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Symbolic Interactionist
Theories of Identity
G
eorge Herbert Mead’s foundational work was termed symbolic inter- actionism by Herbert Blumer, who took over Mead’s famous social psychology course after Mead’s death and who became a persistent advocate of symbolic interactionism for half a century. I am not sure if Mead would have approved this label, but more importantly, symbolic interactionism, as it has evolved over the last sixty years, has tended to focus on the dynamics of self more than either symbols or interaction—as Blumer had advocated. People’s behaviors in interaction with others in social set- tings are governed by their conception of themselves. Self serves as a kind of gyroscope for keeping behaviors consistent and in line; moreover, as has increasingly been emphasized in symbolic interactionist theory, individuals are motivated to verify their sense of self in the eyes of others. The notion of identity became one prominent way to reconceptualize self over the last few decades.^1 In general terms, self is now viewed as a set or series of identities that can be invoked individually or simultaneously in (^1) Aside from these figures, others seeking a theory of self and identity include Eugene Weinstein, Mary Glenn Wiley, and William DeVaughn, “Role and Interpersonal Style as Components of Interaction,” Social Forces 45 (1966): pp. 210–16; Peter J. Burke and Judy C. Tully, “The Measurement of Role/Identity,” Social Forces 55 (1977): pp. 881–97; Nelson N. Foote, “Identification as the Basis for a Theory of Motivation,” American Sociological Review 16 (1951): pp. 14–21; Tamotsu Shibutani, Society and Personality (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1961); Anselm Strauss, Mirrors and Masks (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959); Gregory P. Stone, “Appearance and the Self ” in Behavior and Social Processes , ed. Arnold M. Rose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962). For a review of the history of identity and self theories, see Viktor Gecas and Peter J. Burke, “Self and Identity,” in Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology , eds. Karen S. Cook, Gary Alan Fine, and James S. House (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1995), pp. 41–67. For a very recent review of identity theories, see Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, Identity Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
CHAPTER 16
332 PART IV: INTERACTIONIST THEORIZING situations, but once evoked, individuals’ actions are directed at having oth- ers verify an identity or identities. At the same time, identities can act as filters of selective perception and interpretation as individuals mutually role-take with one another. Thus, the effort to develop a more refined theory of self has been the major thrust of much interactionist theorizing. In this chapter, I will review several of these new theories of identity dynamics. Moreover, the most recent work on identity processes has converged with more recent theorizing on the soci- ology of emotions for the obvious reason that people put their identities on the line during interaction; thus, depending upon whether individuals suc- ceed in verifying or fail in getting others to verify an identity or identities, the emotions that are aroused will shape the subsequent flow of the interaction and, over time, the structure of a person’s identity system.
Sheldon Stryker’s Identity Theory
Designations and Definitions
In Sheldon Stryker’s view, human social behavior is organized by sym- bolic designations of all aspects of the environment, both physical and social.^2 Among the most important of these designations are the symbols and associated meanings of the positions that people occupy in social struc- tures. These positions carry with them shared expectations about how people are to enact roles and, in general, to comport themselves in relation to others. As individuals designate their own positions, they call forth in themselves expectations about how they are to behave, and as they designate the positions of others, they become cognizant of the expectations guiding the role behaviors of these others. They also become aware of broader frames of reference and definitions of the situation as these positional des- ignations are made. And most importantly, individuals designate them- selves as objects in relation to their location in structural positions and their perceptions of broader definitions of the situation. (^2) Sheldon Stryker, Symbolic Interactionism: A Structural Version (Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin/ Cummings, 1980); “Identity Salience and Role Performance: The Relevance of Symbolic Interaction Theory for Family Research,” Journal of Marriage and the Family (1968): pp. 558–64; “Fundamental Principles of Social Interaction,” in Sociology , ed. Neil J. Smelser, 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1973), pp. 495–547. For a more recent version of the theory, see Sheldon Stryker and Richard T. Serpe, “Commitment, Identity Salience, and Role Behavior,” in Personality, Roles, and Social Behavior , eds. William Ickes and Eric Knowles (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982), pp. 199–218; Richard T. Serpe and Sheldon Stryker, “The Construction of Self and the Reconstruction of Social Relationships,” Advances in Group Processes 4 (1987): pp. 41–66; and Sheldon Stryker, “Exploring the Relevance of Social Cognition for the Relationship of Self and Society,” in The Self-Society Dynamic: Cognition, Emotion, and Action , eds. Judith Howard and Peter L. Callero (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): pp. 19–41.
