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The debate between intellectualists and non-intellectualists regarding the role of phronesis, virtue of character, and intellect in Aristotle's ethics. The text clarifies important concepts such as phronesis, starting-point, Humean ethics, and virtue of character. It discusses the arguments of both sides and provides evidence to support the claim that virtue of character is the real maker of right goals.
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by Yuchen Liang A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors Department of Philosophy in the University of Michigan 2017 Advisor: Professor Laura Ruetsche Second Reader: Professor Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
1. Virtue Makes the Goal Right? The Humean Controversy In this chapter I aim to set the stage for a debate on the nature of the starting-point of phronesis. Phronesis is generally translated as “practical wisdom”. It is the knowledge of how to perform morally right actions. Its starting-point, as I will later explain in detail, is the setting of morally right goals. Why does there have to be a debate in the first place? The short answer would be that some Aristotle scholars disagree with ways to read an important sentence in Nicomachean Ethics (EN). This infamous sentence is: 1. Virtue makes the goal right, phronesis the things towards it. (EN 1144a6-9) I will refer to this sentence as the “making the goal right” sentence throughout this thesis. Many philosophers worry that a literal reading of this sentence would lead to a “Humean” interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics. The term “Humean” here denotes a specific type of ethical system, rather than what Hume says strictly. A “Humean” ethical system emphasizes the role of desire in ethical decisions, in contrast to intellect. Some claim that this Humean system contradicts Aristotle’s general attitude towards moral actions, especially his definition of phronesis. The general structure of this contradiction is: a. The “making the goal right” sentence should be read directly, which means that “virtue makes the goal right”. (“The literalist premise”)
Rejection of the first condition sets the stage for one of the focal points of the debate. The non- intellectualists challenge the equivalence premise, while the (non-literalist) intellectualists defend it. However, firstly, I would like to show how a Humean reading of the “making the goal right” sentence is possible. Without that the intellectualists will have nothing to defend and the non- intellectualists will have no targets to aim. The second condition is even more pivotal to the debate. Without it, the debate would not have existed. If the incompatibility premise is not true, even if the “making the goal right” sentence is interpreted as expressing a Humean view, one can still ask: so what? It is incompatibility premise that exhibits the significance of this debate in the broader picture of Aristotle’s moral philosophy. It is because of the incompatibility of Humean reading of Aristotle, that scholars debate ways to avoid it and conserve Aristotle. I seek to reject these two conditions in this chapter. In order to do this, I will firstly clarify important concepts in this debate: phronesis , starting-point, Humean ethics and virtue of character. By doing so I will be able to reject the two aforementioned conditions and pave the ground for the overall debate. At the end of the chapter I will briefly outline positions taken by different camps in the debate. 1.1 General Characteristics of Phronesis Phronesis, or “practical wisdom”, is a central concept in both Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics. Hence, to understand phronesis , we have to firstly understand Aristotle’s overall project in these two books. Aristotle’s aim in both books is to explore ways to act morally. His overall answer to this question is that a person acts morally when her action leads to a moral end. Aristotle calls the moral end of an action its “good”. In the opening sentence of
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle has claimed that “every action and deliberate choice seems to seek some good”. (1094a1) An action is morally right when a “good” of the action is achieved. For example, if the moral end of helping others is being generous, then “being generous” is said to be the “good” of helping others. Only when that is achieved could one say that the person has acted morally. Now, how could this “good” of an action, which seems too general to grasp, be met in reality? This forces us to look at the particular content of “good” in actions. Aristotle thinks that the essential content of good in an action is its function ( ergon ). This “good” is said to “lie in the function”. Using Aristotle’s own example, playing flute is said to be the function of a flute player, since that is what he is supposed to do. (EN 1097b25) He is fulfilling his function when he plays the flute and subsequently, acting rightfully. Notice that flute-playing is used as an analogy here. Although itself is an amoral action, it is used to illustrate the definition of an action’s function. Now, what acting morally really means is that the moral function of an action is fulfilled. However, it takes expertise to carry out those functions. Those who are good at carrying out a particular function is said to be excellent in that particular area. If a flute player wants to act morally, he has to know how to play flute well in the first place. Phronesis is essentially the knowledge of how to carry out correct functions of all morally right goals. It is the sum of knowledge of carrying out correct functions in all particular moral areas, such as courage, generosity, friendliness etc. Aristotle defines phronesis in EN Book V 9 as the “true supposition” of “furthering the end”. (EN 1142b33). In other words, a practically wise person is marked by his success (true supposition) in pursuing right goals (ends). Using the example of generosity, a typical moral goal: a practically wise person can be generous whenever she wants to. She knows how to tackle many practical problems. How much money to share?
