Descartes' Second-Order Judgments in Meditations on First-Order Beliefs, Lecture notes of Reasoning

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Locating “I think, therefore I am” in the Meditations

Sam Pensler

A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts

University of Otago

Dunedin, New Zealand

June 2017

ii Abstract “I think, therefore I am” ( Cogito, ergo sum ) suggests a “naïve” interpretation whereby anyone who argues as follows is certain of their existence. I think. Therefore, I am. Curiously, the famous line doesn’t appear in the Meditations , while it does in Descartes’ other works. Does the naïve interpretation, while a plausible reading of the other works, misread the Meditations? In this thesis, I claim that the Meditations should be naïvely interpreted by defending this position against three central objections. Objection 1: Nowhere in the Meditations does the meditator assert that cogito is certain. I respond that the meditator does assert the certainty of cogito in the first meditation as he doubts his beliefs. This happens when he makes judgments about what he is thinking such as: “I have no answer to these [skeptical] arguments” and “my habitual opinions keep coming back.” Objection 2: Even if the meditator claims cogito in the Meditations , he never accounts for why cogito is certain, which he must do if he uses it as a premise. I show that an argument for the certainty of cogito can be reconstructed by examining how the meditator doubts his beliefs. The idea behind the argument is that for the meditator to doubt his belief system it’s necessary that he is certain that he thinks, in particular, that he is certain about what his beliefs are and their amenability to doubt. In short, the certainty of cogito is built into the method of doubt. Objection 3: The naïve interpretation of the Meditations is false since Descartes says that the cogito is not an argument. For, he says that the cogito is a “simple intuition of the mind”, not a “deduction by means of syllogism.” I respond that Descartes is not denying that the cogito is an argument. He is specifying the type of reasoning process one must use to work through the argument from cogito to sum — sum is discovered by “intuition” rather than syllogistic reasoning.

iv Contents Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………....ii Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………………………..iii Contents……………………………………………………………………………………...…...iv A Note on Translation and Citation……………………………………………………………….v Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….. Chapter 1: Cogito is Claimed in the First Meditation…………………………………………….. Chapter 2: Reconstructing an Argument for the Certainty of Cogito in the First Meditation....... Chapter 3: The Cogito is an Argument. ………………………………………………………….7 8 Closing Remarks……………………………………………………………………………….. Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………

v A Note on Translation and Citation In this thesis, all citations of Descartes will be doubly cited. The first citation is from Collected Works , a compendium of Descartes’ oeuvre assembled by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (“AT”). This is followed by a citation from The Philosophical Writings of Descartes , an English translation by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (“CSMK”). I will almost exclusively quote the CSMK translation of Descartes’s writings. In several places in which the textual analysis is more exacting, I will quote the Latin from AT. For brevity’s sake, in-text references to secondary literature will be limited to a page number closed by parenthesis. If I cite multiple works by one commentator, the year of publication is included in the in-text citation. Full citations are found in the bibliography, formatted in MLA 7.

merely by considering the saying “I think, therefore I am” in isolation of the contexts in the Discourse and the Principles where Descartes asserts it. On the naïve reading, the meditator of the Meditations is presenting an argument. This is suggested by the phrase “therefore” ( ergo ). The argument establishes that the meditator is certain that he exists. The argument is this. I think. Therefore, I am. Suppose, for expository purposes, that I’m deploying this argument. The premise of the argument—I think—is something I’m certain of. I’m also certain that my existence follows from the fact that I think. From these two pieces, I infer the conclusion that I exist. And when I make this argument I become certain that I exist, since the conclusion is established by a certain premise and a certain logical entailment between the premise and the conclusion. Anyone else can make this argument, and so be certain that she too exists. A few clarifications should be made about the naïve argument to avoid confusion. First, a note about the meaning of the premise “I think” ( cogito ). As I will use the term, when someone judges “I think”, or uses “I think” as a premise in an argument, she is saying that there is some thought currently going on in her mind or, as is now common parlance, she is in some mental state. So, when someone judges “I think” or uses “I think” as a premise, I will say that she is making a “second-order judgment.” A second-order judgment is a judgment about one’s own mental state rather than a “first-order judgment”, which is only about some worldly content. “It will rain” is a first-order judgment whereas “I believe that it will rain” is a second-order judgment. Crucially, on my usage, when someone judges “I think” they could be referring to any first-order mental state that they are in at the time of that judgment. For example, they could be referring to their (first-order)

