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The Prince
by Niccolo Machiavelli
To the great Lorenzo Di Piero De Medici
Those who try to obtain the favourable attention of a prince are accustomed to come before him with the things that they value most, or which they think the prince will most enjoy. As a result, one often sees expensive gifts such as horses, weapons, cloths of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented to princes.
Desiring therefore to present myself with some proof of my devotion towards you, I have found that the possession I value above all is the knowledge of the actions of great men. This knowledge has been acquired by long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of history. I have reflected on this long and carefully, and I now send you these reflections presented in a small volume.
And although I consider this work unworthy of your attention, nevertheless I trust that you will be kind enough to accept it. The best gift I can offer you is the opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all that I have learnt in so many years, and with so many troubles and dangers. I have written the work in a simple and direct way, so that it will be accepted not for its style but for the importance of the theme.
I do not agree with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low and humble condition dares to discuss and criticise the concerns of princes. Those who draw pictures place themselves below in the plain to understand the nature of the mountains and other high places, and in order to understand the plains place themselves upon high mountains. Similarly, to understand the nature of the people one needs to be a prince, and to understand princes one needs to be of the people.
Take then, this little gift in the spirit in which I send it. If it is carefully read and considered by you, you will learn my extreme desire that you should attain that greatness which fortune and your other attributes promise. And if, my lord, from the mountain top of your greatness, you will sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see how undeservedly I suffer great and continued bad fortune.
THE PRINCE
CHAPTER 1
HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE
ACQUIRED
There are only two kinds of states, republics or principalities.
Principalities are either hereditary, where the family in control has been long established; or they are new.
The new principalities are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they are, as it were, members added to the hereditary state of the prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of the King of Spain.
Such states thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a prince, or to live in freedom. They are acquired either by the military power of the prince himself or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.
CHAPTER 2
CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES
I will leave out all discussion of republics, and will address myself only to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.
There are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states, particularly those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new ones. The reason is that in such states it is sufficient only for the prince to maintain the customs of those who ruled before him, and to deal carefully with circumstances as they arise. In this way a prince of average powers can maintain himself in his state unless he loses it by some extraordinary and excessive force. If he loses it in this way, whenever anything unfortunate happens to the one who took it from him, he will get it back.
We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who lasted against the attacks of the Venetians in 1484, and those of Pope Julius in 1510, only because he had been long established in his principality. The hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend, hence it happens that he will be more loved. Unless extraordinary wickedness causes him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him, and the longer the duration of his rule, the more likely that the memories and motives that encourage change are lost. One change always increases the possibility of another.
CHAPTER 3
CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES
But the difficulties occur in a new principality, particularly in mixed principalities where there is a new addition to an old state. These difficulties arise chiefly from an inherent problem which is there in all new principalities. People change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces
state to you. If you do not do this, you will have to keep part of your army there. A prince does not have to spend much on such settlements, for with little or no expense he can send the settlers there and keep them there. He offends only a minority of the citizens from whom he takes land and houses to give to the new settlers. Those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are never able to injure him; while the rest being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to cause trouble in case they lose their land and houses. In conclusion, I say that these settlements are not costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. However, one has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed because they can revenge themselves of lighter injuries, but of more serious ones they cannot. Therefore the injury that is to be done to someone ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.
However if instead of settlements the prince maintains armed men there, one spends much more, having to spend on the military presence all the income from the state. Then the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are upset, because the whole state is injured. Through having to shift the soldiers from one place to another, all experience hardship, and all become hostile. They become enemies who, while beaten on their own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a settlement is useful.
The prince who holds a country differing in language, customs and law ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful neighbours. He should weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get established there. It will always happen that some powerful foreigner will be invited in by those who are unhappy with the prince, either through excess of ambition or through fear. The Romans were brought into Greece by the Aetolians, and in every other country where they established themselves, they were brought in by the local people. The usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the existing prince. So the foreigner does not to have any trouble winning them over to himself, for all of them quickly support the state which he has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much authority. Then with his own forces, and with their cooperation, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. If this business is not properly managed, he will soon lose what he has acquired, and while he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles.
