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Intelligence and National Security
ISSN: 0268-4527 (Print) 1743-9019 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fint
Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence
Liaison and International Relations
Adam D.M. Svendsen
To cite this article: Adam D.M. Svendsen (2009) Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations, Intelligence and National Security, 24:5, 700-729, DOI: 10.1080/
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/
Published online: 30 Sep 2009.
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Connecting Intelligence and Theory:
Intelligence Liaison and International
Relations
ADAM D.M. SVENDSEN
ABSTRACT Intelligence liaison increased exponentially during the so-called ‘War on Terror’. Today it continues as the most significant dimension of intelligence, including impacting on accountability and oversight considerations. Nevertheless, the intelligence liaison phenomenon remains largely under-studied and substantially under-theorized. In this article, preliminary suggestions are offered concerning how this dearth of theory can be addressed. Firstly, the relevance of international relations theory and other bodies of theory, together with significant approaches concerning how international relations – extending to how intelligence and intelligence-related phenomena (such as, in this article, intelligence co-operation) – can be studied, are explored. These theories, and equally, approaches, are arguably most appropriate when deployed in an arrangement of ‘complex co-existence plurality’ across the different interrelated levels of experience and analysis, and they offer more effective explanations when intelligence liaison is disaggregated into at least eight systemic attributes or variables. More broadly, the suggestion that international relations theory, and indeed theory generally, is ‘irrelevant’ to intelligence studies is simultaneously challenged.
Introduction
Liaison today represents the most significant dimension of intelligence.^1 Due to the global nature of threats and risks currently confronted, intelligence liaison in all its various forms has increased exponentially. Bilateral international intelligence liaison has grown particularly rapidly. This has brought with it a range of new partners, including some non-traditional collaborators, such as Libya and Sri Lanka.^2 As former US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage observed in 2002:
(^1) ‘Intelligence liaison’ is also known as intelligence co-operation, intelligence sharing, and
intelligence exchange. (^2) For an example of what other countries located outside of the West involved in intelligence,
security and law enforcement sector training, can offer back to their partners, see, ‘2. Training courses for security personnel’, via the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence website,
Intelligence and National Security Vol. 24, No. 5, 700–729, October 2009
ISSN 0268-4527 Print/ISSN 1743-9019 Online/09/050700-30 ª 2009 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/
expertise and training, propagated mainly through initiatives such as Security Sector Reform (SSR).^6 One symptom of the rise of international intelligence liaison has been an accompanying expansion of the academic literature on this subject.^7 As US
(^6) For an illustration of this, see H. Cooper and D.S. Cloud, ‘Bush to Seek More Aid for
Afghanistan as Taliban Regroups’, The New York Times, 26 January 2007 – particularly where they note: ‘The aid request would include $8.6 billion for training and equipping Afghan security forces and would go toward increasing the size of Afghanistan’s national army by 70,000 and its local police forces by 82,000, said a senior American official’; for more on intelligence and SSR, see, for example, G. Hannah, K.A. O’Brien and A. Rathmell, ‘Intelligence and Security Legislation for Security Sector Reform’, RAND Technical Report (Cambridge: RAND EUROPE, June 2005) p.iii – particularly where they note: ‘As the security sector reform (SSR) agenda has developed over the last decade, intelligence has been the most oft-overlooked element. Increasingly, however, intelligence is being included as a key element of SSR. Intelligence can both support SSR and be the target of reform activities... Intelligence services can make a significant contribution.. .’. This RAND report was ‘Prepared for the United Kingdom’s Security Sector Development Advisory Team’; P. Wilson, ‘The Contribution of Intelligence Services to Security Sector Reform’, Conflict, Security and Development 5/1 (2005) pp.87–107. For more on the UK’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) activities, see, for example, Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform (London: DFID Department for International Development, 2005, 5 http:// www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/supportingsecurity.pdf 4 (accessed 1 December 2006); see also the ‘Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform’ website, 5 http://www.ssrnet- work.net/ 4 (accessed 28 January 2007). N.B.: An essential qualifier has to be advanced here. The phrase ‘intelligence and security sector reform (SSR)’ used in this article refers to (1) national interest-led/driven/related initiatives, rather than to (2) international development/ aid-led/driven initiatives. Concerning (2), this is the strand to which the phrase SSR is commonly linked in the literature on this topic – where the initiatives are instead done more in the country-being-developed’s interest by their partner countries, rather than in the partner countries’ own national interests. This is at least the case in relation to the UK’s international development/aid-led/driven initiatives, such as laid out in the UK’s International Development Act of 2002 (effective, 17 June 2002). For details concerning this act, see 5 http:// www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/devact2002overview.asp 4 (accessed 15 March 2007). (Informa- tion also based on a non-attributable source.) However, at times convergence, and equally clashes, between these two different (officially at least, disconnected) intelligence and security sector reform drivers, whether explicitly or not, naturally can occur. (^7) See, for example: M. Rudner, ‘Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against
Islamic Terrorism’, The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17/ (2004) pp.193–230; S. Lefebvre, ‘The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation’, The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16/4 (2003) pp.527–42; C. Clough, ‘Quid Pro Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation’, The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17/4 (2004) pp.601–13; S. Lander, ‘International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17/3 (2004) pp.481–93; R.J. Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances’, Harvard International Review 24/ (2002) pp.50–4; J.E. Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 19/2 (Summer, 2006) pp.195– 217; D.S. Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror’, Orbis 50/3 (Summer, 2006) pp.453–68.
