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Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 03ñ
DONALD P. ROPER, SUPERINTENDENT, POTOSI CORRECTIONAL CENTER, PETITIONER v. CHRISTOPHER SIMMONS ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI [March 1, 2005]
J USTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires us to address, for the second time in a decade and a half, whether it is permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States to execute a juvenile offender who was older than 15 but younger than 18 when he commit- ted a capital crime. In Stanford v. Kentucky , 492 U. S. 361 (1989), a divided Court rejected the proposition that the Constitution bars capital punishment for juvenile offend- ers in this age group. We reconsider the question.
I At the age of 17, when he was still a junior in high school, Christopher Simmons, the respondent here, com- mitted murder. About nine months later, after he had turned 18, he was tried and sentenced to death. There is little doubt that Simmons was the instigator of the crime. Before its commission Simmons said he wanted to murder someone. In chilling, callous terms he talked about his plan, discussing it for the most part with two friends, Charles Benjamin and John Tessmer, then aged 15 and 16
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respectively. Simmons proposed to commit burglary and murder by breaking and entering, tying up a victim, and throwing the victim off a bridge. Simmons assured his friends they could ìget away with itî because they were minors. The three met at about 2 a.m. on the night of the mur- der, but Tessmer left before the other two set out. (The State later charged Tessmer with conspiracy, but dropped the charge in exchange for his testimony against Sim- mons.) Simmons and Benjamin entered the home of the victim, Shirley Crook, after reaching through an open window and unlocking the back door. Simmons turned on a hallway light. Awakened, Mrs. Crook called out, ìWhoís there?î In response Simmons entered Mrs. Crookís bed- room, where he recognized her from a previous car acci- dent involving them both. Simmons later admitted this confirmed his resolve to murder her. Using duct tape to cover her eyes and mouth and bind her hands, the two perpetrators put Mrs. Crook in her minivan and drove to a state park. They reinforced the bindings, covered her head with a towel, and walked her to a railroad trestle spanning the Meramec River. There they tied her hands and feet together with electrical wire, wrapped her whole face in duct tape and threw her from the bridge, drowning her in the waters below. By the afternoon of September 9, Steven Crook had returned home from an overnight trip, found his bedroom in disarray, and reported his wife missing. On the same afternoon fishermen recovered the victimís body from the river. Simmons, meanwhile, was bragging about the killing, telling friends he had killed a woman ìbecause the bitch seen my face.î The next day, after receiving information of Simmonsí involvement, police arrested him at his high school and took him to the police station in Fenton, Missouri. They read him his Miranda rights. Simmons waived his right to
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During closing arguments, both the prosecutor and defense counsel addressed Simmonsí age, which the trial judge had instructed the jurors they could consider as a mitigating factor. Defense counsel reminded the jurors that juveniles of Simmonsí age cannot drink, serve on juries, or even see certain movies, because ìthe legisla- tures have wisely decided that individuals of a certain age arenít responsible enough.î Defense counsel argued that Simmonsí age should make ìa huge difference to [the jurors] in deciding just exactly what sort of punishment to make.î In rebuttal, the prosecutor gave the following response: ìAge, he says. Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isnít that scary? Doesnít that scare you? Miti- gating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary.î The jury recommended the death penalty after finding the State had proved each of the three aggravating factors submitted to it. Accepting the juryís recommendation, the trial judge imposed the death penalty. Simmons obtained new counsel, who moved in the trial court to set aside the conviction and sentence. One argu- ment was that Simmons had received ineffective assis- tance at trial. To support this contention, the new counsel called as witnesses Simmonsí trial attorney, Simmonsí friends and neighbors, and clinical psychologists who had evaluated him. Part of the submission was that Simmons was ìvery immature,î ìvery impulsive,î and ìvery susceptible to being manipulated or influenced.î The experts testified about Simmonsí background including a difficult home environment and dramatic changes in behavior, accompa- nied by poor school performance in adolescence. Simmons was absent from home for long periods, spending time using alcohol and drugs with other teenagers or young adults. The contention by Simmonsí postconviction coun- sel was that these matters should have been established in the sentencing proceeding.
