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Teleological theories of morality states that ethics is defined by concequences of an action.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
difference between inquiring into whether something is true and/or whether it is good. If Truth involves a correspondence between our beliefs and reality, we might argue that Goodness involves a correspondence between our prescriptive beliefs and what is in fact, good. Unfortunately, moral philosophy is not that simple. In fact, it‟s not even clear that Truth involves correspondence, let alone value. My view is that the line of demarcation between the descriptive “is” and prescriptive “ought” is extremely ambiguous. Descriptive theories aim to explain, predict, and control our behavior. These theories are either true or false. Prescriptive moral theories explain whether or not those beliefs correspond to what‟s good or bad. For example, if you want to know whether or not I believe that capital punishment is morally good, or not you could begin by asking me. That‟s fine, assuming that I know what I believe and that I don‟t lie to you. Fortunately, beliefs are not only mental entities, they also influence our behavior. So if you want to know what I believe to be true or good, observe my behavior over a period of time. You could listen to my lectures, or see if I‟ve ever signed petitions for or against capital punishment, etc. In my case, I‟m not exactly sure what I think about capital punishment. Over the years I‟ve changed my mind. I do know that if a member of my family or a close friend was murdered, my behavior would be profoundly influenced by emotion. I‟d insist on retribution. In a moment of moral weakness, I might even attempt to exact retribution on my own. I think it is “true” that in all times and in all places, human beings seek retribution for harms inflicted by others. It is also “true” that human beings often kill one another. Now whether these behaviors are good or not is another question. Scientists today have begun to cultivate a line of scientific inquiry that I call “descriptive psychology.” Some of these inquirers explain our moral behavior by examining the structure of our brains. Then they suggest that that the brain module responsible for morality was shaped by millions of years of evolution. Based on this line of inquiry, many philosophers argue that, over time, as this line of descriptive inquiry unfolds, it will gradually replace prescriptive inquiry. That is to say, prescriptive inquiry will someday be absorbed by descriptive inquiry in the form of brain science. I don‟t believe it. Prescriptive moral inquiry is here to stay. Nevertheless, I think that descriptive inquiry certainly elucidates prescriptive inquiry. To me, the only way to make sense of prescriptive inquiry is via descriptive inquiry: that is to say, we must establish how we, in fact, go about making value judgments. This is an empirically based activity in which we can all participate. All we have to do is observe how we employ moral language in our everyday lives, and how we arrive at moral judgments. Descriptive ethics, therefore, involves the collection of data that relates to moral behavior and the forging of our moral beliefs. It can involve biological inquiry, psychological inquiry, economics, sociological inquiry, and/or political inquiry. But in the final analysis, it turns out that there is something left over that resembles universal morality. You may also notice that I am disinclined to spin a fine distinction between “ethics” and “morality.” In fact, I shall use those terms as synonymous. The language that we employ within the moral domain is an essential ingredient
for productive. Unfortunately, moral inquiry has always been complex, convoluted, and ambiguous. Thank God for philosophers! I‟ll at least try to identify some of those messy borders.
