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Chapter 23
Emotion and Adaptation
Subjectively, there are few psychological phe, nomena that compare with emotion. Emotions punctuate almost all the significant events in our lives: We feel proud when we receive a promotion; we become angry when we learn that our homes have been burglarized, we are joyful at the births of our children; and we experience profound grief at the death of some, one we love. Furthermore, the emotions we experience seem to strongly influence how we act in response to these events: The joy and pride encourage renewed commitment to ad, vance and protect career and family; the anger motivates us to seek justice and retribution; and the sadness pushes us to seek aid and comfort while coming to terms with our loss. The centrality of emotion in human exist, ence is no secret in the arts. Good drama is directed toward evoking emotion in the audi, ence (Scheff, 1979), and thus serves as a study of the affective power of various social cir, cumstances. In a complementary fashion, au, thors use emotional reactions as important clues to their characters' true motivations and personalities, revealing a pervasive assumption that emotions and personality are inextricably
Craig A. Smith
Vanderbilt University
Richard S. Lazarus (1990)
University of California- Berkeley
intertwined. Many of the trait words people use to describe others' personalities (e. g., ':hostile,"
" ttmt. 'd , " (( sptte. ful , " "c h ee rf u , 1 " "aggressrve:,. "
"cautious," etc.) refer directly to the persons' tendencies to respond to diverse situations with characteristic emotions (see Plutchik, 1980). Given the central position that we cede to emotions in our personal lives and the pro, minence of emotion in literary studies of the human condition, one might expect emotion to serve as a central, organizing construct in scientific psychology, and especially in a psy, chology of personality. If to this we add the widespread-and no doubt justified-belief among professionals and laypersons that emo, tions have a major impact on our subjective well,being, our physical health, our social functioning, and our problem,solving perform, ance, then understanding the emotions ought to be a major agenda for the social and biologi, cal sciences. Historically, however, the study of emotion in psychology has been severely neg, leered. Emotion has been considered an irrele, vantepiphenomenon (e.g., Skinner, 1953), or has been used as a convenient chapter heading
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for a loosely organized collection of material not easily covered elsewhere (see Bolles, 1974; Lazarus, 1966; Tomkins, 1962). This neglect, however, is currently showing healthy signs of dissipating. Psychologists from all subfields profess interest in emotional pro, cesses, and research on emotion,related topics is burgeoning. A number of volumes (e.g., Izard, Kagan, & Zajonc, 1984; Plutchik &
Kellerman, 1980; Scherer & Ekman, 1984;
Shaver, 1984), and even new journals (e.g.,
Cognition and Emotion), devoted to the study of
emotion have recently appeared. The same can be found in sociology, anthropology, and the neurosciences. What we think has happened is this: First, there was a loosening of the restrictive epistemology of behaviorism, which allowed investigators once again to examine thoughts about one's plight as factors in adaptation and emotion. Second, the cognitive revolution allowed researchers to center attention onemo, tion in common,sense or folk psychology terms, to recognize the dependence of our emo- tional lives on motivation, and to focus atten, tion on the individual differences in what is important to the person. Although heartened by these developments, we maintain an uneasy sense that, with a few exceptions (e.g., Thoits, 1984), much of this work still fails to appreciate emotion's rightful place as a central and organizing construct within psychology. In- stead, there is a tendency to treat it as yet another interesting, isolated subtopic. We begin by addressing the question of what an emotion is. Next, we describe our own re, cent work directed at illuminating what we see as one of the important issues in emotion theory-the role of cognitive appraisal. We embed this work in a general model of emotion, which identifies the key variables and processes within a systems framework emphasizing per, son-environment relationships and cognitive mediation. In presenting our model, we illus- trate how emotion theory makes firm contact with a variety of topics currently being pursued across diverse psychological disciplines, es, pe.cially personality and social psychology.
