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Pragmatic Account of Explanation - Philosophy of Science - Lecture Notes, Study notes of Philosophy

Pragmatic Account of Explanation, Bas Van Fraassen, Constructive Empiricism, Description and Explanation, Explanatory Power, Essentially Descriptions, Context Dependent, Pragmatic Account, Explanation and Science, Success of Explanation are the important key points of lecture notes of Philosophy.

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Pragmatic Account of Explanation
Bas van Fraassen
Anti-realist
Constructive empiricism
Offers a pragmatic model of explanation
Description and explanation
It is often thought that there is a big difference between description and explanation.
A good description must merely state the facts in an empirically adequate manner.
A good explanation must be empirically adequate and provide understanding.
A good explanation has explanatory power in addition to being empirically accurate.
But what is this additional “explanatory power”?
It cannot be a matter of empirical facts, for all of these are covered by description.
But if it is not a matter of empirical facts, then it invokes mysterious relations.
E.g., necessary vs. contingent relationships in nature, scientific vs. non-scientific explanations,
etc.
Explanations are essentially descriptions
There is no evidence that explanations have an extra-empirical component.
If you ask a scientist for an explanation, the information she gives you is no different in kind
from the kind of information she gives when asked for a description.
The same goes in everyday explanations.
Scientific explanations are just explanations using scientific information. They are no different
in form or kind from everyday explanations.
Explanations are context-dependent
It is wrong to think that explanation is a relation between a (scientific) theory and fact.
Rather, it is a relation between theory, fact, and context.
An explanation is an answer to a question.
The information requested by a question depends on our interests.
We ask for a part of the full description which we do not know and which is important to us for
some reason.
This is why a same answer to the same question can be illuminating for someone and not for
others.
Example
Why did the car crashed?
Police officer: the driver was driving too fast.
Meteorologist: it was raining and the street was wet.
Civil engineer: the turn is too sharp at this place.
Mechanics: the tires were too old and worn.
In short…
Explanation are just (partial) descriptions.
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Pragmatic Account of Explanation Bas van Fraassen

  • Anti-realist Constructive empiricism
  • Offers a pragmatic model of explanation

Description and explanation It is often thought that there is a big difference between description and explanation.

  • A good description must merely state the facts in an empirically adequate manner.
  • A good explanation must be empirically adequate and provide understanding. A good explanation has explanatory power in addition to being empirically accurate.

But what is this additional “explanatory power”?

  • It cannot be a matter of empirical facts, for all of these are covered by description.
  • But if it is not a matter of empirical facts, then it invokes mysterious relations.
  • E.g., necessary vs. contingent relationships in nature, scientific vs. non-scientific explanations, etc.

Explanations are essentially descriptions There is no evidence that explanations have an extra-empirical component.

  • If you ask a scientist for an explanation, the information she gives you is no different in kind from the kind of information she gives when asked for a description.
  • The same goes in everyday explanations.
  • Scientific explanations are just explanations using scientific information. They are no different in form or kind from everyday explanations.

Explanations are context-dependent It is wrong to think that explanation is a relation between a (scientific) theory and fact. Rather, it is a relation between theory, fact, and context.

  • An explanation is an answer to a question.

The information requested by a question depends on our interests.

  • We ask for a part of the full description which we do not know and which is important to us for some reason.
  • This is why a same answer to the same question can be illuminating for someone and not for others.

Example Why did the car crashed?

  • Police officer: the driver was driving too fast.
  • Meteorologist: it was raining and the street was wet.
  • Civil engineer: the turn is too sharp at this place.
  • Mechanics: the tires were too old and worn.

In short… Explanation are just (partial) descriptions.

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  • They only contain empirical facts. They are context-dependent
  • The information needed to provide an explanation will depend on the specific interests of the one asking an explanation.
  • That’s what makes it informative and/or illuminating.

Consequences of the pragmatic account Explanations do not need to have the form of an argument

  • Contra Hempel’s covering-law model Explanations do not need to refer to causes.
  • Contra Salmon’s causal account.

Explanation and science Explanatory power is not a superempirical virtue of scientific theories. But the search for explanations is still good for science, for it is a search for empirically adequate theories.

In van Fraasssen’s own words “a success of explanation is a success of adequate and informative description. And while it is true that we seek for explanation, the value for science is that the search for explanation is ipso facto a search for empirically adequate, empirically strong theories.”

  • Bas van Fraassen, 1980, p.157.

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