GOOD AND BAD HUMAN BEHAVIOR
Another empirically-based observation evident to prescriptive inquiry is that it produces judgments containing an “ought.” Positive moral behavior is judged to be “good” and therefore we “ought to do” those kinds of things. Negative behaviors that are “bad” and therefore we “ought to not do” those things. In a nutshell, morality consists in urging ourselves and others to do some things and not to do other things; and, therefore, we may have either positive duties , negative duties , or both. Moreover, we praise or blame each other, both, for doing good things and for not doing good things. There is also widespread agreement that throughout human history, morality involves rules of conduct. In general, we praise persons that obey the rules and blame those that do not. But there is a lot of disagreement over specific moral rules and how we go discovering which rules to follow under various circumstances. Many philosophers argue that moral rules are simply statements of personal preference, while other philosophers say that moral beliefs are merely expressions of tradition and convention. Let‟s just say that traditionally, prescriptive moral inquiry usually addresses the question of rules. Let‟s also agree that human beings make moral judgments, not only about specific acts of human behavior, we also make judgments about the character of the persons that perform these acts. This usually involves the analysis of internal mental things like intent, reasons, motivation, and conscience. Let‟s examine both good behavior and good persons. When we say that a specific behavior is good, we are “prescribing” that behavior. Of course, we prescribe a lot of different kinds of behavior under a wide variety of circumstances. In fact, I think there are basically four kinds of behavior in which we use the adjective “good:” moral behavior (right or wrong), conventional behavior (good or bad manners), prudential behavior (practical/impractical), and legal behavior (lawful or unlawful)? Usually we invoke rules of conduct to frame these behaviors. But there are notoriously fuzzy boundaries here. First of all, moral behavior is usually classified as a subcategory of normative human behavior, which is to say that not all human normative behavior involves morality. In our society unconventional behavior, such as belching and/or farting at the dinner table is widely regarded as bad behavior. So is eating with your mouth open, picking your nose, and scratching private parts in public, especially on television. Convention behavior is often dictated by a specific line habitual behavior expressed as rules, which constitute a body of collective beliefs called tradition. Most traditional behavior varies between cultures and within cultures. They also vary relative to time and place. Bad manners can evoke feelings of distaste or revulsion in others within those cultural settings, but are not necessarily viewed as immoral. However, philosophers argue over whether there is something more to morality than rules enforced by tradition and convention.
political standpoint, the most pressing issue is to what degree rules of conventionality, rules of morality, and rules of prudence ought to be enforced by government sanctions. Not only do we make moral judgments in regard to our behavior, we also make judgments about the character of persons (or agents) that perform good or bad acts. We typically make these character judgments in reference to conformity to rules of morality, rules of convention, or rules of prudence. I will use the term “good person” to signify a “moral person.” Many philosophers argue that a truly “good person” acts in conformity with moral rules, even when convention and prudence dictate otherwise. Others say that good persons are simply conventional and/or prudent. We can also inquire as to how we can become good persons. Are we good because we were taught to be good? Are we good because we inherited good genes? Can good persons become bad persons? Can bad persons become good persons? If so, are more efficient ways to morally rehabilitate bad persons? Is spanking children an efficient rehabilitative tool? So it is a universal empirical truth that human beings praise other persons for doing good things and we blame others for doing bad things; which is to say that we hold others responsible for their actions. We tend to praise most rule followers and blame most rule breakers. The assessment of praise and blame can be either forward looking or backward looking. Sometimes we praise and blame others in order to influence their future behavior, and therefore, we use those terms in the context of moral education and/or moral rehabilitation. When we assess praise and blame in a “backward looking” context, we aim at retribution; that is, to reward or punish others for their past behavior. The concept of retribution captures the essence of how persons act, and how they ought to act, in response to both the good and the bad.
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
