Download ON THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE and more Study notes Religion in PDF only on Docsity!
ON THE SACRED AND
THE PROFANE
Reimon Bachika
The paired up terms of sacred and profane constitute a twin con- cept we are likely to encounter in not a few studies in the sociology of religion. Implying an opposition between a certain qualification of religiosity and its absence, this double concept will reflect the user's conception of religion revealing „a certain degree" of opposition or another way of relationship between the two implied aspects. In other words, its particular use will reflect how religion is seen to extend into the field of everyday reality, how both religion and everyday re- ality relate to each other. This evidently is an important theological and sociological question. In the following, then, I will review how this pair concept is treat- ed in some literature on religion and discuss or comment mainly on its sociological bearings. Especially we will see how it is utilized by Durkheim, Malinowski and Eliade to all of whom it is of central con- cern. Let us start with Durkheim.
Emile Durkheim
Durkheim's monograph on primitive religion is a very extensive study aiming at the high goal of nothing less than discovering the origin of religion and delineating its final meaning. Durkheim wants — 159—
to reach this goal, first, by pinpointing the elementary forms or the common elements of all religious life and, second, by investigating the circumstances in which these elements come into being. This will allow him to discover the sources and causes of their beginning from which their ultimate meaning can be deducted. The easiest way to re- alize this objective, Durkheim asserts, is to study the most primitive religion, where the distance between cause and effect is easier to cover than in the case of differentiated, historical religionsi). After having discarded the views that religion cannot be primarily concerned with the ideas of the supernatural or with beliefs in spiri- tual beings, Durkheim establishes a preliminary definition of religion. Religion consists, he says, of two fundamental categories , beliefs and rites, in order words, states of mind and specific ways of behavior. Because it is beliefs that determine the objective of the practices , beliefs have to be defined first. It is mentioned that one , common charac- teristic of all beliefs is that they assume a classification of all things , real and spiritual into two opposed categories : the profane and the sacred. Beliefs as expressed in myths and the like are also important for other reasons. They determine not only what objects will be con- sidered as sacred, but also the specific nature, characteristics, virtues etc., of these objects2). The nature of sacred things is rather complex. All sacred things, not all of the same quality, are thought to be superior to things pro- fane and radically opposed to the latter. Most sacred are the totemic ani- mals and plants, also the churinga, which are objects made from wood or stone into which figures are carved or engraved, representing the totemic animal or plant. Every clan named after a totem, has its own churinga or even a collection of such sacred emblems. They are kept in a sacred place and are the center of religious ceremonies. The word churinga itself means „sacred". It is in connection with the re- ligious character of these objects that all things are classified as sacred and profane (p. 167).
41, 9-nialk 4:65 '
Many similar examples show the ambiguity of the sacred, which means after all that both pure and impure kinds have the same nature. The two main sociological problems of totemism, and indeed of all religion, according to Durkheim, are to explain what human forces have been able to inspire those strong religious sentiments, and to explain what has caused man to see two heterogeneous and incom- patible worlds as the sacred and the profane where nothing in com- mon experience seems to suggest this radical duality°. Durkheim relates these two problematic aspects respectively to the social func- tions of totemism and its religious significance°. Concerning the social function of totemism Durkheim argues that the use of names, emblems, in other words, the extensive use of sym- bolism is a necessary condition for the viability of social life. The totem and its symbolism also have an important cognitive function in relating man to nature and inculcating that awareness. The yielded knowledge does not differ fundamentally from scientific thought. Any explanation of any phenomenon even today has to concentrate on the relationships of the various elements of the reality that is to be explained. In relating animals and plants to the human society, primi- tive people only have combined what we would separate and vice- versa. In their social system they have integrated elements from nature, and in their view of nature they made enter human elements. Reli- gion, in this way, as a system of social and religious thought, has been the beginning of science and philosophy. However, Durkheim conti- nues. religion has been able to play this role because of its social and collective nature. In order to create a world of ideas by which the world of observed realities appeared to be transformed, an over-stimula- tion of intellectual forces was needed. This is possible only in and through society (p. 340). It is this intellectual over-stimulation or effer- vescence that lies at the origin of religion, which, together with the moral authority of society is responsible for arousing those strong religious sentiments.
