The Ring of Gyges
from Plato, Republic
359d-360c
Glaucon disagrees with Socrates and insists that justice and virtue are not in fact desirable in
and of themselves. In support of his claim, Glaucon offers the following story which
suggests that the only reason people act morally is that they lack the power to behave
otherwise. Take away the fear of punishment, and the "just" and the "unjust" person will
both behave in the same way: unjustly, immorally.
Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an
earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at
the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen
horse, having doors, at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared
to him, more than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of
the dead and reascended.
Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report
about the flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he
was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly
he became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no
longer present. He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet
outwards and reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same
result-when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible, when outwards he reappeared.
Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; where
as soon as he arrived he seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against the king and
slew him, and took the kingdom.
Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the
unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in
justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what
he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or
release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a God among men. Then the
actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to the same
point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because
he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one
thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that
injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been
supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of
becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be
thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one
another's faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer
injustice.