belief that it’s raining, their (first-order) state of imagining that it’s raining, or that they are having a generic (first-order) thought. For someone to claim “I think”— cogito— is for that person to judge that they are in some first-order mental state, whatever it may be. I believe this broad definition of cogito is how Descartes understood the term. Descartes widely defines thought ( cogitatio ) as: Everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately aware of it. Thus all operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses are thoughts. I say ‘immediately’ so as to include the consequences of thoughts; a voluntary movement, for example, originates in a thought but is not itself a thought. (AT VII 160; CSMK 2:113) Descartes also identifies “operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses” with attitudes such as doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, unwilling, imagining, and having sensory perceptions (AT VII 28; CSMK 2:19). Given Descartes’ broad definition of thought, when someone judges “I think”, they are referring to any of their current first-order mental states of doubting that such and such, of understanding that such and such, of just thinking (in a generic, unspecified sense), and so on.^1 The reason I have specified that, on my usage, the judgment “I think” may report some first-order mental state that is not stated by the proposition “I think” is that there are alternative interpretations of the cogito^2 that understand the proposition cogito —“I think”— (^1) Descartes’ letter from March 1638 (AT II 37) is additional evidence that he understands the judgment that “I think” to be a second-order judgment about one’s first-order mental life. In the letter, Descartes says that to make the argument “I have the opinion that I am breathing, therefore I am” is “just the same as” arguing “I am thinking, therefore I am.” He then goes on to say that “all the other propositions [e.g. “I have the opinion that I am breathing”] from which we can conclude our existence come back to this one [ cogito ].” (^2) Following standard convention in Descartes scholarship, when I write “the cogito” (“cogito” unitalicized and preceded by a definite article) I’m using this phase as a

A second clarification is that on the naïve interpretation, the meditator concludes that he exists by doing more than judging himself to be in some first-order mental state. The meditator is also judging that his existence is entailed by the fact that he is thinking. Many questions arise here. For example, in meditator’s argument, is it necessary that he marks out the fact that he thinks entails that he exists as a separate premise from cogito in order to become certain that he exists? Or, is concluding sum on the basis of cogito enough? Does the meditator need to recognize that the fact that he thinks entails that he exists is an instance of a more general principle such as “Whatever thinks exists”? Why is it true that my thinking entails my existence? I will put off these questions until the third chapter of my thesis where I will examine how Descartes begins to answer these questions. The naïve interpretation is neutral about the answers to these questions. Third, note that in the naïve argument, the meditator doesn’t need to judge “I think is certain ” to become certain of his existence. In other words, the premise doesn’t need to be: “It is certain that I think.” Relatedly, the conclusion doesn’t have to include certainty. The reason why is that, as we will soon see, the meditator accepts, as a tenet of his method of doubt, that he should only make judgments that are certain. Thus, it’s implied that the premise and conclusion are things of which the meditator believes to be certain, in addition to being true.^4 Fourth, the naïve argument doesn’t establish that the reasoner persists, or exists for any period except for the instant at which she is certain that she thinks. So, a completely accurate version of the naïve argument would have the premise and conclusion indexed to the exact same time. (^4) For a discussion of what Descartes means by “certainty”, see chapter two, page 68 - 70.

My thesis argues for the naïve interpretation of the Meditations by responding to three central objections. In the first chapter, I take up the objection that the naïve interpretation is incorrect since nowhere in the text of the Meditations does the meditator judge cogito. That is, nowhere does the meditator make a certain categorical second-order judgment. I argue that the meditator does make categorical second-order judgments that he regards as certain in the first meditation when he makes remarks such as “I have no answer to these arguments [the skeptical arguments]” and “my habitual opinions keep coming back, and despite my wishes, they capture my belief” (AT VII 2 1 - 2 2; CSMK 2:14- 15 ). I go on to argue that in the first meditation, by engaging in the process of doubting his first-order beliefs, the meditator is committed to the Certainty of Mind Thesis (“CM”), the view that all his second-order judgments are certain. Surprisingly, then, the meditator has some certainty even in the first meditation. I close by arguing that when the meditator begins the second meditation, he uses these second-order judgments as a premise in his argument for sum. In the second chapter, I respond to the objection that if the meditator were to derive sum from certain second-order judgements (which is what the naïve interpretation claims), then the mediator should provide an account of why his second-order judgments are certain, but he lacks such an account. I argue that an argument for the Certainty of Mind Thesis can be reconstructed in the first meditation that bears resemblance to an argument developed by Tyler Burge. The general idea behind the argument is that the meditator’s process of doubt requires certain second-order judgments. The meditator must be able to be certain about the structure and substance of his (first-order) belief system. He also must have certain second- order judgments to monitor whether his beliefs have changed in the face of the skeptical

