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Prof. Gaudin's Environmental Economics Notes: Common Property Resources and Market Failure, Study notes of Economics

These technical notes from prof. Gaudin's environmental economics course discuss common property resources, their exploitation, and the resulting market failures. Static and dynamic externalities, the common property resource problem, and the concept of nash equilibrium.

Typology: Study notes

Pre 2010

Uploaded on 08/16/2009

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Prof. Gaudin – Environmental Economics – Technical notes CPR p. 1
Externalities and market failure: The Case of Common Property/Open Access Resources
Note, this is just a primer, we will do more in class!
Common property/Open access resources such as groundwater aquifers, lakes, oceans, some grazing
land, etc. are accessible to anyone and belong to no one in particular. However, they can be
exploited. The harvest becomes the property of the harvester and can be sold on the market for a
positive price. Negative externalities occur in the case of common property resources because
individuals harvesting the common property resource do not take into account the impact of their
level of activity on the resource and on other harvesters’ costs.
Static (instantaneous) externality: each individual harvesting the resource imposes a cost on all other
harvester by depleting the resource. As the resource becomes scarcer, the cost of harvesting
increases for all. But this cost is not taken into account since it depends on the total amount
harvested, which is not under the individual harvester’s control.
Dynamic (inter-temporal) externality: in open access renewable resources, such as fish. The
amount of fish next year depends on the amount of fish left over this year to reproduce. Small
individual harvesters do not take into account this cost since it depends on the total sum of the
harvests and not on their individual harvest.
These externalities can be analyzed as in B with a MPC (calculated by adding up all the private MC
of harvesting) understating the MSC. The Marginal Benefit curve in that case is often assumed
constant as the harvest from a particular common property resource may be assumed to have no
impact on the market price for the harvested good (Graph A below).
The common property externality is sometimes analyzed at the level of the harvester (say a
fisherman for ex.) working for his own consumption, in which case the market price of the fish is
irrelevant. The marginal benefit (MB) to the fisherman decreases as the number of fish caught
increases (diminishing marginal utility). Assume for simplicity that the marginal cost is constant.
Instead of the MPC being understated for each fisherman, we may consider that it is the marginal
benefit perceived by the fisherman that overstates the marginal benefit to society. The social
marginal benefit (MSB) generated by the amount of fish caught is less than the marginal benefit
perceived by the fisherman because of the negative externality he imposes on other fishermen and
the value of the resource. (Graph B).
Graph A Graph B
This explains why common property resources tend to be overexploited and depleting too fast.
MPB=M
S
B
P
Qs Qp
P
p
MPC
MSC
M
S
B
P
Qs Qp
MPC=MSC
MPB
pf2

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Prof. Gaudin – Environmental Economics – Technical notes CPR p. 1

Externalities and market failure: The Case of Common Property/Open Access Resources

Note, this is just a primer, we will do more in class!

Common property/Open access resources such as groundwater aquifers, lakes, oceans, some grazing land, etc. are accessible to anyone and belong to no one in particular. However, they can be exploited. The harvest becomes the property of the harvester and can be sold on the market for a positive price. Negative externalities occur in the case of common property resources because individuals harvesting the common property resource do not take into account the impact of their level of activity on the resource and on other harvesters’ costs.

Static (instantaneous) externality: each individual harvesting the resource imposes a cost on all other harvester by depleting the resource. As the resource becomes scarcer, the cost of harvesting increases for all. But this cost is not taken into account since it depends on the total amount harvested, which is not under the individual harvester’s control. Dynamic (inter-temporal) externality: in open access renewable resources, such as fish. The amount of fish next year depends on the amount of fish left over this year to reproduce. Small individual harvesters do not take into account this cost since it depends on the total sum of the harvests and not on their individual harvest.

These externalities can be analyzed as in B with a MPC (calculated by adding up all the private MC of harvesting) understating the MSC. The Marginal Benefit curve in that case is often assumed constant as the harvest from a particular common property resource may be assumed to have no impact on the market price for the harvested good (Graph A below). The common property externality is sometimes analyzed at the level of the harvester (say a fisherman for ex.) working for his own consumption, in which case the market price of the fish is irrelevant. The marginal benefit (MB) to the fisherman decreases as the number of fish caught increases (diminishing marginal utility). Assume for simplicity that the marginal cost is constant. Instead of the MPC being understated for each fisherman, we may consider that it is the marginal benefit perceived by the fisherman that overstates the marginal benefit to society. The social marginal benefit (MSB) generated by the amount of fish caught is less than the marginal benefit perceived by the fisherman because of the negative externality he imposes on other fishermen and the value of the resource. (Graph B).

Graph A Graph B

This explains why common property resources tend to be overexploited and depleting too fast.

MPB=MSB

P

Qs Qp

Pp

MPC

MSC

MSB

P

Qs (^) Qp

MPC=MSC

MPB

Prof. Gaudin – Environmental Economics – Technical notes CPR p. 2

Common property resource problem are often presented in game theoretical frameworks. Thin about the following example:

Hog Bath is a small pond teeming with fish. The estimated number of fish is 2,000. There are two fishermen, Gary and Carlos, with access to this pond. Each of them can catch either 0 or 1,000 fish this year. Any fish not caught will multiply at a 50% growth rate until next year (i.e. any 2 fish not caught becomes 3 next year). After next year, alas, Hog Bath will be filled with dirt due to the highway construction project. Thus, Gary and Carlos will split the remaining fish equally next year. (There is no limit on how much each can catch in the second year.) For both Gary and Carlos, a fish next year is just as good as a fish this year so that the payoff to each person is the total number of fish in the two year period.

The above situation can be best thought of as a game in which each of the two fishermen chooses the number of fish he will catch this year.

a. Payoff matrix: Fill with the appropriate payoffs for each situation Carlos 0 1, Gary 0 ( ___ , ___ ) ( ___ , ___ ) 1,000 ( ___ , ___ ) ( ___ , ___ )

b. Find the Nash Equilibrium* for how many fish will each fisherman catch in the Nash equilibrium? Explain your answer.

  • A Nash Equilibrium is a situation where players in a game have no incentive to change their choice after they see what other players have chosen.

c. If Gary was given the exclusive property right to the pond, what will be the number of catches this year? Explain.

d. Can you think of how Carlos and Gary can change the rules of the game so that the Nash equilibrium of the new “game” is also the social optimum?