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State of Maryland v. Muriel Morrison , No. 56, September Term 2019. Opinion by Hotten, J. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE—INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER— GROSS NEGLIGENCE The Court of Appeals held the evidence was not sufficient to support the involuntary manslaughter conviction, because co-sleeping by a caregiver with a child after consuming alcohol does not necessarily pose a substantial risk of harm. To the extent that the conduct creates a risk of harm, the attendant factors in conjunction with the associated risk did not support a finding of gross negligence. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE—RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT— SUBSTANTIAL RISK The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction for reckless endangerment, because the conduct did not constitute a gross departure from that of a reasonably prudent person.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 113303023 Argued: March 5, 2020 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 56 September Term, 2019
STATE OF MARYLAND v. MURIEL MORRISON
Barbera, C.J., McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Biran, JJ.
Opinion by Hotten, J., which Barbera, C.J., Watts and Booth, JJ., join. Concurring opinion by Watts, J., which Barbera, C.J. and Booth, J., join. McDonald, Getty and Biran, JJ., dissent.
Filed: July 28, 2020
Court of Special Appeals. We granted certiorari to address the following question, which we have slightly rephrased: Was the evidence sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find that [Ms. Morrison] was guilty of involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment in the death of her infant beyond a reasonable doubt?[^4 ] We answer that question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. The Underlying Incident As reflected from the trial testimony, during September 2013, Ms. Morrison resided in a three-story rowhouse in Baltimore City with her two youngest daughters, four-month- old I.M. and her four-year-old sister (“the four-year-old”).^5 Ms. Morrison awoke around 7:45 a.m. on September 2, 2013 and discovered that I.M. was unresponsive. The night before, Ms. Morrison participated in a virtual “[M]oms’ night out[]” with girlfriends and (^4) In its brief, the State phrased their question presented as follows: Was the evidence sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find that [Ms.] Morrison’s conduct amounted to gross negligence where it showed that [Ms.] Morrison, after drinking herself into a self-described state of drunkenness and/or to the point of passing out, co-slept with an infant and another child in a full-sized bed and the infant died of ‘asphyxiation from probable overlay’? (^5) To protect the privacy of the minor children involved, we do not identify them by name. See In re J.R. , 246 Md. App. 707 , 717 n.1, 232 A.3d 324 , 330 n.1 (2020).
consumed approximately four cups of beer.^6 Approximately two and a half hours later, she fell asleep in the bed she shared with her two minor daughters. At some point, the four- year-old awoke and observed Ms. Morrison sleeping on top of I.M. The four-year-old unsuccessfully attempted to awaken Ms. Morrison by yelling and “thr[o]w[ing] stuff” at her. Ms. Morrison later awoke to find the four-year-old playing on the floor next to the bed and I.M., closer to the edge of the bed, unconscious. I.M.’s lips were blue and her body was cold to the touch. The four-year-old told Ms. Morrison that she had “rolled on top of the baby” in her sleep. Ms. Morrison unsuccessfully attempted to perform CPR and called 911 twice^7 before the paramedics and police arrived at her home. I.M. was transported to Johns Hopkins Hospital (the “hospital”) for treatment, but was pronounced dead upon arrival. The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was “asphyxiation from probable overlay,” as a result of Ms. Morrison sleeping on top of the infant. Ms. Morrison was subsequently charged with involuntary manslaughter, first- degree assault, second-degree assault, and reckless endangerment, in connection with (^6) As explained in more detail below, she consumed the beers during a virtual “moms’ night out” to celebrate the impending first day of school. The other mothers were on Facebook, where they were toasting one another and celebrating virtually because they resided in different states. Ms. Morrison later testified that she consumed about two cans of beer and some portion of a forty-ounce beer—a total of four cups. (^7) The first time Ms. Morrison hung up without providing her address to the dispatcher and had to call back a second time to do so.