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intelligence scholar Loch Johnson observed in 2003: ‘The literature on foreign intelligence liaison – one of the most tightly kept secrets in this invisible world – uniformly indicates that intelligence sharing does occur, but within strict confines and always laced with ambivalence and caution.’^8 However, this recent wave of scholarship offers an almost exclusively empirical analysis of the exponential growth of intelligence liaison.^9 Our understanding of international intelligence liaison as a general phenomenon, therefore, remains somewhat sparse. Deficiencies are most apparent in the realm of theory development. This is puzzling when we consider that most other aspects of international co- operation have attracted considerable theoretical analysis.^10 As Swedish intelligence scholar Wilhelm Agrell has observed: ‘there is no generally established theory of intelligence and hence no given theoretical framework for the analysis of intelligence liaison.’^11 At least in a preliminary manner, this article seeks to address that imbalance. Management and governance considerations vis-a` -vis the intelligence liaison phenomenon can simulta- neously attempt to be better addressed.
Enhancing our Understanding of Intelligence Liaison
Liaison needs to be better understood in the current international environment. This is not least because of the obstacles it presents to effective accountability and oversight, considerations especially enhanced in an era of increasingly ‘globalized’ intelligence.^12 As Canadian intelligence scholar Martin Rudner has remarked: ‘The imperative for intelligence co- operation can sometimes make strange international bedfellows, and can have profound implications for foreign policy, civil society and human rights.’ 13 Typically, contemporary torture allegations and the expose´ of ‘extraordinary renditions’ are intimately associated with international intelligence co-operation. These episodes serve to underline the need to
(^8) L.K. Johnson, ‘Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence’, Comparative Strategy 22/
(2003) p.17. (^9) Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’ is somewhat of an exception from the other studies cited in the
footnote above. This is because alongside his empirical analysis he introduces some international relations theory. (^10) See also, for example, D.C. Ellis, ‘On the Possibility of ‘‘International Community’’’,
International Studies Review 11/1 (2009) pp.1–26. (^11) W. Agrell, ‘Sweden and the Dilemmas of Neutral Intelligence Liaison’, Journal of Strategic
Studies 29/4 (2006), p.635. (^12) See, for instance, A.S. Roberts, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006) p.139; see also R.J. Aldrich, ‘Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old Problem’, Intelligence and National Security 24/1 (2009) pp.26–56. (^13) M. Rudner, ‘The Globalisation of Terrorism: Canada’s Intelligence Response to the Post-
September 11 Threat Environment’, Canadian Issues (September 2002) p.24 – emphasis added. For concerns about a lack of accountability in the world of diplomacy generally, see, for example, C. Ross, Independent Diplomat: Despatches from an Unaccountable Elite (London: Hurst 2007).
Intelligence Liaison and International Relations 703
surrounding 9/11. 17 Not least, this is helpful in the contemporary context when liaison is demonstrably on the increase, and can reflect a high-degree of widespread importance in overall intelligence activities (see above). This article begins by evaluating intelligence studies and its relationships with ‘theory’. Also demonstrated is where the ‘case’ of intelligence liaison can be located within that discussion. Suggestions for rectifying the observed dearth of theory concerning intelligence liaison are then postulated, together with beginning to introduce some more specific theories, such as alliance theory, vis-a` -vis the intelligence liaison phenomenon, as well as offering propositions for how they can ‘fit’, and equally how alone (individually) they are too limited to explain the multi-dimensional and amalgamated intelligence liaison phenomenon at its fullest. Arguments also feature concerning how these types of ‘testing’ and ‘benchmarking’ judgements can potentially be best ascertained. Attention is then turned to the interplay between IR theory and intelligence studies, as well as to issues pertaining to ‘relevance’ in such contexts, again particularly illuminated with reference to the intelligence liaison phenomenon. Finally, approaches towards the study of intelligence and its related phenomena, again most effectively illustrated with emphasis on intelligence liaison, are presented. Some summarizing conclusions then follow.