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The trial court found no constitutional violation by reason of ineffective assistance of counsel and denied the motion for postconviction relief. In a consolidated appeal from Simmonsí conviction and sentence, and from the denial of postconviction relief, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Simmons , 944 S. W. 2d 165, 169 (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U. S. 953 (1997). The federal courts denied Simmonsí petition for a writ of habeas cor- pus. Simmons v. Bowersox , 235 F. 3d 1124, 1127 (CA8), cert. denied, 534 U. S. 924 (2001). After these proceedings in Simmonsí case had run their course, this Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a mentally retarded person. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 (2002). Simmons filed a new petition for state postconviction relief, arguing that the reasoning of Atkins established that the Constitu- tion prohibits the execution of a juvenile who was under 18 when the crime was committed. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed. State ex rel. Sim- mons v. Roper , 112 S. W. 3d 397 (2003) (en banc). It held that since Stanford ,
ìa national consensus has developed against the exe- cution of juvenile offenders, as demonstrated by the fact that eighteen states now bar such executions for juveniles, that twelve other states bar executions al- together, that no state has lowered its age of execu- tion below 18 since Stanford , that five states have leg- islatively or by case law raised or established the minimum age at 18, and that the imposition of the ju- venile death penalty has become truly unusual over the last decade.î 112 S. W. 3d, at 399.
On this reasoning it set aside Simmonsí death sentence and resentenced him to ìlife imprisonment without eligi- bility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the Governor.î Id., at 413.
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(opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). The plurality opinion explained that no death penalty State that had given express consideration to a minimum age for the death penalty had set the age lower than 16. Id., at 826ñ829. The plurality also ob- served that ì[t]he conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense is con- sistent with the views that have been expressed by re- spected professional organizations, by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European community.î Id., at
- The opinion further noted that juries imposed the death penalty on offenders under 16 with exceeding rarity; the last execution of an offender for a crime committed under the age of 16 had been carried out in 1948, 40 years prior. Id., at 832ñ833. Bringing its independent judgment to bear on the per- missibility of the death penalty for a 15-year-old offender, the Thompson plurality stressed that ì[t]he reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsi- bilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.î Id., at 835. According to the plurality, the lesser culpability of offenders under 16 made the death penalty inappropriate as a form of retribution, while the low like- lihood that offenders under 16 engaged in ìthe kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the pos- sibility of executionî made the death penalty ineffective as a means of deterrence. Id., at 836ñ838. With J USTICE OíC ONNOR concurring in the judgment on narrower grounds, id. , at 848ñ859, the Court set aside the death sentence that had been imposed on the 15-year-old offender. The next year, in Stanford v. Kentucky , 492 U. S. 361 (1989), the Court, over a dissenting opinion joined by four
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Justices, referred to contemporary standards of decency in this country and concluded the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did not proscribe the execution of juvenile offenders over 15 but under 18. The Court noted that 22 of the 37 death penalty States permitted the death penalty for 16-year-old offenders, and, among these 37 States, 25 permitted it for 17-year-old offenders. These numbers, in the Courtís view, indicated there was no national consen- sus ìsufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and unusual.î Id., at 370ñ371. A plurality of the Court also ìemphatically reject[ed]î the suggestion that the Court should bring its own judgment to bear on the acceptability of the juvenile death penalty. Id., at 377ñ378 (opinion of SCALIA, J., joined by R EHNQUIST , C. J., and White and KENNEDY , JJ.); see also id. , at 382 (OíC ONNOR, J., concur- ring in part and concurring in judgment) (criticizing the pluralityís refusal ìto judge whether the ë ìnexus between the punishment imposed and the defendantís blamewor- thinessî í is proportionalî). The same day the Court decided Stanford , it held that the Eighth Amendment did not mandate a categorical exemption from the death penalty for the mentally re- tarded. Penry v. Lynaugh , 492 U. S. 302 (1989). In reach- ing this conclusion it stressed that only two States had enacted laws banning the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded person convicted of a capital of- fense. Id., at 334. According to the Court, ìthe two state statutes prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded, even when added to the 14 States that have rejected capi- tal punishment completely, [did] not provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus.î Ibid. Three Terms ago the subject was reconsidered in Atkins. We held that standards of decency have evolved since Penry and now demonstrate that the execution of the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual punishment. The Court noted objective indicia of societyís standards, as
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The beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question. This data gives us essential instruction. We then must determine, in the exercise of our own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.
