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CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE (^) -
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT OCTOBER TERM, 1946.
EVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
TOWNSHIP OF EWING ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT (^) OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF NEW JERSEY. No. 52. Argued November 20, 1946.-Decided February 10, 1947. Pursuant to a New (^) Jersey statute authorizing district boards of education to make rides and contracts for the transportation (^) of children to and from schools othes than private schools operated for profit, a board of education by resolution authorized the reim- bursement of parents for fares paid for the transportation by public carrier (^) of children attending public and Catholic schools. The Catholic schools operated under the superintendency of a Catholic priest and, in addition to secular education, gave religious instruc- tion in the Catholic Faith. A district taxpayer (^) challenged the validity under the Federal Constitution of (^) the statute and resolu- tion, so far as they authorized reimbursement to parents for the transportation of children attendthg sectarian schools. No question was raised as to whether (^) the exclusion of private schools operated for profit denied equal protection of the laws; nor did the record show that there were any children in the district who attended, or would have attended but for the cost' of transportation, any but public or Catholic schools. Held:
1. .The expenditure of tax-raised funds thus authorized (^) was for a public' purpose, and did not violate the due process clause of the 2. Fourteenth The. statute Amendment. Pp. 5-8. and (^) resolution (^) did not violate (^) the provision (^) of the First Amendment (made applicable to the states by the Four- teenth Amendment) prohibiting any "law respecting an establish- ment of religion." Pp. 8-18. 133 N. J. L. 350,44 A. 2d 333, affirmed.
OCTOBER TERM, 1946.
Counsel for Parties. 330 U. S.
In a suit by a taxpayer, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state legislature was without power under the state constitution (^) to authorize reimbursement to par- ents of bus fares paid for transporting their children to schools other than public schools. 132 N. J. L. 98, 39 A. 2d 75. The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals reversed, holding that neither the statute nor a resolution passed pursuant to it violated the state constitution or the provisions of the Federal Constitution in issue. 133 N. J. L. 350, 44 A. 2d 333. On appeal of the federal ques- tions to this Court, affirmed, p. 18.
Edward R. Burke and E. Hilton Jackson argued tne cause for appellant. With Mr. Burke on the brief were Challen B. Ellis, W. D. Jamieson and Kahl K. Spriggs.
William H. Speer argued the cause for appellees. With him (^) on the brief were Porter R. Chandler and Roger R. Clisham.
Briefs of amici curiae in support of appellant were filed by E. Hiltnn Jackson for the General Conference of Sev- enth-Day Adventists et al.; by Harry V. (^) Osborne, Ken- neth W. Greenawalt and Whitney (^) N. Seymour for the American Civil Liberties Union; and by Milton T. Lasher for the State Council (^) of the Junior Order of United American Mechanics of New Jersey.
Briefs of amici curiae in support of 9ppellees were filed by George F. Barrett, Attorney General of Illinois, Wil- liam C. Wines, Assistant.Attorney General of Illinois, and James A. Emmert, Attorney General of Indiana, for the States of Illinois and Indiana; by Fred S. LeBlanc, Attor- ney General, for the State of Louisiana; (^) by Clarence A. Barnes, Attorney General, for the Commonwealth (^) of Mas- sachusetts; by Edmund E. Shepherd, Solicitor General, and Daniel J. O'Hara, Assistant Attorney General, for the
4 OCTOBER^ TERM,^ 1946.
Opinion (^) of the Court. (^330) U. S.
