Download Plato the apology summary and more Study notes Philosophy in PDF only on Docsity!
Plato: The Apology of Socrates
H. N. Fowler Translation, Loeb (1913) Edited with introduction and notes by E. E. Garvin (2013)
Introduction
It would not be possible to overestimate the importance of Socrates in the development of the Western episteme. While it is true that Socrates occupies a position in a continuum of philosophical thought, it is equally true that his contribution was pivotal. Socrates himself wrote nothing except some verses of poetry in his final days - of which nothing survives - and our best connection to Socrates comes from the works of Plato and, to a lesser degree, Xenophon. Plato was a young but ardent follower of Socrates and he produced a body of literature known as the Socratic Dialogues which purport to be faithful transcriptions of conversations Socrates had with various people over the course of his career. This corpus has been so influential that A. N. Whitehead ( Process and Reality. 1979: 39) famously says that all of Western philosophy "consists of a series of footnotes to Plato." It is Plato, then, who is credited with being the founder of the Western intellectual tradition and in his honour we coin such terms as 'academic' and 'academia' after the Academy, the school founded by Plato a few years after the death of Socrates. In that Academy Plato taught Aristotle and Aristotle's works form, among other things, the basis of what is now called The Scientific Method. In a nutshell, then, we have in these three men, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, the genesis and guiding principles of all things philosophical in the European, or Western, tradition. Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete (Plato Alcibiades 131e), was born in 469/ BC. His father, was a sculptor and his mother a midwife. Socrates spent his entire life in Athens and was married to Xanthippe by whom he had a son, Lamprocles. According to Xenophon ( Symposium 2.10), Xanthippe was "the most difficult to get along with of all the women there are
- yes, or all that ever were, I suspect, or ever will be," but Socrates himself could not have been so easy to live with either.
The Indictment against Socrates is recorded by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of the Eminent Philosophers , ii.5.40:^1 [40] The affidavit in the case, which is still preserved, says Favorinus,^2 in the Metron , ran as follows: "This indictment and affidavit is sworn by Meletus, the son of Meletus of Pitthos, against Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus of Alopece: Socrates is guilty of refusing to recognize the gods recognized by the state, and of introducing other new divinities. He is also guilty of corrupting the youth. The penalty demanded is death.
The Apology of Socrates
1 [17a - 18a]
[17a] [1] How you, men of Athens, have been affected by my accusers, I do not know; but I, for my part, almost forgot my own identity, so persuasively did they talk; and yet there is hardly a word of truth in what they have said. But I was most amazed by one of the many lies that they told; when they said that you must be on your guard not to be deceived by me, [17b] because I was a clever speaker. For I thought it the most shameless part of their conduct that they are not ashamed because they will immediately be convicted by me of falsehood by the evidence of fact, when I show myself to be not in the least a clever speaker, unless indeed they call him a clever speaker who speaks the truth; for if this is what they mean, I would agree that I am an orator - not after their fashion. Now they, as I say, have said little or nothing true; but you shall hear from me nothing but the truth. Not, however, men of Athens, speeches; finely tricked out with words and phrases, [17c] as theirs are, nor carefully arranged, but you will hear things said at random with the words that happen to occur to me. For I trust that what I say is just; and let none of you expect anything else. For surely it would not be fitting for one of my age to come before you like a youngster making up speeches. And, men of Athens, I urgently beg and beseech you if you hear me making my defence with the same words with which I have been accustomed to speak both in the market place at the bankers' tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, [17d] not to be
(^1) Diogenes Laertius wrote a history of philosophy in ten books, probably in the late 2nd century
2 AD^. Very little is otherwise known. Favorinus was a philosopher who lived in the early 2nd century AD , under the reign of Hadrian and although he wrote extensively, none of his works survive.
because they had been themselves persuaded - all these are most difficult to cope with; for it is not even possible to call any of them up here and cross-question him, but I am compelled in making my defence to fight, as it were, absolutely with shadows and to cross-question when nobody answers. Be kind enough, then, to bear in mind, as I say, that there are two classes [18e] of my accusers-one those who have just brought their accusation, the other those who, as I was just saying, brought it long ago, and consider that I must defend myself first against the latter; for you heard them making their charges first and with much greater force than these who made them later. Well, then, I must make a defence; men of Athens, [19a] and must try in so short a time to remove from you this prejudice which you have been for so long a time acquiring. Now I wish that this might turn out so, if it is better for you and for me, and that I might succeed with my defence; but I think it is difficult, and I am not at all deceived about its nature. But nevertheless, let this be as is pleasing to God,^1 the law must be obeyed and I must make a defence.