Evaluating Intelligence Studies and ‘Theory’
On close inspection, the intelligence studies landscape is remarkably uneven. Some aspects of intelligence studies appear ‘under-theorized’, while palpably others are not.^18 The state of the discipline reflects its origins. In summary, ‘intelligence studies’ is a multi-disciplinary and specialist niche field of study that has emerged out of (at a minimum) the fields of strategic studies, international history, law and sociology. Inevitably, the disciplines from which its contributing practitioners have originated provide a shaping effect.
(^17) See, for instance, R.J. Aldrich, ‘Whitehall and the Iraq War: The UK’s Four Intelligence
Enquiries’, Irish Studies in International Affairs 16/1 (2005) pp.73–88; A. Danchev, ‘The Reckoning: Official Inquiries and the Iraq War’, Intelligence and National Security 19/ (2004) pp.436–66. (^18) C. Andrew, ‘Intelligence, International Relations and ‘‘Under-theorisation’’’ in L. Scott and
P. Jackson (eds.), Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows (London: Routledge 2004) pp.32–4; see also Philip H.J. Davies quoted in G.F. Treverton et al, Toward a Theory of Intelligence: Workshop Report (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2006) p.27; D. Kahn, ‘An Historical Theory of Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security 16/3 (2001) pp.79–92; Johnson, ‘Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence’; P. Gill and M. Phythian, ‘How do we Understand Intelligence?’ in P. Gill and M. Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World (Cambridge: Polity Press 2006) pp.20–38; see also A.N. Shulsky and G.J. Schmitt ‘Toward a Theory of Intelligence’ in A.N. Shulsky and G.J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc. 2002) pp.169–76; see also the collection of essays published in P. Gill, S. Marrin and M. Phythian (eds.), Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates (London: Routledge 2009).
Intelligence Liaison and International Relations 705
Some dimensions of intelligence studies are theoretically impoverished, while others have enjoyed substantial theory-development. In the latter category, the rise of surveillance as a social phenomenon and the related issues of surprise attack and deception can be cited. 19 It is no coincidence that these areas have attracted scholars with a social science background, and the same might be said of aspects where the study of intelligence overlaps with the study of diplomacy, bureaucracy, law, management and business.^20 In 2009, labelling contemporary intelligence studies as overall being ‘under-theorized’ is arguably an over-simplification. Perhaps a more appropriate description would be ‘haphazardly-theorized’, which captures the ad hoc nature of the ‘theorization’ efforts. Most noticeable for a student of international relations is the largely remaining absence of mainstream IR theory from the above roll call of bodies of theory conventionally drawn upon in intelligence studies. This is perhaps because domestic surveillance issues (rather than foreign intelligence) have received the most attention from social theorists who have seen this as an important part of their analysis of the rise of the national security or police state.^21 Yet in an era of globalization, and with many commentators suggesting that the sovereign state is now somewhat besieged, the undue theoretical salience of the domestic strata stands in urgent need of revision.^22
(^19) See, for example, J.R. Beninger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic
Origins of the Information Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1986); M.I. Handel, ‘Deception, Surprise, and Intelligence’, chapter 15 in his Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge 2001) from p.215; see also, for example, K. Ball and F. Webster (eds.), The Intensification of Surveillance: Crime, Terrorism and Warfare in the Information Age (London: Pluto Press 2003); P. Bracken, I. Bremmer and D. Gordon (eds.), Managing Strategic Surprise: Lessons from Risk Management and Risk Assessment (Cambridge: CUP 2008). (^20) For examples of ‘business/management theory’ texts, which have relevance for the
phenomenon of international intelligence liaison, see B. McKern (ed.), Managing the Global Network Corporation (London: Routledge 2003) and B. Nooteboom, Inter-Firm Collabora- tion, Learning and Networks: An Integrated Approach (London: Routledge 2004); see also C. Stohl, Organizational Communication: Connectedness in Action (London: Sage 1995); P. Collins, Virtual and Networked Organizations (Oxford: Capstone 2002). For more ‘law’- originating/related texts, see, for example, H. Born, L.K. Johnson and I. Leigh (eds.), Who’s Watching the Spies?: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books 2005); M. Phythian, ‘The British Experience with Intelligence Accountability’, Intelligence and National Security 22/1 (2007) pp.75–99. (^21) For a definition of intelligence emphasizing its strong connection to the state (although this
is arguably gradually loosening somewhat in the context of overall globalization and the more specific ‘globalization’ of intelligence), see, for example, M. Warner, ‘Wanted: A Definition of ‘‘Intelligence’’’, Studies in Intelligence 46/3 (2002), 5 http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/ 4 (accessed October 2005) – particularly: ‘Intelligence is secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities’. (^22) Of many, see K. Ohmae, The End of the Nation State (New York: Free Press 1995);
L. Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (New York: Cornell University Press 1998);