The question of " moral responsibility " plays a central role in retribution. Moral responsibility, therefore, is also central to our feelings and ideas about justice. It involves the basic question of what kinds of persons are fair targets for moral praise and moral blame. Simply put, we praise or reward persons that do good things, and we blame persons that do bad things. But what is it about the nature of persons that justifies our penchant for holding them responsible for their behavior? Well, at least in the Western Liberal tradition we assess responsibility based on two main criteria: rationality and free will. We praise and blame persons that are capable of applying rules and reasoning about consequences before they act. The assessment of degrees of rationality usually involves assessing mental processes such as logical reasoning, forethought, learning from experience, processing information etc. Thus, mentality is a necessary condition for the assessment of moral responsibility. But not all persons that possess mentality are morally responsible. We do not hold young children responsible for their behavior. But as they get older we tend to hold them more responsible. Nor do we hold persons that have
a "cognitive or defect" responsible for their actions. We generally do not hold animals morally responsible for their behavior. We also praise and blame persons for acts of free will; that is, acts that they are capable of controlling. Basically, this means that we do not praise or blame persons for acts that are coerced by other persons or by their circumstances. Personal coercion generally involves the use of threats and enticements enforced by others. Both threats and enticements come in various degrees. Major threat: "Rob that bank or I'll kill your family!" Minor threat: "Rob that bank or I'll take your shoes!" Major enticement: "Rob that bank and I'll give you 10 million dollars!" Minor enticement: "Rob that bank and I'll give you one dollar." Generally speaking, we hold moral agents responsible for bad acts that were performed in exchange for enticements and we do not usually praise people that do good things in exchange for major enticements. In other words, responsible persons ought to be able to resist at least some threats and/or enticements. Philosophers argue over whether and/or to what degree threats and enticements undermine free will, and whether the concept of free will makes sense. Not only do we hold individuals morally and legally responsible for their actions, we also hold groups of individuals legally and morally responsible for their actions. But the assessment of collective responsibility is much more difficult. Here‟s why. First of all, our individual association with groups is not always framed by rationality or free will. Sometimes we are coerced into joining groups, and sometimes we associate ourselves with groups without really knowing everything that they do. Sometimes we associate ourselves with group based on tradition alone. Voluntary associations are those groups that we rationally and freely choose to associate with in order to advance our. These associations are usually organized hierarchies that involve leaders and followers. Generally speaking, we hold both leaders and followers responsible for their actions. But the responsibility of followers is contingent upon what knew beforehand and the presence of coercive influences. When we really know what an organization does and when we freely choose to follow its leaders, we are usually held responsible both individually and collectively for what that organization does. Hence, responsibility is diminished commensurate to both knowledge and freedom. Unfortunately, in the real world followers do not always possess perfect knowledge or perfect freedom. Moreover, hierarchies often delegate responsibility, which means that leaders at the top of an organization may not always know what lower level leaders are doing and sometimes upper level leaders employ coercive force on lower level leaders. For example, many of the Nazi doctors claimed that they tortured their patients because they would have been killed if they disobeyed orders. Therefore, this notion of collective (or shared) responsibility turns out to be very complex. One such complexity has to do with how human beings behave in groups. To put it simply, how does social structure affect rationality and free will, or to what degree does "social causation" diminish individual responsibility. This question raises the larger question concerning the nature and extent of circumstantial coercion, the malleability of human nature, and the "nature v. nurture controversy." To what degree are human beings conditioned
Here‟s my overall plan for the rest of this book. I will begin with a brief discussion of the three basic types of moral theory: teleological theories, deontological, and virtue based theories. Then I will examine five moral principles that underlie universal morality: utility, beneficence, nonmaleficence, liberty, and justice. Next, I‟ll discuss moral personhood and the composition of the moral universe. Finally, I will attempt to articulate a libertarian view of what constitutes the “Good Life.”
CHAPTER I
MORAL THEORIES
INTRODUCTION
Human beings ask questions about nature of morality. In the process of prescriptive inquiry, we employ a specific vocabulary. We also invoke theories to explain the nature of morality. All moral theories address the questions of what is Good, why it‟s Good, and where the Good is located? If there is anything “easy” about moral inquiry it‟s the fact that there are only three basic kinds of prescriptive moral theories: teleological theories , deontological theories, and virtue-based theories. Unfortunately, they often (but not always) provide different and mostly conflicting answers to these basic questions.