ON THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE
Durkheim's argumentation concerning the religious function of totemism is basically the same. He explains how the natives in their ritual behavior identify with their totem by imitating its way of being or behavior. These ceremonial performances are intended to ascertain the reproduction of the totem, because it is believed that the fertility of the totem needs the help of man. Man's existence, in turn, depends on that fertility. Durkheim, then, explains the way of thinking behind the totemic practices as a primitive understanding of the principle of causality, which can be summarized in the proposition that "the similar produces the similar". This way of thinking, according to Durkheim, is clearly dominated by the social conditions of primitive existence, ultimately by the moral authority of the group. For Durkheim, again, it is social forces that are at work, rather than religious forces. He, therefore, can reduce religion to the workings of society. This is Durkheim's main conten- tion concerning religion. An early example of how Durkheim short-circuits the social and religious sphere is found in his deduction of the totemic principle, mana, from the functioning of society'). The social origin of the mana-energy is a conclusion from the insignificance of the totemic animal or plant and its representati 3ns. Because they are insignificant, they cannot be the real object of the cult. The object of veneration is the common principle that is present in the mediums. It is some kind of impersonal, anonymous force, some kind of energy that has been trapped in all those heterogeneous objects and beings. How is this energy experienced and where does it come from? Sometimes it is thought of by the natives as a physical force, but to Durkheim its moral character is much more in evidence. He relates it e. g., to the fact that the natives strictly observe their religious practices be- cause of their obligation to their ancestors. Finally, society is deducti- vely established as the ultimate source of mana: because the totem, as the symbol of society, is at the same time the incarnation of the — 163—
ON THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE
socialization has done its work, after the individuals have internalized moral and religious beliefs. Individual consciousness and observances of moral rules, then, cannot be disconnected from the social sphere. Second, a more convincing argument brought up by Malinowski against Durkheim is that the latter mainly studied the seasonal cere- monies of the primitives and much less other forms of collective life. Collective effervescence or heightening of emotions also occurs in pro- fane events such as battles, sailing regatta, tribal gatherings for trad- ing purposes etc. Yet, no religion is generated on any of these occa- sions. Consequently, it may be more correct to say that Durkheim, in- spite of concentrating too much on religious events by overlooking other social activities, by the same token understimated religious events by over-emphasizing their social meaning. Anyway, problematic is Durkheim's argumentation about the relationship of the religious and the non-religious sphere. Durkheim's solution was one of combination and finally of reducing the meaning of the former to that of the latter. Malinowski's view, in contrast, is rather one of separation. Based on his own fieldwork among the Papuo-Melanesian tribes of Eastern New Guinea, Malinowski is able to demonstrate that the natives clearly distinguish between profane work and magic activities9). He reports that many islanders rely on gardening for their subsis- tence and that they manage successfully. The reasons for their success are, except favorable climatological conditions, their careful work and extensive knowledge about the soil, the cultivated plants and other natural conditions. A similar situation is reported in connection with other activities such as fishing, warfare, care for health and so on. However, appart from their knowledge and work, they also rely on magic practices in most of their activities. A different efficacity is attributed to the latter as can be understood from the fact that the natives never substitute magic for work. In the domain of the sacredm, religious and magic activities are distinguished. First, religious creeds and attitudes are found to be
centered around the most important events and crises of the life cycle: pregnancy, birth, initiation, rites of marriage and death. Cere- monies and celebrations in these cases are performed with no particu- lar purpose, except that they are traditional activities, which have several creative functions for the group as well as for the individuals. They establish, fix and reinforce social life and tradition; they sacra- lize the crucial moments of individual existence by shaping and enhan- cing its mental attitudes. For example, the initiation ceremony is the occasion of systematic instruction combined with dramatic ritual. It results in spiritual metamorphosis of the young men who from now on will be able to see themselves as different persons, with new duties and privileges, with a new knowledge of tradition and the communion with the sacred beings. Though very different, a similar creative func- tion is realized by the rites for the departed, which counteract the devastating effect of death at the personal and the collective level. These rites, also, may support or attribute greater significance to in- dividual and social life by inspiring and enhancing the belief in its continuation in another world. All in all, religious ceremonies are not a means to an end, they rather contain their end in their very per- formance. Second, magic is a practical art or a pseudo science, consisting of acts which are only a means to definite results expected to follow later on. Malinowski finds three elements in magic : A spell, a rite and a series of strict conditions in relation to the performer. He rejects the idea that magic is born from the abstract conception of a uni- versal power like mana that some scholars conceive of as a physical force while others see it rather as a supernatural one. Like religion, magic is based on mythological tradition. It also finds its origin in a situational stress, more in particular, it is an emotional reaction on the awareness of impotence in practical activities. Magic as a whole is characterized as: a strong emotional experience, which spends itself in a purely subjective flow of images, words, and acts of behavior , leaves a
— 166 —
4/MdC?-4-ailIEWit.-t=] Next, we will turn our attention to Eliade, historian of religion, who treated the matter extensively in his book The Sacred and the Profane. Although Eliade's view of the relationship of the sacred and the profane resembles that of Durkheim, he provides us with some different aspects of the problem, especially because he treats it in connection with various religions, ancient and modern.
