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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTENTIONAL TORTS ................................................................................................................................................................. 3
TO PERSON...................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Battery Assault False Imprisonment
TO PROPERTY................................................................................................................................................................................. 4
Trespass to land Trespass to chattel Conversion of chattel Section 1983 claim Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) DEFENSES TO INTENTIONAL TORTS .....................................................................................................................................
Protecting against P’s apparent misconduct Consent Public and private necessity
NEGLIGENCE ................................................................................................................................................................................. 8
Duty............................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Carriers and Host-Drivers Landowners Landlords Firefighter’s Rule Healthcare Providers Family Members Charities Governmental Entities, Officers, & Employees Nonfeasance To Protect from Third Persons
Breach of duty............................................................................................................................................................................. 29
Damage/actual harm....................................................................................................................................................................
Actual causation/cause in fact......................................................................................................................................................
Proximate cause/scope of liability...............................................................................................................................................
Negligence per se Res Ipsa loquitur Assessing damage with multiple defendants Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED) DEFENSES TO NEGLIGENCE ...................................................................................................................................................
Fault of P Contributory negligence Comparative fault Assumption of the risk Contractual or Express Implied Sports cases Defenses not on the merits Statutes of limitation or repose Federal Preemption STRICT LIABILITY .....................................................................................................................................................................
2. Between torts – allows the defendant to be held liable for intentional tort A, when he meant intentional tort B. b. Reasonable apprehension i. Awareness of an imminent touching that would be a battery if completed ii. Words alone may not be enough c. Imminent harmful/offensive contact i. Does not include future contact d. Damages i. Do NOT to prove actual damages ii. P can recover nominal or punitive damages III. False imprisonment a. D willfully acts b. Intent to confine P i. Fixed boundaries
- No false imprisonment if there is an escape route and/or knowledge of it
- Can confine without physical boundaries: a. Direct/indirect threats of force b. Exceptions: i. Moral pressure ii. Future threats c. No consent from P/No lawful authority d. D’s act causes P’s confinement i. Directly or indirectly e. P is aware of confinement i. If P was unaware of confinement, harm MUST be shown to succeed with suit
- Harm is ONLY required when P was not aware of confinement f. Miscellaneous i. Time in confinement
- Relevant ONLY for damages ii. Invalid use of legal authority
- Ex: false arrests without a warrant iii. Exception
- Shopkeeper’s privilege a. Applies when: i. There is a reasonable belief to the fact of theft ii. Detention is conducted in a reasonable manner and only nondeadly force can be used iii. Detention must be only for a reasonable period of time and only for the purpose of making an investigation
To property
I. Trespass to land a. P owns/possesses interest in the land b. Entry i. D enters the land; or
- Land extends to beneath the surface, reasonable distance above the earth ii. D causes an object/thing to enter the land
- Ex: floods land, throws rocks, chases third-party onto land c. Intent
i. Single intent – Intent to trespass is not required just an intent to enter onto the land d. Lack of consent from P e. Harm f. Damages i. No requirements of damages, but P can recover:
- Nominal
- Injunctive relief
- Punitive b. Trespass vs. Nuisance i. Trespass – interferes with right to exclusive possession
- Once established, D is liable for all consequences of trespass
- Only must intend to enter land, even if you are mistakenly entering the wrong land (generally will only amount to nominal damages)
