


Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
Prepare for your exams
Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points to download
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
Community
Ask the community for help and clear up your study doubts
Discover the best universities in your country according to Docsity users
Free resources
Download our free guides on studying techniques, anxiety management strategies, and thesis advice from Docsity tutors
The philosophical debate between intermodal and intramodal intentionalism, focusing on the problems and arguments for each perspective. Intermodal intentionalism suggests that the contents of different senses overlap, while intramodal intentionalism argues that the specific sense modality determines phenomenal character. Issues such as common content, cross-modal effects, and intermodal binding, providing references to relevant philosophical works.
Typology: Papers
1 / 4
This page cannot be seen from the preview
Don't miss anything!
1 Problems for intermodal intentionalism....................... 1 1.1 The problem of common content, pt I.................... 1 1.2 The problem of common content, pt II................... 2 2 Problems for intramodal intentionalism....................... 2 2.1 Cross-modal effects.............................. 2 2.1.1 Cross-modal illusions......................... 2 2.1.2 Intermodal binding.......................... 3 2.2 Difficulties making the distinctions between the senses.......... 3
Terminological note: obviously, intermodal intentionalisms entail the corresponding in- tramodal intentionalisms, so every (consistent) intermodal intentionalist is also an in- tramodal intentionalist. For ease in what follows, I will simply talk about intramodal intentionalists when what I strictly mean is ‘intramodal intentionalists who are not also intermodal intentionalists.’
1 Problems for intermodal intentionalism
1.1 The problem of common content, pt I
John (2005) raises the following worry for intentionalism: whatever the content of a visual experience, there could be a belief with just that content. But the belief would not have the phenomenal character of the visual experience. Hence intermodal intentionalism is false.
One could reply by denying that beliefs can have the same contents as sense experiences. This is one of the things behind the idea that the contents of perceptual experiences are ‘nonconceptual,’ and we’ll set that possibility to the side here.
One could also be a local rather than a global intentionalist, and deny that the intention- alist thesis applies to beliefs. But then one wants to know why: something other than content must go into determining phenomenal character, if beliefs and experiences can share content but differ in phenomenology. It is natural to say that this something is fact
that the content is visually presented, rather than entertained in thought. But this is just to go for intramodal intentionalism, it might seem.
Matters are not quite this simple, though. Like local intentionalisms, there are various versions of intramodal intentionalism. In particular, one might take different views on the question of whether the modality that matters is just perceiving that, or whether the distinctions between the senses are relevant.
1.2 The problem of common content, pt II
The problem of common content can also be pressed to decide this last question. (John also discusses this point.) Some properties — like texture and shape properties — are represented by more than one sense modality. So there can be overlap in the contents of a visual experience and a tactile experience. However, there seems to be no overlap in phenomenal character. This indicates that the specific sense modality of an experience is relevant to determining its phenomenal character.
One point to be made in response to this is that it is not easy to turn this into an argument against intermodal intentionalism as such. That is a supervenience thesis, and says nothing about there being a phenomenal ‘overlap’ whenever there is a certain kind of similarity or overlap in content. (This is the familiar point that supervenience theses do not entail that a small change in the subvening properties can only bring about a small change in the supervening properties.)
Can the intermodal intentionalist rest content with this reply?
2 Problems for intramodal intentionalism
2.1 Cross-modal effects
O’Callaghan (2008) aptly describes a view which he calls the ‘composite snapshot’ concep- tion of experience. According to this view, each sense modality provides a certain snapshot — a certain representation of the world — and one’s total perceptual representation of the world is the composite – the conjunction – of those contents.
This view naturally accompanies intramodal intentionalism. The intramodal intention- alist, after all, must think of each sense modality as having its own contents and its own associated phenomenology. However, certain cross-modal perceptual effects call this picture into question.
2.1.1 Cross-modal illusions
Some of these are cross-modal illusions, like the McGurk effect, in which information from one sense modality affects the phenomenal character and content of a simultaneous experience in another sense modality.
intentionalist should be able to explain the distinction between these two propositional attitudes.
This is not as easy to do as it might seem.
There’s another problem here: the problem of distinguishing perceptual experiences from bodily sensations. This is a distinction on which the local intentionalist must rely, just as the intramodal intentionalist must rely on distinctions between the senses.
References
James John, 2005. Representationism, Phenomenism, and the Intuitive View. Philosoph- ical Topics 33(1):159–184.
Casey O’Callaghan, 2008. Seeing What You Hear: Cross-Modal Illusions and Perception. Philosophical Issues 18(316-338).
Michael Tye, 2007. The Problem of Common Sensibles. Erkenntnis 66:287–303.