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Case Notes: Interpreting Statutory Offences and Contractual Liability in Australian Law, Schemes and Mind Maps of Communication

Two cases in australian law: one concerning the interpretation of guilty intent in a statutory offence, and the other regarding the communication of special conditions in contracts. The first case, hatch, deals with a regulation that imposes a duty to prevent contraventions of certain provisions, and the question of whether the defendant had done everything possible to ensure compliance. The second case, another ticket, focuses on the communication of special conditions in contracts, specifically in the context of dry-cleaning services. Excerpts from the court decisions and references to relevant cases.

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Case Notes
two views mentioned
by
the
Full Court
is
the
correct one. Probably
the result in most cases, as
in
the
instant case, will be the same
whichever be the view adopted,
and
the
Full
Court seems to
hint
at
this.
On
the
question of guilty
intent
the
Court was of opinion
that
the
regulation
Il
did
not
in terms "import
any
mental element neces-
sary to constitute the offence".
It
imposed a positive duty, perform-
ance of which could be excused only
by
the
defendant satisfying
the Court
that
he
had
done everything possible to ensure perform-
ance of
the
duty.
This
he
had
not done, nor
had
he
given
any
evi-
dence of a bona fide
and
reasonable belief in
the
only facts which
could exculpate him.
Here
the
Court
seems to approve the opinion
of Dixon
J.
in
Proudman v.
Dayman.u
The
Court declared
that
the regulation
did
not
admit
of a construction which would require
the
informant to prove guilty intent.
On this
matter
of
mens
rea
and
statutory offences
the
Court laid
down no definite rule,
and
merely referred to McCrae
v.
Downey,13
in which O'Bryan
J.
in
a very useful
judgment
reviews
many
of
the
cases,
and
to Proudman v. Dayman.
14
In
the
latter case Dixon
J.,
in
the course of his judgment, said
that
"as a general rule
an
honest
and
reasonable belief
in
a state of facts which, if they existed, would
make the defendant's act innocent affords
an
excuse for doing what
would otherwise be an offence"Y
Although
the present case lays
down no definite rule,
it
is
an
example of
the
modern
trend
of opinion
that
mens
rea, in the sense of a specific state of mind,
is
not
ordinarily
a necessary element in a statutory offence.
R.
HATCH
llSection
4
provided:
"Every
person
shall
ensure
that
no
contravention
of
any
of
the
provisions as
to
the
use
of
electricity
contained
in
any
advertise-
ment
...
occurs
at
these premises
...
and
in
the
event
of
any
contravention
of
any
of
the
said
provisions
occurring
such
person
shall
(unless
he
satisfies
the
Court
that
the
contravention
occurred
in
spite
of
his
having
done
every-
thing
possible to
prevent
its occurrence)
be
guilty
of
an
offence
....
"
12(1941) 67 C.L.R. 536. 13[1947] V.L.R. 194. 14supra. 15supra, 540.
CONTRACT
-COMMUNICATION
OF OFFER
ANOTHER
TICKET
CASE
MOST
of
the
contracts of everyday life are of a skeleton type into
which
the
law must.imply terms to cover matters to which
the
parties
themselves do
not
advert.
In
the so-called "ticket" cases one party
hands to
the
other,
at
the
time
of
the
transaction, a document pur-
porting to limit
the
liability of
the
former
by
modifying or excluding
pf3

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Case Notes two views mentioned by the Full Court is the correct one. Probably the result in most cases, as in the instant case, will be the same whichever be the view adopted, and the Full Court seems to hint at this.

  • On the question of guilty intent the Court was of opinion that the regulationIl^ did not in terms "import any mental element neces- sary to constitute the offence". It imposed a positive duty, perform- ance of which could be excused only by the defendant satisfying the Court that he had done everything possible to ensure perform- ance of the duty. This he had not done, nor had he given any evi- dence of a bona fide and reasonable belief in the only facts which could exculpate him. Here the Court seems to approve the opinion

of Dixon J. in Proudman v. Dayman.u The Court declared that

the regulation did not admit of a construction which would require the informant to prove guilty intent. On this matter of mens rea and statutory offences the Court laid down no definite rule, and merely referred to McCrae v. Downey,

in which O'Bryan J. in a very useful judgment reviews many of the

cases, and to Proudman v. Dayman.^14 In the latter case Dixon J., in

the course of his judgment, said that "as a general rule an honest and reasonable belief in a state of facts which, if they existed, would make the defendant's act innocent affords an excuse for doing what would otherwise be an offence"Y Although the present case lays down no definite rule, it is an example of the modern trend of opinion that mens rea, in the sense of a specific state of mind, is not ordinarily a necessary element in a statutory offence.

R. HATCH

llSection 4 provided: "Every person shall ensure that no contravention of any of the provisions as to the use of electricity contained in any advertise- ment ... occurs at these premises ... and in the event of any contravention of any of the said provisions occurring such person shall (unless he satisfies the Court that the contravention occurred in spite of his having done every- thing possible to prevent its occurrence) be guilty of an offence .... " 12(1941) 67 C.L.R. 536. 13[1947] V.L.R. 194. 14supra. 15supra, 540.

CONTRACT -COMMUNICATION OF OFFER

ANOTHER TICKET CASE

MOST of the contracts of everyday life are of a skeleton type into which the law must.imply terms to cover matters to which the parties themselves do not advert. In the so-called "ticket" cases one party hands to the other, at the time of the transaction, a document pur- porting to limit the liability of the former by modifying or excluding

(^18) Res Judicatae

the terms which the law would otherwise imply. The question for the Court then is, Has there been a sufficient communication of this offer to the recipient? The rules governing the matter are well settled, and are illustrated by the recent case of Causer v. Browne (1952) V.L.R. I. This was an action for damages for breach of contract or damages for negligence in dealing with a frock left with the defendants to be dry-cleaned. It was found that when the frock was deposited a docket was issued containing a printed condition purporting to relieve the defendants from all liability for loss or damage. Herring C.J. held that this special condition had not been communicated to and accepted by the offeree, so as to exclude the implied undertaking to use care in cases of locatio operis faciendi. The defendants not hav- ing negatived negligence, judgment was given for the complainant. His Honour first stated the primary rule: that the offeree is bound if he knew the special conditions, or if he knew that the offer was subject to special conditions and accepted it without enquiring what they were. 1 He then drew the well-established distinction in cases of this kind, between: (I) Transactions of a kind commonly entered into on the basis of special conditions, as in Nunan v. Southern Railway CO.,2 Penton v. Southern Railway,3 Thompson v. London, Midland and Scottish Railway Co.' In these cases the offeree is bound if the offeror shows, either that the offeree knew that the writing contained conditions, or that he (the offeror) had done what was reasonably sufficient to give the offeree notice of the conditions and that he was contracting on those terms. It is settled that the offeror has done what is "reasonably sufficient" if there is on the face of the ticket a reference to the conditions or a statement showing where they are to be fO!lnd. (2) Transactions of a kind commonly entered into without special terms, as in Parker v. South Eastern Railway Co.s Here the offeror must show that the offeree was aware (or ought to be treated as hav- ing been aware) that the document was not a mere voucher or receipt but was also intended to introduce special conditions. In the absence of any such knowledge or good reason for belief, the offeree is not bound to examine the document with a view to ascertaining whether it contains any such conditions. His Honour found that the transaction in the instant case fell within the second class:

1[1952] A.L.R. 12, 14. 3[1931] 2 K.B. 203. 2[1923] 2 K.B. 703. 4[1930] 1 K.B. 41. S(1876) 1 C.P.D. 618, (1877) 2 C.P.D. 416.

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