- Even if trespasser has good intentions – technically it is still a trespass ii. Nuisance – intrusion that interferes with right to enjoy property II. Trespass to chattel a. P owns/ has right to possess the personal property b. Intent i. Dual intent ii. Mistake of ownership is not a valid defense c. D deprived P of possession/use of the property for a substantial period of time i. Interference with Ps use/enjoyment d. Harm due to interference e. No consent f. Damages i. If deprived for a substantial amount of time -> damages = cost of substitute ii. If deprived permanently -> damages = cost of replacement III. Conversion of chattels a. P owns/has the right to possess the personal property b. Interference i. D exercises substantial dominion (deprives P of use/possession) c. Intent i. No dual intent – no requirement to know that it is not yours ii. Aiding and abetting d. Damages i. Measured by the value of the chattel at the time it was taken ii. For stocks and items that fluctuate, a fair market value will be applied e. Remedies i. Trover – can sue original converter and retrieve value back ii. Replevin – can sue the new converter and obtain chattel back f. Exceptions i. Fraud
- Defendant tricks plaintiff into selling than defendant gets title
- Title is voidable ii. UCC
- If goods are entrusted to possession of a merchant who deals, the merchant has legal power to transfer rights to buyer IV. Section 1983 Claims (Civil rights violation) a. Intent
i. ONLY immediate family members who are present at the time of the conduct, and who suffer severe distress, can recover ii. Repeated conduct
- A single request for sexual contact may be offensive, but is not usually sufficiently outrageous a. However, repeated/harassing requests for sexual attention can be outrageous b. Conduct that takes place over a long period of time may be actionable as well j. Exceptions to the “presence” requirement i. Acts of terrorism ii. Parents recovering damages for sexual abuse of their children k. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) i. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over:
- Nonjury civil actions
- Claims seeking relief in personam
- Against a foreign state
- When the foreign state is not entitled to immunity ii. Exception: state-sponsored terrorism
PART II: DEFENSES TO INTENTIONAL TORTS
I. Protecting against P’s apparent misconduct a. Self-defense and defense of others i. Provocation
- Generally, not raised as self-defense
- Insults and arguments are not sufficient for physical attack ii. Reasonable
- Excessive force
- Deadly force iii. Retreat
- Castle doctrine - If you are in your home, you DO NOT have to retreat a. Applies to your home and car in OH b. D who is attacked is usually not required to retreat or otherwise avoid the need for self-defense c. You can use deadly force d. Castle doctrine does not apply UNLESS you are physically in said castle (aka, house/car)
- Stand your Ground – there is no duty to retreat a. There is a duty to retreat in Ohio if possible iv. Mistake v. Statutes a. Defense and repossession of property i. Reasonable force (cannot use deadly force)
- Value of human life > interest of the possessor of land ii. Must act in “fresh pursuit” to reclaim property iii. Deadly force cannot be used to defend property
- Traps cannot be used to defend property
- [INSERT CASE ABOUT RIGGED SHOTGUN] b. Arrest and detention
i. Shopkeepers' privilege – You can detain someone suspected of stealing if conducted in a reasonable manner. You can detain a suspected thief on the premises or outside the premises if caught in fresh pursuit c. Discipline i. Reasonable force ii. Related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor
- Including the prevention or punishment of the minor’s misconduct iii. Neither causes nor creates a substantial risk of causing harm
- Physical harm beyond fleeting pain or minor, transient marks
- Gross degradation
- Severe mental distress iv. Relationship with the child
- Family, teachers, military d. Observing privileges e. Respondeat superior i. Employer is liable for employee negligent actions unless
- Not working within the scope of employment
- If they are an independent contractor (1099)
- Not on the clock II. Consent a. D is not liable if P consented b. Instances of NO consent possible: i. Power relationships
- Ex: prison guard and inmate ii. Employers iii. Minors iv. Adults with disabilities v. Limited/low mental capacity vi. Fraud c. Exceeding the scope of consent i. Medical malpractice cases
- Ex: consenting to surgery on L knee but surgeon operates on the R knee d. Emergencies i. Express consent/Implied-in-fact consent
- Doctors performing in an emergency
- Medical power of attorney e. Can be liable if you don’t disclose everything i. Ex: not disclosing STD III. Public and private necessity a. Public necessity – The use of private property by a public official for a public reason. The potential harm to society necessitates the destruction or use of private property for the greater good. i. Must be within the scope of privilege
- Government officials ii. Most States have takings clauses to repay for any damage caused by public necessity b. Private necessity – The use of another's property for private reasons. Well established doctrines in common law prevent a property owner from using force against an individual in a situation where the privilege of necessity would apply. i. Necessary to “commit” the tort in order to safe life or property ii. Liable for any damage done on the property
a. Exception – where the presence or a trespasser is known, the landowner has a duty of care not to injure a trespasser via active activities i. Duty to avoid willful/wanton misconduct b. Exception – Duty to warn of highly dangerous artificial conditions (some jurisdictions) c. §52 flagrant trespassers – duty of reasonable care to flagrant trespassers who are left helpless i. Examples of flagrant trespassers
- Blatantly ignoring “no trespassing sign” and enters anyway