3 [19a - d]
Now let us take up from the beginning the question, what the accusation is from which the false prejudice against me has arisen, in which [19b] Meletus trusted when he brought this suit against me. What did those who aroused the prejudice say to arouse it? I must, as it were, read their sworn statement as if they were plaintiffs: "Socrates is a criminal and a busybody, investigating the things beneath the earth and in the heavens and making the weaker argument stronger^2 and [19c] teaching others these same things." Something of that sort it is. For you yourselves saw these things in Aristophanes' comedy, a Socrates being carried about there, proclaiming that he was treading on air and uttering a vast deal of other nonsense, about which I know nothing, either much or little. And I say this, not to cast dishonour upon such knowledge, if anyone is wise about such matters (may I never have to defend myself against Meletus on so great a charge as that!), but I, men of Athens, have nothing to do with these things. [19d] And I offer as witnesses most of yourselves, and I ask you to inform one another and to tell, all those of you who ever heard me conversing - and there are many such among you - now tell, if anyone ever heard
(^1) Although the Greeks adhered to a polytheistic religion, they often referred to 'god' in the singular, rather than 'the gods' as one might expect. We might assume that Zeus is meant, especially in this
2 case since Zeus is god of justice. For an interesting discussion on this phrase see Gagarin, Michael, 2002. Antiphon the Athenian; Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists. Austin: University of Texas Press; 25.
me talking much or little about such matters. And from this you will perceive that such are also the other things that the multitude say about me.
4 [19d - 20c]
But in fact none of these things are true, and if you have heard from anyone that I undertake to teach [19e] people and that I make money by it, that is not true either. Although this also seems to me to be a fine thing, if one might be able to teach people, as Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis are.^1 For each of these men, gentlemen, is able to go into any one of the cities and persuade the young men, who can associate for nothing with whomsoever they wish among their own fellow citizens, [20a] to give up the association with those men and to associate with them and pay them money and be grateful besides. And there is also another wise man here, a Parian, who I learned was in town;^2 for I happened to meet a man who has spent more on sophists than all the rest, Callias, the son of Hipponicus;^3 so I asked him - for he has two sons - "Callias," said I, "if your two sons had happened to be two colts or two calves, we should be able to get and hire for them an overseer who would make them [20b] excellent in the kind of excellence proper to them; and he would be a horse-trainer or a husbandman; but now, since they are two human beings, whom have you in mind to get as overseer? Who has knowledge of that kind of excellence, that of a man and a citizen? For I think you have looked into the matter, because you have the sons. Is there anyone," said I, "or not?" "Certainly," said he. "Who," said I," and where from, and what is his price for his teaching?" "Evenus," he said, "Socrates, from Paros, five minae."^4 And I called Evenus blessed, [20c] if he really had this art and taught so reasonably. I myself should be vain and put on airs, if I understood these things; but I do not understand them, men of Athens.
(^1) These are just three of the many itinerant sophists flourishing at the time. They would travel about the Greek World teaching public speaking for a fee. It was believed that their teachings could give a person the advantage in both the courts and the assemblies. It was also widely
2 believed that they taught a form of trickery and that these 'fancy speakers' should not be trusted. 3 A reference to Evenus of Paros (Plato^ Phaedrus^ 267a; Aristotle^ Metaphysics^ 1015a) One of the wealthiest men in Athens and a frequent patron of sophists. The dialogue of Plato's Protagoras takes place in the house of Callias. He most famous for squandering the family
4 fortune Or 500 drachmae, a considerable sum given that soldiers were paid two drachmae per day (Thuc. iii.17.3). Socrates claimed that his entire estate was worth only 5 minae (Xenophon Oec. ii.3).