contended that the statute and the resolution passed pur- suant to it violated both the State and the Federal Consti- tutions. That court held that the legislature was with- out power to authorize such payment under the state constitution. 132 N. J. L. 98, 39 A. 2d 75. The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals reversed, holding that neither the statute nor the resolution passed pursuant to it was in conflict with the State constitution or the provi- sions of the Federal Constitution in issue. 133 N. J. L. 350, 44 A. 2d 333. The case is here on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 344 (a). Since there has been no attack on the statute on the ground that a part of its language excludes children (^) attend- ing private schools operated for profit from enjoying State payment for their transportation, we need not consider this exclusionary language; it has no relevancy to any constitutional question here presented.! Furthermore, (^) if the exclusion clause had been properly challenged, we do not know whether New Jersey's highest court would con- strue its statutes as precluding payment of the school 2 Appellant does not challenge the New Jersey statute or the reso- lution on the ground that either violates the equal protection clause of 'the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding payment for the trans- portation of any pupil who attends a "private school run for profit." Although the township resolution authorized reimbursement only for parents of public and Catholic school pupils, appellant does not allege, nor is there anything in the record which would offer the slightest sup- port to an allegation, that there were any children in the township who attended or would have attended, but for want of transportation, any but public and Catholic schools. It will be appropriate to consider the exclusion of students of private schools operated for profit when and if it is proved to have occurred, is made the basis of a suit by one in a position to challenge it, and New Jersey's highest court has ruled adversely to the challenger. Striking downm a state law is not a matter of such light moment that it should be done by a federal court ex mero motu on a postulate neither charged nor proved, but which rests on nothing but a possibility. Cf. Liverpool, N. Y. & P. S. S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33,39.
EVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.
(^1) Opinion of the Court.
transportation of any group of pupils, even (^) those of a private school run for (^) profit.^3 Consequently, we put to one side the question (^) as to the validity of the statute against the claim that it does not authorize payment for the transportation generally of school children in New Jersey. The only contention here is that the state (^) statute and the resolution, insofar as they authorized reimbursement
- to parents of children attending parochial schools, violate the Federal Constitution in these two respects, which to some extent overlap. First. They authorize the State (^) to take by,taxation the private property of some and (^) bestow it upon others, to be used for their own private purposes. This, it is alleged, violates the due process clause (^) of the Fourteenth' Amendment. (^) Second. The statute and the resolution forced inhabitants to pay taxes to help support and maintain schools which are dedicated to, and (^) which regularly teach, the Catholic Faith. This is (^) alleged to be a use of state power to support church schools (^) contrary to the prohibition (^) of the First Amendment which the Fourteenth (^) Amendment made applicable to the states. First. The due process argument that the state law taxes some people to help others carry out their (^) private
- I It might hold the excepting (^) clause to be invalid, and sustain (^) the statute with that clause excised. N. J. R. S., tit. 1, c. 1, § 10, pro- vides with regard to any statute that if (^) "any provision thereof, shall be declared to be unconstitutional... in whole or in part, (^) by a court of competent jurisdiction, (^) such. .. article... shall, to the extent that. it is not unconstitutional,... be (^) enforced... ." The opinion of the Court of Errors and Appeals (^) in this very case suggests that state law (^) now authorizes transportation of all pupils. Its opinion stated:. "Since we (^) hold that the legislature may appropriate general state funds or authorize the use of local funds for the transportation of pupils to any school, we conclude that such (^) authorization of the use of local funds is likewise authorized by Pamph. L. 1941, ch. 191, and R. S. 18:7-78." 133 N. J. -L. (^) 350, 354, 44 A. 2d 333, 337. (Italics supplied.)
EVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.
