

Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
Prepare for your exams
Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points to download
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
Community
Ask the community for help and clear up your study doubts
Discover the best universities in your country according to Docsity users
Free resources
Download our free guides on studying techniques, anxiety management strategies, and thesis advice from Docsity tutors
A development economics exam consisting of four long questions and four short questions. The long questions require a more sustained argument and are worth 30 points each, while the short questions are worth 10 points each. Topics covered include insurance and inequality, technology adoption, ethnic and social divisions, and education. Students are expected to answer three of the long questions and all four short questions.
Typology: Exams
1 / 3
This page cannot be seen from the preview
Don't miss anything!
This exam has two parts: A section of four long questions and a section of four short questions. You should answer only three of the four longer questions. However, please answer all four short questions.
Longer Questions
Complete three of these longer questions. Each is worth 30 points. These may require a more sustained argument than the short questions, but clarity and concision are still very desirable. We would prefer that you do not use a blue book, but instead use letter-sized notepaper, written on one side. Please also begin each long question you complete on a new sheet of paper.
(a) Supposing that n = 2, sketch a state-date tree for the economy described above. (b) Relaxing the assumption that n = 2, assume that the momentary utility func- tions of farmers i and j (i.e., the functions governing the utility they receive from consumption at a particular date-state) are both increasing, concave, and con- tinuously differentiable. Show that in an efficient allocation these two farmers’ marginal utilities will be perfectly correlated. (c) Now suppose that with probability ψ > 0 known to the farmers, a government program is introduced at time t that will give eligible farmers (say just farmer 1 in this village) an additional unit of the consumption good in every period from t on. How does this additional source of risk affect the date-state tree you sketched above? (d) If in fact the program is introduced, then how do you expect the announcement of this program to affect the allocation of consumption between eligible and ineligible farmers at t? At t + 1? At t − 1? (e) It turns out that this village is merely one in a population of villages which are being randomly assigned to “treatment” and “control” groups, with the “treat- ment” being the introduction of the program. A “baseline” survey of consumption
expenditures is being conducted at t − 1, with a follow-up scheduled for t + 1. The reseachers conducting the study are planning to use a “double-difference” strategy to estimate the average treatment effect on consumption (for eligible farmers) and on “spillovers” for the consumption of ineligible farmers. What do your answers to (b) and (d) imply about the interpretation of these estimates?
(a) Characterize the empirical relationship between country-level ethnic diversity, public policy outcomes, and economic performance over the past fifty years. Which region of the world was arguably the most adversely affected by high levels of ethnic diversity? (b) Discuss at least two distinct theoretical mechanisms that could link high ethnic diversity to low public goods provision. Discuss the empirical evidence on the relative importance of these various channels. (c) Describe at least one public policy approach that could potentially mitigate the adverse effects of diversity on public goods and economic performance. In your view, are these policies likely to be successful in practice? Why or why not?
(a) Discuss the various channels for why education matters for development. What does the empirical evidence say about the relationship between growth and educa- tion? How might education affect the way we think about the effects of institutions on growth? Be sure to cite relevant studies. (b) If education is important for development, why are policy interventions necessary? Discuss in detail two studies that have studied interventions aimed at increasing the demand for schooling. Discuss in detail two studies that have looked at supply-side interventions for schooling. Be sure to provide a discussion of the data, econometric approach, and robustness of the findings.