6 [21b - 21e]
[21b] But see why I say these things; for I am going to tell you whence the prejudice against me has arisen. For when I heard this, I thought to myself: "What in the world does the god mean, and what riddle is he propounding? For I am conscious that I am not wise either much or little. What then does he mean by declaring that I am the wisest? He certainly cannot be lying, for that is not possible for him." And for a long time I was at a loss as to what he meant; then with great reluctance I proceeded to investigate him somewhat as follows: I went to one of those who had a reputation for wisdom, [21c] thinking that there, if anywhere, I should prove the utterance wrong and should show the oracle "This man is wiser than I, but you said I was wisest." So examining this man - for I need not call him by name, but it was one of the politicians^1 with regard to whom I had this kind of experience, men of Athens - and conversing with him, this man seemed to me to seem to be wise to many other people and especially to himself, but not to be so; and then I tried to show him that he thought [21d] he was wise, but was not.^2 As a result, I became hateful to him and to many of those present; and so, as I went away, I thought to myself, "I am wiser than this man; for neither of us really knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either.^3 I seem, then, in just this little thing to be wiser than this man at any rate, that what I do not know I do not think I know either." From him I went to another of those who were reputed [21e] to be wiser than he, and these same things seemed to me to be true; and there I became hateful both to him and to many others.
7 [21e - c]
After this then I went on from one to another, perceiving that I was hated, and grieving and fearing, but nevertheless I thought I must consider the god's business of the highest importance. So I had to go, investigating the meaning of the oracle, to all those who were reputed to know
(^1) Fowler translates 'one of the public men' for τις τῶν πολιτικῶν ( tis ton politikon ) but there seems
2 no need to avoid the obvious here; the phrase is "one of the politicians." It is impossible to know with any certainty who is referred to here, but my suspicion is that the
3 man would have been Pericles. Here, then, is the first tenet of Socratic philosophy: In order to learn one must admit ignorance. True wisdom is understanding how little you know, and how much you have still to learn.
anything. [22a] And by the Dog,^1 men of Athens - for I must speak the truth to you - this, I do declare, was my experience; those who had the most reputation seemed to me to be almost the most deficient, as I investigated at the god's behest, and others who were of less repute seemed to be superior men in the matter of being sensible. So I must relate to you my wandering as I performed this hard work,^2 in order that the oracle might be proved to be irrefutable. For after the politicians I went to the poets, those of tragedies, and those of dithyrambs, [22b] and the rest, thinking that there I should prove by actual test that I was less learned than they. So, taking up the poems of theirs that seemed to me to have been most carefully elaborated by them, I asked them what they meant, that I might at the same time learn something from them. Now I am ashamed to tell you the truth, gentlemen; but still it must be told. For there was hardly a man present, one might say, who would not speak better than they about the poems they themselves had composed. So again in the case of the poets also I presently recognised this; that it was not by wisdom that they composed [22c] what they composed, but imagination^3 and because they were inspired, like the prophets and givers of oracles; for these also say many fine things, but know none of the things they say; it was evident to me that the poets too had experienced something of this same sort.^4 And at the same time I perceived that they, on account of their poetry, thought that they were the wisest of men in other things as well, in which they were not. So I went away from them also thinking that I was superior to them in the same thing in which I excel1ed the politicians.
(^1) A literal translation of νὴ τὸν κύνα ( ne ton kyna ) and the favourite oath of Socrates ( Pahedo 98e; Cratylus 411b; Phaedrus 228b; Gorgias 461b, 466c). The meaning is obscure but it may be equivalent to 'by gosh' and 'by golly' in English; ways to say 'by God!' without using the name in vain. However, Socrates is never afraid to call on a god by name. We are tempted, however, by the phrase "by the Dog, god of the Egyptians" in Plato's Gorgias (482b); more clearly a reference
2 to Anubis, the Egyptian god who is depicted with a dog's (jackal's) head. Fowler offers '… as I performed my Herculean labours, so to speak,' but the Greek does not
3 support a reference to Heracles, hence the amendment. Fowler has '…that what they composed they composed not by wisdom, but by nature and because they were inspired." The word order above more accurately reflects the MS and, in this context, 'nature' seems a rather ambiguous rendering of φύσει (physei) The Greek physis is most often
4 translated as 'nature' but its nuances are many. These statements alone should have been enough to convict Socrates. What he has just said is much like standing in St. Peter's and declaring that the Pope knows nothing about religion.
