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An overview of Guerrilla Hunter Killer (GH/K) operations, focusing on the concept of zones and the organizational structure of GH/K forces. topics such as GH/K command and control, offensive operations, defensive operations, and the role of external and internal command and control. It also discusses the functions of GH/K Base Camps and the importance of zones like Battle Zone, Attack Zone, Kill Zone, Disruption Zone, and Forward Support Zone.
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Page FOREWORD ………………………….……………………..……………………………………………. i
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
iii
AFTERWORD………………………….……………………..…………..………………………………. ix iv
- UPDATE 9.
Recently President Barrack Obama authorized 30,000 additional troops be sent to Afghanistan over the course of twelve months to support General McCrystal’s comprehensive Counter- Insurgency (COIN) strategy for Afghanistan. This new approach to the war in Afghanistan is meant to focus on providing greater security for the people of Afghanistan, discrediting the Taliban and helping to train Afghanistan’s security forces. This is a sound strategy and the additional forces will certainly help improve the situation in Afghanistan. However, additional attention must be given to the biggest shortcoming in either Afghanistan or Iraq; Once again allowing Military Intelli- gence to drive Maneuver. In order for intelligence to drive maneuver we must — 1) understand and define the enemy we face and how he fights and 2) capture the various data streams of infor- mation across all intelligence disciplines, and turn this raw data into comprehensive, fused intelli- gence assessments using a common set of tools. This “Smartbook” is a compilation of the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures that the 572nd Military Intelligence Company used during OEF 09- to provide timely and accurate intelligence products and assessments to the brigade and subordi- nate battalions of 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team).
Methodology After realizing that personality based targeting efforts were often times futile and counterproduc- tive, we opted to focus on producing “Area Intelligence” instead. Our approach to Area Intelli- gence consisted of three main components; Area Fusion Teams (the structure that makes area in- telligence possible), DCGS-A (the tool), and the Guerrilla Hunter Killer (Threat Template).
Area Intelligence The unconventional battlefield is an often times chaotic and confusing environment which pushes modern intelligence analysts beyond what most of their training has taught them. Analysts can no longer focus on just targeting and removing specific individuals from the battlefield, which has been the focus of efforts both in Iraq and Afghanistan, but instead must account for several vary- ing factors to develop a holistic assessment of the area of operations to clearly and accurately de- fine the operational environment. Mao Tse Tung described his war of resistance against the Japa- nese as a “war of jigsaw patterni.” By this he meant that the battlefield, “instead of a pattern of definable
26 July 2009 GUERRILLA HUNTER KILLER SMARTBOOK vi
Preface
front lines, as in conventional warfare, Mao’s war of resistance would be broken into many tiny bits each containing its own separate “mini-war.” Mao envisioned that some of the jigsaw pieces would be “safe” for his movement and others “safe” for his opponents, but the greatest number of pieces would be contested to some extent by both sidesii.” Knowing the numerous sources of information available, and the ineffectiveness of personality based targeting we made a shift to- wards Area Intelligence. G.L. Lamborn defined it best by stating that, “It *Area Intelligence+ identi- fies which districts, villages or hamlets actively assist the insurgents, which villages cooperate un- der duress with the insurgents, and which areas are generally supportive of the government-in- being. But not only does Area Intelligence identify local allegiances, it strives to give the underly- ing reasons for those allegiancesiii.” Analysts must now take into account ethnic and tribal dynam- ics, corruption, projects (both NGO and military initiated), and local security forces operations in conjunction with their effectiveness (or in-effectiveness), Human Terrain Team (HTT) data, and the enemy situation to form accurate assessments and paint the “jigsaw puzzle” that is the unconven- tional battlefield for commanders. Providing true Area Intelligence will produce the comprehen- sive picture maneuver commanders and staffs require to adequately assign resources to areas and form the basis for a solid, effective maneuver plan.
Area Fusion Team The various intelligence disciplines can no longer be separated from one another, producing stove- pipes of intelligence. Instead they must work together, fusing the intelligence disciplines together at every step. Our solution, based on the need to fuse the various forms of intelligence in order to make true All-Source, Area Intelligence assessments, came in the form of creating Area Fusion Teams (AFT). The AFTs were assigned an Area of Operations (AO) for which they provide intelli- gence oversight. Each team generally consisted of: one AFT leader, a 35F20 All Source Analyst who provides the direction and immediate oversight of intelligence analysis; one 35F10 whose main responsibility is to data mine and process reports and one 35N Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Analyst who provides on the spot SIGINT analysis for collaboration with the all source analysts. The AFTs interacted directly with the company’s Collection Management and Dissemination Cell (CM&D), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Measures and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) sections as re- quired to further fuse the intelligence disciplines.