1 Opinion of the Court.
of the people. The Fourteenth Amendment did not strip the states of their power to meet problems previously left for individual solution. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 103-104; Barbierv.Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31-32; Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 157-158. It is much too late to argue that legislation intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular edu- cation serves no public purpose. Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U. S. 370; Holmes, J., in Interstate Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79, 87. See opinion of Cooley, J., in Stuart v. School District No. 1 of Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 69 (1874). The same thing is no less true of legislation to reimburse needy parents, or all parents, for payment of the fares of their children so that they can ride in. public busses to and from -chools rather -than run the risk of traffic and other hazards incident to walking 'or' "hitchhiking." See Barbier v. Connolly, supra, at 31. See also cases collected 63 A. L. R. 413; 118 A. L. R..806. Nor does :it follow that a law has a private rather than a public purpose because it provides that tax- raised funds will-be paid to reimburse individuals on account of money spent by them in a way which furthers a public program. See Carmichael v' Southern Coal 4 Cok' Co., 301 U. S. 495, 518. Subsidies and' loans to individuals such as farmers andhomfe-owners, and to pri- vately owned transportation systems, as well as many other kinds of businesses, have been ,commonplace prac- tices in our state and national history. Insofar (^) as the second (^) phase (^) of the due (^) process argument may differ from the first, it is by suggesting that taxation for transportation of children to church schools constitutes support of a religion by the State. But if the law is invalid for this reason, it is because it violates the First Amend- nent's prohibition against the establishment of religion
OCTOBER TERM, 1946.
Opinion of the Court. 330 U. S.
by law. Thi§ is the exact question (^) raised by appellant's second contention, to consideration of which (^) we now turn. Second. The New Jersey statute is challenged as a "law respecting (^) an establishment of religion." The First Amendment, as made applicable to (^) the states by the Four- teenth, Murdock (^) v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, com- mands that (^) a state "shall make no law respecting an estab- lishment of religion, (^) or prohibiting the free exercise thereof (^)... ." These words of the First Amendment re- flected in the minds of early Americans a vivid mental (^) pic- ture of conditions and practices which they fervently wished to stamp out in order (^) to preserve liberty for them- selves and for their posterity. (^) Doubtless their goal has not been entirely reached; but so far has the (^) Nation moved toward it that the expression (^) "law respecting an establish- ment of religion," (^) probably does not so vividly remind present-day Americans of .the evils, fears, and (^) political problems that caused that expression to be written into our Bill of Rights. Whether this New Jersey (^) law is one respecting ark "establishment of religion" requires an un-, derstanding (^) of the meaning of that language, particularly with respect to^ the^ imposition^ of^ taxes.^ Once^ again,^
4
therefore, it is not inappropriate briefly to review (^) the back- ground and environment of the period in (^) which that constitutional language was fashioned and adopted.
. (^) A large proportion (^) of the early (^) settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the bondage (^) of laws which compelled them to support and attend governnient- favored churches. (^) The centuries immediately before and contemporaneous with the colonization of America (^) had been filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, gen- erfated in large part by established sects determined to
'See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 162; cf. Knowlton v. .Moore, i78 U. S. 41, 89,106.
10 OCTOBER TERM,^ 1946.
Opinion of the Court. 330 U.^ S.
this authority was accompanied^ by^ a^ repetition^ of^ many of the old-world practices and persecutions. Catholics
found themselves^ hounded and^ proscribed^ because^ of^ their faith; Quakers who followed their conscience went^ to^ jail; Baptists were peculiarly obnoxious to certain dominant Protestant sects; men and women of varied faiths who happened to be in a minority in a particular locality were persecuted because they steadfastly persisted^ in^ worship- ping God^ only^ as^ their^ own^ consciences^ dictated.'^ And^ all of these dissenters were compelled to pay tithes and^ taxes^^8 to support government-sponsored churches whose min- isters preached inflammatory sermons designed to strengthen and consolidate the established faith^ by^ gener- ating a burning hatred against dissenters.