DEFINITIONAL ISSUES: THE
NATURE OF EMOTION
Unfortunately, although there is considerable agreement that certain psychophysiological states (e.g., anger, fear, and sadness) should be
regarded as emotions, and that certain others (e.g., hunger and thirst) should not, there are many other states (e. g., startle, interest, guilt)
about which there is little consensus ( cf. Ek,
man, 1984; Ekman, Friesen, & Simons, 1985; Izard, 1977; Ortony, 1987; Plutchik, 1980; Tomkins, 1980). The lack of consensus occurs because there is no absolute agreement on the criteria that should be used to distinguish emo, tion from nonemotion. The "defining" criteria have been based on specific behaviors believed to be produced by the emotions (e.g., Watson, 1919), linguistic properties of the English words used to denote various states (e.g., Ortony, 1987; Ortony, Clore, & Foss, 1987), and distinctive patterns of physiological activ, ity, such as characteristic facial expressions (e.g., Ekman, 1984; Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1980). An examination of previous definitional attempts might lead to this conclusion: "Every, one knows what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition. Then, it seems, no one
knows" (Fehr & Russell, 1984, p. 464).
In any definition we need to distinguish be, tween what can be said about emotion in general, and what can be said about specific emotions such as anger, fear, guilt, shame, pride, love, and so forth. The most common solution, historically, has been to base the defi, nition on descriptive characteristics of the general reaction, which, Hillman ( 1960) has suggested, provides substantial agreement in the abstract. Hillman quotes the following from
Drever's (1952, pp. 80-81) Dictionary of Psy-
chology:
Emotion: differently described and explained by different psychologists, but all agree that it is a complex state of the organism, involving bodily changes of a widespread character-in breathing, pulse, gland secretion, etc.-and, on the mental side, a state of excitement or perturbation, marked by strong feeling, and usually an impulse toward a definitive form of behavior. If the emo- tion is intense there is some disturbance of the intellectual functions, a measure of dissociation, and a tendency towards action ....
Although this definition expresses some con- sensus at the descriptive level, it does not go far toward settling disputes over distinctions be, tween emotion and nonemotion, or th~ specific reaction states that should be considered true emotions. Is surprise an emotion? Excitement? Relief? Love? How should we treat the so, called "aesthetic" emotions? Nbr does it reveal much about the properties of specific emotions,
612 RESEARCH TOPICS
most evident in humans (Piaget, 1952; Wer, ner, 1948). Instead of surviving and flourishing because of a built,in program of adaptive reac, tions for every specific environmental condi, tion, more advanced species survived by learn, ing how to deal with their environments and mobilizing accordingly. Increasingly, judgment took over from innate reflexes, and emotions- drawing upon both motives and thought-have become the key adaptational process interven, ing between environmental challenges and ac, tions (Tomkins, 1962). In short, innate re, flexes were once the simplest solutions to the adaptational problem of getting along in the world, but in more complex creatures these evolved into emotional patterns. In considering the role of the emotions in adaptation, one must remember that the fun, damental adaptational task is to mobilize the most efficacious behavior in the face of the biological and social requirements of living. Remember, too, that in order to effectively produce contingent behavior, the organism must meet two fundamental conditions: First, it needs to reliably detect when environmental circumstances are relevant to one or another of its survival needs; second, this detection must result in behavior that increases the likelihood of satisfying the need. In our view, reflexes, physiological drives, and.emotions all represent mechanisms connecting the detection of sur, vival,relevant conditions with the production of survival,enhancing behavior, but they achieve this connection in different ways.