334 PART IV: INTERACTIONIST THEORIZING cultural definitions and expectations, social structural location, identity, and esteem associated with that identity all become interwoven. And in this process, social structure constrains behavior and people’s perceptions of themselves and others.
The Key Propositions
In the early version of the theory, Stryker developed a series of “hypoth- eses” about the conditions producing the salience of an identity, the effects of identities high in the salience hierarchy on role behaviors, the influence of commitment on esteem, and the nature of changes in identity. These are rephrased somewhat and summarized in Table 16.1. To state Stryker’s argu- ment more discursively, here is what he proposed: The more individuals reveal commitment to an identity, the higher this identity will be in the salience hierarchy. If this identity is positively evaluated in terms of the reac- tions of others and broader value standards, then this identity will move up a person’s hierarchy. When the expectations of others are congruent and consistent, revealing few conflicts and disagreements, individuals will be even more committed to the identity presented to these others because they speak with the same voice. And finally, when the network of these others on whom one depends for identity is large and extended, encompassing many others rather than just a few, the higher in the salience hierarchy will this identity become. Once an identity is high in the salience hierarchy of an individual, role performances will become ever-more consistent with the expectations attached to this identity. Moreover, when identities are high in the salience hierarchy, individuals will tend to perceive situations as opportunities to play out this identity in roles, and they will actively seek out situations where they can use this identity. In this way, the congruence between those identities high in people’s hierarchies and the expectations of situations increases. This congruence increases commitment because individuals come to see their identities as depending on the continued willingness of others to con- firm their identities. As commitment increases, and as individuals become dependent on confirmation of their identities from others, their role perfor- mances have ever-more consequences for their level of self-esteem. Moreover, as people become committed to identities and these identities move up in their salience hierarchy, they come to evaluate their role performances through broader cultural definitions and normative expectations; as people make such evaluations, they become even more committed to their identities. External events can, however, erode commitments to an identity. When this occurs, people are more likely to adopt new identities, even novel iden- tities. As individuals begin to seek new identities, change is likely to move in the direction of those identities that reflect their values. In this way, cultural values pull the formation of new identities in directions that will increase
CHAPTER 16: Symbolic Interactionist Theories of Identity 335
- The more individuals are committed to an identity, the higher will this identity be in their salience hierarchy.
- The degree of commitment to an identity is a positive and additive function of A. The extent to which this identity is positively valued by others and broader cultural definitions B. The more congruent the expectations of others on whom one depends for an identity C. The more extensive the network of individuals on whom one depends D. The larger the number of persons in a network on whom one depends for an identity The Consequences of High Salience
- The higher in a person’s salience hierarchy is an identity, the more likely will that individual A. Emit role performances that are consistent with the role expectations associated with that identity B. Perceive a given situation as an opportunity to perform in that identity C. Seek out situations that provide opportunities to perform in that identity The Consequences of Commitment to Identity
- The greater the commitment to an identity, the greater will be A. The effect of role performances on self-esteem B. The likelihood that role performances will reflect institutionalized values and norms Changing Commitments to Identity
- The more external events alter the structure of a situation, the more likely are individuals to adopt new identities.
- The more changes in identity reinforce and reflect the value-commitments of the individual, the less the individual resists change in adopting a new identity. Table 16.1 A Revised Formulation of Stryker’s Hypotheses on the Salience of Identity the congruence between cultural definitions and role performance as indi- viduals develop new identity commitments and as their self-esteem becomes dependent on successful role performance of these identity commitments.