Chapter 1: Cogito is Claimed in the First Meditation What is the earliest place in the Meditations where the meditator is certain of something? It’s tempting to think that there is a clear answer to this question. The tempting answer is that the meditator waits until the third paragraph of the second meditation to consider what is beyond doubt.^5 There, he presents an argument for, or, more modestly, considers the certainty of his thoughts, existence, and/or their relations. Call this reading—that the meditator waits until the second meditation to begin his positive quest for certainty rather than what is uncertain—the “traditional” reading. The traditional reading is plausible on a first read. Evidence for the traditional reading can be found by comparing the titles of the first and second meditations. The title of the first is “What can be called into doubt”, whereas the title of the second is “The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body.” In this section, I will argue that this traditional reading is false, though made very enticing by how the meditator appears to alert the reader to where his positive epistemology begins. A close reexamination of the end of the first meditation will reveal that the meditator, at this early stage, holds that more than several of his thoughts are certain, and relies on this claim to argue for the certitude of his existence. In light of this reexamination, we should adopt the revisionary reading that the first meditation is the starting point of the meditator’s argument for the certainty of his existence. So, generalizing this point, it’s also the starting point of his positive quest for certainty. (^5) The third paragraph is at AT VII 24 - 25; CSMK 2: 16 - 17.

My motivation for pitching this interpretive shift is to defend the naïve reading of the Meditations. The naïve interpretation says that the meditator advances an argument of the form: I think Therefore, I am The naïve interpretation faces a simple textual objection: nowhere in the text of the Meditations does the meditator categorically assert that “I think” is certain, or that any of his second-order thoughts are certain. So, it’s wrong to read the meditator as making the argument represented above. As I will soon explain, the force of this simple textual objection depends, falsely in my view, on considering the second meditation as the starting point for the meditator’s positive search for certainty. Harry Frankfurt makes this objection in Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen , his famous commentary on the Meditations. “If the peculiar value of deriving sum from cogito actually consisted in the certitude of cogito ,” he writes, “Descartes ought to establish or at least to claim that cogito is in fact a statement of which he is certain. He does not do so” (111). In agreement with Frankfurt, Janet Broughton calls the fact that the meditator never asserts the certainty of his thoughts in the second meditation a “puzzle” that seriously undermines the naïve interpretation (2008, 182 - 183). Before I explain why the traditional reading is mistaken, let us see why it’s so tantalizing. Consider the subheading of the first meditation: “What can be called into doubt” (AT VII 17; CSMK 2:12). That makes it sound as though the meditator is not setting out, just yet, to find what is certain and indubitable. Rather, the task of the first meditation is to discover what can be doubted. Indeed, the meditator’s sustained presentation of a series of skeptical arguments do just what the subheading says—expose

there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. (AT VII 24 - 25; CSMK 2:16-17. Italics are Descartes) Of the passage, Frankfurt writes: The statement, I think, therefore I am, simply does not occur in the passage at all; and neither does any exactly equivalent statement. In fact, the cogito as such does not appear anywhere in the Meditations. I propose to take Descartes’s text on its own terms and to approach it without preconceptions based on the speculation that cogito ergo sum adequately formulates its meaning. (Frankfurt, 92, italics are Frankfurt’s). In the end, I think there is something correct in Frankfurt’s remark. In the passage, there is no point at which Descartes asserts verbatim “I think, therefore I am.” However, at the least, the meditator is asserting that several of his thoughts entail that he exists. I will point out four of these entailments. First, the line, “No: if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed.”^6 seems equivalent to: (1) If I convinced myself of something, then I certainly existed. The next two sentences are a little trickier to interpret, both because the first sentence starts with “but” ( sed ) and because the first half of the second sentence, the clause that ends with the semicolon, seems more germane to the first sentence—showing something that follows from what is being supposed in the first—rather than the second sentence, which expresses a slightly different claim. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; (^6) “ Imo certe ego eram, si quid mihi persuasi. ”

