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UNIVERSITY OF LA VERNE COLLEGE OF LAW
LAW 560
SPRING 2005 FINAL EXAM
INSTRUCTIONS
- You have TWO HOURS to complete this examination. This exam is designed to evaluate your ability to handle a select number of legal authorities in the context of a factual problem involving a client.
- The materials include the legal authorities needed to complete the task. The cases may be real, modified, or written solely for the purpose of this examination. Read them thoroughly.
- You should cite the names of any cases you use to support your analysis, but you do not need to use full citations.
- You may read the materials in any order you choose, but you should write the case-briefs before writing the memorandum of law.
- The case briefs should include the following sections: Facts, Issue, Holding, and Reasoning. The memo should include the following sections: Issue(s), Brief Answer(s), Facts, Discussion (including any appropriate subheadings), and Conclusion.
- The examination grade will be weighted as follows (budget your time accordingly):
a. Case brief 1: 25% b. Case brief 2: 25% c. Memorandum of law: 50%
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM
TO: New Associate
FROM: Senior Partner
SUBJECT: Kramer product liability
DATE: May 11, 2005
A new client, Cosmo Kramer, came into the office today. He was injured while closing a jar of peanuts, and would like to know whether he has a cause of action against the peanut manufacturer.
On January 18, 2005, Mr. Kramer’s neighbor, Jerry Seinfeld, bought a 24-ounce vacuum-sealed plastic-capped jar of peanuts at a store in New York. The jar was made of thick glass. He placed the jar on top of his refrigerator because he knew that Kramer loves peanuts and he did not want Kramer to root about in his cupboards looking for them.
About a week later, Kramer noticed the peanuts and remembered that he had a $2 rebate coupon for “party items,” such as nuts. To obtain the rebate, Kramer needed the proof of purchase from the jar of peanuts. In a hurry to mail in the rebate, Kramer quickly sliced off the label, using an Exacto knife (a razor blade with a handle). He then removed the plastic seal from the jar, uncapped it, took some peanuts, replaced the cap, and returned the jar to the top of the refrigerator, all without incident.
A week after that, on February 3, the accident occurred. Kramer took down the jar, removed the plastic cap, spilled some peanuts into his left hand, and replaced the cap with his right hand. As he pushed the cap down on the open jar, the jar shattered. His hand, continuing in its downward motion, was severely cut, and is now, he claims, permanently impaired. Kramer said he used a normal amount of force in closing the jar, and that Seinfeld told him the jar had not been dropped or bumped and had been sitting on top of the refrigerator since it was purchased. On visual inspection, there appeared to be no flaws in the glass, except for a minor scratch.
Attached are two cases that are the only authority on point in this jurisdiction. Please brief these two cases and then write a memo explaining the likelihood of success of a lawsuit for strict product liability based on a defect in the jar. You should also discuss the potential for a defense of misuse of the product. Do not discuss any other potential torts or defenses.
[2] The basic theory of the defendants in this court is that the requirements of strict liability, as announced in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182, were not established, because the testimony of the experts showed that the _403_** hammer contained no defect. Suvada required a plaintiff to prove that his injury resulted from a condition of the product which was unreasonably dangerous, and which existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's control. But the requirement that the defect must have existed when the product left the manufacturer's control does not mean that the defect must manifest itself at once. The defective 'aluminum brake linkage bracket,' with which the court was concerned in ruling upon the legal sufficiency of the complaint in Suvada, was alleged to have been installed in the tractor not later than March of 1957; it did not break until June of 1960.
[3] Although the definitions of the term 'defect' in the context of products liability law use varying language, all of them rest upon the common premise that those products are defective which are dangerous because they fail to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of their nature and intended function. So, Chief Justice Traynor has suggested that a product is defective if it fails to match _343_* the average quality of like products. (Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn.L.Rev. 363 (1965).) The Restatement emphasizes the viewpoint of the consumer and concludes that a defect is a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer which would be unreasonably dangerous to him. (Restatement, Torts (Second) s 402A, comment g.) Dean Prosser has said that 'the product is to be regarded as defective if it is not safe for such a use that can be expected to be made of it, and no warning is given.' (Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791, 826.) Dean Wade has suggested that apart from the existence of a defect 'the test for imposing strict liability is whether the product is unreasonably dangerous, to use the words of the Restatement. Somewhat preferable is the expression 'not reasonably safe." (Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.Law Journal 5, 15.) See also, Dean Keeton, Products Liability--Liability without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 45 Tex.L.Rev. 855, 859.
