Interpersonal comparisons of phenomenal
character
phil 93507
Jeff Speaks
September 14, 2009
We’re now going to turn to counterexamples directed specifically at interper-
sonal intramodal intentionalisms. These will all be cases in which a pair of
subjects have experiences which differ in phenomenal character, but have the
same content. Accordingly, these sorts of cases presuppose that it makes sense
to compare the phenomenal character of experiences across subjects. Shoemaker
and Stalnaker call the denial of this view ‘the Frege-Schlick view.’
1 Does the Frege-Schlick view make sense?
No one (at least no one we are interested in right now) is denying that expe-
riences have a phenomenal character. What is in question is whether it makes
sense to compare the phenomenal characters of the experiences of distinct sub-
jects.
But one might think that one could not question this without denying that
experiences have phenomenal character. If experiences have phenomenal char-
acter, doesn’t this just imply that we can compare the phenomenal character of
any pair of experiences?
Stalnaker thinks not. The idea is that when we are talking about the phenome-
nal character of experiences, we are talking about relations between experiences
of a single subject, rather than about an intrinsic monadic property of individual
experiences.
One might worry that this makes no sense. Some examples from Stalnaker which
indicate that it does: a relational theory of space; intrapersonal vs. interpersonal
utility values.