they find a great plenty of people who think they know something, but know little or nothing. As a result, therefore, those who are examined by them are angry with me, instead of being angry with themselves, and say that "Socrates is a most abominable person and is corrupting the youth."^1 [23d] And when anyone asks them "by doing or teaching what?" they have nothing to say, but they do not know, and that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say these things that are handy to say against all the philosophers, "the things in the air and the things beneath the earth " and "not to believe in the gods " and "to make the weaker argument stronger."^2 For they would not, I fancy, care to say the truth, that it is being made very clear that they pretend to know, but know nothing. [23e] Since, then, they are jealous of their honour and energetic and numerous and speak concertedly and persuasively about me, they have filled your ears both long ago and now with vehement slanders. From among them Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon. Meletus angered on account of the poets, and Anytus on account of the artisans and the politicians, and [24a] Lycon on account of the orators; so that, as I said in the beginning, I should be surprised if I were able to remove this prejudice from you in so short a time when it has grown so great. There you have the truth, men of Athens, and I speak without hiding anything from you, great or small or prevaricating. And yet I know pretty well that I am making myself hated by just that conduct; which is also a proof that I am speaking the truth and that this is the prejudice against me and these are its causes. [24b] And whether you investigate this now or hereafter, you will find that it is so.
11 [24b - c]
Now so far as the accusations are concerned which my first accusers made against me, this is a sufficient defence before you; but against Meletus, the good and patriotic, as he says, and the later ones, I will try to defend myself next. So once more, as if these were another set of accusers, let us take up in turn their sworn statement. It is roughly as follows: it states that Socrates is a
(^1) Part of Socrates' problem is that these "sons of the richest men" included Alcibiades, the nephew of Pericles and a man so consumed with self-interest that he was condemned as a traitor; Theramenes, one of the architects of the oligarchic revolution of 411; and Critias, leader of the Thirty Tyrants, to name but a few. In the two decades prior to his trial it is difficult to find a
2 single political disaster in Athens the authors of which cannot be linked to Socrates. See above, p. 3 n.5. Fowler's translation "to make the weaker argument the stronger" is an error. The MS says τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν, 'to make the weaker argument stronger.' The inclusion or omission of the second definite article is what determines the meaning of the phrase.
wrongdoer because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings. [24c] Such is the accusation. But let us examine each point of this accusation. He says I am a wrongdoer because I corrupt the youth. But I, men of Athens, say Meletus is a wrongdoer, because he jokes in earnest, lightly involving people in a lawsuit,^1 pretending to be zealous and concerned about things for which he never cared at all. And that this is so I will try to make plain to you also.
12 [24c - 25c]
Come here, Meletus, tell me: don't you consider it of great importance [24d] that the youth be as good as possible? "I do." Come now, tell these gentlemen who makes them better? For it is-evident that you know, since you care about it. For you have found the one who corrupts them, as you say, and you bring me before these gentlemen and accuse me; and now, come, tell who makes them better and inform them who he is. Do you see, Meletus, that you are silent and cannot tell? And yet does it not seem to you disgraceful and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you have never cared about it? But tell, my good man, who makes them better? [24e] "The laws." But that is not what I ask, most excellent one, but what man, who knows in the first place just this very thing, the laws. "These men, Socrates, the Jurors." What are you saying, Meletus? Are these gentlemen able to instruct the youth, and do they make them better? "Certainly." All, or some of them and others not? "All." Well said, by Hera, and this is a great plenty of helpers you speak of. But how about this: [25a] Do these listeners make them better, or not? "These also."