The four-year-old also testified that her father called on Ms. Morrison’s cell phone while the four-year-old attempted to awaken Ms. Morrison, but the ringing of the phone did not (... continued) Q: Now, when mommy was laying in the bed, can you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury if mommy ever moved, or if she just stayed still? A: Oh, by being on top of my baby sister? Q: Yes?
A: She stayed still when she was on top of my baby sister. She just rolled over. She rolled on my baby sister and then almost went back to sleep.
Q: Now, when your mommy was in the bed, before she rolled over, can you describe how she was laying in the bed? A: [S]he was like this. He[r] hair was—her hair was right here. And then she was right here. Q: [W]as your mommy laying on her back, or was she laying on her side? A: Her side…[t]his side.
Q: I can’t see you. Which one are you pointing to? A: This end. Q: Okay. On her left side? A: Yeah.
Q: --what part of mommy’s body touched [I.M.]? A: Only this side of laying on her—no—no, this side laying on her actually. This side was laying on her, and her face was turned this way actually. Q: So [,] her left breast? A: That’s what I remember.
awaken her. She further advised that I.M. was crying when Ms. Morrison laid on top of her, but she was not making any noise when the phone rang. Additionally, the four-year- old indicated that her mother appeared to have “woke[n] up out of her deep, deep sleep[,]” only briefly, after the phone call ended, but Ms. Morrison continued laying on I.M. and purportedly told the four-year-old that I.M. was okay before going back to sleep. The four- year-old also testified that she again tried to awaken Ms. Morrison, but was “too tired” and fell back asleep. Sergeant Laron Wilson (“Sgt. Wilson”), the police officer who responded to the 911 call, testified that he received a call for a “child non-breather” around 8:37 a.m. on September 2, 2013. According to Sgt. Wilson, the paramedics had already taken I.M. to the hospital, but Ms. Morrison remained upstairs, where she sat on the edge of the bed, staring blankly. Sgt. Wilson asked Ms. Morrison if she was alright, and Ms. Morrison responded, “No. I killed my baby.” She further stated: “I got drunk and killed my baby.” Sgt. Wilson did not recall observing any behavior consistent with being under the influence of alcohol. Latonya Townsend (“Ms. Townsend”), a licensed clinical social worker in the Pediatric Emergency Department at the hospital, testified regarding her interview of Ms. Morrison. According to Ms. Townsend, Ms. Morrison informed her that she drank “a few beers” the night before, after putting the children to bed. Ms. Townsend also recalled Ms. Morrison telling her that she had not consumed alcohol in quite some time prior to that evening. She also informed Ms. Townsend that when she woke up the next morning, she noticed that I.M.’s lips were blue and her body was cold. In addition, Ms. Townsend
more than half of the 40-ounce.^12 Det. Jones later transferred Ms. Morrison to Mercy Hospital for a blood alcohol concentration test. However, the collected blood sample was not tested because the “window of opportunity to … accurately test the blood for alcohol had already gone through the window.”^13 Det. Jones also testified that he never detected the smell of alcohol on her breath or person.^14 Next, the State introduced videotaped deposition testimony from the medical examiner, Dr. Ana Rubio (“Dr. Rubio”).^15 Although Dr. Rubio was unable to conclusively determine the infant’s cause of death, Dr. Rubio opined that it was likely caused by “asphyxiation from overlay[,]” because the police investigative report reflected that I.M. was found unconscious under her mother^16 and the autopsy did not reveal the presence of any traumatic injuries or “natural disease processes[.]” Regarding the manner of death, Dr. Rubio determined that I.M.’s death was accidental. When asked about other potential (^12) Her trial testimony revealed that she had two 12-ounce cans of beer and a little over half of a 40-ounce bottle of Private Stock malt liquor the night before I.M. died. (^13) Hours had elapsed between the time Ms. Morrison advised the officers she drank alcohol and the time of the interview. Det. Jones was informed by the Department that any alcohol that may have been in her system had dissipated. (^14) Det. Jones testified that he did not observe any of the typical signs of intoxication, including slurred speech, inability to comprehend instructions, or follow through with menial tasks, and that he did not administer field sobriety tests. (^15) Videotaped deposition testimony was taken in lieu of live testimony because Dr. Rubio retired before trial and was subsequently unavailable for the scheduled trial date. (^16) I.M. was not found under her mother.