TELEOLOGICAL ETHICAL THEORIES
Teleological moral theories locate moral goodness in the consequences of our behavior and not the behavior itself. According to teleological (or consequentialist ) moral theory, all rational human actions are teleological in the sense that we reason about the means of achieving certain ends. Moral behavior, therefore, is goal-directed. I have ice in my gutters right now. I am deliberating about when and how to get that ice out in order to prevent water damage inside the house. There are many strategies (means) that I might employ to remove that ice (end). Should I send my oldest son, Eli, up on the icy roof today? After careful deliberation I finally decided not send him on the roof because it is slippery and he might fall. How did I decide? Well, I took into account the possible consequences. There is nothing inherently wrong with climbing on the roof. What made roof climbing the morally wrong thing to do at this particular time and place were the possible consequences. The issue has moral significance in so far as it affects persons. So from the teleological point of view, human behavior is neither right nor wrong in and of itself. What matters is what might happen as a consequence of those actions in any given context. Thus, it is the contextualized consequences that make our behavior, good or bad, right or wrong. In the case of roof climbing in the winter, I decided to climb up on the roof myself, because it‟s dangerous. Eli might fall off and get hurt. If that happened, my wife would blame me and so would the community. But if I fell off the roof, I would be judged to be imprudent, but not necessarily immoral. From a teleological standpoint, stealing, for example, could not be judged to be inherently right or wrong independent of the context and the foreseeable consequences. Suppose I am contemplating stealing a loaf of bread from the neighborhood grocery store. Many moral theorists would argue that morality requires an analysis of my motives (or intent) that brought about that behavior. However, from a teleological perspective, motives really have nothing to do with the rightness or wrongness of the act. What really matters lies in the potential pains and pleasures associated with the short-term and long-term
subsequently, throw up, that can be a pretty intense pain. And, some human beings are physically incapable of having an orgasm. Naturally, they tend to rank pizza higher on the pleasure scale. The duration of pains and pleasures can be accurately measured with the assistance of a much older technological device; a simple clock. The duration of the pleasure associated with pizza eating is contingent upon how much pizza is available, and how tasty your pizza is, and how fast you eat it. In general it‟s probably true that if your brain generates pleasurable experience while you are eating pizza, that pleasure usually lasts about thirty minutes, at best. If you stretch that experience much more than that the pleasure diminishes proportionately. If you eat it one molecule at a time you will not experience intensity at all, but it would take a long time to eat the pizza. If you eat it too fast, you might also miss out on a lot of the intensity. At best the human orgasm lasts only a few seconds, although the sensual experiences that lead up to orgasm are also pleasurable. Depending upon your sexual prowess these lower-level sensual activities can last quite a while, but that orgasm will still only last a few seconds. Although I haven‟t checked out the research, I‟d estimate the average duration of pleasurable sexual activity and pizza eating to be about thirty minutes. A skilled hedonist learns how to maintain maximum intensity and duration of the experience of pleasure. The experience of pleasure and pain is very complex. Sometimes pleasurable experiences lead to painful consequences and sometimes painful experiences lead to pleasurable consequences. Some pleasures are more likely to lead to other pleasures. The fecundity of a pleasure, therefore, refers to the probability that it will lead to future pleasures. Admittedly, the pleasures associated with reading Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics registers low on the intensity scale (it may occasionally even fall into painful zone) and it takes about a week to read it, and therefore it has more duration than sex or pizza eating. However, the intensity, duration, and fecundity of pleasure are often subject to the laws of probability; that is to say; there is often a quantifiable likelihood that some human acts that one would anticipate to be pleasurable turn out to be painful, and some normally painful acts turn out to be pleasurable. Generally speaking, if you like eating pizza, it is usually a reliably pleasurable experience. But sometimes you do overeat and/or get a lousy pizza. Female orgasms are dependent up acquired skills, and therefore are less likely than male orgasms. But females also have the capacity to experience multiple orgasms, whereas males a refractory period between orgasms. The likelihood, of having a child after having unprotected sex is fairly low, depending on whether there is a fertilizable ova present. And, pregnancy can be interpreted as being either good (pleasurable) or bad (painful), depending upon the context. If you do have children, both the pains and pleasures can have a long of duration: your entire lifetime. Some hedonists distinguish between higher intellectual pleasures and lower physical pleasures. The physical pleasures that typically light up our spinal cord and the inner regions of our brains tend to score high in intensity and likelihood, but rather low in duration and fecundity. Intellectual pleasures involve the pleasures associated with higher-level thinking that result from