(^1) Frivolous lawsuits were a problem in the highly litigious Athenian political and financial culture. To reduce sycophancy, any prosecutor who won less than one fifth of the jury vote had to pay a fine of one thousand drachmae. Socrates is, here, accusing Meletus of sycophancy.
whereas I have reached such a depth of ignorance that I do not even know this, that if I make anyone of my associates bad I am in danger of getting some harm from him, so that I do this great evil voluntarily, as you say? I don't believe this, Meletus, nor do I think anyone else in the world does! [26a] But either l do not corrupt them, or if I corrupt them, I do it involuntarily, so that you are lying in both events. But if I corrupt them involuntarily, for such involuntary errors the law is not to hale people into court, but to take them and instruct and admonish them in private. For it is clear that if l am told about it, I shall stop doing that which I do involuntarily. But you avoided associating with me and instructing me, and were unwilling to do so, but you hale me in here: where it is the law to hale in those who need punishment, not instruction.
14 [26a - 27a]
But enough of this, for, men of Athens, this is clear, as l said, that Meletus never cared much [26b] or little for these things. But nevertheless, tell us, how do you say, Meletus, that I corrupt the youth? Or is it evident, according to the indictment you brought, that it is by teaching them not to believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings? Do you not say that it is by teaching this that I corrupt them? "Very decidedly that is what I say." Then, for the sake of these very gods about whom our speech now is, speak still more clearly both to me and to these gentlemen, [26c] Meletus: For I am unable to understand whether you say that I teach that there are some gods, and myself then believe that there are some gods, and am not altogether godless and am not a wrongdoer in that way, that these, however, are not the gods whom the state believes in, but others, and this is what you accuse me for, that I believe in others; or you say that I do not myself believe in gods at all and that I teach this unbelief to other people. "That is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all." You amaze me, Meletus! Why do you say this? [26d] Do I not even believe that the sun or yet the moon are gods, as the rest of mankind do? "No, by Zeus, judges, since he says that the sun is a stone and the moon earth." Do you think you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus, and do you so despise these gentlemen and think they are so unversed in letters as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras
of Clazomenae are full of such utterances?^1 And indeed the youth learn these doctrines from me, which they can buy sometimes [26e] (if the price is high) for a drachma in the orchestra and laugh at Socrates, if he pretends they are his own, especially when they are so absurd! But for heaven's sake, do you think this of me, that I do not believe there is any god? "No, by Zeus, you don't, not in the least." You cannot be believed, Meletus, not even, as it seems to me, by yourself. For this man appears to me, men of Athens, to be altogether hubristic and undisciplined, and actually to have composed this baseless indictment with arrogance and juvenile carelessness.^2 [27a] For he seems, as it were, by composing a puzzle to be making a test: "Will Socrates, the wise man, recognize that I am joking and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and the others who hear me?" For he appears to me to contradict himself in his speech, as if he were to say," Socrates is a wrongdoer, because he does not believe in gods, but does believe in gods." And yet this is the conduct of a jester.
15 [27a - 28a]
Join me, then, gentlemen, in examining how he appears to me to say this; and do you, Meletus, answer; [27b] and you, gentlemen, as I asked you in the beginning, please bear in mind not to make a disturbance if I conduct my argument in my accustomed manner. Is there any human being who believes that there are things pertaining to human beings, but no human beings? Let him answer, gentlemen, and not make a disturbance in one way or another. Is there anyone who does not believe in horses, but does believe in things pertaining to horses, or who does not believe that flute-players exist, but that things pertaining to flute-players do? There is not, best of men; if you do not wish to answer, I say it to you and these others here. But answer at least the next question. [27c] Is there anyone who believes divine things exist, but does not believe in divinity?^3 "There is not."
(^1) Anaxagoras of Clazomenae was a Natural Philosopher who lived and taught in Athens from 479
2 to roughly 429^ BC^.^ He was exiled for impiety. 3 This line has been retranslated by the editor to conform more closely with the^ MS^ .. Fowler has "spiritual things" for δαιμόνια ( daimonia ) but 'divine' is the correct translation. Because Greek religious beliefs have long been denigrated as pagan mythology, the Greek daimon has, in English, evolved into 'demon.'