Advowsons of all Churches^ which^ ...^ shall^ happen^ to^ be^ built, together with Licence and Faculty of erecting and founding Churches, Chapels, and^ Places^ of^ Worship^.^.^.^ and^ of^ causing^ the^ same^ to^ be dedicated and consecrated according to the Ecclesiastical Laws^ of^ our Kingdom of England, with all, and singular such, and as ample Rights, Jurisdictions, Privileges .... as^ any^ Bishop^.^.^. in^ our^ Kingdom^ of England, ever:... hath had .... ." MacDonald, Documentary Source Book of American History (1934) 31,^ 33,^ The^ Commission^ of New Hampshire of 1680, Poore,'8upra, II, 1277, stated: "And above all things We do by these presents will,^ require^ and^ comand our^ said Councill to take all possible care for ye discountenancing of vice and .encouraging of virtue and good living; and that by such examples ye infidle may be invited and desire to^ partake^ of^ ye^ Christian^ Religion, and for ye greater ease and satisfaction of ye sd loving subjects in matters of religion, We do hereby require and comand^ yt^ liberty^ of conscience shall be allowed unto all protestants; yt such especially as shall be conformable to ye ritee of ye Church of Engd shall be particularly countenanced and , encouraged." See also Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch 292. '7 See. e. g. Semple, Baptists (^) in Virginia (1894); Sweet, Religion in Colonial America, supra at 131-152, 322-339. S Almost every colony exacted some kind of tax for church support. See e. g. Cobb, op. cit. jupra, note 5, 110 (Virginia); 131 (North Carolina); 169 (Massachusetts); 270 (Connecticut); 304, 310, 339 (New York); 386 (Maryland); 295 (New Hampshire).
EVERSON v. (^) BOARD OF EDUCATION.
Opinion of the Court.
These practices became so commonplace (^) as to shock the freedom-loving (^) colonials into a feeling of abhorrence." The imposition of taxes (^) to pay ministers' salaries and to build and maintain churches and church (^) property aroused their indignation.'^0 It was these feelings (^) which found expression in (^) the First Amendment. No one locality and no one group throughout the Colonies (^) can rightly be given entire credit for having (^) aroused the sentiment that culminated (^) in adoption of the Bill of Rights' provi- sions embracing (^) religious liberty. But Virginia, where the established (^) church had achieved a dominant (^) influence in political affairs and where many excesses (^) attracted wide public attention, provided (^) a great stimulus and able lead- ership for the movement. The people there, (^) as elsewhere, reached the conviction that individual (^) religious liberty could be achieved best under (^) a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to (^) interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group. The movement (^) toward this end reached its dramatic climax in Virginia in 1785-86 when the (^) Virginia legis- lative body was about to renew Virginia's (^) tax levy for the support of the established church. (^) Thomas Jeffer-
9 Madison wrote to a friend (^) in 1774: "That diabolical, hell-conceived principle of persecution (^) rages among some... This vexes me the worst of anything whatever. There are at (^) this time in the adjacent country not less than five or six well-meaning (^) men in close jail for publishing their religious sentiments, (^) which in the main are very orthodox. I have neither patience to (^) hear, talk, or think of any- thing relative to this matter; for I hav squabbled (^) and scolded, abused and ridiculed, (^) so long about it to litle purpose, that I am without common patience. So I must beg you (^) to pity me, and pray for liberty of (^) conscience to all." I Writings of James Madison (1900) 18,21. 10 Virginia's resistance to taxation for church (^) support was crystal- lized in the famous "Parsons' (^) Cause" argued by Patrick Henry in 1763. For (^) an account see Cobb, op. cit., supra, note 5, 108-111.
EVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.
Opinion of the Court.
a departure from the plan (^) of the Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both (^) of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either (^).. .; that to compel a man to (^) furnish contributions of money for the propagation of (^) opinions which he dis- believes, (^) is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forc- ing him to support this or that teacher (^) of his own religious persuasion, is depriving (^) him of the com- fortable liberty of giving his contributions (^) to the particular pastor, whose morals he would (^) make his pattern ...."