III A
The evidence of national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles is similar, and in some respects parallel, to the evidence Atkins held sufficient to demon- strate a national consensus against the death penalty for the mentally retarded. When Atkins was decided, 30 States prohibited the death penalty for the mentally re- tarded. This number comprised 12 that had abandoned the death penalty altogether, and 18 that maintained it but excluded the mentally retarded from its reach. 536 U. S., at 313ñ315. By a similar calculation in this case, 30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising 12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, by express provision or judicial in- terpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach. See Appen- dix A, infra. Atkins emphasized that even in the 20 States without formal prohibition, the practice of executing the mentally retarded was infrequent. Since Penry , only five States had executed offenders known to have an IQ under
- 536 U. S., at 316. In the present case, too, even in the 20 States without a formal prohibition on executing juve- niles, the practice is infrequent. Since Stanford , six States have executed prisoners for crimes committed as juveniles. In the past 10 years, only three have done so: Okla- homa, Texas, and Virginia. See V. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973ñDecember 31,
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2004, No. 76, p. 4 (2005), available at http://www.law. onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/JuvDeathDec2004.pdf (last updated Jan. 31, 2005) (as visited Feb. 25, 2005, and available in the Clerk of Courtís case file). In December 2003 the Governor of Kentucky decided to spare the life of Kevin Stanford, and commuted his sentence to one of life imprisonment without parole, with the declaration that ì ë[w]e ought not be executing people who, legally, were children.í î Lexington Herald Leader, Dec. 9, 2003, p. B3, 2003 WL 65043346. By this act the Governor ensured Kentucky would not add itself to the list of States that have executed juveniles within the last 10 years even by the execution of the very defendant whose death sentence the Court had upheld in Stanford v. Kentucky. There is, to be sure, at least one difference between the evidence of consensus in Atkins and in this case. Impres- sive in Atkins was the rate of abolition of the death pen- alty for the mentally retarded. Sixteen States that per- mitted the execution of the mentally retarded at the time of Penry had prohibited the practice by the time we heard Atkins. By contrast, the rate of change in reducing the incidence of the juvenile death penalty, or in taking spe- cific steps to abolish it, has been slower. Five States that allowed the juvenile death penalty at the time of Stanford have abandoned it in the intervening 15 yearsófour through legislative enactments and one through judicial decision. Streib, supra , at 5, 7; State v. Furman , 122 Wash. 2d 400, 858 P. 2d 1092 (1993) (en banc). Though less dramatic than the change from Penry to Atkins (ìtelling,î to borrow the word Atkins used to de- scribe this difference, 536 U. S., at 315, n. 18), we still consider the change from Stanford to this case to be sig- nificant. As noted in Atkins , with respect to the States that had abandoned the death penalty for the mentally retarded since Penry , ì[i]t is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the
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In the words of the Missouri Supreme Court: ìIt would be the ultimate in irony if the very fact that the inappropri- ateness of the death penalty for juveniles was broadly recognized sooner than it was recognized for the mentally retarded were to become a reason to continue the execu- tion of juveniles now that the execution of the mentally retarded has been barred.î 112 S. W. 3d, at 408, n. 10. Petitioner cannot show national consensus in favor of capital punishment for juveniles but still resists the con- clusion that any consensus exists against it. Petitioner supports this position with, in particular, the observation that when the Senate ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U. N. T. S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), it did so subject to the Presidentís proposed reservation regarding Article 6(5) of that treaty, which prohibits capital punish- ment for juveniles. Brief for Petitioner 27. This reserva- tion at best provides only faint support for petitionerís argument. First, the reservation was passed in 1992; since then, five States have abandoned capital punish- ment for juveniles. Second, Congress considered the issue when enacting the Federal Death Penalty Act in 1994, and determined that the death penalty should not extend to juveniles. See 18 U. S. C. ß3591. The reservation to Arti- cle 6(5) of the ICCPR provides minimal evidence that there is not now a national consensus against juvenile executions. As in Atkins , the objective indicia of consensus in this caseóthe rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practiceóprovide sufficient evi- dence that today our society views juveniles, in the words Atkins used respecting the mentally retarded, as ìcate- gorically less culpable than the average criminal.î 536 U. S. , at 316.
