ICC Investigation into Crimes Committed in Central African Republic (CAR) since 2012, Slides of Religion

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Situation in the Central African Republic II

Article 53(1) Report

Executive Summary

24 September 2014

the ICC by the CAR authorities in December 2004. The Prosecutor therefore decided to open a preliminary examination into this new situation.^2

5. On 30 May 2014, the transitional government of the CAR referred to the Prosecutor pursuant to article 14 of the Statute “ la situation qui prévaut sur le territoire de la République Centrafricaine depuis le 1er août 2012 ” (“the situation on the territory of the Central African Republic since 1 August 2012”).^3
6. On 13 June 2014, the Prosecutor formally notified the Presidency of the referral pursuant to Regulation 45 of the Regulations of the Court.
7. On 18 June 2014, the Presidency assigned the Situation in the Central African Republic II to Pre-Trial Chamber II.^4

Contextual background

8. The Central African Republic is a landlocked country in central Africa sharing borders with Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Congo and Cameroon. It is one of the poorest countries in the world. Several different ethnic groups make up the population (estimated at 5,277,959), the largest being the Gbaya (33%), residing mainly in the north-east, and the Banda (27%), residing throughout the country. Sango and French are the most commonly spoken languages, with Arabic also spoken in the north. Prior to the conflict, 15% of the population was reportedly Muslim, 25% Roman Catholic, 25% Protestant and 35% followers of indigenous beliefs.
9. Political instability and armed conflict have plagued the country since 2001. President François BOZIZÉ, who ousted President PATASSÉ from power in 2003, dominated the political landscape for several years. In August 2012, the armed, organized rebel movement Séléka (meaning “alliance” in Sango) emerged as a coalition of militant political and armed groups representing Muslims in the north-east and other groups dissatisfied with President BOZIZÉ, including some of his former close associates. A number of Sudanese and Chadian nationals also joined Séléka.

(^2) ICC OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on opening a new Preliminary Examination in the Central African Republic, 7 February 2014. (^3) See referral of the Central African Republic, annexed to the Decision Assigning the Situation in the Central African Republic II to Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/14-1-Anx1, 18 June 2014. See also ICC OTP, Statement by the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the referral of the situation since 1 August 2012 in the Central African Republic, 12 June 2014. (^4) Decision Assigning the Situation in the Central African Republic II to Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/14- 1, 18 June 2014.

10. Séléka launched a major military offensive on 10 December 2012. Facing little resistance from the Central African Armed Forces (“FACA”), the group advanced quickly until they were stopped close to Bangui by forces from Chad and from the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR (“MICOPAX”) of the Economic Community of Central African States (“ECCAS”). ECCAS- facilitated negotiations resulting in the Libreville Agreements of 11 January 2013 prevented an imminent coup but ultimately failed to bring lasting peace. Séléka resumed its offensive, took Bangui and, on 24 March 2013, seized power. President BOZIZÉ was forced into exile and Séléka leader Michel DJOTODIA was appointed as President.
11. Following the coup d’état , Séléka forces continued to expand their control over CAR territory and sought to suppress resistance, in particular in regions associated with former President BOZIZÉ and his (Gbaya) ethnic group. Civilians in those regions were reportedly frequently subjected to attacks by Séléka fighters, involving mass looting, destruction of property, killings, wounding and sexual violence. In the face of criticism over the conduct of the group, President DJOTODIA declared in September 2013 the dissolution of Séléka, while several thousand “former Séléka” members were integrated into the FACA by decree. However, Séléka continued to exist de facto and allegedly continued to commit crimes, particularly as “anti-balaka” groups started to generate armed resistance to Séléka’s rule.
12. Anti-balaka began to engage Séléka forces militarily from June 2013 but became more organized over the following weeks and months, apparently with the integration of numerous former FACA members.
13. As the conflict between Séléka and anti-balaka escalated, the violence also became more sectarian. Anti-balaka attacks allegedly targeted Muslim civilians, associating them with Séléka on the basis of their religion, while Séléka targeted non-Muslims in return, in particular those of the Gbaya ethnic group or those associated with former President BOZIZÉ.
14. On 5 December 2013, as a new African Union-mandated peacekeeping force (“MISCA”) was preparing to take over from the smaller ECCAS-mandated force in the CAR, and on the eve of the deployment of the French troops mandated to support the AU forces, anti-balaka launched an apparently well- coordinated attack on Bangui which first targeted Séléka positions before beginning retaliatory attacks on Muslims throughout the city. In the ensuing violence, which continued for several weeks, both Séléka and anti-balaka

situation is a national of a State Party or a State accepting jurisdiction of the Court under article 12(3).