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this is a field that has not received systematic study by either political scientists or historians.’^28
Rectifying the Dearth of Theory
To some degree the lack of theory can be readily addressed. One point of departure would be to survey existing bodies of theory with a view to their potential in the realm of liaison. At a minimum, aspects of these pre-existing bodies of theory can be applied to the different areas of intelligence liaison. This can be accomplished through adopting a ‘benchmarking’ approach and engaging in at least some partial or beginning ‘testing’. Descending from the most abstract (‘long-range’) to more focussed (‘mid-’ to ‘short-range’) theories while undertaking evaluations, we can demonstrate that they evidently have at least some relevance, even if they are not fully applicable. This observation emerges because intelligence liaison does not exist in a vacuum and it is closely connected to other aspects of international relations. At once, liaison is composed of and involves or includes a complex combination of many other concepts and phenomena immediately familiar to mainstream IR scholars, such as alliances, diplomacy and bargaining. Liaison appropriately reflects a complex amalgamation of all these qualities, which are largely present to their varying extents in a form of co-existence. Precisely because liaison constitutes the international relations of intelligence, mainstream theories offer viable starting points for aiding our understanding of intelligence liaison. These bodies of theory, especially when increasingly delving into more established ‘short(er)-ranging’ bodies of theory, include ideas of alliance formation, such as balance of power, through to ‘mid-ranging’ theories concerning securitization and diplomacy. When employed together, they have the enhanced potential to better explain intelligence liaison more fully. This is particularly if they are applied in a condition of ‘complex co-existence plurality’.^29 Perhaps at times more artificially, for sharper illustrative and educative demonstration purposes, this involves ‘picking and mixing’ in a realpolitik-inspired fashion. Arguably, at least to some degree, this reflects what practitioners (policy- and decision- makers) do in the ‘real-world’ during their policy and decision-making and implementing processes. 30 As Oxford Professor Sir Adam Roberts has
(^28) L. Scott and P. Jackson, ‘Journeys in Shadows’ in Scott and Jackson (eds.), Understanding
Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century, p.20. (^29) See also R. Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition
and Collaboration (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press/Princeton Studies in Complexity series 1997). (^30) On ‘problem-solving’, see, for example, C.E. Lindblom, ‘The Science of ‘‘Muddling
Through’’’, Public Administration Review 19/2 (Spring, 1959) pp.79–88; see also C.E. Lindblom, ‘Still Muddling, Not Yet Through’, Public Administration Review 39/ (1979) pp.517–26. On the ‘risk management’ dimension see, for instance, S.D. Gibson, ‘In the Eye of the Perfect Storm: Re-imagining, Reforming and Refocusing Intelligence for Risk, Globalisation and Changing Societal Expectation’, Risk Management: An International Journal 7/4 (2005) pp.23–41; see also S. Bell, ‘The UK’s Risk Management Approach to
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argued elsewhere: ‘If there is a single theme that unites what follows, it is recognition, even celebration, of a pluralist approach both to the actual conduct of international relations and to the academic subject.’^31 This observation equally applies, perhaps even a fortiori, within the domain of intelligence and its study. Most theories when employed individually appear too simplistic. When employed alone, most IR theories – especially the ‘long-range’ varieties in all of their varying abstractness – fail to capture the full complexity of the more specifically concerned intelligence liaison phenomenon. This is especially when that entity is taken in general terms together with all of its associated dynamics, at a ‘short-range’. The explanatory strength they can offer, therefore, appropriately adheres to the observations that: (i) different theories can often explain different aspects of intelligence co-operation, for instance underway in different ‘sectors’ (law enforcement, intelligence agencies, military and Special Forces, etc.) with (ii) the overall balance between these different theories varying depending on which particular ‘aspect’ of the relationship, in terms of which ‘level’ of experience and hence analysis (‘strategic’ or ‘operational’, etc. [see below]) is being especially scrutinized, and (iii) at which moment in time. Many overlapping complex- ities evidently exist in parallel. Accordingly, a helpful place to begin our improved analysis of the intelligence liaison phenomenon is to break the co-operation under- observation down. This can be done into at least eight closely interrelated, systemic attributes or variables. These include: (1) internal influences/ factors; (2) rationale; (3) types and forms; (4) conditions and terms; (5) trends; (6) functions; (7) external influences/factors; and (8) effects and outcomes. Once this disaggregation has been achieved, some ‘criteria’ are offered that can be used during ‘testing’ processes. Arguably, this enables increasingly rigorous theoretical benchmarking to be attempted, including when using ‘shorter-ranging’ theories. A look is now taken.
