and accept peacekeeping forces. The consequences of this trend are threefold. First, as the number of peacekeeping activities increase, the range of opera tional tasks also increases, thus putting a premium on flexibility and enhanc ing the potential for air power. From simple observation missions to complicated disarmament operations involving over 20,000 peacekeepers, the tasks of peacekeeping are becoming greatly diversified. The following list represents a sample of past or ongoing peacekeeping operations.
A second consequence of increased international cooperation is the origina tion of peacekeeping accords earlier in the conflict resolution process. As a result, the duration of peacekeeping operations may be longer while the dis puting parties work out their differences. Peacekeeping will need to be in creasingly efficient in future operations or the already spiraling cost will become unbearable.
A final domestic trend is a direct legacy of the successful performance of air power in the Persian Gulf War—precision, efficiency, and intensity. While peacekeeping does not necessarily anticipate the use of force, policymakers will nevertheless favor air power as a hedge against escalation into peace enforcement.
In summary, policymakers have clearly indicated the US will increase par ticipation in peacekeeping operations. A comparison of land, naval, and air assets to the implications of the aforementioned trends suggest air assets may have a comparative advantage. Naval surface assets have a limited role in peacekeeping, and the current trends do not suggest a significant increase.^26 Although land resources are an obvious peacekeeping choice, they offer few unique capabilities beyond existing UN peacekeeping resources. Air power, on the other hand, has both the flexibility and unique capabilities to offer some- thing new to peacekeeping and minimize the negative consequences of the changing nature of peacekeeping. All of this put together indicates that air power may be the logical first choice to fulfill increased US peacekeeping commitments.
Notes
Indar Jit Rikhye, “Peacekeeping and Peacemaking,” in Peacekeeping Appraisals and Proposals , ed. Henry Wiseman (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 6.
Paul Lewis, “A Short History of the United Nations Peacekeeping,” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History , Autumn 1992, 7.
Henry W. Degenheardt, Treaties and Alliances of the World (London: The Eastern Press, 1986), 15.
Ibid.
Ibid., 16.
Brian Urquhart, “Beyond the ‘Sheriff’s Posse’,” Survival , May–June 1990, 196.
Bruce Russett and James Sutterlin, “The UN in a New World Order,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 1992, 164.
The International Peace Academy is a nonpolitical, nonprofit, educational institute lo cated at the United Nations and is regarded to be a leading academic authority on peacekeep ing activities.
Lucia Mouat, “UN Struggles to Keep Politics Out of Relief,” The Christian Science Moni tor , 7 January 1993, 3.
Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order ( Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, February 1993), 19.
Russett, 167.
John Mackinlay, “Powerful Peace-keepers,” Survival , May–June 1990, 241.
Ibid., 242.
Gustav Hagglund, “Peace-keeping in a Modern War Zone,” Survival, May–June 1990,
John Mackinlay and Jaret Chopra, “Second Generation Multinational Operations,” The Washington Quarterly , Summer 1992, 120.
J. D. Murray, “Military Aspects of Peacekeeping: Problems and Recommendations,” in Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals, ed. Henry Wiseman (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 181.
Johan Jorgen Holst, “Enhancing Peace-keeping Operations,” Survival, May–June 1990,
Snow, 20; Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992), 11.
JCS Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War,” Proposed Final Pub, November 1992, IV-1; James C.Wise, “How Not to Fight: Putting Together a US Army Force for UN Peacekeeping Operation,” Military Review, December 1977, 23; Michael S. Serrill, “Under Fire,” Time , 18 January 1993.
Boutros-Ghali, 92.
Frank J. Prial, “UN Seeks Signal On Troop Notice,” New York Times International, 30 October 1992, sec. A11.
Boutros-Ghali, 99.
Snow, 3.
J. S. Bremner and J. M. Snell, “The Changing Face of Peacekeeping,” Canadian Defence Quarterly , August 1992, 8.
John M. Goshko, “Christopher Defines US Role in Negotiations on Bosnia Peace,” Wash ington Post, 12 February 1993, 32.
An International Peace Academy publication by Robert Stevens Staley II addresses the potential for naval peacekeeping operations, The Wave of the Future: The United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992).
