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MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY
Syllabus
MILLIKEN, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, ET AL. V.
BRADLEY ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 76-447. Argued March 22, 1977-Dec-ded June 27, 1977
After this Court in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (Milliken I), deter- mined that an interdistrict remedy for de jure segregation in the Detroit school system exceeded the constitutional violation, and remanded the case for formulation of a decree, the District Court promptly ordered submission of desegregation plans limited to (^) the Detroit school system. After extensive hearings the court, in addition to a plan for student assignment, (^) included in its decree educational components, proposed by the Detroit School Board, in the areas of reading, in-service teacher training, testing, and counseling. The court determined that these com- ponents were necessary to carry out desegregation, and directed that the costs were to be borne by the Detroit School Board and the State. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order concerning the implementation of and cost sharing for the four educational components. Held:
- As part of a desegregation decree (^) a district court can, if the record warrants, order compensatory or remedial educational programs for schoolchildren who have been subjected to past acts of de jure segrega- tion. Here the District Court, acting on substantial evidence in the record, did not abuse its discretion in approving a remedial plan going beyond pupil assignments and adopting specific programs that had been proposed by local school authorities. Pp. 279-288. (a) "In fashioning and effectuating [desegregation] decrees, the courts (^) will be guided by equitable principles," Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300, and in applying such principles, federal courts are to focus on the nature and scope of the violation, the fact that the decree must be remedial, and the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs. (^) Pp. 280-281. (b) Where, as here, a constitutional violation has been found, the remedy does not "exceed" the violation if the remedy is tailored to cure the "condition that offends the Constitution," Milliken I, supra, at 738, i. e., Detroit's de jure segregated school system. Matters other than pupil assignment must on occasion be addressed by federal courts to eliminate the effects of prior segregation, United States v. Mont-
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Syllabus 433 U.^ S.
gomery County Board^ of^ Education,^^395 U.^ S.^ 225,^ and^ federal^ courts have, over^ the^ years,^ required^ inclusion^ of^ remedial^ programs^ in desegregation plans,^ when^ the^ record^ warrants,^ to^ remedy^ the^ direct consequences of dual^ school^ systems.^ Pp.^ 281-288.
- The requirement that^ the state^ defendants^ pay^ one-half^ the^ addi- tional costs^ attributable to the^ four^ educational^ components^ does^ not violate the^ Eleventh^ Amendment,^ since^ the^ District^ Court^ was^ authorized to provide prospective^ equitable^ relief,^ even^ though^ such relief^ requires the expenditure of^ money^ by^ the^ State.^ Edelman^ v.^ Jordan,^^415 U.^ S. 651, 668. Pp. 288-290.
- The Tenth^ Amendment's^ reservation^ of^ nondelegated^ powers^ to^ the States is^ not^ implicated^ by^ a^ federal^ court's^ judgment^ enforcing^ the express prohibitions^ of^ unlawful^ state^ conduct^ enacted^ by^ the^ Four- teenth Amendment,^ nor^ are^ principles^ of^ federalism^ abrogated^ by^ the decree. P.^ 291. 540 F. 2d 229, affirmed.