exercising the cerebral cortex. These pleasures typically lack in intensity, but often register high in duration and fecundity. I‟ve read Aristotle‟s Ethics 10- times and have experienced new (low intensity) pleasures every time. But if you happen to read at a third grade level, the likelihood of you ever “cashing in” on the experience of reading Aristotle is remote. Nevertheless, most (but not all) hedonists argue that “higher” intellectual pleasures are somehow quantitatively superior to “lower” physical pleasures. Other philosophers, argue that even if it turns out that the higher pleasures are quantitatively inferior to lower pleasures, they are nevertheless, qualitatively superior. What exactly this means is beyond my philosophical acumen. Is classical music really qualitatively superior to bluegrass music or rock and roll? Nevertheless, the vast majority of practicing hedonists acknowledge that the “Good Life” ultimately consists in a good mix of both higher intellectual and lower physical pleasures. After all, even philosophers occasionally eat, drink, and have sex. On the other hand, if you live life wallowing like a pig in the lower pleasures, and never experience the higher pleasures, your life will probably be shorter and the variety of pleasures experienced will be very limited. If you neglect the lower pleasures you probably won‟t have many friends and you‟ll probably not live very long either. Finally, the intensity, duration, fecundity, and likelihood of experiencing pleasure can be predicated over the long-term and short-term. There are many pleasures such as smoking tobacco that are highly pleasurable over the short-term, but highly painful over the long term. Other pleasures, such as vigorous physical exercise and practicing violin scales can be painful over the short-term, but tend to pay off over the long run. The basic problem with managing our personal pains and pleasures over the course of our lifetimes is that it is usually much easier to predict the intensity, duration, fecundity, and likelihood of short-term pains and pleasures. Unfortunately, that‟s why most of us tend to overly indulge ourselves in short-term pleasures like smoking, having unprotected sex, and running up credit card debt, often at the expense of our long-term pleasure. So, hedonists argue that morality consists in choosing pleasurable consequences over painful consequences. If this is true, the next question we have to deal with is “Whose pleasure counts?” There are two moral traditions egoism and altruism. Both theories are subject to descriptive and prescriptive philosophical analysis. Egoism is the hedonistic doctrine that holds that the “Good Life” consists in the optimal experience of personal pleasure. Altruism is the hedonistic doctrine that states that the “Good Life” consists in cultivating the experience of pleasure in others. Of course, both doctrines are subject to philosophical debate. Descriptively, we might ask, “Are human beings, in fact, selfish or altruistic by nature?” Prescriptively we might ask, “Is human selfishness and/or altruism good?” First of all, let‟s be honest and admit that the descriptive question of whether human beings are selfish or altruistic can be resolved fairly easily based on empirical observation. When we objectively observe human behavior over the long course of history it‟s hard to ignore the fact that we humans do, more often than not, pursue personal pleasure, and often do so at the expense of
independent of its consequences or how happiness or pleasure is distributed as a result of abiding by that rule, or not abiding by it. It's not difficult to see why philosophers would be drawn to this position. In ordinary life, we often encounter situations where doing our duty toward others does not necessarily increase pleasure or decrease pain. In early nineteenth-century America, many members of the anti-slavery movement argued that slavery was wrong, even though slaveholders and southern society in general, economically benefited from it. Suppose, also that the slaveholders were also able to condition the slaves to the point where they actually enjoyed living under slavery. From a teleological perspective, slavery might appear to be an ideal economic institution. Everybody is happy! A deontologist, however, would argue that even if the American government conducted a detailed cost/benefit analysis of slavery and decided that it created more pleasure in society than pain, it would still be wrong. Therefore, deontologists believe that right and wrong have nothing to do with pleasure, pain, or consequences. Morality is based on whether acts conflict with moral rules or not, and the motivation behind those acts. An act is therefore, good if and only if it was performed out of a desire to do one's duty and obey a rule. In other words, act out of a good will. Hence, slavery is wrong, not because of its negative consequences, but because it violates an absolute moral rule. The problem here is: "How does one distinguish absolute moral rules from mere convention, prudence, or legality, without reference to the distribution of pleasure and pain?" In the Western tradition there have been two approaches to the establishment of deontological principles: divine command theory and Kantian theory.
DIVINE COMMAND THEORY
Divine Command Theory states that the moral goodness of an act is based on religious authority. Hence, for many Christians, killing another human being is wrong simply because it violates the God's 6th commandment. In short, the rightness or wrongness of an act is based on the truthful pronouncements of an outside authority, that is to say, "It is wrong because God or one of God's designated spokespersons said it is wrong." Divine command theorists argue that moral rules are universal because all human beings were created by the same omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent God. There are several sources of religious authority: personal revelation (God personally tells you the rules), or the revelation of others (God personally tells someone else the rules and they pass them on to you). When we accept the authority of others from the distant past, moral rules are usually encapsulated in ancient sacred texts that allegedly were written under divine inspiration. Rational theological discourse, therefore usually focuses on whether a specific person or group, that interprets this God- given moral rule, speaks with legitimate religious authority. Sometimes, theologians even debate over the authenticity of the sacred texts and/or their meaning. Theologians might also inquire whether acts such as: killing in time of war, killing a fetus via abortion, or executing a convicted mass murderer are violations of "Thou shall not kill?" But they ordinarily don‟t calculate cost/benefit ratios.