causes of death, such as Sudden Infant Death Syndrome^17 (“SIDS”), Dr. Rubio testified that she was unable to either identify or rule out SIDS as the cause of death, since the possibility of asphyxiation is enhanced when the infant is sleeping with others. At the close of the State’s case, Ms. Morrison moved for judgment of acquittal, but the motion was denied.^18 Following the denial of her motion, Ms. Morrison was called as the sole witness for the defense. She testified that during the day on September 1, 2013, she and her daughters had a “tire out day, which is a day [she] spen[t][] doing activities all day[,] instead of keeping them in the house.” She further testified that, later that evening, (^17) According to the Center for Disease Control (“CDC”), “[s]udden unexpected infant death (“SUID”) is a term used to describe the sudden and unexpected death of a baby less than 1 year old[,] in which the cause was not obvious before investigation.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Sudden Unexpected Infant Death & Sudden Infant Death Syndrome , https://www.cdc.gov/sids/about/index.htm (last visited July 17, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/4SQB-XX7G. SUIDs include “sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS), accidental suffocation in a sleeping environment, and other deaths from unknown causes.” Id. The Maryland Office of the Chief Medical Examiner defines SUID as “…the sudden death of an infant less than one year of age that cannot be explained after a thorough investigation is conducted, including a complete autopsy, examination of the death scene, and a review of the clinical history. All potentially non-natural causes of death cannot reasonably be excluded by the investigation and/or there is an issue of concern; for example[,] an unsafe sleeping environment or other environmental concerns, previous SIDS in the immediate family, healed unexplained injuries, parental substance abuse etc.” Maryland State Child Fatality Review Team, 2018 Legislative Report, Health Gen. Art., § 5 - 704(b)(12), https://phpa.health.maryland.gov/documents/Health-General-Article- 5 - 704(b)(12)- Maryland-State-Child-Fatality-Review-Team- 2018 - Annual-Legislative-Report.pdf (last visited July 17, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/UQA2-8K56. Some cases of SUID fall under the subcategory of SIDs. “SIDS is a diagnosis of exclusion, assigned only when all known and possible causes of death have been ruled out.” Id. at 13. (^18) During the oral motion for judgment of acquittal, defense counsel did not mention the neglect of a minor charge.
recounted telling Sgt. Wilson, “No matter what, it’s my fault. I couldn’t save her[,]” after the paramedics rushed I.M. to the hospital. At trial, an issue arose regarding the risks of parents sleeping in same bed with their children. The State argued that Ms. Morrison was given a “Pack ‘n Play” for I.M. and informed of the importance of having a safe sleeping environment before I.M. was discharged from the hospital, but she chose to share a bed with I.M. despite the risk. Ms. Morrison testified that she did not use the “Pack ‘n Play” that the hospital provided to her because “critters”—mice and ants—would crawl inside, and she did not want them in the “Pack ‘n Play” with I.M.^20 Regarding the sleeping arrangement, Ms. Morrison also testified that she shared a bed with her mother as a child, her mother had done the same with her grandmother, and that she had engaged in the practice with each of her other children, as did many of the other mothers she knew. According to Ms. Morrison, caregivers sleeping in the same bed with their children was prevalent in her family and community. She recalled that hospital staff briefly discussed sleep safety with her when I.M. was born, but no one detailed the risks associated with co-sleeping. The prosecution argued that her decision to sleep in the same bed with her four-month-old infant after a night of drinking was “extremely reckless” and “creat[ed] a substantial harm” to her now (^20) At oral argument before this Court, the State regarded the sleeping arrangement as a distraction that was never the heart of the State’s argument regarding the recklessness of Ms. Morrison’s conduct. But, much of the prosecutor’s argument in the proceedings below relied heavily upon whether Ms. Morrison should have been aware of dangers specific to sharing a bed with her infant, after consuming alcohol. The allegations concerning the sleeping arrangement are inextricably linked to the argument that Ms. Morrison was reckless and grossly negligent.