- BATTERY EXAMPLE WHEN SEXUAL ASSAULT OCCURS AND DEFENDANT WALKS INTO HOUSE AS TRESPASSER ii. Landowner can use reasonable force to expel/defend property iii. Some courts will be unsympathetic even when owners ignore known trespasser activity iv. Landowners carrying out affirmative acts of care when driving on private roads
- Duty to all licensees for any activity
- Primarily based on conditions of land v. No duty to warn/protect from dangerous condition on neighboring premises UNLESS OWNER HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH IT
- No duty to alter conditions on adjacent locations a. Other provisions may vary for commercial and/or private landowners 2. Invitee – any person on the premises (1) at least in part for the pecuniary benefit of the landowner (a “business invitee”) or (2) who is on premises held open to the general public (a “public invitee”) a. Ordinary care under the circumstances 3. Licensee – someone who is on the land with permission, but with a limited license to be there (understood as “social guest” in traditional common law) a. Neither a trespasser nor an invitee b. Significance - owe the same standard or care as a trespasser i. Do not owe a duty of reasonable care 4. Guest statute – lesser standard of care; driver lets passenger into vehicle without payment a. Person suing must prove that driver acted grossly negligent by wanton/willful misconduct b. Purpose – insurance companies afraid of fraudulent claims c. Declared unconstitutional in OH State Supreme Court in 1975 i. Still on record, but no effective guest statute in Ohio because they have not gotten around to erasing it ii. Many courts have now rejected the traditional higher standard of care in favor of the general negligence standard of reasonable care under the circumstances
- If D discovers and knows that D is about to encounter danger, failing to act responsibly will result in a potentially guilty charge of wanton/willful misconduct iii. States that have rejected the division among trespassers, invitees, licensees 1. CA and NY a. CA was first to rid of categories iv. Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
- (held) Gladon was no longer an invitee when he exceeded his scope of invitation by extending near/onto the RTA tracks, rather he became a licensee or trespasser. Cannot be proven that the operator was willful/wanton. v. Child trespassers 1. Bennett v. Stanley a. (held) The Ohio Supreme Court adopts the “attractive nuisance” doctrine after 5- year-old child and mother drown in the neighbor's pool, to create a special duty for trespassing children and place the burden of the landowner to act with ordinary care. i. Supreme Court does not abandon “dangerous instrumentality” doctrine, where landowners are subject to liability if:
- Owner has reason to know that children are likely to trespass
- Condition creates an unreasonable risk to children
- Children cannot appreciate severity of risk
- Burden is slight to maintain condition
- Owner fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate danger 2. “Attractive Nuisance” Doctrine – A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by artificial condition upon land if: a. The place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and b. The condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and c. The children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and d. The utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, and e. The possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children.
- The “attractive nuisance” doctrine applies mainly to children of grade school age or younger, and only rarely to teenagers
- Some courts have held that “common hazards” such as fire and pools of water cannot be considered attractive nuisances vi. Modifying the traditional common law duties owed to entrants 1. Rowland v. Christian a. (held) D owed a duty to warn P of dangerous conditions due to their prior knowledge of such conditions. There are other factors to consider aside from just whether they are an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. i. Argue that divisions go against social norms and obscure rather than illuminate proper consideration ii. CA was first state to abolish the divisions in 1968 b. (dissent) it is not unreasonable or unfair that a social guest should be obliged to take the premises in the same condition as his host finds them or permits them to be. The distinctions between trespassers, invitees, and licensees have supplied a reasonable and workable approach to such issues. c. Analysis i. Circumstances that vary among the three-part divisions
- Closeness of connection of injury and D’s conduct
- Policy of preventing future harm
- Most courts have held that the rec. use statutes do not overrule a landowner’s duty of care to private guests, as opposed to members of the general public who are on the land for rec. purposes
- When a landowner accepts a fee for P’s use of the land, rec. statutes generally do not provide any protection to the landowner
- When lacking specific statutory language, most courts do not extend protection to gov’t entities
- Effect: prevent liability when D’s failure to use reasonable care has caused an injury or death
- Interpretive difficulties a. Place where the injury takes place b. What P was doing at the time of injury (was the use truly “recreational?”) c. Some jurisdictions interpret the statute(s) to protect against negligence liability for conditions on the land, but not against liability for active negligence on the property e. Landlords' duty to tenants i. Traditional rule: the lessee is not owed a higher duty by the lessor
- Landlord may still be liable under contract theory ii. Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Insurance Co.