The Romans, in the countries which they took over, closely followed these principles. They sent settlements and maintained friendly relations with the minor powers, without increasing the strength of the minor powers. They kept down the greater states, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. ... Thus the Romans did in these instances what all careful princes ought to do, who have to regard not for only present troubles, but also for future ones. When problems are noted before they occur, it is easy to remedy them. But if you wait until they approach, the medicine is too late because the illness has become incurable. Thus doctors say that the beginning of a severe fever is easy to cure but difficult to detect. In the course of time not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. This also happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been predicted (which only wise men can do), they can be quickly dealt with. But when, through not having been predicted, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, predicting troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come to a head. They knew that war cannot be avoided, but can only be delayed to the advantage of others...
France however ... did the opposite of those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed of differing elements. King Louis XII was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get established in Italy, and having no friends there - seeing rather that every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles - he was forced to accept those friendships which he could get. He would have succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy got back at once the authority which the previous king,Charles, had lost. Genoa yielded, the Florentines became his friends. Many other powerful people and groups made advances to him to become his friend. Only then the Venetians realized the foolishness of the course taken by them. In order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, they had made the king master of two-thirds of Italy.
With little difficulty the king could have maintained his position in Italy, if he had observed the rules laid down above, and kept all his friends secure and protected. For although they were numerous, they were both weak and frightened. Some were afraid of the Church, some of the Venetians. Thus they would always have been forced to stand with him, and because of this he could easily have made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening himself, losing friends and those who had rushed to be his friend. He increased the strength of the Church by adding a lot of earthly power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority. Having committed this prime error, Louis was forced to follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of Pope Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy.
And as if it were not enough to have given power to the Church, and to have lost his friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime ruler in Italy he takes an associate, with the result that the ambitious of that country and the discontents of his own had somewhere to shelter. Whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own appointment as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn.
The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they can. For this they should be praised not blamed. But when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is foolishness and error. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so. If she could not, then she ought not to have divided it. The division of the state which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she gained a presence in Italy. This other division deserved blame, because it did not have the excuse of that necessity.
Louis made these five errors. He destroyed the minor powers. He increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy - the church. He brought in a foreign power. He did not settle in the country. He did not create settlements. If he had lived, these errors were not enough to injure him. However, he made a sixth error by taking the Venetians’ states away from them. He ought never to have consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have kept others from invading Lombardy...
Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the principles observed by those who have taken possession of countries and wished to retain them. Nor is there anything unusual in this, but much that is reasonable and quite natural. As I have told others, the French did not understand the principles of controlling a state, otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who
Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk. Therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to conquer him in battle, and then to take the country from him. After the victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no rebellions raised in the kingdom except those they caused themselves.
But it is impossible to easily hold states constituted like that of France. Hence there were frequent rebellions against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, because of the many principalities there were in these states. As long as the memory of them lasted, the Romans always held an insecure possession. However, with the power and long continuance of the empire, the memory of them passed away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And later when the states fought amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed there. The family of the former lord had been destroyed, and so none other than the Romans were acknowledged.
When these things are remembered no one will wonder at the ease with which Alexander held the Empire of Asia. And none will wonder at the difficulties which others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more. This is not caused by the ability of the conqueror, but by the lack of uniformity in the subject state.
CHAPTER 5
CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER
THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE JOINED TO ANOTHER PRINCIPALITY
Whenever those states which have been acquired have been accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three courses for those who wish to hold them. The first is to ruin them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live under their own laws, drawing a regular payment from the state, and establishing within it a governing group which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest, it tries hard to support him. Therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way.
There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes, establishing there a governing group, nevertheless they lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia largely destroyed them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did not succeed. So to hold it they were forced to destroy many cities in the country. There was, in fact, no safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, because it always has liberty and its ancient rights as a way of uniting a rebellion. Neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget these. Whatever you may do to protect against rebellion, the people never forget freedom or their old rights unless they are scattered.
But when cities or countries are accustomed to living under a prince and that prince’s family is destroyed, they, being on the one hand accustomed to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot
agree in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to rebel. A new prince can become accepted as their leader and secure them much more easily. But in republics there is more energy, greater hatred, and more desire for revenge, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their former liberty to rest. So the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there.
CHAPTER 6
CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND
ABILITY
Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities as I shall do, I always refer to the highest examples both of prince and of state. This is because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others and imitating their deeds, are still unable to keep entirely to the ways of others or attain the power of those they imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate those who have been the best, so that if his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will have some traces of it. He should act like those who are skilled at shooting with a bow and arrow who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark. This is not done in order to reach a great height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.