BURGER, C.^ J.,^ delivered^ the^ opinion^ of^ the^ Court,^ in^ which^ BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE,^ MARSHALL,^ BLACKMUN,^ REHNQUIST,^ and^ STEVENS,^ JJ., joined. MARSHALL,^ J.,^ filed^ a^ concurring^ opinion,^ post,^ p.^ 291.^ POWELL, J., filed an^ opinion^ concurring^ in^ the^ judgment,^ post,^ p.^ 292.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney^ General^ of^ Michigan, argued^ the cause for petitioners. With^ him^ on^ the^ briefs^ were^ Robert^ A. Derengoski, Solicitor^ General,^ and^ Gerald^ F.^ Young,^ George^ L. McCargar, and^ Mary^ Kay^ Bottecelli,^ Assistant^ Attorneys General. Nathaniel R.^ Jones^ argued^ the^ cause for^ Bradley respond- ents. With^ him^ on^ the^ brief^ were^ Paul^ R.^ Dimond,^ Louis^ R. Lucas, Robert^ A.^ Murphy,^ William^ E.^ Caldwell,^ and^ Richard S. Kohn.^ George^ T.^ Roumell,^ Jr.,^ argued^ the^ cause^ for respondent Detroit^ Board^ of^ Education.^ With^ him^ on^ the brief were^ Jane^ K.^ Souris^ and^ Thomas^ M.^ J.^ Hathaway.* *Robert P.^ Kane,^ Attorney^ General,^ and^ Jeffrey^ Cooper^ and^ J.^ Justin Blewitt, Deputy Attorneys^ General,^ filed^ a^ brief^ for^ the^ Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as^ amicus^ curiae^ urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging^ affirmance^ were^ filed^ by^ Acting^ Solicitor General Friedman, Assistant^ Attorney^ General^ Days, Deputy^ Solicitor General Wallace, Brian K.^ Landsberg,^ and^ Judith^ E.^ Wolf^ for^ the^ United
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A In the first stage of the remedy proceedings, which we re- viewed in Milliken I, supra, the District Court, after reviewing several "Detroit-only" desegregation plans, concluded that an interdistrict plan was required to "'achieve the greatest degree of actual desegregation... [so that] no school, grade or classroom [would be] substantially disproportionate to the overall pupil racial composition.'" 345 F. Supp. 914, 918 (ED Mich. 1972), quoted in Milliken I, supra, at 734. On those premises, the District Court ordered the parties to submit plans for "metropolitan desegregation" and appointed a nine- member panel to formulate a desegregation plan, which would encompass a "desegregation area" consisting of 54 school districts. In June 1973, a divided Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, upheld, 484 F. 2d 215 (CA6), the District Court's determina- tion that a metropolitanwide plan was essential^ to^ bring^ about what the District Court had described as "the greatest degree of actual desegregation... ." 345 F. Supp., at 918. We reversed, holding that the order exceeded appropriate limits of federal equitable authority as defined in Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 24 (1971), by concluding that "as a matter of substantive constitutional right, [a] particular degree of racial balance" is required, and by subjecting other school (^) districts, uninvolved with and unaf- fected by any constitutional violations, to the court's remedial powers. (^) Milliken I, supra. Proceeding from the Swanm stand- ard "that the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation," we held that, on the record before us, there was no interdistrict viola-
initiate an intradistrict remedy to ameliorate the effect of the past segre- gation practices, the Michigan Legislature enacted a law forbidding the carrying out of this remedy. Those conclusions as to liability were affirmed on appeal, 484 F. 2d 215, 221-241 (CA6 1973), and were (^) not challenged in this Court. 418 U. S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I).
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267 Opinion of the Court
tion calling for an interdistrict remedy. Because the (^) District Court's "metropolitan (^) remedy" went beyond the constitutional violation, we remanded the case for further proceedings (^) "lead- ing to prompt formulation of a decree directed to (^) eliminating the segregation found to exist (^) in the Detroit city schools, a
remedy which has been delayed since 1970." 418 U. S., at 753.
B
Due to the intervening death of Judge (^) Stephen J. Roth, who had presided over (^) the litigation from the outset, the case on remand was reassigned to Judge Robert E. DeMascio. (^) Judge DeMascio promptly ordered respondent (^) Bradley and the Detroit Board to (^) submit desegregation plans limited to the Detroit school system. On April (^) 1, 1975, both parties sub- mitted their proposed plans. (^) Respondent Bradley's plan was limited solely (^) to pupil reassignment; the proposal called for extensive (^) transportation of students to achieve the plan's ultimate (^) goal of assuring that every school within the district reflected, (^) within 15 percentage points, the racial ratio of the school (^) district as a whole.^3 In contrast to respondent Brad- 2 Separate opinions were filed in Milliken I. MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring, stated that the metropolitanwide (^) remedy contemplated by the District Court (^) was "in error for the simple reason that the remedy... was not commensurate (^) with the constitutional violation found." 418 U. S., at 754. Dissenting (^) opinions were filed by Mr. Justice Douglas, MR. JUsTICE WHITE, and (^) MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL. The dis- senting opinions (^) took the position, in brief, that the remedy was appro- priate, given the State's undisputed (^) constitutional violations, the control of local education by state (^) authorities, and the manageability of any necessary administrative modifications to effectuate a metropolitanwide remedy. 3 According to the then most recent statistical data, as (^) of September 27, 1974, 257,396 students were enrolled in the Detroit (^) public schools, a figure which reflected a decrease of 28,116 students in the system since the 1960-1961 school year. (^402) F. Supp. 1096, 1106-1107 (1975). Of this total student population, 71.5% were Negro and 26.4% were (^) white. The remaining 2.1% were composed (^) of students of other ethnic groups. Id., at 1106.