CHAPTER 16: Symbolic Interactionist Theories of Identity 337 individual is of low intensity, then this might signal that the identity is lower in the salience hierarchy and relatively unimportant to the individual. In identity theory, then, emotions motivate individuals to play roles in which they receive positive reinforcement, and emotions also inform indi- viduals about the adequacy of their performances and their commitments to identities in the salience hierarchy. Emotions thus drive individuals to play roles in ways that are consistent with normative expectations, defini- tions of the situation, cultural values, and highly salient feelings about self.
George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons’ Theory of Identity
Role Identity and Role Support
In contrast with Stryker’s more structural theory, where culture and social structure designate many of the identities held by individuals, George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons emphasized that roles are typically improvised as individuals seek to realize their various plans and goals.^4 A role identity is, therefore, “the character and the role that an individual devises for himself (herself as well) as an occupant of a particular social position.”^5 Role iden- tity constitutes an imaginative view of oneself in a position, often a rather idealized view of oneself. Each role identity thus has a conventional portion linked to positions in social structure as well as an idiosyncratic portion constructed in people’s imaginations. Role identities become part of individuals’ plans and goals because legitimating one’s identity in the eyes of others is always a driving force of human behavior. Moreover, people evaluate themselves through the role performances intended to confirm a role identity. But, as McCall and Simmons emphasized, the most important audiences for a role perfor- mance are individuals themselves who assess their performances with respect to their own idealized view of their role identity. Still, people must also seek role support from relevant audiences outside their own minds for their role identities. This support involves more than audiences granting a person the right to occupy a position, and it includes more than approval from others for conduct by those in a position. For an individual to feel legitimated in a role, audiences must also approve of the more expressive content—the style, emotion, manner, and tone—of role performances designed to legitimate a role identity. Because much of a role identity is rather idealized in the individual’s mind and because a person must seek legitimization along several fronts, there is always discrepancy and disjuncture between the role identity and (^4) George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons, Identities and Interactions (New York: Basic Books, 1960). A second edition of this book was published in 1978, although the theory remained virtually unchanged. (^5) Ibid., p. 67.
338 PART IV: INTERACTIONIST THEORIZING the role support received for that identity. People idealize too much, and they must seek support for performances that can be misinterpreted. As a result, there is almost always some dissatisfaction by individuals about how much their role identity has been legitimated by audiences. These points of disjuncture between identity and legitimating support motivate and drive individual behavior. Indeed, for McCall and Simmons, the most distinctive emotion among humans is the “drive to acquire support for (their) ideal- ized conceptions of (themselves).”
The Mechanisms for Maintaining Role Support
To overcome the discrepancy between what people desire and get in role support for an identity, several mechanisms are employed. One is the accu- mulation of short-term credit from interactions where discrepancies have been minimal; these emotional credits can then carry individuals through episodes where the responses from others provide less than whole-hearted role support. A second mechanism is selective perception of cues from others where individuals only see those responses confirming an identity. A third mechanism is selective interpretation of cues whereby the individual sees the cues accurately but puts a spin or interpretation on them that supports a role identity. A fourth mechanism is withdrawing from interactions that do not support an identity and seeking alternative situations where more sup- port can be garnered. A fifth mechanism is switching to a new role identity whose performance will bring more support from others. A sixth mecha- nism is scapegoating audiences, blaming them for causing the discrepancy between performance and support. A seventh mechanism is disavowing unsuccessful performances that individuals had hoped to legitimate. And a final defensive mechanism is deprecating and rejecting the audience that withholds support for a role identity. When these mechanisms fail, indi- viduals experience misery and anguish, and through such experiences, people learn to be cautious in committing themselves so openly and fully to particular role performances in front of certain audiences.^6
The Hierarchy of Prominence
The cohesiveness role identities of individuals vary, McCall and Simmons argued, in how the elements of an identity fit together and in the compati- bility among various role identities. There is also a hierarchy of prominence among role identities; although this hierarchy can shift and change as cir- cumstances dictate, it tends to exist at any given point in an interaction. This prominence reflects the idealized view of individuals, the extent to which these ideals have been supported by audiences, the degree to which individuals have committed themselves to these identities, the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards (to be discussed shortly) associated with an identity, and (^6) Ibid., p. 75.