Intelligence Liaison and Alliance Theory
An active scholarly debate continues surrounding the nature of alliances and why they are formed.^32 Perhaps more than any other issue, this debate has coalesced around some of the classic schools of IR theory, notably in terms
National Security’, RUSI Journal 152/3 (2007) pp.18–22. On a ‘pact of restraint’ idea, see J. Elie, ‘Intelligence and the Cold War’, SAIS Review XXIV/1 (2004) p.174; see also P.W. Schroeder, ‘Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management’ in K.L. Knorr (ed.), Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Kansas University Press, 1976) pp.227–62. (^31) A. Roberts, ‘International Relations after the Cold War’, International Affairs 84/2 (2008)
p.335. (^32) See G.H. Snyder, ‘Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut’, Journal of International Affairs
44/1 (1990) p.103 – particularly where he claims: ‘One of the most underdeveloped areas in the theory of international relations is alliance theory.’ This is arguably due to the phenomenon of alliances not fitting neatly into one international relations theory position, as is suggested in this article.
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with any speed.^36 As Richard J. Aldrich has argued, although secret services are sometimes associated with a gritty and operational mindset that might be thought of as being pragmatic and ‘realistic’, in fact there is increasingly a case for a contrasting perspective on long-term intelligence liaison informed by liberal institutionalism:
Perhaps clandestine agencies and their intelligence alliances should be viewed less as exponents of realism and more as the smooth and experienced exemplars of liberal institutionalism. Not only were they among the first to accept that values, ideas, and knowledge can sway events, they have also been required to mediate national interests using cooperation and trust inculcated through a vast institutionalized network of information exchange. This complex web of unseen agreements and networks arguably raises expectations about cooperation and regulates some rather awkward practices by radiating established norms and conventions.^37
However, what liberal institutionalist and indeed idealist leaning theories of alliance alone cannot explain sufficiently, is the presence in international affairs of long-term international ‘collective/co-operative security’ driven arrange- ments – such as the United Nations (UN) – which co-exist in a complex manner alongside the alliances but lack an overt intelligence infrastructure, and indeed are often inimical to intelligence, even while information dynamics may be involved.^38 Therefore, classical alliance theories only partially explain why so-called ‘intelligence alliances’ are sustained and thus can only contribute in part towards offering an account of why international intelligence liaison takes place.^39 Moreover, once we begin to talk of ideas, traditions, norms and values, constructivist perspectives, as well as other approaches towards the study of intelligence, soon start to resonate in the overall mix (see below). Focusing on alliance theory ultimately allows for the most useful concentration on and consideration of the internal influences/factors attribute of intelligence liaison (as outlined above). To extend the scope of our analysis further, in order to better consider some of the other attributes that constitute the intelligence liaison phenomenon and to better answer the question of ‘why it occurs’, we also have to look elsewhere.
(^36) For an in-depth exploration of these trends, see A. Svendsen, ‘The Globalization of
Intelligence since 9/11: Frameworks and Operational Parameters’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21/1 (2008) pp.129–44. (^37) Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’. (^38) S. Chesterman, ‘Does the UN have Intelligence?’, Survival 48/3 (2006) pp.149–64. (^39) For another in-depth recent study of alliances, see, for example, P.A. Weitsman, Dangerous
Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Standford, CA: Stanford University Press 2004); see also J.J. Wirtz, ‘Book Review: Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. By Patricia A. Weitsman’, The Journal of Politics 69/1 (2007) pp.257–59 – particularly where he notes: ‘According to Weitsman, theorists have missed an important part of the alliance puzzle by concentrating on external threat as an indicator of alliance cohesion; internal factors also govern the ability of allies to undertake coherent and constructive initiatives’ (p.257).