Sometimes divine command theory relies on teleological considerations. For example, many religions also use the omniscient, omnipotent, and goodness of God as a means of rewarding compliance and punishing non-compliance. God rewards believers and punishes non-believers. Sometimes these positive or negative consequences are felt in this life, (in the form of good or bad fortune here on earth); sometimes the consequences are felt in a subsequent life (in heaven, or hell where either eternal reward or eternal punishment is administered by God.) So even though many of us approach morality from the standpoint of divine command theory, we must recognize that the only possible basis for rational debate is over the actual meaning of the moral rule and authority that sanctions it. Moreover, religion‟s tendency to rely on the unquestioned authority of religious experts, often leads to unquestioned immoral behavior. In other words, religion does not, and must not, have a monopoly on morality. So beware of those that argue that morality is contingent upon religion and its institutions. If there is such a thing as morality apart from mere convention and prudence, then religion must ultimately be judged based on morality, and not the reverse. Historically, religion has been both a noble servant of morality and an evil purveyor of immorality. The obvious puzzle here is that in the history of the human race, many religions teach their believers that the tenets of their own particular religion are universally true and everyone else's universally false. Historically, this has contributed to wars over religion and the seats of religious authority. Therefore, I don‟t believe that morality is contingent upon religion. In fact, I think religious beliefs can be judged based on morality. Yes, there are immoral religious tenets, and immoral religions. Personally, I find it difficult to believe that God would ever command us to kill or subjugate other humans. So there must be some way for us to know the rules of morality apart from the dictates of religious authority.
NATURAL LAW THEORY
In the Western deontological tradition moral rules have also been derived, not only from divine command, but also from the so-called “facts” of human nature. The fundamental assumption here is that moral goodness can be somehow deduced from a set of descriptive, natural facts. This approach has always been attractive because, like divine command theory, it claims to provide an objective and universal foundation. Moral rules based on natural law, like the dictates of science, are portrayed as objective and existing independent of personal, social, or cultural beliefs. Natural law theory (or naturalism) is often invoked in support of divine command theory, secular humanism in the Western Enlightenment tradition, and even evolutionary biology. The key here is to identify natural attributes that provide the basis for knowledge of moral goodness. We might argue, for example, that human beings are rational by nature and therefore any act that is performed after sufficient and effective reasoning is good. The assumption is that all rational persons will arrive at the same moral conclusions if only they reason properly. Moral disagreements, therefore, turn out to be a conflict between rational and irrational agents. For example, suppose I was to discuss the issue of slavery with a
Despite its inherent vagaries moral philosophy probably cannot altogether avoid naturalism in the sense that we surely must take into account natural human behavior in deciding what we can reasonably expect in our treatment of one another. Indeed, the history of human moral codes testifies that it possible to conceive of absolutely binding moral rules, based on natural law, that ordinary individuals, because of their biological or social nature, simply cannot live up to. A moral rule is called superogative or idealistic if it calls for a level of moral turpitude beyond the reach of us ordinary individuals. Many philosophers argue, for example, that it is simply overly idealist to expect teenagers to refrain from engaging in sexual activity: its natural behavior. However, many deontologists would argue that, just because teenagers find sexual activity pleasurable and pre-marital celibacy to be difficult, if not impossible to live up to, that doesn't mean that the moral rules pertaining to pre- marital sex are invalid. The rule is right. It's their acts are simply wrong.