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267 Opinion of the Court
submitted a critique of the Detroit Board's desegregation plan; in its report, the State Board opined that, although "[i]t^ is possible that none of the thirteen 'quality education' com- ponents is essential... to correct the constitutional viola- tion... ," 8 of the 13 proposed programs^ nonetheless^ deserved special consideration^ in^ the^ desegregation^ setting.^ Of^ par- ticular relevance here, the State Board^ said: ' Within the context of effectuating a pupil desegrega- tion plan,^ the^ in-service^ training^ [and]^ guidance^ and counseling.. components appear^ to^ deserve^ special emphasis." 4 Record,^ Doc.^ 591,^ pp.^ 38-39.' After receiving^ the^ State^ Board's^ critique,^8 the^ District Court conducted extensive hearings on the two plans over a two-month period. Substantial testimony^ was^ adduced^ with respect to the proposed educational components, including testimony by petitioners'^ expert^ witnesses.'^ Based^ on^ this
include the Governor of Michigan, the^ Attorney^ General,^ the^ State^ Super- intendent of Public Instruction, and the State Treasurer. Two months later, the Bradley respondents also submitted a critique of the Board's plan; while criticizing the Board's proposed^ educational components on several grounds, respondents nonetheless suggested^ that a remedial reading^ program^ was^ particularly^ needed^ in^ a^ desegregation plan. See n. 5, supra. The^ Bradley^ respondents^ claimed^ more^ generally that the Board's plan failed to inform^ the^ court^ of^ the^ then-current^ extent of such^ programs^ or^ components^ in^ the^ school^ system^ and^ that^ the plan failed to assess "the relatedness of^ the^ particular^ component^ to desegregation." 8 The other state defendants likewise filed objections to the^ Detroit Board's plan^ on^ April^ 21,^ 1975.^ They^ contended,^ in^ brief,^ that^ the court's remedy^ was^ limited^ to^ pupil^ reassignment^ to^ achieve^ desegregation; hence, the proposed inclusion of^ educational^ components^ was,^ in^ their view, excessive. For example, Dr.^ Charles^ P.^ Kearney,^ Associate^ Superintendent^ for Research and School Administration for^ the^ Michigan^ Department^ of Education, gave^ the^ following^ testimony: "[T]he State Board and the Superintendent indicated that^ guidance
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evidence and^ on^ reports^ of^ court-appointed^ experts,^ the^ Dis- trict Court on August 11, 1975, approved,^ in^ principle,^ the Detroit Board's^ inclusion^ of^ remedial and^ compensatory^ edu- cational components^ in^ the^ desegregation^ plan."