DCGS-A The Distributive Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) is what the brigade was fielded and ex- pected to use as the primary means to collect, process, and analyze battlefield information into analytical products for the brigade commander. The DCGS-A program was developed in order to “pass critical information and intelligence down to the level requirediv,” and “by design breaks stovepipe data barriers, alters collaboration methods, and enhances the Brigade Combat Team Commander’s ability to ACT on actionable intelligencev.” Recognizing the advertised capabilities of DCGS-A, we took the tool and made it work, where the Army’s Flagship tool failed to be integrated into other intelligence processes. We pushed the system to its full capabilities, proving that DCGS- A does support the intelligence process at the Brigade Combat Team level.
26 July 2009 GUERRILLA HUNTER KILLER SMARTBOOK vii
Chapter 1
“In the Sierra Maestra, a communist leader who visited us, admiring such Improvisation and how all the little details being worked out separately were adjusted to centralized organization, stated that it was the most perfectly organized chaos in the universe.”
Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s letter to Ernesto Sabato, April 12, 1960 Episodes of the Cuban Revolutionary War, 1956-
This chapter discusses the order of battle templates derived and used by 5/2 ID (SBCT) to help define the threat faced in our Area of Operations (AO). The name and basic organi- zation come from FM 7-100.4 (Opposing Force Organization Guide) with some slight modification to more accurately reflect the current enemy structure^1.
1-1. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Refresher. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is a systematic process that builds upon itself. Without seriously considering step three (Evaluate the Threat) one cannot move on to step four (Determine Threat Course of Action). Attempting to understand how the enemy organizes and fights allows intelligence analysts to get back to predictive analysis; allowing commanders at all levels to make more informed decisions and allowing intelligence to once again drive maneuver. Once a baseline understanding is established, ISR assets can be employed to confirm or deny the initial assessment. ISR confirmation will not only provide greater clarity to enemy formations and their mission, but it will also drive targeting efforts for commanders. Accurate targeting enables offensive operations as opposed to movement to contact.
1-2. Taliban Commander. A common case of not using precise terms precisely for Afghanistan can be found in the following example—Mullah X is a TB Commander operating in Zabul and Mullah Y is a TB Commander oper- ating in Arghandab. Both Mullahs are defined as Taliban Commanders, but Mullah X operating in Zabul commands 20 fighters, while Mullah Y operating in Arghandab commands only 5 fighters. Applying the Guerrilla Hunter Killer (GH/K) template; Mullah X is a GH/K Group leader operating in Zabul and Mullah Y is a GH/K Team leader operating in Arghandab. If one understands and uses the GH/K template a general understanding of the actual number of forces commanded is clear. Using the Guerrilla Hunter Killer (GH/K) template alleviates vagueness and interpretation while supporting the decision making process for the allocation of resources and assets for maneuver commanders.
1-3. Guerrilla Hunter Killer Command and Control. Due to the unique nature of Guerrilla Hunter Killer operations, Command and Control (C2) of the Guerrilla Hunter Killer can be expressed and understood as external and internal. Both are unique in their organization and tasks they are responsible for accomplishing as part of the overall GH/K end state.
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Chapter 1
1-4. External Guerrilla Hunter Killer Command and Control. External GH/K C2 (EGH/K C2)^2 is part of the GH/K structure but is not located within the principal GH/K Macro Zones, but is instead located in a neighboring country or state not actively involved in GH/K Operations. External GH/K C2 will develop the left and right limits of GH/K operations and organization along with issuing broad guidance to Internal GH/K C2. External GH/K C2 will supply Internal GH/K C2 with supplies not readily available within the principal GH/K zones.
1-5. Internal Guerrilla Hunter Killer Command and Control. Internal GH/K C2 (IGH/K C2)^3 comes from GH/K units located in the principal GH/K Macro Zones. The internal GH/K C2 acts independently with minimal guidance from the External GH/K C2. When given a specific task by the External GH/K C2 this task will take preference, otherwise the Internal GH/K C2 displays its own initiative by planning and executing their own actions along with the pro- curement of logistics easily obtainable in zone.