Mercea Eliade
The meaning that Eliade attributes to the sacred is largely tra- ceable to Christian theology. He begins his study") by referring to Otto's conception of the sacred, but he proposes to investigate it, not only in so far as it is irrational, as Otto had done, but in all its com- plexity (p. 10). Eliade, in this way, seems to pledge continuity with Otto, but actually his approach is rather different. Otto studied religi- ous experience, i. e., man's religious feelings towards the Holy as found in the Bible and other sacred texts. He came to characterize the numinous as an awe-inspiring, fascinating mystery. Eliade, on the other hand, is not at all concerned with a description of the Holy it- self, but with its "revelation" in nature. He is also concerned with the "perceptions" of things as sacred or profane by religious or non- religious people — It may be remarked that the latter perceptions are much less important to religious experience than the perceptions of the Holy itself — In other words, Eliade mainly discusses various cross- cultural religious meanings that have been attributed to space, time, to nature and human life in some of its physiological functions (e. g., the body itself, eating and sex) and social manifestations and activities
(e. g., sanctification of dwellings, initiation rites, belonging to men's or women's groups etc.) Two lines of description are interwoven as already suggested. First, the sacred is represented as factually revealing itself to man in a Christian-theological fashion, as may be seen especially from the
— 168—
ON THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE
much used term hierophany, something sacred manifesting itself (p. 11). In other words, an identical meaning is found in manifestations of the sacred in things, for instance, in a rock or a tree, as well as in the supreme hierophany which occurred in the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ. It is called a paradox that, although the sacred is thought to be totally different from the profane, there is no solution of continuity in any hierophany, because there is the manifestation of something of a wholly different order...in objects that are an integral
part of our natural "profane" world (p. 11). Shortly, we will return to this way of presentation. A second line of description is that of religious experience, more specifically of the religious or non-religious orientations of man. Things in nature and in life are capable of being experienced in a merely material or natural way, but also, as things participating or revealing cosmic sacrality. As a consequence, there are two modes of existence, the religious and the non-religious one, which are separated by the abyss of the sacred and the profane (p. 14). In other words, the sacred and the profane are two existential situations assumed by man in the course of his history. Later, Eliade will expose the view that the sa- cred or religious way of life has prevailed from the beginning through- out the greatest part of man's history and that the profane way is a recent development. As the characteristics of the sacred and the profane are concerned, we have encountered two in our summary so far, which earn Eliade companionship with Durkheim. They are, firstly, of course, the oppo- sition of the two aspects, the illustration and definition of which Eliade proclaims to be the very aim of his study, and secondly, their continuity. Otherwise, Eliade's presentation is quite different, as com- pared with Durkheim's and also Malinowski's. Therefore, we will en- counter different problems we would like to comment upon, because they are not unrelated to the conception of the sacred and the profane. To begin with, a methodological problem seems to be involved — 169—
ON THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE
fane, while Eliade states elswhere that all nature is capable of reveal- ing itself as cosmic sacrality (p. 12) and that the whole of life is capa- ble of being sanctified. (p.167) How this "division of awareness" works , is not explained. A double arbitrareness seems to be involved between the principle of the general possibility of sacrality in all nature and, on the one hand, its partial experience (only some space is experien- ced as sacred), and on the other hand, its result at least if we take at face value the statement that "experience of sacred space makes possible experience of profane space". Time is experienced similarly but the situation is more complex. As in the case of space, it is the introduction of sacred time that makes possible the other time, ordinary time, the profane duration in which every human life takes its course (p. 89). However, sacred time is not all of the same quality. There is mythological and historical time. The former is sacred time periodically reactualized in pre-Chris- tian religions. It is primordial, original and not preceded