Reflexes
The task of pairing adaptive behaviors with survival,relevant conditions is easiest when a
need is reliably signaled by a very specific cue or set of cues, and can be met by performing a specific behavior. It is this very specific linkage that innate reflexes accomplish, and the hall, mark of the reflex is its stimulus specificity and response rigidity (Ekman, 1984; Ekman et al., 1985). Very specific patterns of stimulation ("releasing stimuli") elicit very specific patterns of behavior ("fixed action patterns") that en, sure the need signalled by the releasing stimulus is met. These characteristic properties of re, flexes are summarized in the first column of Table 23.1. Reflexes (at one time, the term "instincts" might have been used) constitute an effective adaptational system for organisms that can afford to interact with their environments in highly stereotyped ways. However, their sim, plicity-the rigid pairing of a specific stimulus with a specific response--has high costs, parti, cularly as organisms and their environmental interactions become more complicated. For an organism dependent on reflex, each new mode of interaction with the environment requires the development of a new reflex, and at some relatively modest level of complexity this requirement becomes highly disadvantageous. As the survival issues themselves become more complex, they become increasingly difficult to address through the performance of rigid be, havioral sequences, and more flexible, context, sensitive responses become necessary. Further, more, it becomes increasingly unlikely that specific survival issues will be reliably signaled by single stimuli. Thus, with increasing com, plexity there is increasing selective pressure to surmount the behavioral rigidity inherent in reflexes and to decouple specific stimuli from specific responses {see Epstein, 1984; Leeper, 1965; Scherer, 1984b; Tomkins, 1962). There
TABLE 23.1. Comparison of Reflexes, Physiological Drives, and Emotions
Property
Stimulus source
Periodicity Stimulus specificity Response flexibility
Examples
Reflex
Internal or external event (real)
Reactive High Low
Startle, eye blink
Physiological drive
Internal tissue deficit (real)
Cyclical Moderate-high Moderate
Hunger, thirst
Emotion
Internal or external event (real or im, agined) Reactive Low High
Anger, sadness, guilt
Chapter 23. Emotion and Adaptation (^) 613
is still a need for mechanisms that both alert the organism when it faces survival,relevant circumstances and compel it to respond adap, tively to those circumstances. However, there is much to be gained if the organism is some, how able to equate distinct stimuli that signal functionally similar conditions, and/or to re, spond to those conditions with a degree of behavioral flexibility.
Physiological Drives
Physiological drives, such as hunger and thirst, evolved in the service of particular internal, homeostatic needs. For instance, hunger serves to ensure that the organism's nutritional needs are met, and thirst ensures that the organism maintains an adequate fluid balance. These drives have tended to remain stimulus,specific even in the most complicated species, presum, ably because the homeostatic needs they serve can be reliably anticipated on the basis of specific internal cues, resulting in little selec, rive pressure to abandon the specificity. For example, in many animal species (including humans), an impending need for nourishment can be predicted quite reliably from specific internal cues, such as the level of sugar in the bloodstream, and these cues elicit hunger (e.g., Thompson & Campbell, 1977). Physiological drives are distinguished from reflexes by a moderate degree of response flexibility. In most higher animals drives tend to motivate specific classes of behavior, but the specific behavioral sequences within these classes are not determined by the drive itself. For instance, hunger motivates the organism to eat something, but for many species (including humans), the hunger itself does not determine either the specific behaviors to be performed to obtain and prepare the food, or the identity of appropriate foodstuffs. This response flexibility provides considerable adaptational advantages, but also entails considerable cost. The major advantage is that the behavioral flexibility enables the organism to adjust its behaviors sensitively to its specific environ, mental contingencies. Thus, in hunger, if one strategy for obtaining food fails, the organism is relatively free to try another; if a favorite food becomes scarce, the organism is able to seek an alternative; and so on. The major cost is that this flexibility makes the drive in some sense incomplete: It must be supplemented with
something that guides the organism toward specific appropriate behaviors. Thus, with hun, ger, appropriate strategies for obtaining food must come from somewhere, and the organism must have some means of identifying suitable foods. The apparent evolutionary solution to this tradeoff has been to make the degree of be, havioral flexibility associated with drives de, pendent upon the species' capacity for learning. The ability to draw upon past experience to guide present behavior seems to be a prerequi, site for response flexibility (cf. Bolles, 197 4; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Epstein, 1984; Scherer, 1984b). Across species, organisms that demonstrate the most highly developed learning capabilities tend to be the ones that have acquired the greatest behavioral latitude in responding to specific physiological drives. For instance, human food preferences are de, pendent on culture and the individual's life experience (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Drives display an additional characteristic, "periodicity," that further distinguishes them from reflexes (and emotions). Unless anti, cipated, the homeostatic needs, and hence the drives that serve them, arise with great regular, ity. For example, after an extended period
without nourishment (or fluid) an organism will