The definition of phronesis as a sort of know-how is usually compared to another concept in Nicomachean Ethics: techne, or craft. Techne describes also a person’s aptitude in fulfilling given goals. Techne is said to be a productive instead of active state and it is said to involve reason. (EN 1140a10) Aristotle uses the example of building. (EN 1140a9) Building is a techne because it teaches people, through a well-thought plan, how to achieve the goal of building a house. Therefore, superficially both phronesis and techne can be said to be the know-how of achieving desired ends. How is phronesis different from techne then? This has to do with the first characteristic of phronesis. 1.1.1 Phronesis vs Techne Phronesis ’ first characteristic is that it is always about a particular category of goals: the morally right goals. As aforementioned, phronesis ’ starting-point is making goals morally right. This moral starting-point determines that phronesis operates within the boundary of morality. Phronesis concerns only “what is good for themselves and for human beings.” (EN 1140b8) It does not concern things that are not morally right, be it amoral or immoral. On the contrary, techne as a capacity is morally neutral. A person who can fight well is said to possess techne. However, this capacity can be used for morally right or wrong goals. Both Darth Vader and Luke Skywalker know how to use the force. However, because Luke uses it for morally right purposes, he is said to have phronesis and Darth Vader, regardless of how well he uses the force, cannot be said to have phronesis. We can see here that while phronesis is evaluated on morality, techne is not.
Aristotle further claims that unlike techne , which is craft, phronesis is a kind of virtue (not to be confused with the virtue we would talk about in later chapters, which is short for “virtue of characteristics”). This difference between phronesis and techne is confirmed by the following two pieces of evidence. Firstly, phronesis concerns action rather than production. Production is about creating something else, while action is only about the acts performed. Aristotle has highlighted that while the end of production differs from production, the end of action is action itself. (EN 1140b8) The hallmark of a craft is that it aims at production while that of a virtue is that it aims at action. A builder is said to have techne in building. However, the end of building is the house, which is not equivalent to the process of building. Techne’s value is in the quality of the product but not the action itself. On the other hand, a successful philanthropist is said to have the phronesis of acting generously. The end of acting generously, however, is acting generously itself. For the philanthropist herself, acting generously does not produce anything else rather than the fact that she has acted generously. Secondly, Aristotle also adds that “in the case of a craft, someone who makes errors voluntarily is preferable but with practical wisdom he is less so, as is also the case with the virtues.” (EN 1140b21-22) It is preferable for someone with craft to make errors voluntarily because it shows her ability to bring about an (erroneous) product. Only people with supreme techne can make sure that errors will be achieved. It is conceivable that a master builder can deliberately build a house that collapses exactly on the fifth day. The proper end of a house is to last and shelter and this is a wrongful use of the techne of building. Nonetheless, this master builder can still be said to possess more techne than average builders because they are not up to the task of designing
for himself”. (EN 1140a25) This deliberation is a process of using reason to determine whether to reject or embrace an action. As aforementioned, a practically wise philanthropist should know what actions to take given a certain condition. For example, when she needs to decide whether to throw money off a building, she shows her phronesis by doing the right action in that given situation—to reject the proposal. Again, Aristotle emphasizes the intellectual state of deliberation here. An indication of “deliberating correctly” is that practically wise people “rationally calculate well about what furthers some excellent end”. (EN 1140a26-28) The philanthropist decision not to throw money off a building is reached through rational calculation. She chose that decision based on whether it furthers or hinders her goals. Therefore, phronesis ’ deliberation cannot be random. Rather, it is the result of a calculation based on reason and given facts. 1.2 How is A Humean Reading of Aristotle Possible 1.2.1 Definition and Consequences of a Humean reading Now I should explain the definition of “Humean” reading used in this debate. Aristotelian scholars’ use of “Humean ethics” is related to general characteristics of Hume’s ethical teachings but does not necessarily follow his comprehensive idea. I will not attempt to show Hume’s authentic moral philosophy but rather what the Aristotelian scholars have used as “Humean ethics”. The “Hume” that I mention in this essay will be this caricatured philosopher of passion. Hume is famous for saying that reason is and ought to be the slave of passion. (Hume, 399) In this way Hume’s reason operates just like Aristotle’s techne, which concerns only facts of concrete situations. In other words, it teaches a person what to do in a given situation to achieve a given end but does not tell the person which ends to pursue. Instead, those ends are perceived