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Intelligence Liaison and Specialist Forms of IR Theory
Potentially, more specific forms of theory (‘mid-’ to ‘short-ranging’ in their nature) have no lesser claim to enhancing our understanding of the intelligence liaison phenomenon. The many different theories of bureau- cratic politics that have attracted interest within Foreign Policy Analysis have an obvious potential to explain the twists and turns of intelligence liaison, albeit more microscopically.^40 Meanwhile, theories concerning security and securitization, as well as those relating to diplomacy, are also applicable. For those who prefer theory testing, modern varieties of rational choice theory resonate. Aspects of liaison, especially under emergency conditions of crisis, bear an uncanny resemblance to ‘Game Theory’ constructs, such as the classical ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’, requiring considera- tion of why rational strategies may be less profitable than a non-rational selection in certain situations. A rational choice analysis of intelligence exchange, perhaps based on volumes of traffic over time, would be revealing. However, it is unlikely that the detailed numerical data would be available in an unclassified form to chart this domain of co-operation in sufficient detail.^41 Interestingly, inputs from both theories of bureaucratic politics and rational choice models also feed predominantly into the internal influences/ factors attribute or variable of intelligence liaison (as identified above).^42 Similarly, bodies of theory relating to security and securitization and diplomacy have their more or less discernible limits. Again, they concern only a limited range of the eight attributes of intelligence liaison identified earlier, such as diplomacy concerning types and forms. Equally, therefore, they can only explain parts of the phenomenon rather than liaison as a whole.^43 This is especially when they are employed on an individual basis.
(^40) See, for example, C. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave/
Macmillan 2003) pp.85–92. (^41) Griffiths and O’Callaghan, International Relations, p.257; see also the work of Robert
Axelrod, for example his The Complexity of Cooperation. (^42) For an insight into bureaucratic theory and politics, see B.G. Peters, ‘The Politics of
Bureaucracy’, chapter 6 in his The Politics of Bureaucracy, 5th ed. (London: Routledge 2001). For another insight into the limitations of bureaucracy theory in the intelligence context, see A. Dupont, ‘Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century’, Intelligence and National Security 18/4 (2003) p.34 – where he argues that ‘the bureaucratic walls which once separated the providers and users of intelligence are coming down at a rapid rate, removing the artificial and dysfunctional distinctions between strategic, operational and tactical intelligence assets’; for an argument that bureaucratic management is not suited to the intelligence profession, see R.D. Steele, ‘Information Peacekeeping & the Future of Intelligence: ‘‘The United Nations, Smart Mobs, & the Seven Tribes’’’ in B. De Jong, W. Platje and R.D. Steele (eds.), Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future (Oakton, VA: OSS International Press 2003) p.201. (^43) For security and securitization, see P. Hough, ‘Security and Securitization’ and ‘Towards
Global Security’, both are chapters in his Understanding Global Security (London: Routledge 2004); see also B. Buzan, O. Wæver and J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riemmer 1998).
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abstract (‘long-range’) IR theory? If so, this might pose fundamental problems inherent in attempting to employ IR theory in this area. It might even be argued that the extent of those limitations might underpin claims made by some commentators that IR theory is essentially ‘irrelevant’ to the phenomenon of intelligence liaison specifically, and indeed more widely to intelligence as a whole. To resolve this, before widening the theoretical lens we deploy, first we need to turn our attention to some of the wider arguments concerning the relevance of IR theory in the intelligence context.
IR Theory and Intelligence Studies: A Questionable Relevance?
Alone, no established classical position in IR theory ultimately commends itself as an over-arching explanation in the world of intelligence. Arguably, this is most usefully clarified and illustrated by the case of intelligence liaison. A similar observation has led UK intelligence scholar Philip H.J. Davies to outline the position that IR theory is essentially irrelevant to intelligence and, by logical extension, to intelligence studies. He claims, perhaps somewhat provocatively, that: ‘For its part, international relations theory is mostly about an attitude towards international relations rather then any real knowledge of it. So, it is not much help’.^48 However, this argument has force only if a narrow and scientific (‘hard’) approach to (and conceptualization or definition of) theory is adopted. It is also more persuasive if just one IR theory position is applied and tested. As in relation to most areas of international relations, when only one theoretical position is adopted to explain a phenomenon, the result is, at best, an oversimplifica- tion. Only one facet of the problem is illuminated. Moreover, we can readily rebut that few events are uni-causal. Overall, the inherent complexities of intelligence can best be captured if we think in terms of different levels of analysis and experience. Crucially, these are most dominantly in play at different points or ‘moments’ in time. These therefore co-exist simultaneously in a complex manner at the same moment of evaluation, hence sometimes flowing counter to each other and always enjoying some degree of mutual influence, but at the same time being discernibly different and distinctive. Together, these different levels of analysis and experience can be readily characterized. They descend from the more macro ‘ideological’ and ‘theoretical’, through ‘strategy’ and ‘policy’ to the more micro ‘operational’ and ‘tactical’, and finally to the ‘individual’ (as ‘professional’) and ‘personal’ levels. If we dissect intelligence liaison in this way then we might argue that at the higher and macro ‘quartet’ of levels (the ‘ideological’, ‘theoretical’, ‘strategy’ and ‘policy’ levels), the friendlier and more ‘evangelical’-imbued liberal internationalism/institutionalism positions offer the most purchase. These seem to drive the rather idealized explanation that most policy-makers and political leaders offer, in more of the abstract, for the ‘top-down’-directed and political impetus-driven large-scale sharing of intelligence and for
(^48) Treverton et al, Toward a Theory of Intelligence, p.27 (emphasis in original text).
