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“This book will take its place as the very best introduction to the subject on the market… Carroll, because of his vast knowledge of the popular arts as well as traditional high arts, both old and new, is able to provide an enormous variety of examples that will speak to a wide audience.” Professor Peter Kivy, Rutgers University

“This is analytic philosophy at its best: thorough, rigorous, even-handed, e m i n e n t l y r e a d a b l e t h r o u g h o u t … C a r r o l l ’ s b o o k g e n e r a t e s a n enthusiasm for the subject and liveliness of debate which will guarantee that its student readership will profit from it and be engaged by it.” Professor Peter Lamarque, University of Hull

Philosophy of Art is a textbook for undergraduate students interested in the topic of philosophical aesthetics. It aims to introduce the techniques of analytic philosophy in addition to a selection of the major topics in this field of inquiry. These include the representational theory of art, f o r m a l i s m , n e o - f o r m a l i s m , a e s t h e t i c t h e o r i e s o f a r t , n e o - Wittgensteinianism, the Institutional Theory of Art, as well as historical a p p r o a c h e s t o t h e n a t u r e o f a r t. T h r o u g h o u t t h e b o o k , a b s t r a c t philosophical theories are illustrated by examples of both traditional and contemporary art including frequent reference to the avant-garde. In this way the reader’s understanding of art theory as well as the appreciation of art is enriched.

Noël CarrollNoël CarrollNoël CarrollNoël CarrollNoël Carroll is the Monroe C.Beardsley Professor of the Philosophy of Art at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is currently also President of the American Society for Aesthetics and has been a documentary screenwriter and a journalist. His other books include The Philosophy of Horror (Routledge, 1990) and A Philosophy of Mass Art (1998).

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A RA RA RA RA R TTTTT

A contemporary introduction

Noël Carroll

London and New York

First published in 1999 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002.

© 1999 Noël Carroll

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-415-15963-6 (hbk) ISBN 0-415-15964-4 (pbk) ISBN 0-203-19723-2 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-19726-7 (GlassBook Format)

Contents

• IntroductionIntroductionIntroductionIntroductionIntroduction AcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgments xixixixixi
  • What is philosophy?
  • The analytic philosophy of art
  • Analysing concepts
  • Some peculiarities of philosophical research
  • The structure of this book
  • The aims of this book
• Chapter 1Chapter 1Chapter 1Chapter 1Chapter 1 Art and representationArt and representationArt and representationArt and representationArt and representation
• Part I Art as representation
  • Art, imitation and representation
  • The neo-representational theory of art
• Part II What is representation?
  • Pictorial representation
  • Traditional approaches to pictorial representation
  • The conventionalist theory of pictorial representation
  • A neo-naturalist theory of pictorial representation
  • Representation across the arts
  • Chapter summary
  • Annotated reading
• Chapter 2Chapter 2Chapter 2Chapter 2Chapter 2 Art and expressionArt and expressionArt and expressionArt and expressionArt and expression
• Part I Art as expression
  • The expression theory of art
  • Objections to the expression theory of art
• Part II Theories of expression
  • What is expression?
  • Expression, exemplification and metaphor
    • exemplification Some problems with the theory of metaphorical
  • Is expression always metaphorical?
  • Chapter summary
  • Annotated reading
• Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3Chapter 3 Art and formArt and formArt and formArt and formArt and form
• Part I Art as form
  • Formalism
  • Objections to formalism
  • Neoformalism
• Part II What is artistic form?
  • Different views of artistic form
  • Form and function
  • Form and appreciation
  • Chapter summary
  • Annotated reading
• Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4Chapter 4 Art and aesthetic experienceArt and aesthetic experienceArt and aesthetic experienceArt and aesthetic experienceArt and aesthetic experience
• Part I Aesthetic theories of art
  • Art and aesthetics
  • The aesthetic definition of art
  • Two versions of aesthetic experience
  • Objections to the aesthetic definition of art
• Part II The aesthetic dimension
  • Aesthetic experience revisited
  • Aesthetic properties
  • Detection or projection?
  • Aesthetic experience and the experience of art
  • Chapter summary
  • Annotated reading
• Chapter 5Chapter 5Chapter 5Chapter 5Chapter 5 Art,Art,Art,Art,Art, definition and identificationdefinition and identificationdefinition and identificationdefinition and identificationdefinition and identification
• Part I Against definition
  • Neo-Wittgensteinianism: art as an open concept
  • Objections to Neo-Wittgensteinianism
• Part II Two contemporary definitions of art
  • The Institutional Theory of Art
  • Defining art historically
• Part III Identifying art C O N T E N T S ix
  • Definition and identification
  • Identification and historical narration
  • Historical narratives: their strengths and weaknesses
  • Chapter summary
  • Annotated reading
• IndexIndexIndexIndexIndex

Introduction

What is philosophy?