be bad who died at Troy, including the son of Thetis,^1 who so despised danger, in comparison with enduring any disgrace, that when his mother (and she was a goddess) said to him, as he was eager to slay Hector, something like this, I believe, 'My son, if you avenge the death of your friend Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself shall die;' "for straightway," she says, "after Hector, is death appointed for you." He, when he heard this, made light of death and danger, [28d] and feared much more to live as a coward and not to avenge his friends, and 'Straightway,' said he, 'may I die, after doing vengeance upon the wrongdoer, that I may not stay here, jeered at beside the curved ships, a burden of the earth.'^2 Do you think he considered death and danger? For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth; wherever a man stations himself, thinking it is best to be there, or is stationed by his commander, there he must, as it seems to me, remain and run his risks, considering neither death nor any other thing more than disgrace.^3
17 [28d - 30b]
So I should have done a terrible thing, [28e] Men of Athens, if, when the commanders whom you chose to command me stationed me, at Potidaea and at Amphipolis and at Delium,^4 I remained where they stationed me, like anybody else, and ran the risk of death, but when the god gave me a station, as I believed and understood, with orders to spend my life in philosophy and in examining myself and others, [29a] then I were to desert my post through fear of death or anything else whatsoever It would be a terrible thing, and truly one might then justly hale me into court, on the charge that I do not believe that there are gods, since I disobey the oracle and fear death and think I am wise when I am not. For to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing else than to think one is wise when one is not; for it is thinking one knows what one does not know: For no one knows whether death be not even the greatest of all blessings to man, but they fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. [29b] And is not this the most reprehensible form of ignorance, that of thinking
(^1) Achilles. (^2) These quotes are from Homer, Iliad xviii 96; 98 & 104. (^3) This last section is a tour de force in argumentation. What he is saying is that he, just like any member of the Jury, knows his Homer and his obligations as a hoplite soldier and citizen. He might just have said 'Men of Athens, I value our common religious and civic beliefs and customs
4 just as you do.' But it is much more effective to make the statement as a display. The Siege of Potidaea began in the winter of 432/1 and did not end until the winter of 430/29 BC. The Battle of Delium was fought in November of 424 and it was very shortly after that Amphipolis fell to the Spartans without a battle. Socrates could be referring to the battle at Amphipolis in 421, but he may also be referring to the founding of Amphipolis in 437.
one knows what one does not know? Perhaps, gentlemen, in this matter also I differ from other men in this way, and if I were to say that, I am wiser in anything, it would be in this, that not knowing very much about the other world, I do not think I know. But I do know that it is evil and disgraceful to do wrong and to disobey him who is better than I, whether he be god or man. So I shall never fear or avoid those things concerning which I do not know whether they are good or bad rather than those which I know are bad. And therefore, [29c] even if you acquit me now and are not convinced by Anytus, who said that either I ought not to have been brought to trial at all, or since I was brought to trial, I must certainly be put to death, adding that if, I were acquitted your sons would all be utterly ruined by practising what I teach - if you should say to me in reply to this, "Socrates, this time we will not do as Anytus says, but we will let you go, on this condition, however, that you no longer spend your time in this investigation or in philosophy, and if you are caught doing so again you shall die." [29d] If you should let me go on this condition which I have mentioned, I should say to you, 'Men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never give up philosophy or stop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to any one of you whom I may meet, saying in my accustomed way: Most excellent man, are you who are a citizen of Athens, the greatest of cities and the most famous for wisdom and power, not ashamed to care for the acquisition of wealth [29e] and for reputation and honour, when you neither care nor take thought for wisdom and truth and the perfection of your soul?"^1 And if any of you argues the point, and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once, nor shall I go away, but I shall question and examine and cross-examine him, and if I find that he does not possess virtue, but says he does, I shall rebuke him for scorning the things [30a] that are of most importance and caring more for what is of less worth. This I shall do to whomever I meet, young and old, foreigner and citizen, but most to the citizens, inasmuch as you are more nearly related to me. Remember that the god commands me to do this, and I believe that no greater good ever came to pass in the city than my service to the god. For I go about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property [30b] more than for the perfection of your souls, or even so much; and I tell you that virtue does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things to man, both to the individual and to the state. If by saying these things I corrupt the youth, these things must be
(^1) The irony here is thick: At that time Athens was struggling to recover from her defeat by Sparta and was still anything but great, powerful or wealth.
enduring the neglect of my concerns all these years, but I am always busy in your interest, coming to each one of you individually like a father or an elder brother and urging you to care for virtue; now that is not like human conduct. If I derived any profit from this and received pay for these exhortations, there would be some sense in it; but now you yourselves see that my accusers, though they accuse me of everything else in such a shameless way, have not been able to work themselves up to such a pitch of shamelessness [31c] as to produce a witness to testify that I ever exacted or asked pay of anyone. For I think I have a sufficient witness that I speak the truth, namely, my poverty.