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sustaining elaborate frameworks of intelligence co-operation. Meanwhile, at the lower or micro ‘quartet’ of levels of intelligence liaison (the ‘operational’, ‘tactical’ and the ‘individual’ (as ‘professional’) and ‘personal’ levels), the more business-like and ‘functional’ position of realism and cost-gain calculation often seem to be the most enduring. This more business-like cost-accounting approach, involving quid pro quos, can act as a (counter-) balance to the wider imperatives of sharing.^49 Also, at these lower and micro levels, the specifics and details, notably concerning particular intelligence sources and operations, matter to a greater extent. At the daily work level, individuals and their professional and personal dynamics matter, evoking ideas of trust, the central component for undertaking the most effective intelligence liaison. 50 Accordingly, international relations theory in its entirety, therefore, is not ‘irrelevant’ to intelligence studies. However, to apply it most successfully, we may need to have recourse to use the different theories together (collectively) in order to explain the different levels of activity at different moments in time, and hence to explain intelligence liaison and its dynamics more fully. At the very least, overall intelligence liaison reflects an enduring duality consisting of both realism and liberal internationalism/institutionalism.^51 The duality represents two sides of the same coin, and is neatly captured by the phrase ‘friends and allies’ often uttered by US politicians. At once, this phrase appropriately captures both the ‘cultural’ and ‘structural’ related factors closely involved in such interactions, as well as the different participatory liaisons (including formal and informal) encountered. At the most, once other IR theories are introduced, together with other approaches adopted towards its study – for example, constructivism – we can argue that intelligence liaison is perhaps more representative of a plurality that co-exists at and across the different levels.^52
(^49) For more on the schools of interpretation in Anglo-American relations, such as
‘evangelicalism’, ‘functionalism’ and ‘terminalism’, see A. Danchev, ‘On Specialness: Anglo-American Apocrypha’ in On Specialness (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1998), from p.1; see also the ‘Introduction’ in J. Baylis (ed.), Anglo-American Relations Since 1939: The Enduring Alliance (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1997). On the quid pro quo aspect, Clough, ‘Quid Pro Quo’. (^50) See A.M. Hoffman, ‘A Conceptulization of Trust in International Relations’, European
Journal of International Relations 8/3 (2002) pp.375–401. (^51) Stafford Thomas suggests this duality as ‘egoism’ and ‘altruism’, respectively – see S.T.
Thomas, ‘Assessing Current Intelligence Studies’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2/2 (1988) p.233. (^52) Indeed, here, the Shell Global Scenarios model can be seen to be equally appropriately
applicable to the world of intelligence co-operation. The model is presented as a triangle with the three points respectively: (1 – top) ‘Efficiency (market incentives)’; (2 – bottom, left) ‘Security (coercion, regulation)’; and, (3 – bottom, right) ‘Social cohesion, justice (the force of the community)’ – for further details, see ‘Executive Summary’ in Shell Global Scenarios to 2025: The Future Business Environment: Trends, Trade-offs and Choices (London: Shell International Ltd 2005) p.12; see also 5 http://www.shell.com/scenarios/ 4 (accessed 03 February 2007). A graphic of the model can be found on p.9 of the PDF downloadable from
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information on commonly-shared and perceived mutual threat(s) and risks, be they internal or external. Realism also appears to explain why intelligence liaison has increased both qualitatively and quantitatively in the current context, most especially against terrorism. During a so-called ‘Global War on Terror’, critical information is distributed more and a greater degree of trading is necessitated, in order to better bring information in from the periphery to the centre. Here, according to the realist perspective, intelligence liaison relationships are frequently akin to business-like relationships, where intelligence is the product that is ‘bartered’ and traded over, or marketed, in a similar manner to any other product or commodity over which deals are negotiated.^56 This parallels the realist view of alliances, in which extempore relationships may be created quickly in a climate of expediency. However, alone the realist paradigm of liaison, where the concept of quid pro quo looms large, does not adequately account for non-reciprocal sharing. This is the case even if the ‘exchange deals’ have already been forged elsewhere – for instance, scoped as ‘areas of responsibility’ both determined and agreed between intelligence liaison partners at a higher-level of activity. Clearly, liaison consists of more substance than merely measurable ‘tangibles’ and more ‘structural’ qualities. Therefore, even under current conditions, we need to continue to draw on a range of other international relations theory positions. This particularly concerns those that better account for the simultaneous or co-existing presence of ‘softer’ and more culturally-imbued constructs, such as ‘norms’, as well as more ‘intangible’ qualities, such as ‘values’, being involved in these sorts of interactions.