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Midterm Exam Version C - General Equilibrium and Market Power | ECON 173, Exams of Microeconomics

Material Type: Exam; Professor: Boal; Class: INTERMED MICROECON ANALYSIS; Subject: Economics; University: Drake University; Term: Fall 2006;

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Intermediate Microeconomic Analysis (Econ 173) Signature:
Drake University, Fall 2006
William M. Boal Printed name:
MIDTERM EXAMINATION #4 VERSION C
“General Equilibrium and Market Power”
December 5, 2006
INSTRUCTIONS: This exam is closed-book, closed-notes. Simple calculators are permitted, but not
graphing calculators or calculators with alphabetical keyboards. Point values for each question are
noted in brackets.
I. MULTIPLE CHOICE: Circle the one best answer to each question. Feel free to use margins for
scratch work. [2 pts each—52 pts total]
The next three questions refer to the following
Edgeworth box diagram. The solid curves are
Joshua's indifference curves. The dashed
curves are Kelly's indifference curves.
(1) From allocation A, both people can be
made better off if
a. Joshua gives Kelly some food, and Kelly
gives Joshua some clothing.
b. Joshua gives Kelly some clothing, and
Kelly gives Joshua some food.
c. Either (a) or (b).
d. No trade can make both people better off.
(2) From allocation C, both people can be
made better off if
a. Joshua gives Kelly some food, and Kelly
gives Joshua some clothing.
b. Joshua gives Kelly some clothing, and
Kelly gives Joshua some food.
c. Either (a) or (b).
d. No trade can make both people better off.
(3) Joshua and Kelly have identical marginal
rates of substitution in consumption at
a. allocation A only.
b. allocation C only.
c. both allocations A and C.
d. neither allocations A nor C.
(4) The contract curve for this Edgeworth box
diagram would not pass through
a. Allocation A.
b. Allocation B.
c. Allocation C.
d. The contract curve passes through all three
allocations.
e. The contract curve does not pass through
any of these three allocations.
Joshua
Kelly
Clothing
Food
A
B
C
pf3
pf4
pf5
pf8
pf9
pfa

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Intermediate Microeconomic Analysis (Econ 173) Signature: Drake University, Fall 2006 William M. Boal Printed name:

MIDTERM EXAMINATION #4 VERSION C

“General Equilibrium and Market Power”

December 5, 2006

INSTRUCTIONS: This exam is closed-book, closed-notes. Simple calculators are permitted, but not graphing calculators or calculators with alphabetical keyboards. Point values for each question are noted in brackets. I. MULTIPLE CHOICE: Circle the one best answer to each question. Feel free to use margins for scratch work. [2 pts each—52 pts total] The next three questions refer to the following Edgeworth box diagram. The solid curves are Joshua's indifference curves. The dashed curves are Kelly's indifference curves. (1) From allocation A, both people can be made better off if a. Joshua gives Kelly some food, and Kelly gives Joshua some clothing. b. Joshua gives Kelly some clothing, and Kelly gives Joshua some food. c. Either (a) or (b). d. No trade can make both people better off. (2) From allocation C, both people can be made better off if a. Joshua gives Kelly some food, and Kelly gives Joshua some clothing. b. Joshua gives Kelly some clothing, and Kelly gives Joshua some food. c. Either (a) or (b). d. No trade can make both people better off. (3) Joshua and Kelly have identical marginal rates of substitution in consumption at a. allocation A only. b. allocation C only. c. both allocations A and C. d. neither allocations A nor C. (4) The contract curve for this Edgeworth box diagram would not pass through a. Allocation A. b. Allocation B. c. Allocation C. d. The contract curve passes through all three allocations. e. The contract curve does not pass through any of these three allocations. Joshua Kelly Clothing Food

A

B

C

Drake University, Fall 2006 Page 2 of 11 The next three questions refer to the following graph of an economy's production-possibility curve. Assume this economy is in general competitive equilibrium at point A, where the slope of the production-possibility curve is 2 (in absolute value). (5) If this economy were to produce two more units of food, it would have to reduce production of other goods by about a. one unit. b. two units. c. four units. d. six units. e. eight units. (6) If the price of food in this economy is $ per unit, then the price of other goods must be a. $2. b. $3. c. $4. d. $6. e. $12. (7) Throughout the economy, the slope of every consumer's budget line, with food on the horizontal axis and other goods on the vertical axis, is a. two. b. three. c. four. d. six. e. twelve. The next question refers to the graph below of alternative average cost curves. Assume that industry output is at least Q. (8) Which average cost curve above is typical of a firm that enjoys a natural monopoly? a. Average cost curve A. b. Average cost curve B. c. Average cost curve C. d. None of the above. e. Cannot be determined from information given. (9) If marginal revenue is greater than marginal cost at the current level of output, the firm can increase its profit by a. increasing output. b. decreasing output. c. either increasing or decreasing output. d. neither—the firm cannot increase its profit by making small changes in output. e. Cannot be determined from information given. (10) If the firm’s demand curve for its product slopes downward, and the firm must charge all customers the same price, then the firm's price will be a. less than marginal revenue. Food Other goods A Quantity of output Q Average cost A