deceased child. At the close of all of the evidence, Ms. Morrison renewed her motion for judgment of acquittal, but the motion was again denied. At the conclusion of the three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for the State, convicting Ms. Morrison of the charges of reckless endangerment, neglect of a minor, and involuntary manslaughter. She was sentenced to a total of twenty years with all suspended—ten years for involuntary manslaughter to be served consecutive to a five-year term for reckless endangerment and a five-year term for neglect of a minor—followed by the imposition of a five-year period of supervised probation. B. Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals In noting her timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Ms. Morrison argued that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions for involuntary manslaughter, reckless endangerment and neglect of a minor, and (2) any remaining convictions should merge for sentencing purposes. Morrison , 2019 WL 3992051 at *1. The Court of Special Appeals agreed that the evidence was insufficient to support Ms. Morrison’s convictions for involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment, but did not conclude Ms. Morrison had preserved her argument regarding neglect of a minor. Id. Regarding the sufficiency issue, the Court of Special Appeals held that Ms. Morrison’s conduct was insufficient to support a finding of “gross negligence,” which was required for the involuntary manslaughter conviction. Id. at *5. The court reasoned that Maryland appellate courts had not addressed the question of gross negligence as it pertains to the sleeping arrangement between a mother and her children. Id. The court specifically distinguished cases from other jurisdictions, observing that “[u]nlike the defendant in State
DISCUSSIO N
I. Standard of Review The sufficiency of the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Corbin v. State , 428 Md. 488, 514 52 A.3d 946, 961 (2012) (internal citations omitted). “[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction... is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Smith v. State , 415 Md. 174, 184, 999 A.2d 986, 991 (2010) (emphasis in original). The purpose of our review is not to engage in a “review of the record that would amount to, in essence, a retrial of the case.” Titus v. State , 423 Md. 548, 557, 32 A.3d 44, 49–50 (2011). As such, the appellate court does not “re-weigh” the credibility of witnesses or attempt to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. Fuentes v. State , 454 Md. 296, 307– 08 , 164 A.3d 265, 272 (2017). We do, however, assess “whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could convince a rational trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged[.]” White v. State , 363 Md. 150, 162, 767 A.2d 855, 862 (2001) (internal citations omitted). Although circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a conviction, “the inferences... must rest on more than mere speculation or conjecture.” Smith , 415 Md. at 185, 999 A.2d at 992. Those inferences must “afford the basis for an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
II. Parties’ Contentions The State argues that the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find that Ms. Morrison’s conduct amounted to gross negligence. According to the State, Ms. Morrison engaged in a practice—co-sleeping—that had been proven to be dangerous and, in addition to sharing a bed with her daughters, she drank enough alcohol to effectively “pass out.” The State contends that this alone was sufficient for a finding of gross negligence: [Her] admission that she was drunk when she lay down in bed with I.[M.], that she then fell asleep, that she did not know and could not remember what happened, that she did not wake up when the phone rang, and that [four-year old-daughter] could not wake [Ms.] Morrison by “thr[o]w[ing] stuff” at her, is the kind of evidence that this Court has recognized supports a finding on gross negligence. The State argues that the Court of Special Appeals focused on whether Ms. Morrison was aware of the risks associated with the sleeping arrangement, instead of applying the reasonable person standard applicable to gross negligence cases. According to the State, Ms. Morrison’s “awareness” of those risks does not absolve her of wrongdoing where the standard is that of an objectively reasonable person. The State did not explicitly address the merits of the reckless endangerment charge, stating only that “[a] conviction for reckless endangerment also requires proof of the defendant’s gross negligence.” Ms. Morrison argues that the Court of Special Appeals did not err because a reasonable trier of fact could not find sufficient evidence that Ms. Morrison acted with willful or wanton disregard for human life, or recklessly engaged in behavior that was substantially likely to cause death or serious bodily harm. Comparing the case at bar to
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence A. The Court of Special Appeals correctly held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for involuntary manslaughter based on gross negligence. Evidence is legally sufficient if any rational jury could find “the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Coleman , 423 Md. 666, 672 , 33 A.3d 468, 471 (2011) (internal citations omitted). As such, we begin our analysis with the essential elements of the underlying crime. Neither the parties nor the Court of Special Appeals addressed whether there was sufficient evidence of actual and legal causation, and we need not address the issue sua sponte. Therefore, our review is limited to whether any reasonable jury could have found that Ms. Morrison’s conduct was grossly negligent.