^57 Frequently, liaison also extends beyond merely more formal interactions to also include (less-structured) informal interactions. While of course some overlaps could be argued to exist, the empirically discernible presence of these qualities even takes us beyond updated and more advanced, and accommodating ‘softer’ or ‘friendlier’ forms of ‘realism’, such as encapsu- lated within ‘neo-realism’. Liberal institutionalism/internationalism and idealism now recommend themselves for consideration. Arguably, liberal institutionalism and idealism offer a more convincing account for some of the less ‘selfish’ aspects of international intelligence liaison. For example, liberal internationalism/institutionalism explains the presence of more altruistic collective and co-operative security drivers, shared values, and – although they have arguably tended to be somewhat more muted in the post-9/11 environment – at least some ethical and
(^56) M. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: CUP 1996) pp.217–18;
Intelligence is also marketed, bartered and bargained over. In such circumstances, the vernacular and practices of the world of business are employed. See also Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison’, p.196, where she states: ‘Although sometimes equated with intelligence sharing, intelligence liaison is actually better understood as a form of subcontracted intelligence collection based on barter.’ (^57) Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, p.218.
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regulatory principles that can be observed in the overall mix.^58 Certainly in Europe, the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in much of the recent intelligence and security organizing across Europe from the mid-1990s resonates with the broad observations of regime theory. This in turn underpins the general observations of Griffiths and O’Callaghan, who argue that: ‘Many liberal internationalists believe that it is possible to promote the rule of law and develop international institutions and practices that moderate the security dilemma among states.’^59 In the realm of international intelligence liaison this is reflected most clearly in long-standing formal arrangements, such as that embodied by the various BRUSA/UKUSA and parallel defence and military intelligence agreements dating from the 1940s.^60 Not only do these agreements constitute a complex, interconnected regime of arrangements that have taken on something of a life of their own, in an epistemic manner they also represent an ‘exclusive’ club of states of a particular type. This in turn introduces an idealist perspective, suggesting that such co-operation is perhaps closest between states with similar constitutions, outlooks and underlying political values. However, intelligence itself still matters, with national intelligence services still closely guarding especially human (Humint) sources, some times even jealously.
Intelligence Liaison and Materialist Perspectives
Standing alongside the more established schools of international relations theory are a range of time-honoured materialist perspectives. These may also at least partially resonate with regard to international intelligence liaison. Including those that are not explored within the remit of this article, they, too, feature to some degree within the overall ‘complex co-existence plurality’. This can be observed, for instance, with a formal Marxist position with its emphasis on ‘universal solidarity’,^61 and the much wider tradition of critical international theory which emphasizes ‘the possibility of overcoming the exclusionary dynamics associated with the modern system of sovereign states’ and which seek arrangements more likely to deliver social justice.^62 Many Marxist and post-structuralist traditions arguably have intrinsic problems with state agencies, and tend to view clandestine intelligence and security services as agencies of state oppression.^63 Hence, while their main
(^58) For more on ethics in relation to intelligence, see, for example, M. Herman, ‘Ethics and
Intelligence after September 2001’ in Scott and Jackson (eds.), Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century. (^59) Griffiths and O’Callaghan, International Relations, p.181. (^60) For more background on the UKUSA agreement, see, for example, J. Richelson, The US
Intelligence Community, 5th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2008) pp.342–49; see also D. Ball and J. Richelson, The Ties that Bind, 2nd ed. (Boston: Unwin Hyman 1990) pp.1–8. (^61) A. Linklater, ‘Marxism’ in Burchill et al, Theories of International Relations, p.149. (^62) R. Devetak, ‘Critical Theory’ in Burchill et al, Theories of International Relations, p.175. (^63) Ibid., p.167. See also, I. Wallestein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1979).
718 Intelligence and National Security