In entirely new principalities, where there is a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them depending on whether there is more or less ability in him who has acquired the state. Now, because becoming a prince from a private station requires either ability or good luck, it is clear that one or other of these things will reduce many difficulties to some degree. Nevertheless, he who has relied least on good luck will be more strongly established. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no other state, is forced to reside there in person.
But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus Theseus, and such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere instrument of the will of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found to be admirable; and if their particular deeds and conduct are considered, they will not be found to be less than those of Moses, even though he had so great a guide. And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material to change into the form which seemed best to them Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been wasted, and without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain.
It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of Israel in Egypt held as slaves by the Egyptians, in order that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of slavery. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become King of Rome and founder of that country. It was necessary that Cyrus should find the Persians unhappy with the government of the Medes, and the Medes soft and weak through their long peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability if he had not found the Athenians scattered. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, and their great ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby their country was made strong and famous.
fly, but they have many when they reach the top. Such are those to whom some state is given either for money or by the favour of him who gives it. This happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might hold the cities both for his security and his glory. Similar to those were those leaders who, by bribery of the soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. Such stand simply upon the favour and the fortune of him who has given them the position - two most inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge required for the position, because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command having always lived in a private condition. In addition, they cannot hold their position, because they do not have forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.
States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature which are born and grow rapidly, cannot establish their foundations in such a way that the first storm will not destroy them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown to them. Thus those foundations, which others have laid before they became princes, they must lay afterwards.
Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or fortune, I wish to describe two examples within our own times. These are Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia acquired his state while his father, Pope Alexander the Sixth, was in power. On his father’s decline he lost it notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise and able man to firmly fix his roots in the states which the arms and fortunes of others had given to him.
He who has not first laid his foundations may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble to the designer and danger to the building. If therefore, we look at all the steps taken by Cesare, it will be seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power. It is well worth looking at them, because I do not know what better advice to give a new prince than the example of his actions. If his planning failed, that was not his fault, but simply extraordinary bad luck.
Pope Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to promote Cesare, his son, had many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, it seemed that the only available state would be one belonging to the Church. If he was willing to use a Church state he knew that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not consent. Besides this, he saw the armies of Italy, that might have assisted, him, were in the control of people who did not want to see the Church made more powerful by this move. It was necessary, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and create disorder among the powers, so as to make himself more securely master of part of their states. This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, motivated by other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy. He decided not to oppose this, but to assist it by helping King Louis officially end his former marriage. Therefore the King of France came into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of Pope Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him simply from fear of the king. Cesare, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was hindered by two things. Firstly, his forces did not appear loyal to him. Secondly, there was general good feeling towards France. That is to say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which he was using would not be loyal to him. They might not only hinder him from winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and the King of France might also do the same. He had a warning of the Orsini when after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. He learned the mind of the king when he himself, after taking the Dukedom of
Urbino, attacked Tuscany and the king made him stop that undertaking. Hence Cesare decided not to depend upon the arms and the luck of others any more.
Firstly, he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in Rome, by winning over all their followers who were gentlemen and making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and honouring them with official positions and power suited to their rank, so that in a few months all loyalty to the parties was destroyed and directed entirely to Cesare. After this he waited for an opportunity to crush the Orsini, having scattered the Colonnessi supporters. This opportunity soon came to him and he used it well. The Orsini, perceiving eventually that the promotion of Cesare and the Church was ruin to them, called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this came the rebellion at Urbino and the rebellions in the Romagna, with endless dangers to Cesare. However, he overcame these with the help of the French. Having restored his authority, he decided not to leave it at risk by relying either on the French or other outside forces. He thus decided to act more cleverly and to hide his intentions well. By the mediation of Signor Pagolo – whom Cesare secured with all kinds of attention, giving him money, clothes, and horses – the Orsini became more sympathetic, so that their simple trust brought them into his power. Having got rid of the leaders, and turned their supporters into his friends, and having all the Romagna and the Dukedom of Urbino, Cesare had laid sufficiently good foundations for his power,. Moreover, the people were now beginning to appreciate their improved living conditions, so they were happy to support him.
There is another important point to note. When Cesare occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak masters, who robbed their subjects rather than ruled them, and gave them more cause for rebellion than for union. So the country was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence. So, wishing to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thus he promoted Ramiro d'Orco, an efficient and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with great success. Afterwards Cesare considered that it was not a good idea to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt that he would become disliked. So he set up a court of judgment in the country, under an excellent president, in which all cities had their advocates. He knew that the past severity had caused some hatred against him. So, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and make them entirely loyal to him, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated from him, but came from the personal cruelty of the governor. Under this pretence Cesare took Ramiro, and one morning had him killed and left in the square at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. This terrible sight caused the people to be at the same time satisfied and worried.
