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J7ournal of medical ethics, I980, 6, 33-
Words
Ethics, morals and moral philosophy
R S Downie Department of Moral Philosophy,
University of Glasgow
Many scientists and men of action have little sympathy with discussions of words, regarding all such as easy to settle - 'Look it up in the dictionary!'
- or as trivial - (^) 'Just word-chopping!.' But (^) disputes about words cannot always be settled so easily, since dictionaries may well just record the ambigui- ties which have occasioned the disputes; and they are often anything but trivial, since the meanings we attach to words certainly influence, and may even determine, our perceptions of the world or our values. Indeed, in some cases there is no clear distinction between changing one's view on the meanings of words and changing one's view of the facts. These points are illustrated by the confusions surrounding the words 'ethics' and 'morals' as these words are (^) used in medical (^) discussion.
Ethics and morals The first use of 'ethics' we shall note is that in which it is synonymous with 'morals'. In this sense of the term an 'ethical judgement' is the judgement of an ordinary moral agent about moral right and wrong, or about what someone morally ought or ought not to do, or^ about whether^ or^ not^ someone^ behaved fairly, or about whether or not someone is a morally good person. In this sense we might say that a certain question is a matter of ethics, rather than of politics. But if 'ethics' and 'morals' can be co-extensive in their areas of application there are also, secondly, uses of 'ethics' and 'morals' in^ terms^ of which they
refer to roughly distinguishable areas within 'ethics'
or 'morals' in the first sense. Thus, in popular speech the^ term^ 'morals'^ has become^ narrowed to matters of sexual (^) behaviour, whereas (^) high-minded people who are aware that there are problems of conduct other than sexual ones have pre-empted the word 'ethics' to refer to them. In terms of this distinction we find that the politician who tells us lies is deemed (if caught at^ it) 'unethical', whereas his mistress who is caught at^ it^ (no need^ to^ say what) is deemed to have 'loose morals'. In short, 'ethics' and 'morals' can refer to two different areas of ordinary morality in the first sense.
Professional ethics
Different again, thirdly, and of greatest interest to
the medical profession, is the use of 'ethics' in the
expression 'professional ethics', of which medical
ethics is an important branch. All codes of pro-
fessional ethics embody three main components:
a) standards of professional competence;
b) standards of professional integrity;
c) accepted professional procedures,
or, in a broad sense, 'etiquette'. A professional code
ofthis sort can acquire the force ofmoral imperatives
in our first sense. Indeed, some professional roles,
and particularly medical ones, are such that a
person can identify his whole personality with them.
For such a person, to be a moral being just is to be
a doctor, nurse, or whatever, where these roles are
defined by the current ethics of the profession. The
moral duties of life which are for most people
diffused over many areas and activities have for the
dedicated doctor a sharper focus, and insofar as they
are more sharply defined they can have a degree of
strength which outweighs all other claims on him.
Seen in this way professional ethics are a source of
inspiration, and^ a^ profession becomes^ a^ vocation or a
calling. Professional ethics can thus be ordinary
morality at its finest, and the third sense of 'ethics'
becomes a^ specialised case of the^ first.
Codified procedures and ethics
It is possible, however, and perhaps it is not
uncommon, for the institutional side to professional
ethics to^ become^ dominant. When that^ happens the
emphasis is^ placed on^ professional procedures,
procedures which may of^ course^ be^ justified but^ can
seem artificial or just plain comic, as when it is a
matter of precedence in the ward round. This gives
us a fourth sense of 'ethics', when the term acquires a
specific content^ which refers^ to^ codified^ procedures,
but lacks the prescriptive force of morality. An
example of 'ethics' used in this descriptive, pro-
cedural sense can be found in the reaction of the Ethical Committee of the British Medical Associa-
tion to the virginity tests^ alleged to^ have been
carried out on^ Asian^ immigrant^ women^ at^ Heathrow
Airport. A^ spokesman for^ the^ BMA^ is^ reported as
having said that while such tests may have been
morally wrong there was nothing unethical about
them." Presumably the^ meaning of^ this is^ that there
34 RS^ Downie
was nothing in the codified procedures of the BMA
which could be interpreted as ruling out such tests.
'Ethics' in this procedural, quasi-legal sense is
distinct from 'morals' or 'morality' in the first
sense, as we can see if we consider that it is possible
to decide by a majority vote what will or will not
count as ethical in this sense, whereas an action or a
practice cannot be made morally right or wrong by a
majority decision or piece of legislation. Thus, it is
logically possible, and perhaps not uncommon, for
someone to dissent on moral grounds from a decree
that a given practice is ethically right or wrong in
the descriptive sense. For example, it might be
decided by the Ethical Committee of the BMA, or
other such body, that providing AID for lesbians
is ethically wrong or right, but a doctor or social
worker might well dissent from such a decree on
moral grounds, just as we might object morally to
certain laws although they have been enacted by
Parliament. Ethics, in^ this sense of codified pro-
cedures, does not in^ itself, then, have moral force,
although clearly any member of a profession has a
moral duty to consider the codified procedures ofhis
profession and^ to^ act^ on them^ unless he can show
good reason why he ought not -^ just as a citizen has
a general moral duty to obey the law of the land and
may dissent only if he can show morally good
grounds for his dissent.
Ethics and moral philosophy
'Ethics', finally, is often used to refer to that branch
of philosophy also called 'moral philosophy. Thus,
philosophers write books with titles such as The
Methods of Ethics or Principia Ethica, and such
books are concerned with the philosophical study
of the principles governing man's life in society.
Ethics in this sense is a theoretical, second-order
study of practical, first-order morality or ethics,
and its aim is to bring about an intellectual under-
standing ofthe nature ofmoral action and judgement.
It does not follow from this that moral philosophy
as a theoretical study has no relevance to practical
morality. Perhaps an analogy from music may help here. The study of the form and structure of music is a purely theoretical study, but nevertheless a
performer will have a better overall grasp of the
music he is playing if he has this theoretical know-
ledge. There^ are^ of^ course^ musicians^ with^ an
intuitive insight into the^ music they are playing,
just as there are^ ordinary moral agents with an
intuitive insight into moral situations, but it
remains true that most people will have a more
informed awareness of morality if they have some
theoretical grasp of the principles underlying it.
It will be clear from the foregoing that discussions
of at least some words can be both controversial -
not to be settled by appeals to dictionaries or
stipulations - and important, since confusions over
the meaning of 'ethics' (for example) may lead to
serious misunderstandings among members of a
profession or between a profession and the general
public.
Reference
'Editorial. World medicine, March IO I979, p 99.