The evidence in this case, including the tests and the testimony of the experts as to 'work hardening' or 'metal failure,' shows that hammers have a propensity to chip which increases with continued use. From that evidence it would appear that a new hammer would not be expected to chip, while at some point in its life the possibility of chipping might become a reasonable expectation, and a part of the hammer's likely performance. The problems arise in the middle range, as Chief Justice Traynor has illustrated: 'If an automobile part normally lasts five years, but the one in question proves defective after six months of normal use, there would be enough deviation to serve as a basis for holding the manufacturer liable for any resulting harm. What if the part lasts four of the normal five years, however, and then proves defective? For how long should a manufacturer be responsible for his product?' Traynor, The Ways and _344_* Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn.L.Rev. 363, 369--70 (1965).
[4] [5] The answers to these questions are properly supplied by a jury, and on the
record that is before us this case presents only the narrow question whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the jury's conclusion that the hammer was defective. The record shows that it was represented as one of 'best quality' and was not put to a use which was regarded as extraordinary in the experience of the community. The jury could properly have concluded that, considering the length and type of its use, the hammer failed to perform in the manner that would reasonably have been expected, and that this failure caused the plaintiff's injury.
[6] [7] Strict liability, applied to the manufacturer of the hammer, Vaughn & Bushnell, _404_** extends as well to the wholesaler, Belknap Hardware and Mfg. Co., despite the fact that the box in which this hammer was packaged passed unopened through Belknap's warehouse. The strict liability of a retailer arises from his integral role in the overall producing and marketing enterprise and affords an additional incentive to safety. (See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964), 61 Cal.2d 256, 37 Cal.Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168.) That these considerations apply with equal compulsion to all elements in the distribution system is affirmed by our decision in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 617, 210 N.E.2d 182. See, Restatement (Second) (1965), Torts s 402A, comment f. The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. END OF DOCUMENT
it should be interlocked to the power of the machine; (5) the guard, had it come with the machine, was difficult to mount as it was stainless steel; (6) it violated ANSI standards which require a guard with an interlocking device; and (7) the electrical control system did not contain any visual indication that power was being supplied to the machine. He further described the machine as relatively quiet and that one would have to go up to the machine to feel a vibration.
_962 353_ Valerio Baccetti, president of defendant corporation, testified that a __ guard should have been sent with the machine. He assumed the machine was sent with the guard and four mounting pins because he inspected the machine the day before shipment and at that time it was complete. There was no witness to testify as to the condition of the machine immediately prior to shipment.
Rex Wharton, the salesman who sold the machine to King’s employer, Danielson Food, also testified. He was employed by T.W. Equipment and stated that when he sold the machine a guard was not mentioned. He testified that he was unaware that the machine had a guard. Danielson Sr., president of Danielson Food, testified that no guard or mounting pins were received when the machine was shipped. He further testified that no operation or installation instructions were received.
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred, in finding as a matter of law, that King did not misuse the mixer/blender by ignoring the warnings.
[5] [6] Misuse is the use of a product "for a purpose neither intended nor 'foreseeable' (objectively reasonable) by the defendant" and may defeat a cause of action. ( Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. (1970), 45 Ill.2d 418, 425, 261 N.E.2d 305 .) Although the question of foreseeability is normally a question for the jury, the standard applicable to the trial court's ruling is in viewing the evidence most favorably to the defendant, does it so overwhelmingly favor the plaintiff that no contrary verdict could ever stand on the issue of misuse. ( Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill.2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504.) The trial court found that it was foreseeable that one might place his hand in the discharge chute. We find that the trial court acted properly in striking this defense as there is no evidence that King used the machine for a purpose that was neither intended nor reasonably foreseeable.
The totality of the evidence demonstrates that Abbot believed the machine was turned off. Abbot testified that he knew the machine could cause injury if he placed his hand inside when the blades were in motion. However, he stated that it was his perception, via Crance's actions, that the machine was turned off.
During the trial, the president of defendant corporation testified that the machine is not dangerous when it is not being powered. He stated that when the machine is off, there is nothing wrong with putting one's hand inside. In fact, testimony was presented that workers will put their hands into the machine in order to clean it. The president further testified that the purpose of the guard was to prevent a worker from putting his hands into the machine when it was in operation. It is clear from that testimony that such was a
possibility, otherwise a guard would be pointless. Therefore, in light of the president's own testimony regarding the foreseeability of a worker putting his hand into the machine, the trial court acted properly in striking the misuse defense. __* Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. AFFIRMED.