340 PART IV: INTERACTIONIST THEORIZING They begin by classifying three basic types of rewards: First, there are extrinsic rewards , such as money or other reinforcers, that are visible to all. Second, there are intrinsic rewards that provide less visible means of rein- forcement for the individual—rewards such as satisfaction, pride, and com- fort. And third, and most important, there is support for an identity , which McCall and Simmons believe is the most valuable of all rewards. Individuals are motivated to seek a profit—rewards less the costs in securing them—in all their interactions. Moreover, there are separate types of calculi for each of these three categories of reward, and there are rules of the marketplace: Rewards received by each party to an exchange should be roughly compa- rable in their type (whether extrinsic, intrinsic, or identity support), and rewards should be received in proportion to the investments individuals incur in receiving them (a principle of distributive justice ). These negotiations are affected by what McCall and Simmons term the salience of identities, which are those identities that, for the immediate interaction at hand, are the most relevant in an individual’s hierarchy of prominence. This salience of identities constitutes, in McCall and Simmons’ words, a situated self that is most pertinent to the present inter- action. This situational self determines a person’s preferences about which role identities he or she will enact in a given situation, but the preferences of the situational self are fluid and changeable. In contrast, the ideal self is more stable than the situated self, while being the highest-order identity in the prominence hierarchy. A person’s ideal self will thus influence which identities should be salient in an interaction and how they will be invoked to constitute a situated self. Besides the prominence hierarchy, other factors also influence the formation of a situated identity. The needs that an individual feels for support of an identity, the extrinsic and intrin- sic rewards to be received by claiming a situated self, and the opportunity for profitable enactment of a role in relation to a situated self all shape identity formation. All these factors are, in McCall and Simmons’ view, potential reinforcers or payoffs for roles emitted in claiming an identity. These payoffs vary in value, however. Support of the ideal self brings greater rewards than either extrinsic or intrinsic rewards. The patterns of payoffs for rewards can also vary. For extrinsic and intrinsic types of rewards, when payoffs match expectations and desires, needs for them decline somewhat (in accordance with satiation or the principle of marginal utility). If people receive either more or less than they expected or desired of these two types of rewards, then their immediate need for these rewards suddenly escalates. In contrast, the payoff schedule for role support for an identity reveals a more compli- cated pattern. Role support for what was desired or expected does not increase the desire for further role support of an identity. A moderate dis- crepancy between the support sought and received increases the desire for support of an identity. But, extreme discrepancies operate differently, depending on the sign of the discrepancy: If people receive support that greatly exceeds their expectations, they immediately desire more role support,
CHAPTER 16: Symbolic Interactionist Theories of Identity 341 whereas if they dramatically receive less role support than expected, their desire for this role support drops rapidly. Because payoffs will almost always, or at least eventually, be less than expected, discrepancies will be chronic, even after individuals have employed all the defense mechanisms to reduce discrepancies that were discussed earlier. Hence, people are constantly driven to overcome this discrepancy, but this search to reduce discrepancy is complicated by the payoff schedule for role support. Moderate discrepancies drive people to seek more role support, whereas large ones reduce efforts to secure role support for an identity. And when people have received more support than they expected for an identity, they want even more of this reward, raising this identity in salience and, over time, increasing its prominence in the hierarchy.