become hungry (or thirsty) etc.) in a very pre, dictable manner. In contrast, many reflexes, and all emotions, are "reactive." They arise in response to appropriate signals whenever those signals occur, and if the signal never arises then the reflex or emotion may never be ex, perienced. As summarized in the second col, umn of Table 23.1, physiological drives display periodicity, stimulus specificity, and moderate response flexibility, and they serve homeostatic needs. Physiological drives-which are innate in all animal species, including humans-are not the only motivational forces to which complicated species respond. In humans, for example, there appear to be strong needs to explore, achieve, and gain mastery over the environment, as well as to maintain contact and form social bonds with others. Whether one refers to these needs as learned or acquired drives, or "social mo, rives," the development of adaptational systems to satisfy them has depended on a powerful and abstract intelligence. Advanced intelligence also made possible the complex patterns of so, cial organization that dominate the behavior of advanced species, and that are as important to
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Chapter 23. Emotion and Adaptation (^) 615
results in harm or benefit. This is what it means to speak of a "relational" approach to emotion. Moreover, with the adaptational responses having become less innate, more flexible, more variable, and more dependent upon the species' cognitive capabilities, emotions are not only reactions to ongoing relationships with the en~ vironment but are also cognitive. However, the adaptive solution has not been merely to produce a purely cold cognitive proc~ ess of detection and evaluation. Instead, it comprises a complex psychobiological reaction that fuses intelligence with motivational pat~ terns, action impulses, and physiological changes that signify to both the actor and observer that something of significance for well~being is at stake in the encounter with the environment. We call this psychobiological reaction an "emotion., It is a very complex reaction that simultaneously encompasses mo~ tives and cognitive evaluations of the adapta~ tional requirements of the encounter, and, if the encounter is evaluated as having important consequences for personal well~being, it results in organismic involvement. Therefore, in place of "emotion" we often use the expression "cognitive-motivational-emotive configura~ tion.'' The divorce of emotional response from specific stimuli and its replacement with a cognitive evaluation of the significance of the organism-environment relationship is the cen~ terpiece of the emotion process in humans. By centering on the person's interpretation or evaluation of what an encounter signifies for its well~being, the effective stimulus for emotion has shifted from a concrete event to an abstract meaning. In becoming meaning~centered, emo~ tions have achieved a flexibility and adapta~ tional power that is simply not possible for stimulus~centered adaptational systems such as drives and reflexes. From this point of view, anything that implies harm or benefit to the person can produce an emotion. Thus, pain, hunger, or even emo~ tional.reactions themselves (e.g., anger) can evoke fear, guilt, shame, or some other emo~ tion-even a positive one such as happiness or love-if they are interpreted as somehow being a harm or threat, or a benefit. Just as signifi~ candy, the critical event-be it internal, ex~ ternal, or a combination of both-need not have actually occurred. Anticipated circum~ stances can be as emotionally arousing as the actual occurrence, if not more so (e.g., Folkins,
1970; Nomikos, Opton, Averill, & Lazarus, 1968). Even purely imaginary experiences, which the person in no way expects to take place, are quite effective at evoking low~level emotional reactions, as a long tradition of im~ agery~based research will attest (e.g., Carroll,
Marzillier, & Merian, 1982; Lang, 1979;
Schwartz, Fair, Salt, Mandel, & Klerman,
1976; Smith, 1989; Smith, McHugo, & Lan~
zetta, 1986). That emotions are reactions to abstract meanings conveyed by just about any set of circumstances implies an emotion process that is extraordinarily complex, variable, and flex~ ible. Whereas any given drive can only be satis~ fied by performing a particular class of be~ haviors (e.g., eating something in hunger, drinking something in thirst), this does not appear to be the case for emotions, perhaps because the diverse range of circumstances that can elicit a given emotion cannot be effectively addressed by any single class of behavior. For example, anxiety arises when we perceive our~ selves to be in a potentially dangerous situa~ tion, and we become motivated to avoid or escape the threat. But a wide variety of be~ haviors that eliminate or reduce the threat can satisfy this motivation-fleeing the situation, remaining in the situation but increasing vigi~ lance, or even mounting a pre~emptory attack to eliminate the source of threat. Thus, an emotion provides the motivation to react to the situation in an ill~defined way-in this case, to avoid the perceived threat-but it does not greatly constrain the specific behaviors pro~ duced. Finally, the dependence on meaning lends emotion a dynamic fluidity that allows the re~ sponse to sensitively track the changing adapta~ tional significance of the person-environment relationship as an encounter unfolds. Thus, if the anxious person's attempts to avoid the threat prove successful, and the perceived dan~ ger is eliminated, the person's anxiety will be transformed into relief,' and vigilance abates. If the threat materializes, and there is recognition of an irremedial harm, the anxiety wilL be transformed into sadness or despair, and the psychophysiological and behavioral pattern will look quite different. The idea that the adaptational power and flexibility of emotion depend upon the organ~ ism's cognitive capabilities provides the basis for Plutchik's (1984) assertion that cognition evolved in the service of emotion, and has also
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been invoked to explain why human beings, the most cognitive of creatures, also appear to be the most emotional (e.g., Hebb, 1949; Scherer, 1984b). Given the analysis above, it is not surprising that recent efforts to understand emotion have focused on the role of cognition,
and in particular cognitive appraisal, in eliciting
emotion.