But let us return to where we started. Cesare now found himself sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having largely crushed those forces around him that could injure him. If he wished to proceed with his conquest, he next had to consider France. He knew that the king, who was now aware of his own misjudgements with Cesare would not support him. So from this time Cesare began to seek new friends and to delay helping France with the campaign which she was making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were attacking Gaeta. It was his intention to secure himself against them, and he would have quickly succeeded if his father, Pope Alexander, had lived.
Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new Pope might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which his father, Pope Alexander, had given him. So Cesare decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by killing the families of those lords whom he had defeated, so that the new Pope could not use them as an excuse to attack him. Secondly, by winning the loyalty of all the gentlemen of Rome, so that they would not support the Pope.
CHAPTER 8
CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS
A prince can also rise from a private situation in two other ways, neither of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius. These methods are when by some wicked actions one gains the principality, or when by the favour of his fellow citizens a private person becomes the prince of his country. The first method, wickedness, will be illustrated by two examples – one ancient, the other modern – and without going further into the subject, I consider these two examples will be enough for those who may have to follow them.
Agathocles, the Sicilian, became King of Syracuse not only from being an ordinary citizen, but also from a low and humble position. This man, the son of a pot maker, through all the changes in his fortunes always led a wicked life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his wickedness with so much ability of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession, he rose through its ranks to become leader of the army in Syracuse. Once he was established in that position, he resolved to make himself prince and to seize by violence, that which had already been willingly given to him. He came to an understanding for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating to the Republic. At a given signal the soldiers killed all the senators and the richest of the people. He then seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil rebellion. And although he was twice defeated by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, he was not only able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others he attacked the Carthaginians in Africa. In a short time the Carthaginians’ were forced to stop their siege on Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were forced to make peace with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with the possession of Africa.
Anyone who considers the actions and the genius of this man will see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune. He attained success, as is shown above, not by the favour of any one, but step by step in the military profession. This advancement was gained with a thousand troubles and dangers, and was afterwards boldly held by him in spite of many dangers. Yet it cannot be called “ability” to kill fellow citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and removing himself from dangers is considered together with his greatness of mind in overcoming hardships, it seems that he should be admired as much as the most notable captain. Nevertheless, his terrible cruelty and infinite wickedness do not permit him to be ranked among the most excellent men. What he achieved however cannot be attributed to fortune.
In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da Fermo, his parents having died many years before, was brought up by his uncle, Giovanni Fogliani. In the early days of his youth he was sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, so that, being trained under his discipline, he might attain some high position in the military profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo and in a very short time, being clever and capable, he became the leading man in his profession. But he did not like serving under others. So, he resolved, with the aid of some citizens of Fermo (to whom the slavery of their country was more important than its liberty) and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So he wrote to his uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, that, having been away from home for many years, he wished to
visit him and his city. He also wanted to look at what his parents had left him. He said that although he had not laboured to acquire anything except honour, he wanted the citizens of Fermo to see he had not spent his time in vain. Thus, he would be accompanied by one hundred of his soldiers, his friends and servants. He begged Giovanni to arrange for him to be received honourably by the Fermians, in recognition of not only his own achievements but also those of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.
Giovanni, therefore, did his best for his nephew. Oliverotto was honourably received by the Fermians, and he stayed in his uncle’s own house. After several days, and having arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a formal dinner to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the leaders of Fermo. When the food and all the other usual entertainment were finished, Oliverotto began to speak of serious matters, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare. Giovanni and others replied to this speech, but Oliverotto rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be discussed in a more private place. He went into another room, and Giovanni and the rest of the citizens went in after him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers came out from secret places and killed Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto rode up and down the town on horseback and besieged the governing council. The people were afraid and were forced to obey him, and to form a government with Oliverotto as the prince. He killed all those who were able to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military laws, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the principality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become more powerful than all his neighbours. His destruction would have been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be tricked by Cesare Borgia. One year after he had committed the murder of his uncle, he was killed.
Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after infinite wickedness and cruelties, should live securely for so long in his country, be able to defend himself from external enemies, and never have to deal with rebellion by his own citizens. Many others, by means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this follows from severe measures being badly or properly used. They are properly used (if it is possible to say that evil is proper) if they are applied at one blow, are necessary to one's security, and are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage of the subjects. The severe measures are badly employed if although they are few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by the aid of God or man, in some degree to later soften their rule, as Agathocles did. It is impossible for those who continue to be cruel to maintain their control.
Hence, in seizing a state, the attacker ought to examine closely all those injuries which are necessary, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them daily. Thus by not continually upsetting the people, he will be able to make them feel more secure, and win them over by benefits. He who does otherwise, either from reluctance or evil advice, is always forced to keep the knife in his hand. He cannot rely on his subjects, and they cannot attach themselves to him, because of the continued and repeated wrongs. Injuries ought to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less. Benefits ought to be given little by little, so that their flavour may last longer.
Above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil shall make him change. If the necessity for this comes in troubled times, you are too late for severe measures. Mild ones will not help you, because they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will feel grateful to you for them.
Thus the people quickly become more devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality through their support. The prince can win their support in many ways, but as these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules and so I omit them. But, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in difficult times.
Nabis, prince of the Spartans, defended his country and his government against the attack of all Greece and of a victorious Roman army. To overcome this danger, it was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this would not have been sufficient if the people had been hostile. And do not let any one attack this statement with the old saying that "He who builds on the people, builds on the mud." This saying is true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and foolishly persuades himself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies. But if the leader is a prince who has established himself as a person who can command, and is a man of courage who does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps all the people encouraged – such a one will never find himself abandoned by the people, and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well.
These principalities are open to danger when they are passing from the constitutional to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule personally or through councils. In the latter case their government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the attitude of those citizens who are placed on the council, and who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either by trickery or open rebellion. The prince does not have the chance in a rebellion to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receiving orders from the council, are not willing to obey him when there is an unstable situation. Moreover, there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. Such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because then everyone agrees with him. They all promise to support him, and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him. But in troubled times, when the state has need of its citizens, then he finds only a few. Moreover this experiment of moving from a constitutional to an absolute government is dangerous, because it can only be tried once. Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will always in all kinds of circumstances have need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.
CHAPTER 10
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE
MEASURED
It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own resources or whether he always has need of the assistance of others. To be more specific, I consider those who are able to support themselves by their own resources as those who can, either by having plenty of men or money, raise a sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack them. I consider those always to have need of others as those who cannot show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed, but we will speak of it again should it come up. In the second case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision and strengthen their towns, and not on any account try to defend the country. And whoever protects his town well, and has managed the other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above, will never be attacked without great caution. Men are not eager for actions where the difficulties can be clearly seen, and it will be seen to not be an easy thing to attack one who has his town well protected, and who is
not hated by his people.
The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own little of the country around them, and they yield obedience to the king when it suits them. They do not fear this or any power they may have near them, because they are protected in such a way that every one thinks the taking of them by direct attack would be drawn out and difficult. They have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient large guns and they always keep enough supplies in public store houses for one year's eating, drinking, and fighting. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss to the state, they always have the means of giving work to the community in those labours that are the life and strength of the city, and through the pursuit of which the people are supported. They also value military exercises, and moreover have many laws to support these exercises.
Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and who has not made himself hated, will not be attacked. If any one does attack, he will only be driven off in defeat. Because the affairs of this world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army for a whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever should reply: “If the people have property outside the city, and see it burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long attack and self-interest will make them forget their prince”. To this I answer that a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for long, and at another time encouraging fear of the cruelty of the enemy. At the same time he should deal appropriately with those subjects who seem to him to speak out too much.
Furthermore, the enemy would naturally immediately on their arrival burn and ruin the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and ready for the defence. Therefore, so much the less should the prince hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the damage is already done, and there is no longer any remedy. Thus the people are at that time much more ready to unite with their prince, because he appears to owe them a favour now that their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his defence. This is because it is in the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the minds of his citizens strong and loyal from first to last when he continues to support and defend them.
CHAPTER 11
CONCERNING CHURCH PRINCIPALITIES
It only remains now to speak of church principalities. All of the difficulties with them occur prior to getting possession because they are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held without either; for they are sustained by the ancient laws of religion. These laws are so powerful, and of such character that the principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live. These princes alone have states and do not defend them. They have subjects and do not rule them. The states, although unguarded, are not taken from them. The subjects although not ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire nor the ability to rebel. So only such principalities are secure and happy. But being supported by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, because, being created and maintained by God, it would be the act of a proud and foolish man to discuss them.
Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how it happens that the Church has attained such greatness in
considered in some degree the causes of their being good or bad. I have also shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire principalities and to hold them. It now remains for me to discuss generally the means of attack and defence which go with each of them.
We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or mixed, are good laws and good arms. As there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion and shall speak of the arms.
The arms with which a prince defends his state are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. If a prince holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe, because they are ambitious, not united, without discipline, unfaithful, brave in front of friends and cowardly before enemies. They have neither fear of God nor loyalty to men. Destruction caused by them is put off only as long as the attack lasts. In peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for staying in battle than a small amount of pay which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your soldiers while you do not make war, but if war comes they disappear or run from the enemy. I will have no trouble in proving this, because the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries. Although they formerly made some display and appeared brave amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed what they really were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy without a show of resistance. Whoever told us that our weaknesses were the cause of it told the truth. But they were not the weaknesses he imagined, but those which I have described. And as they were the weaknesses of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the result. I wish to demonstrate further the danger of these soldiers. The mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not. If they are, you cannot trust them, because they always want to become more powerful, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your intentions. If the mercenary captain is not skilful, you are ruined in the usual way.
If it is argued that any soldiers will act in the same way whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms must be used, they are under the control of a prince or a republic. The prince ought to go in person and perform the duty of a captain. The republic has to send its citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily it ought to send him back. When one is a worthy captain, it ought to hold on to him by the laws so that he does not leave the command. Experience has shown princes and republics, single- handed, make the greatest progress and mercenaries do nothing except damage. It is more difficult for a republic armed with its own arms to be taken over by one of its citizens, than it is to take over one armed with foreign arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Swiss are completely armed and quite free.
Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains. After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their liberty.
Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese hired Francesco Sforza to fight against the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio, joined with the Venetians to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father, Sforza, having been hired by Queen Johanna of Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was
forced to throw herself into the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. On the other hand, the Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their possessions by using mercenaries, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them. I consider however that the Florentines in this case have been lucky, because of the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been successfully opposed, and others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto, and since he did not conquer his loyalty cannot be proved. However, everyone will acknowledge that, if he had conquered, the Florentines would have been in his power. Sforza always had the Bracceschi against him, so they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a very careful man, who from a private position had risen to become very famous. If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the Florentines to keep on good terms with him, because if he became the soldier of their enemies, they had no means of resisting, and if they stayed friendly with him, they would have to obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and successfully, as long as they sent their own men to war, when with their own armed gentlemen and citizens they did very well. This was before they turned to fighting on land, but when they began to fight on land they gave up this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. In the beginning of their expansion on land, by not having much land to control, and because of their great reputation, they did not have much to fear from their captains. But when they expanded, they had a taste of this mistake of hiring mercenaries. Having found him a very brave man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand, knowing how unenthusiastic he was in the war, they feared they would no longer conquer under him. For this reason they were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go. So, in order not to lose what they had acquired again, they were forced to murder him, in order to secure themselves. Afterwards they had Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of Pitigliano, and the like, for their captains under whom they had to fear loss and not gain. This happened afterwards at Vaila, where in one battle they lost that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much trouble. From such mercenaries conquests come slowly, are long delayed and are not very significant. The losses however are sudden and very great.
Because with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them in depth in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better prepared to stand against them. You must understand that the empire has recently been destroyed in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more earthly power, and that Italy has been divided up into more states. The reasons are that many of the great cities took up arms against their nobles, who, formerly supported by the emperor, were oppressing them. The Church was supporting the rebellions so as to gain earthly authority. In many others, their citizens became princes. Thus Italy fell partly into the hands of the Church and of the republics. The Church consisted of priests and the republic consisted of citizens who were not soldiers, so both commenced hiring foreigners as mercenaries.
The first who made mercenaries well known was Alberigo da Conio, from the Romagna. From the school of this man came, among others Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the masters of Italy. After these came all the other captains who till now have directed the military of Italy. The outcome of all their bravery has been, that Italy has been invaded by Charles, robbed by Louis, exploited by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Swiss. The principle that has guided the mercenaries has been first, to lower the credit of foot soldiers so that they might increase their own status. They did this because they did not have their own lands to give them income and so had to survive on their pay. They were thus unable to support many soldiers. Moreover, having foot soldiers did not give them any authority, so they were led to employ horse soldiers. In this way, with a moderate force they could maintain themselves with some