1-6. Flexibility. While the GH/K template is expressed in a line and block format, the template is not as rigid as one may assume. The intent is not to build a Soviet- style Order of Battle. The intent instead is to provide a starting point for intelligence analysts and commanders to better understand and visual- ize the enemy. Fully understanding the enemy is the key to effective targeting, separation from the population and eventual defeat of enemy forces. All echelons of the GH/K may shrink or ex- pand for certain AO’s. This is not a “one-size-fits-all” approach or solution.
1-7. Roles and Responsibility in the Guerrilla Hunter Killer Template. Key to understanding the GH/K concept is the fact that one individual may be responsible for one or more roles depicted on the GH/K template. The template is just a starting point to visually de- pict these roles, and remind analysts and commanders that certain roles are essential for the Guerrilla Hunter Killer to be successful and accomplish his mission.
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Chapter 1
d. Logistics. GH/K Company Logisticians are responsible for obtaining weapons and vehi- cles for GH/K Groups as well as delivery to the various GH/K Groups.
e. Medical. Medical care at the GH/K Company level is the most comprehensive available. Medical staff at the GH/K Company level will have formal medical training and be active GH/K sup- porters. At this level the medical personnel will work solely for the GH/K, as opposed to medical personnel at the GH/K Group level who may primarily work at civilian hospitals or clinics.
1-9. Guerrilla Hunter Killer Group^5.
Figure 1-2. Guerrilla Hunter Killer Group.
Overview. GH/K Groups will have anywhere from 18-27 personnel comprised of three GH/K Teams and a Headquarters and Command element. The GH/K Group Headquarters and Com- mand element is responsible for providing command and control as well as logistical support for GH/K Team operations. It is assessed that multiple GH/K Groups will operate within a dis- trict. The GH/K group was commonly the largest formation that conducted operations in the Task Force Stryker AO.
a. C2. The GH/K Group Leader takes broad guidance from the GH/K Company Commander and executes operations. The GH/K Group leader will communicate with other GH/K Group Lead- ers if support is needed in the form of men or material and to synchronize efforts. A GH/K Group Deputy is a possibility but not a necessity for the GH/K Group to be successful.
1- 26 July 2009 GUERRILLA HUNTER KILLER SMARTBOOK
Guerrilla Hunter Killer Order of Battle
b. IED Operations. IED materials are received from the GH/K Company level, and are as- sembled almost to completion for distribution to the GH/K Team for emplacement.
c. Surveillance/Communications. Surveillance at the GH/K Group level help GH/K Group Leaders plan their movement without Coalition Forces (CF) detection, plan deliberate operations as well as exploit targets of opportunity. Civilians are a key component of GH/K reconnaissance efforts; however they are not depicted on the template. Civilians acting in a reconnaissance effort are most likely GH/K Contact, sympathizers, or may support GH/K efforts due to intimidation.
d. Logistics. Responsible for coordinating with the GH/K Company Logistics section for materials necessary to conduct operations.
e. Medical. Medical support at the GH/K Group level will have some medical training, but not necessarily as formal training as the GH/K Company Medical Personnel. The GH/K Group medi- cal personnel will take full advantage of civilian medical facilities and personnel. The medical staff providing support at civilian medical facilities will not be active GH/K supporters.
1-10. Guerrilla Hunter Killer Team^6.
Figure 1-3. Guerrilla Hunter Killer Team.
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Chapter 1
d. Command and Control. The GH/K Militia will be under local leadership, but is always subordinate to the main Guerrilla Hunter Killer Forces operating in the zone. The GH/K Militia will fall under either the Internal or External Guerrilla Hunter Killer Civil Organization explained in the next chapter.
1-12. Guerrilla Hunter Killer Contact^10.
a. Overview. Because the GH/K relies heavily on the support of the local populace in the GH/K Zones, there will be segments of the local population that provide key functions for the GH/ K. These functions include but are not limited to movement of GH/K personnel, supplies, storage of weapons and ammunition, information on enemy troop movements, information on informers, acting as guides and couriers between GH/K formations. Motivations can vary for the GH/K Con- tact. These motivations can be monetary, ideological, fear or a combination of all three. The GH/K Contact will not be a participant in GH/K direct action, nor will the GH/K allow it for the GH/K re- quires that the Contact is able to move freely through the various zones amongst the people, Guerrilla’s and enemy forces.
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Chapter 2
It is the ultimate goal of the overall Guerrilla Hunter Killer organization to replace an ex- isting government with their own. Therefore the GH/K must have a civil organization component to effectively govern the local populace of a given area as more territory falls under GH/K control^11.