APPRAISAL THEORY
How a given individual reacts emotionally to an encounter depends on an evaluation of what the encounter implies for personal well,being, which is what "appraisal" means in our usage. A fundamental proposition is that the evalua, tion causes the emotional response in accor, dance with a set of psychobiological laws, which we spell out later. That is, if we know how a person evaluates the relationship with the environment, we can predict that person's emotional reaction. In order to develop this position into a full,scale theory, and to make clear its utility, it is important to specify the causally relevant aspects of the appraisal proc, ess for each emotion. A large portion of our own recent collaboration (e.g., Lazarus &
Smith, 1988; Smith, Lazarus, & Novacek,
- has been directed at developing a system of thought that specifies what a person must want and think in order to experience each kind of emotional response. In developing the theory we wanted to inte, grate recent theoretical and empirical work relating specific types of cognitive activity to specific emotions (e. g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a, 1988b; Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984b; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; Weiner, 1985) with the more general theory of appraisal, stress, and coping de, veloped by Lazarus and colleagues (e.g., Lazar, us, 1966, 1968; Lazarns, Averill, & Opton,
1970; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). We also
wanted to clarify and refine the construct of "appraisal" so that it would refer only to the
cognitive activities directly related to emotion.
Finally, we hoped that by specifying the appraisals that produce individual emotions, the resulting theory would clarify how emotions motivate the organism to cope effectively with the adaptational demands confronting it.
Appraisal and Knowledge
Although emotions are evoked as a result of cognitive activity, not all cognitive activity is relevant to emotion, and even relevant cogni,
tive activities are not all equally relevant. The
task of interpreting the adaptational signifi~ cance of our circumstances draws upon a highly complicated and only partially reliable arrange, ment of cues to determine what, if anything, the relationship to the environment implies for personal well,being. There appear to be at least two distinct types of cognition involved in this process. First, there must be a well,developed repre~ sentation of one's circumstances. Much social, psychological and personality research has been devoted to describing a vast array of attribu, tional and inferential strategies that people use to go beyond the often paltry data directly available and construct rich representations of what is happening (e.g., Bruner, 1957; Heider, 1958; Jones et al., 1971; Lewin, 1936; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Ross, 1977, 1987; Shaver, 1977). These representations, which reflect
knowledge or beliefs about what is happening,
are relevant to emotion because they are the data that the person evaluates with respect to their adaptational significance. These know!, edge,centered representations, or "situational construals," however, do not directly produce emotions. Instead, it is how these representations are
appraised with respect to their significance for
personal well,being-the second type of cogni, tion-that directly determines the emotional state (see Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus & Smith, 1988). Appraisals are strongly in, fluenced by personality variables. Two in, dividuals can construe their situations quite similarly (agree on all the facts), and yet react with very different emotions, because they have appraised the adaptational significance of those facts differently. This derives from the relational nature of emotions, in which the confluence of both an environmental con, figuration and personality traits is required to have a particular bearing on subjective well, being in the eyes of each individual. The distinction between knowledge and appraisal can be understood as the difference
between distal cognitive variables that in,
fluence emotions only indirectly, and proximal
ones that have direct causal influences (see
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(e.g., Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus et al., 1970; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). "Primary appraisal" concerns whether and how the encounter is relevant to the person's well~being, and "secon~ dary appraisal" concerns the person's resources and options for coping with the encounter. 