by any other time. The latter, historical time, is a mutation originating in the affir- mation of the historicity of the person of Jesus Christ. However, in non-religious time more heterogeneity is allowed for than in the case of the experience of space. Also, for non-religious man varying tem- poral rhyhms are recorded in work, celebrations, while listening to music, when being bored etc. But after all, non-religious time cannot present neither break nor mystery. What Eliade's argumentation amounts to is the statement that, basically, there are two opposing orientations of the mind, a sacred and a prolane one. This is illustrated by many examples in relation to the various conceptions of man's existence in nature and in society. These expamples are taken from many religions, primitive and modern. Because the concepts about space, time etc, are not central to religion, Eliade's study bears more on culture than on religion itself, as was announced in the subtitle of the book, and as we find in his asser- tion that culture from the beginning of human history has been
— 171 —
religious and still remains so today, though many people are not aware of its religious origin. This view is reminiscent of Durkheim's, as we find expressed toward the end of his study on religion14). The fact that the concept of „sacred-profane" is used in a context of culture will diminish its utility in connection with religion itself, especially because Eliade attributes to it a certain Christian interpre- tation as mentioned above. To focus more precisely on this issue what is the cognitive or evaluative value of such a concept? What does it convey about Christianity, Buddhism, Islam or any other religion? It only conveys that those religions nurse some kind of sacral awareness, which is not much more than a tautology, an affirmation to the extent that these religions are religious. The specific, sacral awareness of any religion can only be known by studying the concrete case. From the preceeding can be concluded that, even if there exists an oppostion between sacred and profane, it can only exist within a concrete religion, within its believers. I would like to argue that the opposition between the sacred and the profane is only one manifestation of religious awareness, and that many different religious orientations do exist. To mention some by way of example, there is the basic belief of Christianity in the good- ness of all "creation", or the belief that all creation reflects Gods power and majesty15). We also can mention a similar belief usually held in Catholic convent life, that a religious value can be attributed to all activity, provided it does not violate religious commandements. There is also the view in Calvinism, famous since Weber's The Protes- tant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, that the glory of God can, and has to be achieved through work in society (inner-worldly asce- tism). In connection with Buddhism, mention can be made of the be- lief in the Hinayana traditon of the sacredness of all animal life. In Mahayana there are trends and endeavors to integrate or transcend the for Western thinking fundamental opposition between the good and the bad, etc. All these examples show that the realm of the sacred
if/A*K9'-treNjta657'•
passed on didactically, they may have lost their creative quality and comprehensibility in the ensuing situation of application. But also, he argues, religious activity cannot always be an object of rational under- standing, because of its relation to such mysteries as life and death, which have been incomprehensible from the beginning and remain largely so today. Anyway, Jensen's argument seems to imply that "in- comprehensibility" and separation from daily life are not inherent qualities of religion. However, a reason for the conceptual separation of the sacred and the profane may be found in the continuity of the recent history of European Christianity. No reforms have been recorded during the 19 th. century and the first half' of the 20th. Towards the turn of the last century there has been a movement, within church institutes, though mostly unorganized, to work for a new orientation of catholi- cism towards the world. This is known as "modernism"17). Attempted at was the application of modern criticism to bible study and church history. Rome, however, radically condemned and suppressed the move- ment. The fact that the Catholic church has reacted with panic measures such as excommunication against what was only mordern learning, shows that the church must have been strongly embedded and embat- tled in tradition. A similar situation also exsisted in the highly ritua- lized liturgy, which was only modernized after the 1960's. Therefore, it is easily imagined that the 19th. and the first half of the 20th. cen- tury was a time in which the religious "services" had become totally different from anything profane. This is further illustrated by the atti- tudes of the priests towards their parishioners they spoke of as "souls" that had to be saved from "the world". The relation of this situation to our present interest is, that it have been scholars who lived in such a climate during the 19th. century, who began studying primitive religions in which they located the same fundamental differences between religion and non-religion. — 174—
