Cross-National Variation in Adapting to New Social Risks: Post-Industrial Welfare Politics, Slides of Sociology

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The Politics of Post Industrial Welfare States

Explaining cross-national variation in the adaptation to new social risks

The late 2000s: a new « consensus » for the welfare

state

• The 2000s have seen the emergence of a new

« consensus » on social policy

• It puts emphasis on “social investment”
• Defended by international organisations, and,

within countries, different political forces

• Countries have moved in this direction, but at

a different speed and with different results

| Diapositive 2 |

Examples of old and new social

policies

Old

• Pensions
• Survivors benefits
• Short term unemployment

benefits

• Sickness benefits
• Invalidity benefits

New

• Active labour market policies
• In work benefits
• Child care services
• Family benefits
• Parental leave

| Diapositive 4 |

It is justified to distinguish between two sorts of social

policies, because:

1. They constitute responses to different

social transformations (industrialisation/

postindustrialisation)

2. They have different objectives

(decommodification/ labour market

participation)

3. They target different groups
4. Why not?

| Diapositive 5 |

Spending on old and new polices as a % of GDP, averages 1997-

2001

2.00 4.00 6.00 8.

Spe nding on NSR police s

Spending on industrial social polices

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

AUS

A

B

CAN

DK

FIN

F

D

I

NL

NZ

N

P

E

S

CH

UK

US

| Diapositive 7 |

Source: OECD SOCX 2004

The timing of key postindustrial developments in 18

OECD countries

Service

employment

as a % of

total civilian

employment

Female

employment rate,

as a proportion of

the 15- 64

population

Divorce rate

(divorces per 100

marriages)

Average

benchmark year

Benchmark

(Swedish level in 1970)

Year in which the Swedish 1970 level was reached (benchmark year)

Sweden 1970 1970 1970 1970

Denmark NA 1971 1972 1972

Norway 1972 NA 1981 1977

Finland 1983 1982 1976 1980

UK 1975 1988 1975 1979

US < 1970 1984 < 1970 1975

Canada < 1970 1987 1978 1978

Australia (^) <1970 1995 NA 1982

New Zealand 1978 1988 NA 1979

Germany 1986 2001 1981 1989

France 1978 > 2003 1982 1988

Netherlands NA 1998 1981 1990

Switzerland 1980 1987 1980 1982

Belgium NA >2003 1984 1993

Austria 1988 1994 1982 1988

Italy 1985 >2003 > 2003 1994

Spain 1989 >2003 > 2003 1996

Portugal 1992 1990 > 2003 1995

| Diapositive 8 |

Source: Based on OECD Statistical compendium

Alternative explanations 1: the strength of the left

0.00 25.00 50.00 75.00 100.

Weighted left cabinet shares 1996-

Spending on new social risk policies

A

A A A

A A A A A A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

AUS

A

B

CAN

DK

FIN

F

D

GR

I

NL

NZ

N

P

E

S

CH

UK

US

| Diapositive 10 |

Source: OECD SOCX and Armingeon et al. CPDS

Alternative explanation 2: the strength of the Christian

democrats

0.00 25.00 50.00 75.

Weighted Christ. Dem. cabinet share, 1996-

Spending on new social risk policies, 1997-2001)

A

A A A

A A A A A A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

AUS

A

B

CAN

DK

FIN

F

D

GR

I

NL

NZ

N

P

E

CH

UK

US

| Diapositive 11 |

Source: OECD SOCX and Armingeon et al. CPDS

Competing explanations: correlation matrix

Average

benchmark

year

Percentage of

Catholics, late

1990s

Weighted

Christ. Dem.

cabinet share,

1996 - 2000

Weighted left

cabinet shares

1996 - 2000

Percentage of Catholics,

late 1990s

.866**

N 18 18

Weighted Christ. Dem.

cabinet share, 1996- 2000

.576* .521*

N 17 17

Weighted left cabinet

shares 1996- 2000

• .157 - .113 -.

N 18 18 18

Spending on new social

risk policies, 1997- 2001

• .566* - .509* - .259 .465*

N 18 18 18 19

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

• Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

| Diapositive 13 |

Source: see previous slides

Alternative explanation: catching up

Increase in spending on the new polices in the 1990s and

spending in 1987-

0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.

Spending on NSR policies, 1987-

Increase in NSR exp. between 1987-1991 and 1997-

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

AUS

B

CAN

DK

FIN

F

D

I

NL

NZ

N

P

E

S

CH

UK

US

| Diapositive 14 |

Pooled time series analysis of spending on childcare

and ALMPs

• ALMPs: spending data 1981-2003 * 21

OECD countries, time t

• Childcare: spending data 1996-2003 * 23

OECD countries, time t

• IV: strength of the Left, Christian

democracy, trade openness, proportion of

women in parliament, spending on old age

(+ controls), at time t-

| Diapositive 16 |

Prais-Winsten Regression of spending on

ALMPs, 1981-2003.

Model 2 Model 3

Left parties -0.0050** -0.

Religious parties 0.0039** 0.

Trade openness 0.0018 0.0023*

Left parties * trade open. 0.00011** 0.

Spending on old age

Public social expenditure

Unemployment rate 0.0187** -0.

p.c. GDP in PPP (1000) 0.0002 -0.

Common Rho 0.84 0.

R-square 0.09 0.

N 404 380

| Diapositive 17 |

Source: G. Bonoli, The Political Economy of Activation , Lausanne, IDHEAP, Working paper No.

1/2008, available on www.idheap.ch/ps

Conclusions?

• We clearly need a multicausal explanation to

account for the divergence

• Timing matters, through an institution-

induced crowding out effect

• Politics also matters. But we need a more

complex understanding of politics.

• Left parties are not identical across countries

• Need to focus on new cleavages (gender, age)

| Diapositive 19 |