through passions, such as desire or aversion. Passions teach a person which ends to pursue by giving her “experiences of approval and uneasiness of disapproval”. (Cohon 2010 ) In this case, a Humean has no rational account of determining which ends to pursue. A person does generous things just because doing generous things makes her happy. Now, since determining which ends to pursue is just another way of saying Aristotle’s “making goals morally right”, which in turn is starting-point of practical philosophy, Hume is actually claiming a particular kind of nature of the starting-point, that it is perceived through passion only. 1.2.2 Possibility of Reading Aristotle in A Humean Way Now I will reject the first condition that makes the debate trivial, i.e., that it is impossible to read Aristotle in a Humean way. Why would scholars conceive of this peculiar kind of reading in the first place? To understand this, we have to go back to the “making the goal right” sentence. People who read it literally would conclude that the first half of the sentence really means “ virtue makes the goals right”. In other words, virtue determines starting-point of phronesis. Furthermore, as I will explain later, it is possible to read virtue as a state of passion. Therefore, the literal reading of first half of the “making the goal right” sentence could equate to: the starting-point (making of right goals) of Aristotelian ethics is obtained through some kind of passion (virtue). If its starting-point is obtained through passion, it could be said that Aristotelian ethics is indeed Humean. Hence, a literal reading of the “making the goal right” sentence could leads possibly to a Humean interpretation of Aristotelian ethics. Now, to show the possibility of a Humean reading on Aristotle, I just have to show that the virtue mentioned in the “making the goal right” sentence is indeed a state of passion. As
e. An ethical system is Humean when something non-rational sets the goals. (The Humean non- rational premise) f. Therefore: Aristotle’s ethic is Humean. Now it is time to reject the second unwanted condition, that a Humean reading is innocuous to Aristotle’s ethics in general. 1.3 Incompatibility of a Humean reading and Phronesis ’ general characteristics I will now aim to prove statement c , that a Humean reading of the “making the goal right” sentence is incompatible with general characteristics of phronesis and therefore should be rejected. There are three arguments supporting the incompatibility premise: 1. Textual evidence against desire’s role in setting of goals for phronesis ; 2. Phronesis requires an understanding of what right goals are and why they are right; 3. A Humean reading of Aristotle will trivialize the role of phronesis. 1.3.1 Textual Evidence against Humean Reading There is plenty of textual evidence in Aristotle that explicitly contradicts a Humean reading. These texts exclude desire from playing a role in the setting of right goals. Aristotle explicitly says that “once someone is ruined by pleasure or pain, to him it does not appear a starting-point.” (EN 1140b18) To decide by “pleasure or pain” is exactly how Hume argues that starting-points should be made. “Pleasure or pain” is the deliberating mechanism behind desire in place of reason. A person with reason deliberates by using arguments. A person with desire, on the
contrary, deliberates by listening to her own pleasure and pain. The above texts show that Aristotle does not approve of the second kind of people. Later we will show that there are more positions available between someone deliberates only using reason and someone only using desire. However, it is clear here that the Humean position is one of the position clearly opposed by Aristotle. 1.3.2 Humean Reading vs. Cognition Even if one leaves those texts aside and claims that other texts (the “making the goal right” sentence potentially) support a Humean reading, such reading is still at odds with general characteristics of Aristotelian moral actions. Accepting it would mean much more than abandoning literal readings of the few aforementioned texts. It would also lead to confusion regarding Aristotle’s general attitude towards phronesis. Phronesis is, as Taylor labels, a “cognizant” process. (Taylor 2016 ) In the context of starting-point of phronesis , a cognizant process means that practically wise people understand their chosen goals as true morally right goals. Taylor’s main evidence includes the following text: “The good deliberation will be the sort of correctness that is in accord with furthering the end about practical wisdom.” (EN 1142b33) Therefore, it is not enough for practically wise people to believe in certain goals. They must also understand why those goals are indeed morally right. This cognizant nature of starting- point of phronesis is an effect of the combination of the two aforementioned general characteristics of phronesis. Firstly, as phronesis is only the pursuit of right goals, as explained in section 1.1.1, it is important to know that the goals we are pursuing are indeed right. Regardless of whether phronesis makes the goals right, practically wise people should be able to
cognizant requirement of starting-point. It should be noted that Hume himself is not a radical relativist as depicted here. However, as aforementioned, the “Humean" position in this essay is a caricature used by Aristotle scholars to represent a situation that they want to avoid, i.e., a moral principle based entirely on desire. 1.3.3 Trivialization of Phronesis Through the Humean Reading Lastly, a Humean reading would trivialize the role of phronesis. As aforementioned, the role of reason in Hume is purely instrumental and akin to techne. Therefore, Phronesis according to Hume would be no different from just a special kind of techne. Aristotle gives phronesis much importance when he says “at the same time as phronesis is present, all the virtues of character will all be present”. (1145a2) This is in accordance with the fact that phronesis is mentioned at least 71 times^1 , as one of the most frequently mentioned term in the entire Nicomachean Ethics. It is hard to think that the Humean definition of reason can play such an important role. The Humean reason is purely instrumental. It concerns production rather than action. However, as explained in section 1.1.1. Aristotle’s phronesis concerns action rather than production. It is a virtue and not a craft like techne. It is different in kind from rather than as a subsection of techne. If it is so, techne will be more important for Aristotle than phronesis. In fact, Aristotle mentions phronesis many more times in Nicomachean Ethics than he mentions techne. All the evidence points to a phronesis that is unique and important and not just instrumental. In summary, the Humean reading faces textual challenges. It also conflicts with the general characteristics of Aristotelian ethics. Therefore, it is clear that a Humean reading of Aristotle is (^1) This number is according to the index page in C.D.C Reeve’s new translation of Nicomachean Ethics. It includes mentioning of “practical-wisdom ( phronesis )”, “ practically wise person”, “practically wise”.