And the (^) statute itself enacted
"That no man shall be compelled (^) to'frequent or sup- port any religious worship, place, or ministry whatso- ever, (^) nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened (^) in his body or goods, nor shall other- wise suffer on account of his (^) religious opinions or belief. 14 This Court has previously recognized that (^) the provi- sions of the First (^) Amendment, in the drafting and adop- tion of which Madison and (^) Jefferson played such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended (^) to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion (^) on religious (^) liberty as the Virginia statute. Reynolds v. United States, supra (^) at 164; Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679; Davis v. Beason, (^133) U. S. 333, 342. Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First (^) Amend- ment did not (^) apply as a restraint against the states." Most of them did soon provide (^) similar constitutional protections
14 12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia (1823) (^) 84; Commager, Docu- ments of American History (1944) (^) 125. 15 Permoli v. New Orleans, 3 How. (^) 589. Cf. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243.
OCTOBER TERM, 1946.
Opinion of the Court. 330 U. S.
for religious (^) liberty." But some states persisted for about half a century in imposing restraints upon the free exercise of religion and in discriminating against particular reli- gious groups." In recent years, so (^) far as the pro~ision against the establishment of (^) a religion is concerned, the question has most frequently arisen in (^) connection with proposed state aid to church schools and efforts to carry on religious teachings in the public schools (^) in accordance with the tenets of (^) a particular sect. 8 Some churches have
either sought or accepted state financial support for their schools. Here again (^) the efforts to obtain state aid or acceptance of it have (^) not been limited to any one particu- lar faith. "^ The state courts, in the main, (^) have remained faithful to the language of their own constitutional provi- sions designed to protect religious freedom and to separate religions (^) and governments. Their decisions, however, show the difficulty in (^) drawing the line between tax legis- lation which provides (^) funds for the welfare of the general public and that which is designed to support institutions which teach religion. The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, pre- venting establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in the light of its history and (^) the evils it
16 For a collection of state constitutional provisions on freedom of religion see Gabel, Public Funds for (^) Church and Private Schools (1937) 148-149. (^) See also 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (1927) 960-985. 1,Test provisions forbade officeholders to "deny ... the truth of the Protestant religion," e..g. Constitution of North Carolina (1776) §XXXII, II Poore, supra, 1413. (^) Maryland permitted taxation for support of the Christian religion and limited civil office to Christians until 1818, id., I, 819,820, 832. 18See Note 50 Yale L. J. (1941) (^) 917; see also cases collected 14 L. R.A. 418; 5A.L.R.879; (^141) A.L.R. 1148. l"ISee cases collected (^14) L. R. A. 418; 5 A. t.R. 879; (^141) A. L. R.
2 Ibid. (^) See also Cooley, op. cit., supra, note 16.
OCTOBER TERM, 1946.
Opinion of (^) the Court. 330 U. S.
ing or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. (^) No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to (^) support any religious activities or institutions, whatever (^) they may be called, or whatever form they (^) may adopt to teach or prac- tice religion. Neither (^) a state nor the Federal Govern- ment can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jeffer~on, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State." Reynolds v. United (^) States, supra at 164. We must consider the New Jersey statute in accordance with the foregoing (^) limitations imposed by the First Amendment. But we must not strike that state (^) statute down if it is within (^) the State's constitutional power even though it approaches the verge of that power. See Interstate Ry. v. Massachusetts, Holmes, J., supra at 85, 88. New Jersey cannot (^) consistently with the "estab- lishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment con- tribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches (^) the tenets and faith of any church. On the other hand, other language (^) of the amendment commands that New Jersey (^) cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists. Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public (^) welfare leg- islation. While (^) we do not mean to intimate that a state could not (^) provide transportation only to children attend- ing public schools, we must be careful, (^) in protecting the (^) citizens of New Jersey against state-established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New (^) Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious belief.
EVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.
Opinion of the Court.