"We find that the^ majority^ of^ the^ educational^ com- ponents included in the Detroit Board^ plan^ are^ essential for a school district^ undergoing^ desegregation.^ While^ it^ is true that the^ delivery^ of^ quality^ desegregated^ educational services is the obligation of the school board, nevertheless this court deems it essential to mandate^ educational^ com- ponents where they^ are needed^ to^ remedy^ effects^ of^ past segregation, to^ assure^ a^ successful^ desegregative^ effort^ and to minimize the possibility of resegregation." 402 F. Supp., at^ 1118. The District Court expressly found that^ the^ two^ components of testing and counseling, as then administered in^ Detroit's
and counselling appeared to deserve special emphasis^ in a^ desegregation effort. "We support the notion of a guidance^ and^ counselling^ effort.^ We^ think it certainly does have a relationship in the desegregation^ effort,^ we think it^ deserves^ special^ emphasis."^30 Record,^ Tr.^ 126,^ 129. As to in-service^ training,^ Dr.^ Kearney^ testified^ that,^ in^ his^ opinion, such a^ program^ was^ required^ to^ implement^ effectively^ a^ desegregation plan in Detroit. Id., at 179,^ 187.^ Finally,^ even^ though^ the^ State's critique did not deem testing as deserving of^ "special^ emphasis"^ in^ the desegregation plan, Dr. Kearney stated as^ follows: "Q: [D] o you see a^ direct^ relationship^ between^ testing and^ desegregation? "A: If test results were^ inappropriately^ used,^.^.^.^ I^ think^ it^ would have certainly a discriminatory affect^ [sic]^ and^ it^ would^ have a negative affect [sic], I'm sure on any^ kind^ of^ desegregation^ plan^ being^ imple- mented." Id.,^ at^ 184. 10 The District Court^ did^ not^ approve^ of^ all^ aspects^ of^ the^ Detroit Board's plan. With respect^ to^ educational^ components,^ the^ court said: "The plan as^ submitted^.^.^.^ does^ not^ distinguish^ between^ those^ compo- nents that are necessary to^ the^ successful^ implementation^ of^ a^ desegrega- tion plan and those that are not." 402 F. Supp., at^ 1118.^ (Emphasis supplied.)
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training program, an element "essential to a system under- going desegregation." Id., at 1139. In^ the District^ Court's view, an in-service training program for teachers and adminis- trators, to train professional and instructional personnel to cope with the desegregation^ process^ in^ Detroit,^ would^ tend^ to ensure that all students in a desegregated system would^ be treated equally by teachers and^ administrators^ able,^ by^ virtue of special training, to cope with^ special^ problems^ presented^ by desegregation, and thereby facilitate Detroit's conversion to^ a unitary system. (c) Testing. Because it found, based on record evidence,
that Negro children^ "are^ especially^ affected^ by^ biased^ testing procedures," the District Court determined that, frequently, minority students in Detroit were adversely affected by dis- criminatory testing procedures. Unless the school system's tests were administered in a way "free from racial, ethnic and cultural bias," the District Court concluded that Negro chil- dren in Detroit might thereafter be impeded in their educa- tional growth. Id., at 1142. Accordingly, the court directed the Detroit Board and the State Department of Education to institute a testing program along the lines proposed by the local school board in its original desegregation plan. Ibid. (d) Counseling and Career Guidance. Finally, the Dis- trict Court addressed what expert witnesses had described as psychological pressures on Detroit's students in a system undergoing desegregation. Counselors were required, the court concluded, both to deal with the numerous problems and tensions arising in the change from Detroit's dual system, and, more concretely, to counsel students concerning the new voca- tional and technical school programs available under the plan through the^ cooperation^ of^ state^ and^ local^ officials."
"In contrast to their position before the District Court with respect to the four educational components at issue here, the state defendants,
MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY
267 Opinion (^) of the Court
Nine months (^) later, on May 11, 1976, the District Court entered (^) its final order. Emphasizing that it had "been care- ful to order only what is essential (^) for a school district under- going desegregation," App. to Pet. for Cert. 117a, the court ordered the Detroit Board and the state defendants (^) to insti- tute comprehensive programs (^) as to the four educational com- ponents by the start of the September 1976 school term. (^) The cost of these four programs, the court concluded, (^) was to be equally (^) borne by the Detroit School Board and the State. To carry out this cost sharing, the court directed the (^) local board to calculate (^) its highest budget allocation in any prior year for the several educational (^) programs and, from that base, any excess cost attributable to the desegregation plan was to be paid equally by (^) the two groups of defendants responsible for prior constitutional violations, i. e., the Detroit Board and (^) the state defendants. C On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's (^) order concerning the implemen- tation of and cost sharing (^) for the four educational compo- nents.^1 " 540 F. 2d 229 (1976). The Court of Appeals (^) ex-
through the State Board of Education, voluntarily entered (^) into a stipulation with the Detroit Board on February (^) 24, 1976, under which the State agreed to provide 50% of the construction (^) costs of five vocational centers which the (^) District Court ordered to be established. App. to Pet. for Cert. 139a-141a. 12 The Court of Appeals disapproved, however, of the District (^) Court's failure to include three of Detroit's eight regions in the pupil (^) assignment plan. See n. 4, supra. The Court of Appeals remanded (^) the case to the District Court for further consideration of the three omitted regions, but declined to set forth guidelines, given the practicabilities of the situation, for (^) the District Court's benefit. Further proceedings were deemed appropriate, however, particularly (^) since the Bradley respondents had previously been granted (^) leave to file a second amended complaint to allege interdistrict violations on the part of the (^) state and local defendants.