- (injuries sustained falling off faulty balcony; court abandons traditional view and imposes that landlords owe a duty of ordinary care)
- Significance a. Traditional rule had too many exceptions, so it led the court to extend its possible liability to tenants i. Traditional rule did not apply if – land was leased for public use, if landlord conceals existing defect without informing tenant (latent defect), if landlord negligently makes repair iii. If the landlord's duty was merely to warn of a danger rather than repair it, the tenants may be barred from recovery by something like the “open and obvious” doctrine iv. Lease terms can be key in determining liability v. Implied warranty of habitability - an unstated guarantee that a rental property meets basic living and safety standards before occupation and will continue to meet them for the duration of the occupancy 1. Applies ONLY to contracts, NOT torts
- Majority of states/jurisdictions uphold, but warranty is controversial a. Only applied to residential leases, but not commercial leases vi. Statutes
- Many statutes now set standards or impose liability for specific defects
- Some state statutes may give the negligence per se effect if landlords do not keep common areas in safe conditions f. The firefighter’s rule i. The firefighter’s rule – precludes a firefighter et al. (and certain other public employees) from recovering against a defendant whose negligence caused the firefighter’s on-the-job injury
- Rationale a. Firefighter is licensee (not invitee, not there to benefit you economically) b. Firefighter assumed the risk (outside of expressed assumption and primary assumption has emerged to negligence and comparative fault rules) c. Firefighter has special training, not in vulnerable position to not protect himself/herself d. Argue that D was not negligent in the first place e. Firefighters get a special type of compensation (not just worker’s compensation)
- States vary on the use/acceptance of the rule a. Majority of states accept the rule, execution is subject to jurisdiction b. SC rejects the rule, so P can try and prove ordinary negligence and not willful/wanton misconduct ii. Minnich v. Med-Waste, Inc.
- (firefighter sustained injuries while stopping a rolling truck left negligently by defendant; the court does not recognize the firefighter’s rule as a part of state common law) iii. Whether a court takes a broader or narrower view of the covered risks may well be outcome- determinative iv. Private rescuers
- Some courts say the firefighter’s rule has no application to private individuals who may undertake assistance, yet other courts have said that the rule is an exception to the rescue doctrine g. Duties of healthcare providers i. Standard of care
- Medical malpractice = negligence suit
- Doctors owes ONLY a duty of care to patients; only patients can bring that suit
- Expert testimony to prove duty, breach of that duty, standard of care, breach of that standard of care, and actual causation 4. Walski v. Tiensenga a. (held) The court held that P failed to introduce evidence of the standard of care to which D was bound to adhere, as D’s procedure was controversial but appropriate for the circumstances b. Rejects T.J. Hooper ruling and instead recognizes that the “custom” is the medical standard of care in the relevant medical community
- Why negligence instead of battery? a. Statute of limitations is longer b. May be able to recover more because of insurance
- Traditional medical standard a. Almost always reflect particular customs or procedures used under very particular circumstances b. Rule for the very circumstances involved in P’s case
- Determining the standard of care a. By the care customarily provided by other physicians b. What the average qualified physician would in a particular situation is the standard of care c. Need not be scientifically tested or proven effective
- Jury instruction a. If proof is sufficient by P to get to the jury, the instructions must reflect: i. The medical standard of care (not ordinary care) ii. Physician must possess the learning, skill, and ability of other physicians, must use reasonable care, and must use their best judgment b. “honest mistake” and “error in judgment” instructions have been disapproved in a number of cases i. Not expected to be infallible ii. Not expected to guarantee results
- Expert medical testimony a. Required i. When the issue is beyond comprehension of a lay jury
i. Owe a duty of reasonable care/bound under national standards ii. Can be subject to liability for failure to provide appropriate facilities, equipment, and staff support
19. Good Samaritan statute – meant to encourage the rendering of medical care to those who would not otherwise receive it, by physicians who come upon such patients by chance, without the benefit of expertise, assistance, equipment, or sanitation that is available in hospital setting a. All states have some form (including Ohio) i. Except for medical malpractice, renumeration, and willful/wanton misconduct b. Expressly exclude: i. Hospital care ii. Those that expressly include hospital care iii. Those that contain no explicit provision one way or another