and let him deceive me as much as he case, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. (AT VII 25; CSMK 2: 17 )^7 Note that the “but” that begins these sentences plays the role of introducing considerations—a supposed evil demon—that is claimed to bear on the truth of (1). Thus, the first sentence and the second sentence up until the semicolon don’t express a new entailment of the form: “If I am deceived by a powerful and cunning deceiver, then I undoubtedly exist.” What they express is a slightly modified version of (1): (2) If I convince myself of something, then I certainly exist, even if I am being deceived.^8 Moreover, the remainder of the second sentence can be rendered: (3) If I think that I am something, then indubitably I exist. And the final sentence, the “conclusion” Descartes reaches after “considering everything very thoroughly”^9 might be read as (4) If I conceive of or put forward the proposition “I exist” in my mind, then I exist. Before I move on, I wish to say why the traditional reading makes the naïve interpretation looks so unpromising. Recall that on the naïve interpretation the meditator establishes that he exists with certainty by inferring this from the premise “I think”, which he regards as certain, and, as I understand Descartes’ usage of “I think”, it’s equivalent to (^7) “ Sed est deceptor nescio quis, summe potens, summe callidus, qui de industriâ me semper fallit. Haud dubie igitur ego etiam sum, si me fallit; & fallat quantum potest, nunquam tamen efficiet, ut nihil sim quamdiu me aliquid esse cogitabo. ” (^8) A subtlety about the past/present tense: if my reading of (2) as being a modification of (1) in the way described is correct, it seems plausible that Descartes would have allowed (1) to be rewritten in the present tense, since the two sentences that begin with “But” are themselves in the present tense. This point about tense is significant because “I think, therefore I am” is in the present tense. (^9) “ Adeo ut, omnibus satis superque pensitatis, denique statuendum sit hoc pronuntiatum, Ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum. ”

This is a considerable list, if everything on it belongs to me. But does it? Is it not one and the same 'I' who is now doubting almost everything, who nonetheless understands some things, who affirms that this one thing is true, denies everything else, desires to know more, is unwilling to be deceived, imagines many things even involuntarily, and is aware of many things which apparently come from the senses? Are not all these things just as true as the fact that I exist, even if I am asleep all the time, and even if he who created me is doing all he can to deceive me? Which of all these activities is distinct from my thinking? Which of them can be said to be separate from myself? The fact that it is I who am doubting and understanding and willing is so evident that I see no way of making it any clearer. But it is also the case that the 'I' who imagines is the same 'I'. For even if, as I have supposed, none of the objects of imagination are real, the power of imagination is something which really exists and is part of my thinking. Lastly, it is also the same 'I' who has sensory perceptions, or is aware of bodily things as it were through the senses. For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. Yet I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called 'having a sensory perception' is strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking. (AT VII 28 - 29; CSMK 2:19) I will refrain from investigating whether either of these sentences are equivalent to, or imply, an assertion that the meditator’s second-order thoughts are certain. Even if the meditator is asserting that his second-order thoughts are certain, the underlying strategy to defend the naïve interpretation by citing assertions that come after the beginning of the second meditation is inconsistent with the order of discovery in the Meditations. Descartes makes it clear in the Second Objections and Replies that there is a strict sequence of argumentation in the Meditations : The order consists simply in this. The items which are put forward first must be known entirely without the aid of what comes later; and the remaining items must be arranged in such a way that their demonstration depends solely on what has gone before. I did try to follow this order very carefully in my Meditations, and my adherence to it was the reason for my dealing with the distinction between the mind and the body only at the end, in the Sixth Meditation, rather than in the Second. It also explains why I deliberately and knowingly omitted many matters which would have required an explanation of an even larger number of things. (AT VII 155; CSMK 2:110)

Since Descartes is explicit that he doesn’t intend for things established at later stages to be parts of arguments for claims made earlier on, it would be illicit for the possible assertions within AT VII 28- 29 ; CSMK 2:19 to be counted as components of an argument for the certainty of his existence. Notice: AT VII 28-29; CSMK 2:19 occurs after the meditator concludes his argument for the certainty of his existence. The change from arguing for his existence to examining the nature of his existence is implied by the transition sentence that comes directly after the third paragraph of the second meditation: “But I do not have a sufficient understanding of what this ‘I’ is that now necessarily exists” (AT VII 25; CSMK 2:17). That these two matters—establishing his existence and inquiring into the nature of his existence—are different issues and are taken up sequentially is further confirmed in Descartes’ gloss of the second meditation in the Synopsis (AT VII 12 - 1 3; CSMK 2:9). A somewhat more compelling defense of the naïve interpretation is to highlight passages from the Objections and Replies in which Descartes attempts to clarify the argument for sum made in the Meditations. The most promising of these passages is a response that Descartes makes to one of Gassendi’s objections. There, I read Descartes as claiming that any second-order judgment about one’s first-order thoughts is completely certain and so it can be used as a premise to infer the certainty of sum. Gassendi’s objection is that the meditator didn’t need “all this apparatus” of putting forward, or conceiving of, the proposition “I exist” to “conclude” that he exists—the meditator “could have made the same inference from any one of [his] other actions, since it is known by the natural light that whatever acts exists” (AT VII 258 - 259; CSMK 2:180). Below is Descartes’ response. I draw the reader’s attention to two points. (1) Descartes’ response accepts the naïve interpretation. (2) Descartes’ comments suggest that