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Amendment (^) bars an ordinary suit for money damages against the State without its consent, the Court of Appeals held: "[The District Court's order] imposes (^) no money judg- ment on the State of Michigan (^) for past de jure segrega- tion practices. Rather, the order is directed toward the State defendants as a part (^) of a prospective plan to comply with a constitutional requirement to eradicate all vestiges of de jure segregation." (^540) F. 2d, at 245. (Emphasis supplied.) The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further considera- tion of the three central city regions untouched by the District Court's pupil reassignment plan. See n. 12, supra. The state defendants then sought review in this Court, challenging only those portions of the District Court's com- prehensive remedial order dealing with the four educational components and with the State's obligation to defray the costs of those programs. We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. 958 (1976), and we affirm. II
This Court has not previously addressed directly (^) the ques- tion whether federal courts can order remedial education pro- grams as part of a school desegregation decree. 3 However, the general (^) principles governing our resolution of this issue are well settled by the prior decisions of this Court. In the first case concerning federal (^) courts' remedial powers in elimi- nating de jure school segregation, (^) the Court laid down the basic rule which governs to this day: "In fashioning and 13 In (^) Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971), the Court affirmed an order of the District Court which included a requirement of in-service training programs. 318 F. Supp. 786, 803 (WDNC 1970). However, this Court's opinion did not treat the precise point. In Keyes v. (^) School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U. S. 189 (1973), the Court (^) expressly avoided passing on the District Court's holding that called (^) for, among other things, "compensatory education in an integrated environment." Id., at 214 n. 18.
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Opinion of the^ Court^433 U.^ S.
effectuating the [desegregation] decrees,^ the^ courts^ will^ be guided by^ equitable^ principles."^ Brown^ v.^ Board^ of^ Educa- tion, 349 U. S. 294, 300^ (1955)^ (Brown^ II).
A Application of those "equitable^ principles,"^ we^ have^ held, requires federal courts to focus upon three factors.^ In^ the^ first place, like other equitable remedies, the nature of^ the^ desegre- gation remedy is to be determined by^ the nature^ and^ scope^ of the constitutional violation. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of^ Education,^^402 U.^ S.,^ at^ 16.^ The^ remedy^ must therefore be related to "the condition alleged to^ offend^ the
Constitution... ." Milliken I, 418 U. S., at^ 738.11^ Second,
the decree must^ indeed^ be^ remedial^ in^ nature,^ that^ is,^ it must be designed as nearly as possible "to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to^ the^ position^ they would have occupied in^ the^ absence^ of^ such conduct."^ Id.,^ at 746.1" Third,^ the^ federal^ courts^ in devising^ a^ remedy^ must
14 Thus, the Court has consistently held that the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more. Pasadena Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 434^ (1976);^ Milliken^ I, 418 U. S., at 763 (WHITE,^ J.,^ dissenting);^ Swann,^ supra,^ at^ 26.^ An^ order contemplating the^ "'substantive^ constitutional^ right^ [to^ a]^ particular degree of^ racial balance or^ mixing'"^ is^ therefore^ infirm^ as^ a^ matter^ of^ law. Spangler, supra, at 434. 15 Since the ultimate objective of the remedy is to make whole^ the victims of unlawful conduct, federal courts are authorized to^ implement plans that promise "realistically to work^ now."^ Green^ v. County School Bd., 391 U. S. 430, 439 (1968). At^ the^ same^ time,^ the Court has carefully stated that, to ensure that federal-court decrees^ are characterized by the flexibility and sensitivity required of^ equitable^ decrees, consideration must^ be^ given^ to burdensome^ effects^ resulting^ from^ a^ decree that could "either^ risk^ the^ health^ of^ the^ children^ or^ significantly^ impinge on the educational process."^ Swann,^ supra,^ at^ 30-31.^ Our^ function,^ as stated by MAR. JUsTIcE WHITE, is "to desegregate an educational system in which the races have^ been^ kept^ apart,^ without,^ at^ the^ same^ time,^ losing sight of^ the^ central^ educational^ function^ of^ the^ schools."^ Milliken^ I, supra, at^764 (dissenting opinion).^ (Emphasis^ in^ original.)^ In^ a^ word,