KANTIAN THEORY
In the Western philosophy deontological ethical theory has been dominated by two alternative theories: divine command theory and Kantian theory. Immanuel Kant‟s major theoretical work, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals , is probably representative of the most palatable form of secular deontology. It is also rooted in natural law theory. First of all, Kant argued that morality is only possible in a community of beings that possess the natural attributes of rationality and free will. Thus, we cannot justly hold someone responsible for his/her actions unless that person is capable of knowing right from wrong; and unless that person is capable doing right and avoiding wrong. Knowing what‟s right or wrong is different from doing what‟s right or wrong. Kant is not sure whether or not human beings do, as a matter of fact, possess the attributes of rationality and free will, but he is certain that morality is impossible without those attributes. I think he‟s right. Attempts to reconstruct morality by avoiding rationality and/or free will are, at least in my view, woefully incoherent. But I digress… Recall that deontological theories avoid both consequentialist reasoning and hedonism, in favor of a duty-based system of rules. Now Kant acknowledged that human beings do, as a matter of descriptive fact, pursue pleasurable consequences in their life. And he also observed the fact that, through personal and collective experience we can discover general rules that maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Recall my earlier discussion of rules of prudence: “Look both ways before you cross the street.” It‟s certainly a valid prescription that you ought to follow. But just because you look both ways doesn‟t mean that you are a good person. Abeyance to the rules of prudence that govern the distribution of pain and pleasure has nothing to do with morality. Hence, Kant distinguishes between the rules that govern pleasure, which are relative to the tastes and inclinations of particular individuals; and the rules that govern morality. Rules of prudence take the form of hypothetical imperatives. If A then B: “If you like chocolate ice cream, go to Graeters and buy it.” Moral rules, however, are not contingent upon our individual interests, wants, or taste. They
are universal. The hallmark of Kantian morality is its alleged universality. But how does one go about identifying these universal rules of morality? Well, Kant argued that we need to apply a rule, which he called the categorical imperative. Categorical imperatives take the form “Do A.” You do it not because of any pleasurable consequence, but because it‟s the right thing to do. It is your moral duty to abide by any particular rule that is consistent with the categorical imperative. In the Groundwork Kant offers us several different formulations, including: “always act on universal principles” and “always treat persons as ends and never as means.” Now what does Kant mean when he says that we ought to act on universal principles, or rules? Well, a good way to start would be to ask the following question. “Could I rationally prescribe that rule to apply to all persons, in all times, and in all places?” Take for example the rule: “Look both ways before crossing the street?” Now clearly, in our automobile-based society the highways would be very unsafe if no one “looked both ways.” But, note that what makes this a valid rule is the presence of automobiles and the potential for being struck by them, and the painful consequences that flow from all that. Therefore, this is really a hypothetical imperative, “If there are cars around, look both ways.” If you live in a society of pedestrians, the rule makes no sense. Let‟s try another rule. How about the rule: “Always keep your promises.” First of all, we know that human beings have always made promises. We also know if everyone makes promises, but they never keep promises, the whole concept of a promise is derailed. Or suppose you know that human beings only follow the rule: “I keep my promises, if and only if, keeping that promise increases my own personal pleasure, or the pleasure of most persons.” If I ask you for a loan, and if you knew that promises are subject to hypothetical conditions, would you lend me $20 based on my promise to repay you? If you knew that no one ever keeps their promises, would you still float me that loan? The basic idea here is that the idea of a promise carries with it duty to fulfill it. But what happens if I simply cannot repay that loan, even though I promised to pay you back today? Am I a bad person? For Kant, and all deontological theorists, the morality of human action cannot be separated from intent. Morally good actions arise out of good intentions and morally bad actions arise out of bad intentions. Deontologists say that morally good actions are brought about by a good will. For Kant, a good will is a will that molds itself in conformity to these absolute universal moral rules. So if I make a promise that I intend to keep, but circumstances impede my ability to keep that promise: say I get hit by a car and cannot afford to pay back the loan. If I intended to pay back that loan, and later regretted that I could not do it, then I might be morally “off the hook.” Suppose that you I do, in fact, pay back that loan, but not because it‟s the right thing to do, but because I knew that if I didn‟t pay you back, you would stop by my house and beat the crap out of me? Morality cannot be based on fear of getting caught! Hence, this gives rise to another useful Kantian distinction. He argues that there is difference between a “good person” and a “good citizen.” A good person follows the dictates of the categorical imperative, and therefore, acts in conformity to universal moral rules that hold true at all times in all places. A good person does not worry about pain or pleasure, and does not engage in