Primitive Concepts and Conceptual Analysis, Study notes of Literature

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Primitive Concepts

David J. Chalmers

Conceptual Analysis:

A Traditional View

n A traditional view: Most ordinary concepts (or

expressions) can be defined in terms of other more basic

concepts (or expressions)

n bachelor = unmarried man

n knowledge = justified true belief

n All concepts can ultimately be defined in terms of

primitive concepts.

Some Versions: Cognitive

Science

n Roger Schank: Conceptual Dependency theory

n 11 primitive action concepts: ATRANS, PTRANS, MOVE, PROPEL, GRASP, INGEST, EXPEL, ATTEND, SPEAK, MBUILD, DO

n Anna Wierzbicka: Semantic primes

n 60+ primitive lexical items

n E.g. plants = living things; these things can ’ t feel something;

these things can ’ t do something

Philosophical Doubts about the

Traditional Picture

n Worry: Most expressions don’t seem to have (short) definitions or explicit analyses that are a priori equivalent to the original n For most purported definitions/analyses, one can find conceptually possible counterexamples n If so: then on the definitional account of primitive concepts (where definitions must be a priori), most concepts will be primitive? n But still: some concepts seem more primitive than others…

Some Primitive Concepts?

n Many/most concepts are like knowledge here, but not all.

n E.g. time (and temporal concepts)?

n To determine whether certain temporal concepts apply to a situation, one needs to use temporal concepts to describe it?

n Some other candidates:

n space (and spatial concepts)? n consciousness (and phenomenal concepts)? n red (and perceptual concepts)? n existence (and logical concepts)?

Wierzbicka’s primitives

n N.B. Some of Wierzbicka’s primitives seem not to be primitive in this sense: e.g. know, living, inside, touching n One can describe an entity in non- living involving terms and make a conceptual judgment about whether it is living n One can describe the geometry of bodies without using touching and make a conceptual judgment about whether they are touching n Of course they may still be primitive in Wierzbicka’s sense n (involving indefinability in more basic terms, and an appropriate standard of definitional adequacy) n I think there are multiple notions of primitiveness, but I’ll focus on one.

Scrutability of Reference

n The Scrutability of Reference:

n Once we know enough about the world, we’re in a

position to know what our terms and our concepts

refer to.

n Something like this is the basis of the conditional model of conceptual analysis.

Examples

n E.g. ‘water’

n A priori, we don’t know what ‘water’ refers to

n Could be H2O, XYZ, whatever

n Once we know enough about the environment, we

know that ‘water’ refers to H2O

n E.g. given knowledge of appearance, behavior, composition, distribution, history of environmental objects and substances

Scrutability of Truth

n For most terms T used by a speaker, then for any truth S

involving T, there exists a truth D such that D is

independent of T and D is epistemically sufficient for T

n D is independent of T when D doesn’t contain T or any close cognates. n D is epistemically sufficient for T when knowing that D is the case puts the speaker in a position to know (on sufficient rational reflection, without needing further empirical information) that T is the case.

Scrutability of Truth II

n There is a relatively limited vocabulary V such that for

any truth S, there is a V-truth D such that D implies S.

n D implies S when ‘D⊃S’ is a priori n The move from epistemic sufficiency to a priori entailment is substantive but plausible (C&J 2001) n To obtain a limited vocabulary, just eliminate “scrutable” terms one by one according to the previous thesis

What is in an Epistemic Basis?

n Chalmers & Jackson 2001:

n For all truths S, PQTI implies S.

n P = microphysical truths

n Involving mass, charge, spacetime, etc

n Q = phenomenal truths

n Involving phenomenal concepts of experiences

n T = that’s-all truth

n The world is a minimal world satisfying P&Q

n I = indexical truths

n Specifying one’s location in the world (using ‘I’, ‘now’, etc)

PQTI as Epistemic Basis?

n I’ll assume that the C&J 2001 thesis is correct.

n First pass suggestion: the expressions used in PQTI

form an epistemic basis?

n But: it’s implausible that microphysical concepts are

primitive.

n Microphysical terms are scrutable using e.g. causal-role characterizations.

n Still: we can use PQTI as a starting-point to find an

epistemic basis.

Perceptual Terms?

n Arguably: truths involving perceptual terms (such as ‘red’) are scrutable using truths about experiences and the properties that cause them. n I.e. given full knowledge of underlying properties of all the things that cause red and green experiences and so on, I’m in a position to know which things are red and green. n [Even a primitivist about redness can allow that the truths about redness are scrutable, with the aid of the that’s-all clause.] n If so, we can eliminate color terms using phenomenal and causal vocabulary. Same for other secondary quality terms. n Something similar is plausible for ‘mass’ (scrutable from truths about what causes mass-experiences, what resists acceleration, etc).

Spatiotemporal Terms?

n Hard case: Spatiotemporal terms n View 1: Our grasp on spatial properties is “indirect”. It’s a priori that spatial properties and relations (if they exist) are those properties and relations that stand in an appropriate causal relation to our spatial experiences. If so, spatial terms are scrutable using phenomenal and causal terms. n View 2: Our grasp on spatial properties is “direct”. No thesis about causal connections between these properties and our experiences is a priori. If so, spatial terms are not scrutable as above, and are plausibly primitive. n Similar alternatives for temporal terms.