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the remedy are to^ be^ determined^ by^ the^ violation^ means simply that federal-court decrees must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation^ itself.^ Because^ of^ this^ inherent limitation upon federal judicial authority, federal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at elimi- nating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or does not flow from such a violation, see PasadenaBd.^ of^ Edu- cation v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976), or^ if^ they^ are imposed upon governmental units that were neither involved in nor affected by the constitutional violation, as in^ Milliken^ I,^ supra. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U. S. 284, 292-296 (1976). But where, as here, a constitutional violation has been found, the remedy does not "exceed" the violation if^ the^ remedy^ is^ tailored^ to cure the "'condition that offends the Constitution.'" Milli- ken I, supra, at 738.^ (Emphasis^ supplied.) The "condition" offending the Constitution is Detroit's de jure segregated^ school^ system,^ which was^ so^ pervasively^ and persistently segregated that the District Court^ found^ that^ the need for the educational components flowed^ directly^ from constitutional violations^ by^ both^ state^ and^ local^ officials. These specific educational^ remedies,^ although^ normally^ left to the discretion of^ the^ elected^ school^ board and^ professional educators, were deemed necessary to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have^ en- joyed in terms of education had these four components been provided in a nondiscriminatory manner in a school system free from pervasive de jure racial segregation. In the first case invalidating a de jure system, a unanimous Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice^ Warren,^ held^ in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I): "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." And in United States v. Montgomery County^ Bd. of Educ., 395 U. S.^^225 (1969),^ the^ Court^ concerned^ itself not with pupil assignment, but^ with^ the^ desegregation^ of faculty and staff as part of^ the^ process^ of^ dismantling^ a^ dual
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system. In doing so, the Court, there speaking through Mr. Justice Black, focused on the reason for judicial concerns going beyond pupil assignment: "The dispute ... deals with faculty and staff desegregation, a goal that we have recognized to be an important aspect of the basic task of achieving a public school system wholly free from racial discrimination." Id., at 231-232. (Emphasis supplied.) Montgomery County therefore stands firmly for the propo- sition that matters other than pupil assignment must on occa- sion be addressed by federal courts to eliminate the effects of prior segregation. Similarly, in Swann we reaffirmed the principle laid down in Green v. County School Bd., 391 U. S. 430 (1968), that "existing policy and practice with regard to faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities were among the most important indicia of a segre- gated system." 402 U. S., at 18. In a word, discriminatory student assignment policies can themselves manifest and breed other inequalities built into a dual system founded on racial discrimination. Federal courts need not, and cannot, close their eyes to inequalities, shown by the record, which flow from a longstanding segregated system.