2-1. Internal Guerrilla Hunter Killer Civil Organization. The Internal Guerrilla Hunter Killer Civil Organization (IGH/KCO) is found in the GH/K Base Camp Zone. The IGH/KCO is emplaced to efficiently govern the local populace and influence the people to the GH/K’s side. The functions of the internal IGH/KCO can include, but are not limited to collec- tion of taxes, establishment of a penal code and civil code along with the establishment of a judi- cial system to settle local disputes and enforce punishment on the local population for failure to follow the established IGH/KCO laws. The IGH/KCO will also establish regulations for the popula- tion to contribute food and other necessary supplies to the GH/K. There will always be a strong propaganda element to the IGH/KCO IOT explain to the population the reasons for the implemen- tation of taxes and laws. This propaganda will also show how the legitimate government is not providing the basic civil functions where as the IGH/KCO is. Through this propaganda the GH/K will be able to exploit their success amongst the local population in other zones enabling the further penetration of the GH/K for the GH/K’s success lies in the support of the people.
2-2. External Guerrilla Hunter Killer Civil Organization. The External Guerrilla Hunter Killer Civil Organization (EGH/KCO) is found in the Zone of Security and Operations. The EGH/KCO performs many of the same functions as the IGH/KCO but is no- where near as robust as the IGH/KCO because these zones are not under full GH/K control.
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Chapter 3
The primary mission of the Guerrilla Hunter Killer is to continually expand his control over a country or state. In order to accomplish this mission, the battlefield can viewed from a Macro level as comprising three primary zones. Each zone performs a specific function to the Guerrilla Hunter Killer and are necessary to expand his control^12. Defining and under- standing the battlefield using these zones can be used as a clear measure of effectiveness for maneuver forces over time.
3-1. Macro Level Guerrilla Hunter Killer Zones.
Figure 3-1. Guerrilla Hunter Killer Macro Zones.
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Chapter 3
3-2. Guerrilla Hunter Killer Zone of Operations^13. This is the principal zone of GH/K operations, as it is somewhat effectively controlled by the en- emy. GH/K’s seek to bring more and more of this zone under effective control. The Zone of Opera- tions can further be divided into the Guerrilla Hunter Killer Micro (below) zones among the subor- dinate GH/K units. Within these areas each subordinate unit exercises control over the civilian population, selects targets and carries out attacks with broad guidance from their next level of command. Occasionally the GH/K will be directed to carry out a specific attack which will take precedence, but this is not the norm. The GH/K Micro Zone definitions will be explained in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5. Battle Zone Attack Zone Kill Zone Disruption Zone Forward Support Zone
3-3. Guerrilla Hunter Killer Base Camp Zone^14. This zone is effectively controlled by the Guerrilla Hunter Killer. Headquarters and base camps will be located in this zone, usually in difficult terrain. Limited defensive operations will be conducted in this zone against enemy forces seeking to penetrate this zone.
a. Guerrilla Hunter Killer Base Camps^15. Located within the Base Camp Zone, GH/K Base Camps house command posts, training areas, communications facilities, medical stations, and lo- gistics centers. The Guerrilla Hunter Killer can defend or attack out of his GH/K base camp. How- ever, it is important to note that the GH/K does not seek to defend these base camps for any length of time; therefore he does not employ fixed, contiguous defensive fronts. The GH/K will only defend for a short time, as part of a larger movement out of the area. b. Characteristics of a Guerrilla Hunter Killer base camp^16. Cover and concealment. Rough, inaccessible terrain. Suitable for bivouac Remoteness
3-4. Guerrilla Hunter Killer Zone of Security^17. This zone is not controlled effectively by either the Guerrilla Hunter Killer or the enemy. This is the principal transient area used by the GH/K to reach the Zone of Operations. The GH/K will not offer determined resistance to the enemy in this zone for he wishes to keep this zone open in order to maintain freedom of maneuver from the Base Camp Zone to the Zone of Operations and vice versa. The GH/K will conduct limited harassing type attacks to limit enemy movement in the zone.
a. Guerrilla Hunter Killer camp. The GH/K camp is a small temporary position employed by the GH/K in the Zone of Security in route to the Zone of Operations or Base Camp Zone. The GH/K camp is employed for resting of forces, intermediate C2 or sudden meetings of GH/K leadership. 3- 26 July 2009 GUERRILLA HUNTER KILLER SMARTBOOK