C

B

Drake University, Fall 2006 Page 4 of 11 (17) If all firms in an industry are colluding to maximize their total profit, then each firm's marginal cost is a. less than the price. b. greater than the price. c. equal to the price. d. Cannot be determined from information given. (18) According to the model of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, the total quantity produced will be larger, a. the less elastic is demand. b. the fewer firms are in the industry. c. both (a) and (b). d. neither (a) nor (b). The next three questions refer to the following graph of a representative firm under monopolistic competition. $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Quantity Demand A Demand B Demand C Average cost Marginal cost (19) Which demand curve shows long-run equilibrium in this market? a. Demand curve A. b. Demand curve B. c. Demand curve C. d. None of the above. e. Cannot be determined from information given. (20) Long-run equilibrium quantity for this firm is a. 8 units. b. 20 units. c. 40 units. d. 50 units. e. 65 units. f. 80 units. (21) Long-run equilibrium price for this firm is a. $2. b. $6.25. c. $7. d. $8. e. $10.50.

Drake University, Fall 2006 Page 5 of 11 The next five questions refer to the following game. Firm A is the dominant firm in the industry. Firm B is a potential entrant into the industry. (Negative payoffs indicate losses.) Firm B Enter market Stay out of market Firm A Set high price A gets $ million. B gets $ million. A gets $ million. B gets $ million. Set low price A gets $ million. B gets -$ million. A gets $ million. B gets $ million. (22) How many Pareto-optimal outcomes are there in this game? a. Zero. b. One. c. Two. d. Three e. Four. (23) What is Firm A's dominant strategy? a. Set high price. b. Set low price. c. Both (a) and (b). d. Firm A has no dominant strategy. (24) What is Firm B's best reply if Firm A chooses to set a high price? a. Enter market. b. Stay out of market. c. Both (a) and (b). d. Firm B has no best reply. (25) What is the dominant-strategy equilibrium of this game? a. Firm A sets high price, Firm B enters market. b. Firm A sets low price, Firm B enters market. c. Firm A sets high price, Firm B stays out of market. d. Firm A sets low price, Firm B stays out of market. e. There is no dominant-strategy equilibrium in this game. (26) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game? a. Firm A sets high price, Firm B enters market. b. Firm A sets low price, Firm B enters market. c. Firm A sets high price, Firm B stays out of market. d. Firm A sets low price, Firm B stays out of market. e. There is no Nash equilibrium in this game. II. PROBLEMS: Please write your answers in the boxes on this question sheet. Show your work and circle your final answers.

Drake University, Fall 2006 Page 7 of 11 (2) [Monopoly, price discrimination: 16 pts] Suppose a monopolist faces the following demand curve: P = 20 – (Q/10). Further suppose that the monopolist's marginal cost and average cost are constant and equal to $2. Assume initially that the monopolist must charge the same price for all units sold— that is, price discrimination is impossible. Circle your final answers. Use the space on the next page for scratch work. Note: question continues on next page. a. Find the monopolist's marginal revenue function MR(Q). b. Compute the monopolist's profit-maximizing quantity of output. c. Compute the monopolist's profit-maximizing price. d. Compute monopoly profit at this price. e. Compute social deadweight loss at this price.

Drake University, Fall 2006 Page 8 of 11 Alternatively, assume that perfect price discrimination is possible. Each unit of output may be sold at a different price, equal to the maximum amount the buyer is willing to pay for that unit. f. Compute the monopolist's profit-maximizing quantity of output with perfect price discrimination. g. Compute monopoly profit with perfect price discrimination. h. Compute social deadweight loss with perfect price discrimination. Quantity Price

Drake University, Fall 2006 Page 10 of 11 e. Compute total market quantity Q* and the equilibrium price P*. f. Compute the total profit of both firms. g. Compute the social deadweight loss. Quantity Price

Drake University, Fall 2006 Page 11 of 11 III. CRITICAL THINKING: Answer one question below (your choice). [4 pts] (1) Consider the following statement. “Profits are higher for all firms under a well-functioning cartel than under competition. So the government should encourage cartels.” Do you agree or disagree? Why? (2) Suppose there are twenty students in the class. The teacher brings 100 crackers and 40 pieces of cheese to the class party. Each student is allocated 5 crackers and 2 pieces of cheese. Is this a Pareto optimal allocation? Why or why not? Circle the question you are answering. Please write your answer below. Full credit requires good grammar, accurate spelling, and correct economic reasoning. [end of exam]