- Leaves the possibility for gross negligence a. Gross negligence – absence of even slight diligence
- Special emergency-care statutes ii. Informed consent - physician fails to disclose/misrepresented material risks of procedure and if he had, patient would not have undergone surgery by acting reasonably under circumstances for being too risky
- Injury is not a result of negligence, but rather it was foreseeable per material risks that failed to be disclosed
- What is the doctor supposed to do? (2 standards) a. Majority - information a physician reasonably should possess is that information possessed by average qualified physician practicing that specialty i. Only duty to report what they deem as material after confirmation from other medical expert testimony b. Follow the “ patient rule ” - what patient would want to reasonably be warned of before agreeing to undergo surgery 3. Harnish v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center a. Plaintiff suffered almost total loss of tongue function from lack of informed consent on the risks; court adopted the rule that a physician owes to his patient the duty to disclose in a reasonable manner all significant medical information i. Most doctors do not disclose about loss of tongue function, but court here adopts the patient rule
- Issue of not being able to get informed consent due to patient’s incapacity, lack of guardian, not possible in timely fashion is solved by assigning individual as guardian ad litem a. Patient has a right to refuse treatment EVEN IF IT RESULTS IN DEATH b. But do not have the CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT to medically assisted suicide i. 9 states that allow – CA, CO, DC, HI, ME, NJ, OR, VT, WA ii. Alternatives - can have a signed will with a “do not resuscitate” (DNR) order, or a living will with an appointed medical power of attorney in writing
- Negligence vs. battery theory a. Normally treat informed consent claims under negligence rules b. Courts recognize a medical battery with lack of consent
- Doctor's liability insurance might not cover an intentional tort
- Informed consent claim may be subject to special statutory limits/conditions
- Materiality
a. Determined by the patient without expert testimony or physician i. Question for the jury b. Physicians must disclose material risks such as i. Condition itself ii. Risks (all that are not essentially inherent) iii. Benefits iv. No prediction of outcome v. Potential irreversibility vi. Alternatives c. Issue of disclosure i. Can be privileged to withhold information for therapeutic reasons
- Causation a. Most courts have required “objective” proof of factual cause b. Emergency exception i. Medical emergency exists ii. Treatment required to protect health of patient iii. Impossible to get consent iv. No reason to believe patient would decline
- Things to consider a. Physician success rates i. Under professional standard, physicians are not legally obligated to disclose success rates 1. Why not? - could be worried about lowering numbers and therefore refusing care for high-risk patients that need it (“GOMERs”) ii. Under patient rule, success rates should be disclosed b. Procedure success rates c. Physician experience d. Physician impairment i. Not legally obligated to admit that they are recovering alcoholics, drug users, etc. ii. Attorneys, after taking the Bar, typically obtain liability insurance to protect against such claims e. Lack of insurance f. Financial interests
- What can you do to find out? a. JUST ASK! i. Physician cannot lie in direct response to patient’s questions in seeking concrete answers before granting consent iii. Statutory Reforms
- The Medical Malpractice “Crisis” a. Between 44,000 and 98,000 people die each year due to preventable medical errors i. More people than from motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, or AIDS b. The finger is often pointed to lawyers for increased insurance costs, which is misleading for several reasons: i. Medical malpractice payouts are not increasing significantly or at a staggering rate ii. P’s prevails against doctors in only about 1 in 5 claims submitted to the jury
b. Would interfere with the family and disrupt family harmony/unity
- Rejection of the Immunities a. Near the end of the 1970s a majority of courts had abolished spousal immunity b. A majority of courts have abolished parent-child immunity, while some states have abolished immunity only in special groups of cases c. Generally, reject immunity between siblings ii. The Contours of Parental Immunity
