Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer
Abstract: Roderick Firth take the position of a dispositional objective relational empirical
absolutist. This implies that (absolutist)he will analyse an object in an non-relative fashion;
also, (dispositional) he will analyse it as ācontrary-to-fact conditionalā under certain
condition; in addition, (objectivist) he will analyse in the the truth of ethical statement which
doesnāt need the existence of experiencing a subject; furthermore, (relational) he will analyse
if a thing is related in a certain way to some other thing, either actual or hypothetical; lastly,
(empirical) he will analyse the moral data of an ethical statement. With this position in mind
he goes to create an ideal observer. An ideal observer, according to Firth, is similar to an ideal
judge, but not one, with the qualities of being omniscient with respect to non-ethical facts,
āomnipercipient,ā disinterested, dispassionate, consistent, and normal. The ideal observer is
omniscient states that it know everything about the fact, past, future. He, ideal observer, is
āomnipercipientā meaning that has the ultimate imagination, able to think of outcome of an
act and thinking of a stranger as families. He is disinterested, showing that he is not
influenced by particular interest. He is dispassionate, implying that he is not influenced by
emotions. He is consistent as a result of all his characteristic. Lastly, he is normal, showing
that the properties of an ideal observer canāt go beyond the limit of ānormality.ā With this
being refer to as the ideal observer, Firth concludes that ethical statement are statements
about an ideal observer and his ethically-significant reactions.