Peter J. Burke’s Identity Control Theory
Working squarely within the symbolic interactionist tradition, Peter J. Burke and various colleagues, particularly Jan E. Stets, have developed yet another variant of identity theory.^7 For Burke, individuals carry general views of themselves to all situations, or an idealized self , but it is the working self or self-image that guides moment-to-moment interaction.^8 The ideal- ized self may, of course, influence just how individuals see themselves in a situation, but the key dynamics of self revolve around trying to verify this working self or self-image in situations as individuals play roles. At other times, Burke has also conceptualized self as a rough hierarchy.^9 At the more abstract level is a principle self in which cultural standards contained in broader values and beliefs become part of how individuals see themselves, but this principle-level self influences behavior in situations through a program-level identity consisting of the goals that individuals seek to realize in a concrete situation. In general, the more a program-level identity is guided by a principle-level self and the more the goals of the program-level self are realized in a situation, the greater are persons’ sense of efficacy and (^7) Peter J. Burke, “The Self: Measurement Implications from a Symbolic Interactionist Perspective,” Social Psychology Quarterly 43 (1980): pp. 18–20; “An Identity Model for Network Exchange,” American Sociological Review 62 (1997): pp. 134–50; “Attitudes, Behavior, and the Self,” in The Self-Society Dynamic, eds. Judith Howard and Peter L. Callero (cited in note 2), pp. 189–208, “Identity Processes and Social Stress,” American Sociological Review 56 (1991): pp. 836–49; P. J. Burke and D. C. Reitzes, “An Identity Theory Approach to Commitment,” Social Psychology Quarterly 54 (1991): pp. 239–51; P. J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, “Trust and Commitment through Self-Verification,” Social Psychology Quarterly 62 (1999): pp. 347–66; and Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, Identity Theory (New York: Oxford University Press). (^8) Burke, “The Self: Measurement Implications from a Symbolic Interactionist Perspective” (cited in note 7). (^9) T. Tsushima and P. J. Burke, “Levels, Agency, and Control in Parent Identity,” Social Psychology Quarterly 62 (1999): pp. 173–89.
CHAPTER 16: Symbolic Interactionist Theories of Identity 343 to the standard to see if, indeed, the standard has been realized. As indi- viduals play a role in a situation, they emit outputs of meaningful behavior on the environment, particularly to other individuals in the situation who, in turn, respond to these behavioral outputs. As individuals emitting out- puts role-take with others in a situation, they experience reflected appraisals that become inputs of self-meanings that are compared to the identity stan- dard. Depending on whether or not the identity standard is met, the next round of behavioral outputs will vary. When the identity standard is real- ized, individuals will experience more positive emotions, and their subse- quent behavioral outputs will revolve around commitments to others in the situation. When inputs from others signal that the identity standard is not realized, people will experience negative emotions, and the next round of behavioral outputs will seek to change the responses of others so that a role identity can be confirmed. Thus, in Burke’s theory, humans are motivated to have inputs match up with identity standards. Behavior is goal directed in the sense that individu- als try to elicit from others in a situation responses that match their identity standard. To achieve this result, individuals orchestrate their gestures and use other signs in behavioral performances that, they hope, will allow them to receive inputs that match the identity standard.^12 (^12) Lee Freese and Peter J. Burke, “Persons, Identities, and Social Interaction,” in Advances in Group Processes , eds. Barry Markovsky, K. Heimer, and Jody O’Brien (Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1994). directs has effects on Identity standard establishes Comparator provides criterion for directs/redirects stimulates Perceived congruence between comparator and effects of outputs on environment Reflected appraisal of effects of behavioral outputs on environment leads to Behavioral outputs on environment Social environment, particularly other individuals Figure 16.1 The Cybernetic Control System in Burke’s Theory
344 PART IV: INTERACTIONIST THEORIZING In Burke’s model, a separate control system is operative for each identi- ty.^13 That is, if multiple identities are presented in a situation, each is guided by the dynamics outlined in Figure 16.1. For example, if a professor seeks to present an identity as both an intellect and a sexually attractive person, then two role identities—intellect and sexy—are revealed in behavioral outputs, and two cybernetic control systems revolving around two comparators (dic- tated by the two identities), two sets of inputs, two comparisons, and two outputs are operative. However, higher-level identities—or what Burke sometimes terms principle-level identities —often provide more general frames of reference for lower-level or program identities, thereby simplify- ing the control process. For instance, if a college professor is in the class- room, the higher-level identity revolving around beliefs in the importance of intellectual activity per se may provide guidance for how the lower-level program identity of being sexually attractive is to be orchestrated in role behaviors. In this way, the two identities are not contradictory, and the con- trol systems guiding efforts at confirmation will not work at cross-purposes.