The analytic philosophy of art

Analysing concepts

Some peculiarities of philosophical research

The structure of this book

The aims of this book

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are concepts. That is why it is sometimes also called conceptual analysis. Though by this point in history, many philosophers would argue that this is not all that analytic philosophy does, for purposes of introducing the topic, it is fair to say that this is what many analytic philosophers have attempted to do in the past and what many, at least part of the time, continue to do today. They analyse concepts. Concepts, of course, are fundamental to human life. Concepts organize our practices. The concept of a person, for example, is central to myriad practices, including politics, morality, the law, and so on. The concept of a number is fundamental to mathematics, while the concept of knowledge is indispensable throughout the widest gamut of human activities. Without such concepts, the activities in question would not exist. For example, without the concept of a person, there would be no morality as we know it for it is persons, not mere things, to which morality pertains. A rough and ready way to characterize analytic philosophy is to say that it is concerned with the analysis of concepts that are key to human practices and activities, including not only those of enquiry, like science, but, as well, of pragmatic endeavors, such as governance. Analytic philosophers, in this regard, may trace their heritage back to Socrates, who walked the streets of ancient Athens asking “What is knowledge?” and “What is justice?” in ways that undermined commonplace and often complacent answers to these questions, thus paving the way, the analytic philosopher might say (in a slightly self-congratulatory tone of voice), for more rigorous analyses. Those of you who’ve spent some time thumbing through college bulletins have probably noticed that the philosophy section is full of titles that take the form “the philosophy of ________. The blank is often filled in by the name of some other field—as in the philosophy of science, or of logic, or of art, law, history and so forth. Philosophy generally seems to be the philosophy of something. But what sort of something? That something is a practice, like law or religion. Very often it is a practice involved with acquiring knowledge—like physics, psychology, history, and the like. But it may also be a practical activity, such as ethics. Philosophy begins when the people involved in the relevant practices become self- conscious—when they begin to wonder about just what it is that they are doing or just what they are really talking about. That is, each one of these practices organizes its field of operation in terms of certain concepts, which are applied according to certain criteria. In addition, each of these practices employs certain recurrent modes of rea- soning—certain ways of connecting concepts—which modes are appropriate to the point of achieving the goals of the practice in question. These concepts and modes of reasoning are what make the practice possible— they are what, so to speak, constitutes the practice. And it is such concepts and modes of reasoning that analytic philosophy analyses.

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To be more concrete, consider the case of the law. It is a practice. It possesses a large number of key concepts—concepts without which there would be no practice of law. One such concept, quite obviously, is the very notion of law itself. What is a law? Under what conditions—according to what criteria—do we classify an injunction as a law? This is the kind of question that practitioners of the field ask when they become self-conscious about their practice. It is the point at which the philosophy of law takes off. In asking “What is a law?” different options need to be explored. Is a law just what some duly appointed assembly decides is a law in accordance with certain established procedures? Or is a law—a genuine law—such that it must follow from or at least be consistent with deep principles— perhaps deep constitutional principles or deep moral principles, involving human rights? What arguments can be brought forward on behalf of these different options? Such questions, needless to say, are not idle. They may come to the fore when, for example, someone maintains that a draft law is illegal. Of course, to allege that a draft law—or, for that matter, any law—is illegal—i.e., is against the law—brings us to the very brink of paradox. In order to resolve such paradoxes and puzzles, as arise frequently in our practices, we need to take a close look at our concepts. And that is the vocation of analytic philosophy. In addressing questions such as “What is a law?” analytic philosophers, among other things, attempt to identify the criteria that we use to categorize things one way rather than another. Sometimes this is dismissed as merely playing with words. However, when one considers how very much can ride on questions of categorization, it seems that analytic philosophers are generally less naïve than those who disparage them as “mere logic choppers.” Throughout much of the twentieth century, analytic philosophy has increasingly become a “second order” form of enquiry. It is the philosophy of this or that—the philosophy of physics, or of economics, or of art. Analytic philosophers take as their domain significant forms of human practice, but unlike the social scientist, the analytic philosopher does not look for recurring patterns of social behavior within said practices. Instead, the analytic philosopher tries to clarify the concepts that make activities within the relevant domains possible. Analytic philosophers, in other words, do not attempt to ascertain answers to empirical questions like “How many people obey the law?” but rather address questions like “What does it take for something to count as a law?” or, to state the matter in more linguistic trappings: “What does it mean to call something a ‘law’?” Undoubtedly, learning how many people obey the law is crucial for designing social policy. But discovering what a law is, or attempting to do so, is an important project too, since if we ignore this question, we will be left wondering whether our practice is intelligible—whether it hangs together, and has any rhyme or reason. By interrogating the deep concepts that