- The Gross Negligence Involuntary Manslaughter Standard. Common law involuntary manslaughter is generally defined as an “unintentional killing of a human being, irrespective of malice.”^23 State v. Thomas , 464 Md. 133, 152, 211 A.3d 274, 285 (2019) (citing State v. Albrecht , 336 Md. 475, 499, 649 A.2d 336 (... continued) felony would require all mothers to know each and every risk associated with raising children—including co-sleeping. The Center highlights the racial, socioeconomic, and gender-based biases underlying judgments regarding co-sleeping. Finally, the WLC contends that criminal liability for co-sleeping does not advance the goals of the criminal justice system—punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation—because Ms. Morrison is a grieving mother “who needs not be convicted of a felony to punish her,” and such a conviction would neither rehabilitate her nor deter others from engaging in similar behavior. (^23) In Maryland, involuntary manslaughter is a common law felony. The punishment for involuntary manslaughter is codified in Md. Code, Criminal Law Article (“Crim. Law”) § 2-207.
(1994)). To sustain a conviction for involuntary manslaughter, the prosecution must prove that the killing was committed in one of three ways: “(1) by doing some unlawful act endangering life but which does not amount to a felony[;] or (2) in negligently doing some act lawful in itself[;] or (3) by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty.” Corbin , 428 Md. at 5 13 n.14, 52 A.3d at 961 n.14 (citing Albrecht , 336 Md. at 449, 649 A.2d at 347 ). For the latter two variations of involuntary manslaughter, “the negligence [must] be criminally culpable.” Thomas , 464 Md. at 152, 211 A.3d at 285 (internal citations omitted). Negligence is criminally culpable if it rises to the level of wanton and reckless conduct— i.e., gross negligence. See Mills v. State, 13 Md. App. 196, 200, 282 A.2d 147, 200 (1971) (“[T]he negligence [must] be criminally culpable[.]”); Albrecht , 336 Md. at 499, 649 A.2d at 347– 48 (“[W]here the charge of involuntary manslaughter is predicated upon the allegation that the defendant committed a lawful act in a negligent manner, a conviction of manslaughter will not lie on a showing of simple negligence... but must rather be predicated upon that degree of aggravated negligence which is termed ‘gross negligence.’” (emphasis added)). Depending on the circumstances presented, there is often a fine line of distinction between simple negligence and gross negligence. This Court has long recognized that “[t]here are degrees of negligence in the sense that some acts evidence a greater degree of carelessness and recklessness than do other acts which may still be classed as negligent.” State, Use of Abell v. W. Maryland R. Co. , 63 Md. 433, 444 (1885). In Stracke v. Butler , 465 Md. 407, 214 A.3d 561 (2019)—a civil case addressing gross negligence—we expounded on that principle, noting that “[i]ssues involving gross negligence are often