unacceptable. However, as explained in section 1.2, the most literal reading of the “making the goal right” sentence would lead to a Humean reading and results in the contradiction a-c. Therefore, Aristotelian scholars argue about ways to avoid the contradiction. They differ from each other only in their strategies. I will briefly lay out those different strategies in the next section. 1.4 General Arguments of Both Sides of the Debate The first two premises of the trilemma, the literalist premise and the equivalence premise, are in this order for a reason. The literalist premise is more basic than the equivalence premise. If one rejects the literalist premise, the claim that the “making the goal right” sentence should be read literally, there is no need to argue about the equivalence premise. People who argue against a are generally intellectualists. Their argument runs roughly as follows: 1.A Humean reading of Aristotle is unacceptable (The incompatibility premise). 2.A Humean reading can only be avoided if something other than desire makes the goals right. (a variety of the Humean non-rational premise) 3.Virtue of character is a kind of desire (the non-rational virtue premise). Therefore: Virtue of character cannot make the goals right (not-the literalist premise). The first premise is already established in section 1.3 and can be accepted as given. Different scholars from the intellectualist camp have different ways to argue for 2 and 3. I will present their ideas in chapter 2.
Those rejecting the Humean non-rational premise, that an ethical system is Humean when something non-rational sets the goals, are non-intellectualists. Their general argument would be: 1.A Humean reading of Aristotle is unacceptable (the incompatibility premise). 2.Virtue of character makes the goal right (the literalist premise). 3.Virtue of character is non-rational. (the non-rational virtue premise) Therefore: A system can remain non-Humean when something non-rational makes the goals. (not the Humean non-rational premise) I will discuss their ideas in chapter 3. Now it is clear to see that winning this debate depends on arguing which one of premises, literalist premise, non-rational virtue premise and Humean non-rational premise, is more likely to be false and therefore is more appropriate to reject. In chapter 4 I will compare arguments for and against those three premises. I will argue that the literalist premise and the non-rational virtue premise are more defensible than the Humean non-rational premise_._ This gives the non- intellectualists advantages over the intellectualists. However, the other two premises, especially the non-rational virtue premise, also faces serious problems. Therefore, the non-intellectualist position has to face its own problems as well.
2. The Intellectualists: Intellect, Instead of Desire, Makes the Goal Right In this chapter I will explore the first solution to the previously mentioned Humean controversy regarding the reading of the “making the goal right” sentence. As the most prominent feature of Humean ethics is the role of desire in making the goal right, scholars from all camps want to make sure first, that it is not desire or its equivalents that makes the goal right. A natural follow up question would be: if not desire, then what? The most intuitive replacement for desire is something that is often used as its antonym with regards to sources for actions: intellect. Both play the role of informing an agent which actions to take. Just as desire is related to feelings, intellect is related to rational thinking. On the other hand, some claim that the replacement of desire with something at the other end of the spectrum amounts to a false dichotomy or even a blatant violation of Aristotle’s own golden mean principle. This controversy will be discussed in the next chapter. In this chapter, I want to discuss possible ways for intellect to replace desire’s role in making goals right. Scholars supporting using intellect as the replacement, whom in this thesis I will refer to as the intellectualists, have different ways to make that happen. The first group of intellectualists wants to show that despite of the apparent claim in the “making the goal right” sentence that “virtue makes the goal right”, Aristotle actually assigns something else, which involves the intellect, other than virtue, for that role. I will call this group of intellectualists the non-literalists, as they reject the straight-forward reading of “virtue makes the goal right”. The second group of intellectualists, the literalists, on the other hand, affirm the literal reading of the “making the goal right” sentence, that virtue makes the goal right. They, however, argue that virtue itself is at least partly intellectual. Therefore, intellect would still replace desire in making