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of our artistic past. Nor even, without some command of the concept of art, would economists know how to evaluate empirical claims like “Art is a significant component of the financial well-being of New York City.” But far more important than the preceding “official” uses of the concept of art is the role the concept plays in our personal, ongoing commerce with artworks, si n c e h o w w e r e s p o n d t o a n o b j e c t — i n t e r p r e t i v e l y, appreciatively, emotively, and evaluatively—depends decisively upon whether or not we categorize it as an artwork. Suppose we come across a living, breathing couple seated at opposite sides of a wooden table, staring intently at each other. Ordinarily we might pay no attention to them at all, or avert our glance out of a sense of politeness. But if we categorize the situation as an artwork—as the performance piece Night C r o s s i n g b y M a r i n a A b r a m o v i c a n d U l ay — o u r r e s p o n s e w i l l b e altogether different. We will shamelessly scrutinize the scene carefully, attempt to interpret it, perhaps in terms of what it says about human life and relationships. We will try to situate it in the history of art, comparing it to other artworks in various genres. We will contemplate what it expresses and what feelings it arouses in us, and we may evaluate it— possibly commending it for drawing our attention to neglected realms of experience, or for moving us, or for making its point with a startling economy of means. Or maybe we will criticize it for being boring or hackneyed. But in any event, it is clear that once we categorize the situation as an artwork, our response to it will differ radically from the way in which we regard comparable seated couples in “real” life. Or consider surgical procedures. In the everyday course of life, we do not think of them as alternatives to a night at the opera. But when such procedures are incorporated in a performance piece such as the work Image/New Image(s) or the Re-incarnation of Saint-Orlan and we categorize Orlan’s plastic surgery as a work of art, we see it in a different light. We note the interesting color arrangement of the surgeons’ uniforms and we ask about the meaning of Orlan’s self-elected decision to go under the knife—what does it say about society, about women, about personal identity, about art history and the ideals of female beauty found there? That is, we react to the event completely differently from h o w w e w o u l d , h a d w e h a p p e n e d u p o n a n o r d i n a r y g a l l - b l a d d e r operation. The attempt to interpret the meaning of your typical gall- bladder operation is out of place, but the attempt to interpret an artwork is usually appropriate. Yet interpretation here hinges on whether or not we classify the item in question as an artwork—on whether we correctly apply the concept of art to it. Thus, clarifying our concept of art is not merely a matter of dry, academic book-keeping. It lies at the living heart of our artistic practices, since

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categorizing candidates as artworks puts us in a position to mobilize a set of art responses that are the very stuff of our activities as viewers, listeners and readers. In order to play the game, we need a handle on the concept of art. And it is the task of the analytic philosophy of art to make sure that that handle is a sturdy one by reflecting upon the concept of art and articulating its elements in as precise a manner as possible. As already indicated, the concept of art is not the only one that preoccupies analytic philosophers of art, though for the reasons just stated, it is a central one. Representation, expression, artistic form, aesthetic experience and aesthetic properties are also of great interest. Consequently, much of the remainder of this book will be spent analysing these six concepts. Other concepts might have been chosen for analysis; however, for a text of this length, these should supply the inquiring student with a serviceable introduction to the field.

Analysing concepts

The phrase “analysing concepts” has been bandied about extensively in this introduction. But what does it involve? How do you go about analysing concepts? Since so much time will be spent in what follows analysing concepts, some opening comments may be helpful here. Like most issues in philosophy, there is substantial debate about what concepts are and how to analyse them. However, there is one very standard approach (though as we shall see in Chapter 5, it has not enlisted universal assent). We can call this standard approach the method of necessary and sufficient conditions. It proceeds by breaking concepts down into their necessary and sufficient conditions for application. Although this method is controversial, we shall presume its practicability for most of this text, if only because it is a powerful tool for organizing and guiding research, even if ultimately it rests on certain questionable assumptions. The standard approach takes concepts to be categories. Applying a certain concept to an object is a matter of classifying it as a member of the relevant category. Calling an object an artwork involves determining that it meets the criteria or conditions required for membership in the category. Analysing a concept is a matter of breaking it down into its component parts, where the component parts are its conditions for application. Think of the concept bachelor. What is a bachelor? A bachelor is an unmarried man. We can break down or analyse the concept of bachelor into two component parts—manhood and unmarriedness. In order to be counted as a member of the category bachelor—in order to apply correctly the concept