C In light of the mandate of Brown I and Brown II, federal courts have, over the years, often required the inclusion of remedial programs in desegregation plans to overcome the inequalities inherent in dual school systems. In 1966, for example, the District Court for the District of South Carolina directed the inclusion of remedial courses to overcome the effects of a segregated system: "Because the weaknesses of a dual school system may have already affected many children, the court would be remiss in its duty if any desegregation plan were approved which did not provide for remedial education courses. They shall be included in the plan." Miller v. School
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United States, 415 F. 2d 817, 831 (1969). (Emphasis supplied.) In the same year the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana required school authorities to come forward with a remedial educational program as part of a desegregation plan. "'The defendants (^) shall provide remedial education programs which permit students... who have previously attended all-Negro schools to overcome past inadequacies in their education.'" (^) Smith v. St. Tammany ParishSchool Board, 302 F. Supp. 106, 110 (1969), aff'd, 448 F. 2d 414 (CA5 1971). See also Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School (^) Board, 304 F. Supp. 244, 253 (ED La. 1969); Moses v. Washington (^) Parish School Board, 302 F. Supp. 362, 367 (ED La. 1969). In the 1970's, the pattern has been essentially (^) the same. The Fifth Circuit has, when the fact situation warranted, continued to call for remedial education programs in desegre- gation plans. E. g., United States v. Texas, 447 F. 2d 441, 448 (1971), stay denied sub nom. Edgar v. United States, 404 U. S. 1206 (1971) (Black, J., in chambers). To that end, the approved plan in United States v. Texas required:
"[C'urriculum offerings and programs shall include specific (^) educational programs designed to compensate minority (^) group children for unequal educational oppor- tunities resulting from past or present racial and ethnic isolation... ." 447 F. 2d, at 448. See also George v. O'Kelly, (^448) F. 2d 148, 150 (CA5 1971). And, as school desegregation litigation emerged in other :";In denying the stay application, Mr. Justice Black was untroubled by the underlying order of the District Court: "It would be very difficult for me to suspend (^) the order of the District Court that, in my view, does no more than endeavor to realize the directive of the Fourteenth Amendment and the decisions of this Court that racial discrimination (^) in the public schools must be eliminated root and branch." 404 U. S., at 1207.
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regions of the country, federal courts have^ likewise^ looked^ in part to remedial programs, when the^ record^ supported an order to that effect.^ See,^ e.^ g.,^ Morgan^ v.^ Kerrigan,^^401 F. Supp. 216, 235 (Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F. 2d^401 (CAI), cert. denied sub nom. White^ v.^ Morgan,^^426 U.^ S.^935 (1976); Hart v. Community School Board of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699, 757 (EDNY 1974),^ aff'd,^512 F.^ 2d^37 (CA2^ 1975);^ cf. Booker v. Special School^ Dist.^ 1,^ Minneapolis,^ Minn.,^^351 F. Supp. 799 (Minn.^ 1972)^. Finally, in addition to other^ remedial^ programs,^ which could, if circumstances warranted,^ include^ programs^ to remedy deficiencies, particularly in reading and communi- cations skills, federal courts have expressly ordered special in-service training for teachers, see, e.^ g.,^ United^ States^ v. Missouri,^523 F.^ 2d^ 885,^887 (CA8^ 1975);^ Smith^ v.^ St.^ Tam- many Parish School^ Board,^ supra,^ at^ 110;^ Moore^ v.^ Tangi- pahoa ParishSchool Board, supra, at 253, and have^ altered^ or even suspended testing^ programs^ employed^ by^ school^ systems undergoing desegregation. See, e. g., Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School^ Dist.,^^419 F.^ 2d^ 1211,^1219 (CA 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.^ S.^^1032 (1970);^ Lemon^ v.^ Bossier Parish School Board, 444 F. 2d 1400, 1401 (CA5^ 1971); Arvizu v. Waco Independent School^ Dist.,^^373 F.^ Supp.^1264 (WD Tex. 1973), rev'd in part on other issues, 495 F.^ 2d^499 (CA5 1974). Our reference to these cases is not to be taken as necessarily approving holdings not^ reviewed^ by^ this^ Court.^ However, they demonstrate that the District^ Court^ in^ the^ case^ now
17 We do not, of course, pass upon the correctness of the particular holdings of cases we did not review. We simply note that these holdings support the broader proposition^ that,^ when^ the^ record^ warrants,^ remedial programs may, in the exercise of equitable discretion, be appropriate remedies to^ treat^ the^ condition^ that^ offends^ the^ Constitution.^ Of^ course, it must always be shown that the constitutional violation caused the^ con- dition for which remedial programs are^ mandated.