3 Both of these issues can be further subdivided, and at present we have identified a total of six appraisal components-two for primary ap~ praisal, and four for secondary appraisal. Consistent with the doctrine that emotion depends on antecedent motivations that are part of personality, the two components of pri~ mary appraisal are motivational relevance (or importance) and motivational congruence or incongruence. "Motivational relevance" is an evaluation of the extent to which an encounter touches upon personal goals and concerns-in other words, the extent to which there are issues in the encounter about which the person cares or in which he or she has a stake. This appraisal component is also included in the theoretical systems of Frijda (1986), Scherer (1984b), and Smith and Ellsworth (1987). "Motivational congruence or incongruence" refers to the extent to which a transaction is consistent or inconsistent with what one wants-that is, the extent to which it either thwarts or facilitates personal goals. This corre~ sponds closely to Roseman's (1984) concept of "motive consistency," Scherer's (1984b) "goal conduciveness," and Smith and Ellsworth's (1985) "perceived obstacle." The four components of secondary appraisal are accountability, problem~focused coping potential, emotion~focused coping potential, and future expectancy. "Accountability" pro~ vides direction and focus to the emotional re~ sponse and the coping efforts motivated by it. It determines who (oneself or someone else) is to receive the credit (if the encounter is motiva~ tionally congruent) or the blame (if it is moti~ vationally incongruent) for the harm or bene~ fit. It is also closely related to locus of causality (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982), which is an attributional or knowledge factor, but differs from it in ways that highlight the earlier stated difference be~ tween knowledge and appraisal. Accountability is a more proximal construct than locus of causality, intentionality, legiti~ macy, and controllability, which are often combined in evaluating accountability-that is, who gets the credit or blame (McGraw, 1987; Shaver, 1985). For example, under con~
ditions of harm, people who are considered the locus of causality will be held less accountable to the extent that their harmful actions are perceived as unintentional, just, and/or un~ avoidable (Pastore, 1952; Shaver, 1985; Wein~
er, Amirkhan, Folkes, & Verette, 1987). The
attribution of causality is "cold," with no neces~ sary motivational consequences, whereas a de~ termination of blame or credit is "hot" because it not only implies personal involvement but also implies that one's subsequent emotion and coping efforts should be directed toward the target of that judgment. Often what makes the difference between an attribution of mere locus of causality and an appraisal of accountability, and hence blame, is a judgment of imputed control by the other person. In other words, if the other person who has caused the harm could have done other~ wise, as when he or she has acted maliciously or has treated us too lightly and hence demeaned us, there will be accountability, blame, and anger. If, however, the other person could not have controlled what was done, then there will be an attribution of causal locus without accountability or blame. In this case, anger will not occur, or it will be directed at other sources of blame on the basis of complex social judg~ ments about the accountability, say, of the au~ thorities, or the system, or the like. The differ~ ent motivational dynamics of locus of causality and accountability can often be observed when in the course of their jobs people must inflict harm on others, and even while acknowledging being the locus of causality they try to deflect the accountability and blame to their social role in the hope that the other person's anger will be similarly deflected (e.g., "I'm sorry, I really hate to do this, but I have to--it's my job"). The remaining three components of secon~ dary appraisal all have to do with evaluation of the potential for improving an undesirable situation or maintaining a desirable one. The two subvarieties of coping potential correspond to one's evaluations of tbe ability to engage in the two major types of coping identified by Folkman and Lazarus (1980, 1985; Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel~Schetter, DeLangis, & Gru~
en, 1986; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). "Pro~
blem~focused coping potential" reflects evalua~ tions of one's ability to act directly upon the situation to manage the demands of the encounter and actualize the personal com~ mitments that are brought to it. This evalua~
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Chapter 23. Emotion and Adaptation (^) 619
tion is closely related to the concept of power as discussed by Roseman ( 1984), and control and power as discussed by Scherer (1984b). "Emo, tion,focused coping potential" refers to the per, ceived prospects of adjusting psychologically to the encounter-in other words, of regulating the emotional state that harmful or threatening consequences generate. This evaluation is closely related to Scherer's concept of "the potential for adjustment to the final outcome via internal restructuring" (Scherer, 1984a, p. 39). "Future expectancy" refers to the per, ceived possibilities, for any reason (i.e., in~ dependent of whether the individual plays a role), for changes in the psychological situation that could make the encounter more or less motivationally congruent.