Multiple Identities
In recent years, Burke along with Jan Stets has identified three types of identities: person identity or an individual self-conception (or what some call core-identity); role identity tied to particular roles; and social identity tied to a social group.^14 Individuals can have all three of these identities in play during an interaction, but the dynamics of identity control operate in the manner described above. Also, people have different levels of identity, such as a principle identity or a moral identity. These too, as well as other identities that a person may have, operate in the same cybernetic manner outlined in Figure 16.1. Since many potential identities can be in play at any given moment for a person, identity-control dynamics can become complicated. Still, there is probably some limit on how many identities can be salient since humans have limited cognitive capacities to store the relevant information and bring it to bear in a particular situation.
Identity and Emotions
In a number of research projects, Burke and Jan Stets have explored the effects of verification, or the failure to verify an identity, on people’s emo- tional arousal.^15 When role identities are verified by the responses of others, people will experience positive emotions, and moreover, they will generally (^13) Peter J. Burke, “Relationships Among Multiple Identities” (Conference in Bloomington, IN: The Future of Identity Theory and Research, 2001). (^14) Burke and Stets, Identity Theory (cited in note 7); see Table on p. 129. (^15) P. J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, “Trust and Commitment through Self-Verification” (cited in note 7).
346 PART IV: INTERACTIONIST THEORIZING simply too rigid in his or her expectations for how others should respond. A final condition increasing the likelihood of failure to verify an identity is where an identity is only episodically played out in a role or only occasion- ally becomes salient, with the result that the individual is simply out of practice in emitting the behavioral outputs that allow others to verify the identity.^16 Whatever the source of incongruence between (1) the expectations dic- tated by an identity standard and (2) the responses of others, discrepancies between (1) and (2) will inevitably cause individuals to experience distress and potentially other negative emotions. Several conditions increase the level of distress experienced. One is the importance to a person of others who have failed to verify a role identity. The more significant to an indi- vidual are others whose responses fail to match identity standards, the more intense is the sense of distress and the more motivated is the individual to adjust behavioral outputs to secure the appropriate responses from these significant others. Another condition is the salience of the role identity itself. The more important to a person the verification of a role identity in a situation, the more distressed that person will become when this identity is not verified. Still another condition is the more that a role identity reflects a commitment to others and the group, the more intense is the sense of distress when others do not verify the identity, especially if this identity is built around principle-level elements or the cultural values and beliefs of the group. Another condition influencing the level of stress is the direction and degree of incongruity between expectations set by a role identity and the non-confirming responses of others. When the responses of others fall below expectations, individuals will experience distress and be motivated to adjust behavioral outputs to secure verifying responses from others. More complicated is when expectations established by an identity standard are exceeded. Preliminary research indicates that the degree to which expecta- tions are exceeded determines the responses of individuals.^17 The more expectations are exceeded, the more individuals are forced to adjust their identity standards and, as a result, the more they will experience distress, whereas if expectations are exceeded to a more moderate degree, the iden- tity standards do not have to be radically adjusted, and hence, the person will experience positive emotions. Failure to verify an identity repeatedly will, over time, cause less intense negative emotions because people begin to adjust their identity standards (^16) Burke, “Identity and Social Stress” (cited in note 7) and “Social Identities and Psychosocial Stress,” in Perspectives on Structure, Theory, Life-Course, and Methods , ed. H. Kaplan (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1996); Burke and Stets, Identity Theory (cited in note 7), pp. 77–79. (^17) Jan E. Stets, “Justice, Emotion, and Identity Theory,” (Conference in Bloomington, IN: The Future of Identity Theory and Research, 2001); Jan E. Stets and T. M. Tsushima, “Negative Emotion and Coping Responses within Identity Control Theory,” Social Psychology Quarterly 64 (2001), pp. 283–295.