18. Jurisdiction ratione materiae : The information available provides a reasonable basis to believe that, since at least December 2012, an armed conflict of a non- international character has been taking place in the CAR between Government forces, and organised armed groups and between such groups, considering that: (i) Séléka and anti-balaka exhibit a sufficient degree of organization and (ii) the violence is of sufficient intensity to justify the application of international, as opposed to national, law.
19. Accordingly, conduct that took place in the context of and was associated with this armed conflict may qualify as war crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court.
20. The information available provides a reasonable basis to believe that both Séléka and anti-balaka members have committed crimes against humanity within the territory of the CAR. Information available provides a reasonable basis to conclude that, from February 2013 at the latest to the time of writing of the present report, Séléka forces conducted a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population as they expanded their control of the territory of the CAR, targeting perceived opponents in the civilian population. In late 2013 these attacks allegedly became more notably targeted at non-Muslim civilians, who were perceived as supporters of anti-balaka.
21. The information available provides a reasonable basis to believe that, from September 2013 at the latest, anti-balaka carried out a widespread and systematic attack against the Muslim civilian population, whom they perceived to be supportive of Séléka. The attack was reportedly concentrated in Bangui and the west of the country and forced a massive displacement of Muslim civilians to other parts of the country or out of the country.
22. The information available provides a reasonable basis to believe that Séléka has committed the following war crimes (at the latest from December 2012 onwards) and crimes against humanity (at the latest from February 2013 onwards): murder as a war crime under article 8(2)(c)(i) and as a crime against humanity under article 7(1)(a); mutilation, cruel treatment and torture as war crimes under article 8(2)(c)(i) and torture and/or other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity under articles 7(1)(f) and (k); intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such under article 8(2)(e)(i); attacking personnel or objects involved in a humanitarian assistance mission under article 8(2)(e)(iii); intentionally directing attacks against protected objects

under article 8(2)(e)(iv); pillaging under article 8(2)(e)(v); rape as a war crime under article 8(2)(e)(vi) and as a crime against humanity under article 7(1)(g); conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities under article 8(2)(e)(vii); and persecution in connection with the above-mentioned alleged crimes of murder, rape, torture and/or other inhumane acts under article 7(1)(h).

23. The information available also provides a reasonable basis to believe that anti- balaka have committed the following war crimes (at the latest from June 2013 onwards) and crimes against humanity (at the latest from September 2013 onwards): murder as a war crime under article 8(2)(c)(i) and as a crime against humanity under article 7(1)(a); committing outrages upon personal dignity under article 8(2)(c)(ii); intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such under article 8(2)(e)(i); attacking personnel or objects involved in a humanitarian assistance mission under article 8(2)(e)(iii) ; intentionally directing attacks against protected objects under article 8(2)(e)(iv); pillaging under article 8(2)(e)(v); rape as a war crime under article 8(2)(e)(vi) and as a crime against humanity under article 7(1)(g); conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities under article 8(2)(e)(vii); deportation or forcible transfer of population under article 7(1)(d); and persecution in connection with the above-mentioned alleged crimes of murder, rape and deportation or forcible transfer of population under article 7(1)(h).
24. While there is some information about alleged crimes committed by members of the FACA, in particular the Presidential Guard of former President BOZIZÉ , between at least 1 January and 23 March 2013, there is insufficient information at this stage to reach a determination on whether such alleged crimes constitute war crimes under article 8 of the Statute.

Admissibility

25. Complementarity: To date, a limited number of proceedings have been launched in the CAR in relation to crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Some of these proceedings relate to groups of persons and conduct which could potentially be the subject of investigations by the Office. Existing proceedings remain, however, at the preliminary stage and the Office understands that the prosecutors and police generally lack the capacity and security to conduct investigations and apprehend and detain suspects.