- Limited-Immunity Formula a. A child may maintain a lawsuit against their parent for injuries suffered as a result of the alleged ordinary negligence of the parent unless i. Where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child ii. Where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care b. Effectively bars most children’s claims of negligent parental supervision 2. Neel v. Sewell a. (P sustained severe burns while disposing of garbage in a fire; court holds that D is immune from liability as he was acting in his capacity as P’s parent)
- Purpose a. To remove as a matter of policy or prudence, certain parenting decisions from the judicially created regulatory regime that is the negligence tort
- Reasonable Person (parent) Standard a. A few courts have said that parents may be liable to children under a reasonable person (or “reasonable parent”) standard b. “What would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?” i. Alternative would be determining the reasonableness of D’s conduct (not applied in immunity cases relating to supervision/discipline)
- Negligent-supervision cases a. Other courts hold that parents owe no legally enforceable duty to supervise their children i. Plumley case argues that “parental authority” extends beyond discipline and “includes the providing of instruction and education so that a child may be aware of dangers to his/her well-being” b. “Parents have always had the right to determine how much independence, supervision, and control a child should have, and to best judge the character and extent of development of their child”
- Asserting parental immunity against other parties a. Issue of immunity can arise where the child sues another D and that D seeks to apportion fault to the parent, or seeks contribution from the parent, based on negligent supervision of the child
- Persons standing in loco parentis (in the parent’s shoes) a. Foster parents i. Courts are somewhat divided as to whether foster parents are entitled to parental immunity b. Step-parents i. Some courts have given step-parents the same immunity as parents c. Those who stand in loco parentis
i. Others suggest that anyone who stands in the parent’s shoes should share the parental immunity
- Parent-child relationship a. The parental immunity defense did not depend on a significant relationship between parent and child and that inquiries into particular parent-child relationships would be a “highly subjective and ultimately undesirable” approach i. Charities i. Traditional rule
- Most states adopted the view that charities were not liable in tort
- The idea was that tort liability would divert trust funds from their intended charitable purpose ii. Exceptions
- The charity was not exempt from liability as to non-trust funds. Charities would be liable to the extent that insurance or other free funds were available to pay the judgment
- Some jurisdictions had phased the rule by saying that the charity would not be liable for the negligence of its servants. The view was developed that the charity could somehow act “itself” rather than through agents or servants if it acted through its top administrators. a. AKA: administrative negligence
- The charity could not claim the immunity against those who paid for its services
- The charity could not claim an immunity as to its collateral commercial activities
- Intentional or “reckless” torts were not protected by the immunity in some states iii. General abolition of immunity, with some dissenters
- Most states have entirely abolished the rule that there is no charitable immunity
- Some states retain the immunity, causing litigation over the exceptions and factors in each particular case
- A few states have retained the charitable immunity for negligent torts, but not for intentional torts or willful or wanton acts iv. Hospitals
- Some state statutes abolish the immunity only as to particular charities such as hospitals
- Distinguishing between charitable hospitals and other medical providers was held to violate the equal protection clause of the state’s constitution v. Damages caps
- Other statutes abolish charitable immunity BUT cap damages in cases in which the tort involved activities in furtherance of charitable purposes vi. Individuals engaged in charitable activities
- Traditional immunity a. Protected the charity itself but not the individuals engaged in its activities
- Contemporary statutes a. Number of statutes provide some kind of limitation on the duty of various individuals associated with charities or charitable acts i. Ex. Good Samaritan statutes b. Some statutes are quite specific in identifying the specially privileged or protected groups i. Ex. Volunteers in various community sports programs ii. Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland
- Summary judgment granted for Bishop for immunity from negligent supervision, but reversed for fraudulent concealment
- Maine, at the time, was one of the states that did not abolish charitable immunity for intentional torts