CHAPTER 16: Symbolic Interactionist Theories of Identity 347 downward, lowering their expectations for how others will respond.^18 But when an identity standard is not initially verified, individuals will adjust their outputs in an effort to get the identity verified. Thus, for example, a student who has the identity of good student will study much harder if he or she does not meet expectations on an examination, although if this individual consistently fails to do well, the role identity and expectations associated with this identity will be adjusted downward, and the student’s motivation to study harder will likely decline. Another option when an identity standard is not verified is for the individual to leave the situation, if possible, and thereby avoid the negative emotions that come from incon- gruities between expectations and responses of others. In sum, Burke’s identity theory generates a number of testable propo- sitions, some of which are summarized in Table 16.2. These and other propositions are implied by the theory, but equally important, they also come from efforts to test the theory. Although some research has been performed on the other identity theories summarized in this chapter, Burke’s theory is subject to ongoing research. The generalizations offered in this chapter have, to varying degrees, been confirmed by research. Moreover, in recent years, efforts have been made to reconcile Burke’s identity theory with that offered by Stryker as well as McCall and Simmons.^19 Thus, it is likely that various theories of self will become more unified in the future.
Jonathan H. Turner’s Theory on Transactional Needs
As part of my general theory of microdynamic processes, I see transac- tional needs as a critical force in human interaction.^20 Humans have certain (^18) All cited in note 17. (^19) Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, “A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity Theory” (cited in note 1); Sheldon Stryker and Peter J. Burke, “The Past, Present, and Future of Identity Theory,” Social Psychology Quarterly 63 (2000): pp. 284–97. (^20) See, for examples, A Theory of Social Interaction (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); Face-to-Face: Toward a Sociological Theory of Interpersonal Behavior (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002); Theoretical Principles of Sociology , Volume 2 on Microdynamics (New York: Springer, 2010); Human Emotions: A Sociological Theory (London: Routledge, 2008); “Toward a Theory of Embedded Encounters,” Advances in Group Processes 17 (2000): pp. 285–322; Jonathan H. Turner and Jan E. Stets, “The Moral Emotions,” in Handbook of The Sociology of Emotions , eds. Jan E. Stets and Jonathan H. Turner (New York: Springer, 2006), pp. 544–68; Jonathan H. Turner, “Emotions and Social Structure: Toward a General Theory,” in Emotions and Social Structure , eds. D. Robinson and J. Clay-Warner (New York: Elsevier, 2008), pp. 319–42; Jonathan Turner, “Self, Emotions, and Extreme Violence: Extending Symbolic Interactionist Theorizing,” Symbolic Interaction 30 (2008): pp. 290–301; “Toward A Theory of Interpersonal Processes,” in Sociological Social Psychology , eds. J. Chin and J. Cardell (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2008), pp. 65–95; Jonathan Turner, “Identities, Emotions, and Interaction Processes,” Symbolic Interaction 34 (2011): pp. 330–39.