ON THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE
Actually, classic anthropology is being criticized in recent studiesm for perpetuating discriminating views between primitive times and modern societies, for the confusion of the sacred and the unclean , for considering ideas concerning pollution as primitive hygiene , for the opposition between ritual and spiritual religion, between the sacred and the profane. About the latter is mentioned that: A total opposition between the sacred and the profane seems to have been a necessary step in Durkheim' s theory of social integration. It expressed the opposition between the individual and society (p. 21). Further, especially Frazer is severely criticized and even blamed for isolating and hardening the idea of magic as the efficacious symbol19). Magic , according to Frazer, resulted from early man's inability of distinguishing between his own subjective associations and external objective reality. Critique of this and similar views from early anthropology resembles the saying that beauty exists in the eye of the beholder. So possibly do conceptual problems. Bringing our argument about the vitale relationship between sa- cred and profane awareness to a close, we have to say that this re- lation cannot be explained without connection to the question what religion and society is, or that of how individuals relate to society. We have to see how institutions come into being, how they are main- tained, and how they change. We also have to consider how man is socialized into the ways of thinking and behavior in his society. Con- sidering these things, we will find that religion like all other social reality is constructed reality20). To summarise this view of society briefly, there is externalization of subjective experience in the setting of social interaction. There is habitualization of activities some of which become typified as roles. The process of institutionalization is completed when not only activities but also actors are typified. When habitualized and institutionalized patterns of behavior have been transmitted to the following generations, society takes on its full shape as objectivated reality. It is then that gradually a system of legitimation
ON THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE
NOTES
- E. Durkheim, Les formes ‘limentaites de la vie religieuse. Presses de France, 1960, pp. 1-
- Durkheim, op. cit. pp. 49-
- •Concerning the negative and positive cult, cf. Durkheim, ibid. esp. pp. 427-
- Durkheim, ibid., pp. 584- p. 58
- Concerning the social and religious functions of totemism cf ibid., esp. pp. 329-42 and 508-
- For the concept of mana, cf., ibid. pp. 292-
- B. Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion, Doubleday, 1954 (1948). pp. 55-
- Malinowski, op. cit. pp. 25-
- Concerning religion and magic cf., Malinowski, op. cit. respectively pp. 36-53 and pp. 69-
- Malinowski, ibid., p. 87 where is written : As matter of empirical fact the body of rational knowledge and the body of magical lore are incor- porated each in a different tradition, in a different social setting and in a different type of activity, and all these differences are clearly recognized by the savages. Cf also pp. 17,29,35-6 and 59
- M. Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, The Nature of Religion, The Significance of Religious Myth, Symbolism, and Ritual within Life and Culture, Harper & Brothers, 1957, pp. 8-
- Eliade, op. cit., pp. 20-
- Durkheim, The fundamental categories of thought, and therefore of science, have a religious origin p. 598
- The Bible, Rom. 1,19-
- A. Jensen, Myth and Cult among Primitive Peoples, The University of Chicago Press, 1951, cf. pp. 1-
- A. Vidler, The Church in an Age of Revolution, Hodder and Stoughton,
- pp. 179-
- M. Douglas, Purity and Danger, An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollu- tion and Taboo, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966, cf. pp. 7- — 177 —
4AVOce*-E_,M0311'465-
- Douglass, op. cit., p. 59, cf., aslo pp. 22-4, 20,
- P. Berger-T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, Doubleday, 1966, cf. 47-
- Eliade, op. cit., p. 100
- The ideological dimension of religion should not be taken to exhaust its significance. A belief in a higher transcendency or spiritual nature of man is usually required as the proper qualification of religion. Cf a related study by my self, On Thomas Luckmann's Theory of Religion, in Shakagaku Ronso, No. 14, Bukkii University, 1980
— 178 —