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B A majority of States have rejected the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is required by the Eighth Amendment. Because the death penalty is the most severe punish- ment, the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force. Thompson , 487 U. S., at 856 (OíC ONNOR, J., concur- ring in judgment). Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit ìa narrow category of the most serious crimesî and whose extreme culpability makes them ìthe most deserving of execution.î Atkins , supra, at
- This principle is implemented throughout the capital sentencing process. States must give narrow and precise definition to the aggravating factors that can result in a capital sentence. Godfrey v. Georgia , 446 U. S. 420, 428ñ 429 (1980) (plurality opinion). In any capital case a de- fendant has wide latitude to raise as a mitigating factor ìany aspect of [his or her] character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant prof- fers as a basis for a sentence less than death.î Lockett v. Ohio , 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); Ed- dings v. Oklahoma , 455 U. S. 104, 110ñ112 (1982); see also Johnson v. Texas , 509 U. S. 350, 359ñ362 (1993) (summa- rizing the Courtís jurisprudence after Furman v. Georgia , 408 U. S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) , with respect to a sen- tencerís consideration of aggravating and mitigating fac- tors). There are a number of crimes that beyond question are severe in absolute terms, yet the death penalty may not be imposed for their commission. Coker v. Georgia , 433 U. S. 584 (1977) (rape of an adult woman); Enmund v. Florida , 458 U. S. 782 (1982) (felony murder where defen- dant did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill). The death penalty may not be imposed on certain classes of offenders, such as juveniles under 16, the insane, and the mentally retarded, no matter how heinous the crime. Thompson v. Oklahoma , supra; Ford v. Wainwright , 477
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niles] lack the freedom that adults have to extricate them- selves from a criminogenic settingî). The third broad difference is that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed. See generally E. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968). These differences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders. The susceptibil- ity of juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means ìtheir irresponsible conduct is not as morally rep- rehensible as that of an adult.î Thompson , supra, at 835 (plurality opinion). Their own vulnerability and compara- tive lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment. See Stanford , 492 U. S., at 395 (Bren- nan, J., dissenting). The reality that juveniles still strug- gle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juve- nile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character. From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minorís character deficiencies will be reformed. Indeed, ì[t]he relevance of youth as a miti- gating factor derives from the fact that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.î Johnson , supra, at 368; see also Steinberg & Scott 1014 (ìFor most teens, [risky or antisocial] behaviors are fleeting; they cease with maturity as individual identity becomes settled. Only a relatively small proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into adulthoodî). In Thompson , a plurality of the Court recognized the
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import of these characteristics with respect to juveniles under 16, and relied on them to hold that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles below that age. 487 U. S., at 833ñ838. We conclude the same reasoning applies to all juvenile offend- ers under 18. Once the diminished culpability of juveniles is recog- nized, it is evident that the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults. We have held there are two distinct social pur- poses served by the death penalty: ì ëretribution and deter- rence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.í î Atkins , 536 U. S., at 319 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia , 428 U. S. 153, 183 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS , JJ.)). As for retribution, we remarked in Atkins that ì[i]f the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.î 536 U. S., at 319. The same conclusions follow from the lesser cul- pability of the juvenile offender. Whether viewed as an attempt to express the communityís moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the vic- tim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult. Retribution is not proportional if the lawís most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpa- bility or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity. As for deterrence, it is unclear whether the death pen- alty has a significant or even measurable deterrent effect on juveniles, as counsel for the petitioner acknowledged at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. In general we leave to legislatures the assessment of the efficacy of various criminal penalty schemes, see Harmelin v. Michigan , 501 U. S. 957, 998ñ999 (1991) (K ENNEDY , J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Here, however, the
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is both arbitrary and unnecessary to adopt a categorical rule barring imposition of the death penalty on any of- fender under 18 years of age. We disagree. The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability. An unacceptable likeli- hood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offenderís objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less se- vere than death. In some cases a defendantís youth may even be counted against him. In this very case, as we noted above, the prosecutor argued Simmonsí youth was aggravating rather than mitigating. Supra , at 4. While this sort of overreaching could be corrected by a particular rule to ensure that the mitigating force of youth is not overlooked, that would not address our larger concerns. It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differenti- ate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juve- nile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. See Steinberg & Scott 1014ñ1016. As we understand it, this difficulty underlies the rule forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing any patient under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, a disorder also referred to as psycho- pathy or sociopathy, and which is characterized by cal- lousness, cynicism, and contempt for the feelings, rights, and suffering of others. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 701ñ706 (4th ed. text rev. 2000); see also Steinberg & Scott 1015. If trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we conclude that States
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should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver condemnationóthat a juvenile offender merits the death penalty. When a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity. Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be drawn. The plurality opinion in Thompson drew the line at 16. In the intervening years the Thompson pluralityís conclusion that offenders under 16 may not be executed has not been challenged. The logic of Thompson extends to those who are under 18. The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest. These considerations mean Stanford v. Kentucky should be deemed no longer controlling on this issue. To the extent Stanford was based on review of the objective indicia of consensus that obtained in 1989, 492 U. S., at 370ñ371, it suffices to note that those indicia have changed. Supra , at 10ñ13. It should be observed, fur- thermore, that the Stanford Court should have considered those States that had abandoned the death penalty alto- gether as part of the consensus against the juvenile death penalty, 492 U. S., at 370, n. 2; a Stateís decision to bar the death penalty altogether of necessity demonstrates a judgment that the death penalty is inappropriate for all offenders, including juveniles. Last, to the extent Stan- ford was based on a rejection of the idea that this Court is