CHAPTER 16: Symbolic Interactionist Theories of Identity 349 verify self and the identities making up self. I have come to visualize self as composed of four fundamental identities , although people can probably have an identity about almost anything. For example, recently, there has been great interest in people’s moral identities or the extent to which, and the arenas into which, people see themselves as moral.^21 Still, the most cen- tral identities are (1) core identity , or the fundamental cognitions and feel- ings that people have about themselves that are generally salient in almost all situations (some have termed this person identity ); (2) social identities , or the cognitions and feelings that people have of themselves as members of social categories (for example, gender, sexual preference, ethnicity, class, or any social category) that define people as distinctive and that generally lead to differential evaluation of memberships in social categories; (3) group identities , or cognitions and feelings about self that stem from membership in, or identification with, corporate units revealing divisions of labor (groups, communities, and organizations being the most likely sources of a group identity); and (4) role identities, or the roles that people play in any social context, but particularly the roles associated with membership in the divisions of labor in corporate units and, at times, memberships in social categories or what I term categoric units.^22 I am skeptical that there is a neat linear hierarchy of prominence or salience among identities, as is posited by most identity theories, but I would argue that some are more general than others; the more general is the identity and the more likely it is relevant and salient in a wide variety of situations, the more individuals seek to have it verified by others. Figure 16. summarizes the relations among the four identities that I am emphasizing. The core identity is the most general, followed successively by the social identity, group identity, and role identity. I also emphasize several proper- ties of this hierarchy of identities. First, the lower an identity is in generality, the more likely are individuals to be aware and able to articulate their iden- tity. For example, most people can probably tick off the cognitions and feelings that they have of themselves in role and group identities, whereas social identities and core identities are not only more complex but they also have elements that are unconscious even as they affect the behaviors of persons Second, the higher is an identity in the hierarchy portrayed in Figure 16.2, the more intense are the emotions associated with this identity. Moreover, many of the emotions, particularly negative ones, may be repressed, but this (^21) See, for example, Steven Hitlin, ed., Handbook of The Sociology of Morality (New York: Springer, 2010); Steven Hintlin, Moral Selves, Evil Selves: The Social Psychology of Conscience (London, UK: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2008). (^22) This label comes from Amos Hawley, Human Ecology: A Theoretical Essay (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986). I now use this term to denote a category of persons, seeing this category as constituting a social unit that defines individuals as distinctive, while carrying a level of evaluation of moral worth and set of expectations for the behavior of persons who are members of such categoric units.
350 PART IV: INTERACTIONIST THEORIZING
- Verification of identities : Needs to verify one or more of the four basic identities that individuals present in all encounters (a) Core identity : The conceptions and emotions that individuals have about themselves as persons that they carry to most encounters (b) Social identity : The conception that individuals have of themselves by virtue of their membership in categoric units that, depending upon the situation, will vary in salience to self and others; when salient, individuals seek to have others verify this identity. (c) Group identity : The conception that individuals have about their incumbency in corporate units (groups, organizations, and communities) and/or their identification with the members, structure, and culture of a corporate unit; when individuals have a strong sense of identification with a corporate unit, they seek to have others verify this identity. (d) Role identity : The conception that individuals have about themselves as role players, particularly roles embedded in corporate units nested in institutional domains; the more a role identity is lodged in a domain, the more likely will individuals seek to have others verify this identity. 2_._ Making a profit in the exchange of resources : Needs to feel that the receipt of resources by persons in encounters exceeds their costs and investments in securing these resources and that their shares of resources are just and fair compared to (a) the shares that others receive in the situation and (b) reference points that are used to establish what is a just share.
- Group inclusion : Needs to feel that one is a part of the ongoing flow of interaction in an encounter; the more focused is the encounter, the more powerful is this need.
- Trust : Needs to feel that others’ are predictable, sincere, respective of self, and capable of sustaining rhythmic synchronization through talk and body language
- Facticity : Needs to feel that, for the purposes of the present interaction, individuals share a common intersubjectivity that the situation is indeed as it seems and that the situation has an obdurate character Table 16.3 Transactional Needs does not prevent these repressed emotions from affecting behavior or indi- viduals’ emotional reactions when these identities are not verified by others. Third, because they are more general, social and core identities are car- ried to virtually all social situations, whereas role identities and group iden- tities are more likely to be salient when actually in a role or responding to a group. Yet, I should not over-generalize because some roles can be highly salient—say, the role of mother—and invoked outside the family in a wide variety of situations, while group identities can often be carried about to many situations, as is the case with a rapid fan of a sports team.