Measured by these standards, we cannot say that the First Amendment prohibits New^ Jersey^ from^ spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other schools. It is undoubtedly true that children are helped to get to church schools. There is even a possibility that some of the children might not be sent to the church schools if the parents were compelled to pay their children's bus fares out of their own pockets when transportation to a public school would have been paid for by the State. The same possi- bility exists where the state requires a local transit com- pany to provide reduced fares to school children including those attending parochial schools, 2 4^ or where a municipally owned transportation system undertakes to carry all school children free of charge. Moreover, state-paid policemen, detailed to protect children going to and from church schools from the very real hazards of traffic, would serve much the same purpose and accomplish much the same result as state provisions intended to guarantee free trans- portation of a kind which the state deems to be best for the school children's welfare, And parents might refuse to risk their children to the serious danger of traffic accidents going to and from parochial schools, the ap- proaches to which were not protected by policemen. Similarly, parents might be reluctant to permit their children to attend schools which the state had cut off from such general government services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public
24 New Jersey long ago permitted public utilities to charge school children reduced rates. See Public S. R. Co. v. Public Utility Connrs. 81 N. J. L. 363, 80 A. 27 (1911); see also Interstate Ry. v. Massachusetts, supra. rhe District of Columbia Code requires that the new charter of the District public transportation company provide a three-cent fare "for'school children... going to and from public, parochial, or like schools .... ." 47 Stat. 752, 759.
EVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION.
1 JACKSON, J., dissenting.
this case involves is not in itself a serious^ burden^ to tax- payers and I had assumed it to be as little serious in principle. Study of this case convinces me otherwise. The Court's opinion marshals every argument in favor of state aid and puts the case in its most favorable light, but much of its reasoning confirms^ my.^ conclusions^ that there are no good grounds upon which to support the pres- ent legislation. In fact, the undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompromising separation of Church from^ State,^ seem^ utterly^ discordant^ with^ its^ con- clusion yielding support to their commingling in educa- tional matters. The case which irresistibly comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who, according to Byron's reports, "whispering 'I will ne'er consent,'- consented." 1."
The Court sustains this legislation by assuming two deviations from the facts of this particular case; first, it assumes a state of facts the record does not support, and secondly, it refuses to' consider facts which are inescapable on the record. The Court concludes that this "legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help par- ents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools," and it draws a comparison between "state provisions intended to guarantee free transportation" for school children with services such as police and fire protection, and implies that we are here dealing with "laws authorizing new types of public services... ." This hypothesis permeates the opinion. The facts will not bear that construction. The Township of Ewing is not furnishing transportation to the children in any form; it is not operating school busses itself or contracting for their operation; and it is not performing any public service of any kind with this
OCTOBER TERM, 1946.
JACKSON,' J., issenting. 330 U. S.
taxpayer's money. All school children are left to ride as ordinary paying passengers on the regular busses oper- ated by the public transportation system. What the Township does, and what the taxpayer complains of, is at stated intervals to reimburse parents for the fares paid, provided the children attend either public schools or Cath- olic Church schools. This pxpenditure of tax funds has no possible effect on the cl ild's safety or expedition in transit. As passengers on the. public busses they travel as fast and no faster, and are as safe and (^) no safer, since their parents are reimbursed as before. In addition to thus assuming a type of service that does not exist, the Court, also insists that we must close -our. eyes to a discrimination which does exist. The (^) resolution which authorizes disbursement of this taxpayer's (^) money limits reimbursement to those who attend (^) public schools and Catholic schools. That is the way the Act is applied to this taxpayer. The New Jersey- Act in question makes the charmacter of the school, not the needs of the children, determine the eligibility of parents to reimbursement. The Act permits payment for transportation to parochial schools or public schools but prohibits it to private schools oper- ated in whole or in part for (^) profit. Children often are sent to private schools because their parents feel that they (^) require more individual instruction than public
schools can provide, or because they are backward or defec- tive and need special attention. If all children of the state were objects of impartial solicitude, no reason is obvious for denying. transportation reimbursement to stu- dents of this class, (^) for these often are as needy and as worthy as those who go to public or parochial schools. Refusal to reimburse those who attend such schools is understandable only in the light of a purpose to aid the schools, because the state might well abstain from aiding a profit-making private enterprise.. Thus, under the Act
