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The philosophical concept of cross-modal binding, where an object is perceived to be both f and g, despite having distinct senses in different modalities. The author discusses the implications for intramodal intentionalism and suggests that singular propositions, rather than existentially quantified contents, may provide a solution. However, this approach raises concerns about closure principles and the explanation of illusory cases.
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Last time we were talking about the pressure put on intramodal intentionalism by cases of cross-modal binding. These are cases in which, intuitively, we perceptually represent, with distinct senses, an object as being F and as being G, and in which it perceptually seems to us that a single object is both F ad G. Then it seems that there is a proposition, namely the proposition that
∃x x is both F and G
which is the content of my overall perceptual experience, but is not the content of my visual experience, or my auditory experience, or....
One can of course deny that there are such cases of ‘experienced togetherness’, as Tye puts it. But as usual we can take our intuitions about what would count as an illusory experience – a case of perceptual misrepresentation – as a rough guide to the contents of our experience. And there do seem to be cases in which we would be inclined to take our experience to be illusory if something turned out to be F , and something else turned out to be G.
This indicates that one of the following two things is true: (i) in addition to visually representing, etc., we also, in addition to these ‘modal’ representational states, simply perceptually represent some things which are not represented in any sense modality; or (ii) talk about visual representation etc. is just talk about an aspect of what we percep- tually represent. The worry was that (ii) seems difficult for the intramodal intentionalist to accept, since it seems to involve giving up what Tye calls ‘separatism’ about sense experiences, and that (i) seems weird.
Last time we considered the possibility that the intramodal intentionalist could respond by taking the contents of the relevant experiences to be not existentially quantified contents (as above), but rather singular propositions which predicate the relevant properties of particular objects. So in the sort of case above the perceiver might have a visual experience with the singular content
o is F.
and an auditory experience with the singular content
o is G.
If the experiences had these contents, this would explain, in an intramodal-friendly way, the fact that we would count an experience as illusory when the F -thing is distinct from the G-thing. But there are two problems with this way of handling the cases:
Now, the choice between intra- and intermodal intentionalism is not an all-or-nothing thing. One could be a local intermodal intentionalist, and say that any two perceptual experiences with the same overall content must also have the same overall perceptual phe- nomenology, without saying the same thing about the content and phenomenal character of someone’s perceptual-cum-attentional state, for instance.
But the cross-modal cases can also be used to put some pressure on this sort of local intentionalism, because it seems that we can come up with cases of cross-modal binding in which the relevant modalities are not modalities of perceptual experience at all. Consider a case where you see yourself being stabbed. Intuitively, don’t you perceptually represent the knife as located in a certain spot and as causing the pain you feel? But you surely can’t visually represent pains, right? The obvious response is that we should take one’s ‘overall perceptual experience’ to include pain sensations (and indeed all bodily sensations, since this sort of ‘binding’ argument generalizes).
Does this sort of argument show that a local intentionalism limited to perceptual experi- ences in inherently unstable?