19 [31c - 32a]
Perhaps it may seem strange that I go about and interfere in other people's affairs to give this advice in private, but do not venture to come before your assembly and advise the state. But the reason for this, as you have heard me say at many times and places, [31d] is that something divine and spiritual comes to me, the very thing which Meletus ridiculed in his indictment. I have had this from my childhood; it is a sort of voice that comes to me, and when it comes it always holds me back from what I am thinking of doing, but never urges me forward. This it is which opposes my engaging in politics. And I think this opposition is a very good thing; for you may be quite sure, men of Athens, that if I had undertaken to go into politics, I should have been put to death long ago and should have done [31e] no good to you or to myself. And do not be angry with me for speaking the truth; the fact is that no man will save his life who nobly opposes you or any other populace and prevents many unjust and illegal things from happening in the state. [32a] A man who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve his life for even a little while, must be a private citizen, not a public man.
20 [32a - e]
I will give you powerful proofs of this, not mere words, but what you honour more; actions. And listen to what happened to me, that you may be convinced that I would never yield to any one, if that was wrong, through fear of death, but would die rather than yield. The tale I am going to tell you is ordinary and commonplace, but true. [32b] I, men of Athens, never held any other office in the state, but served in the Boulé ; and it happened that my tribe held the Prytaneia when you wished to judge collectively, not severally, the ten generals who had failed to gather up the
slain after the naval battle.^1 This was illegal, as you all agreed afterwards. At that time I was the only one of the Prytaneis who opposed doing anything contrary to the laws, and although the orators were ready to impeach and arrest me, and though you urged them with shouts to do so, I thought [32c] I must run the risk to the end with law and justice on my side, rather than join with you when your wishes were unjust, through fear of imprisonment or death. That was when the democracy still existed; and after the oligarchy was established,^2 the Thirty sent for me with four others to come to the Tholos ( Prytaneum ) and ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis to be put to death. They gave many such orders to others also, because they wished to implicate as many in their crimes as they could. [32d] Then I, however, showed again, by action, not in word only, that I did not care a whit for death if that be not too rude an expression, but that I did care with all my might not to do anything unjust or unholy. For that government, with all its power, did not frighten me into doing anything unjust, but when we came out of the Tholos , the other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I simply went home; and perhaps I should have been put to death for it, if the government had not quickly been put down. [32e] Of these facts you can have many witnesses.^3
21 [32e - 33b]
Do you believe that I could have lived so many years if I had been in public life and had acted as a good man should act, lending my aid to what is just and considering that of the highest importance? Far from it, men of Athens; nor could any other man. [33a] But you will find that through all my life, both in public, if I engaged in any public activity, and in private, I have always
(^1) The Battle of Arginusae, in the late Fall of 406 BC (referred to above p.8 n.1). The Athenians defeated a Spartan fleet and, in the face of a coming storm, chose to pursue the fleeing Peloponnesian ships rather than collect the bodies of those who had died in the battle. In that month, probably Pyanepsion , the fifty members of the Boulé from the tribe Antiochis held the Prytaneia and Socrates was elected (by lot) Epistates (See Ath. Pol. 43 for exegesis). After the Battle of Arginusae, ten of the general were tried and convicted for failing to recover the dead, among them was Pericles, son of Pericles (Xen. Hell. i.7.9-15; Mem. iv.4.2: Plut. Per.
2 24: Diodorus xiii 98 - 103). Athens was defeated by Sparta in 404 BC ending the Peloponnesian War. One of the terms imposed on Athens was that the Democracy be dissolved and an oligarchic Council of Thirty be established to govern the city. Their rule, so harsh that they are called the Thirty Tyrants, ended
3 in rebellion in the Spring of 303^ BC^. One of those witnesses was Meletus himself, who was one of the four who did arrest and execute Leon (Andocides 1.94).