Appraisals for Each Emotion
The six appraisal components noted above, which combine into core relational themes, provide the conceptual machinery needed to generate hypotheses about the specific apprais, als responsible for every emotion. One task is to identify the core relational theme and its specific harm or benefit, which is necessary and sufficient to produce each emotion. A second task is to describe this theme in terms of a particular combination of the six appraisal components.
Primary appraisal is involved in every emo~ tional encounter. The evaluation of motiva, tional relevance is necessary for emotion, since it defines the most elemental aspect of a per~ son's level of affective involvement by indicat, ing whether there is any personal stake in the encounter. In the absence of motivational rele, vance, the person's state of mind is likely to be one of indifference or passive tranquility (cf. Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b). Motivational con~ gruence or incongruence combines with rele, vance to define the encounter as beneficial or harmful, actually or potentially (Lazarus et al., 1980). Motivational relevance and motivational congruence or incongruence are not sufficient to shape the kind of emotion that will be ex~ perienced. The components of secondary appraisal are also needed to determine whether one will experience happiness, relief, pride, gratitude, hope, or the like on the positive side, or anger, guilt, shame, anxiety, sadness, envy, or the like on the negative side. Table 23. 2 combines the appraisal com~ ponents with core relational themes, and de~ picts the specific appraisals for illustrative emotions. These hypotheses are generally consistent with the findings of a number of studies that have examined the relationships between cognitive activities and emotions (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a, 1988b; Frijda, 1987;. Roseman, 1984; Scherer, Wallbott, &
TABLE 23.2. Functional Analysis of Some Illustrative Emotions
Proposed Core Important Emotion adaptive function relational theme^ appraisal components
Anger Remove source of harm from Other,blame 1. Motivationally relevant environment and undo harm 2.^ Motivationally incongruent
- Other,accountability Guilt Make reparation for harm to Self-blame 1. Motivationally relevant otherslmoti vate socially re,^ 2. Motivationally incongruent sponsible behavior 3. Self,accountability Anxiety Avoid potential harm Ambiguous danger/ 1. Motivationally relevant threat 2. Motivationally incongruent
- Low/uncertain ( emotion,focused) coping potential Sadness Get help and support in the Irrevocable 1. Motivationally relevant face of harm/disengage from a loss 2. Motivationally incongruent lost commitment 3. (^) Low (problem-focused) coping potential
- (^) Low future expectancy Hope Sustain commitment and Possibility of arne, I. (^) Motivationally relevant coping liorationlsuccess 2. (^) Motivationally incongruent
- (^) High future expectancy
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Chapter 23. Emotion and Adaptation 621
On the other hand, sadness promotes dis, engagement from commitments that have been lost and motivates the person to get help (Izard, 1977; Klinger, 1975; Plutchik, 1980). The core relational theme producing this emotion is "irrevocable loss" or "helplessness" (Abramson et al., 1978). Accordingly, the components of secondary appraisal that distinguish this theme from anxiety are a combination of negative future expectancy and poor coping potential. In sadness, one is totally pessimistic about amelioration, whereas in anxiety there is main, ly uncertainty. And whereas emotion,focused coping potential is salient for anxiety, problem, focused coping potential is particularly: salient in sadness; in a condition of irrevocable loss, nothing that can be done seems capable of restoring the prior status. Thus far, we have considered only "negative" emotions--those arising under conditions of harm or threat. However, an exclusive focus on harm,related emotions does a disservice to the role of emotion in adaptation, because there is also motivational incongruence when a person perceives the absence of potential benefits and gains. A voiding or ameliorating harm is, of course, a factor in survival. However, striving for gain enables the person (and the species) to grow and flourish. Accordingly, human ada pta, tional subsystems also include hope, which sus, tains positive striving toward mastery and gain (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b; Lazarus et al.,
1980). It seems wise here to again recognize the
difficulty of deciding what are genuine emo, tions by begging the question of whether hope should be regarded as an emotion or a border, line state. As depicted in Table 23. 2, the core relation, al theme for hope combines an appraisal that existing conditions are not yet the way the person wants them to be (importance, motiva, tional incongruence) with a future expectation that these conditions could become or be made motivationally more congruent. Hope can be maintained as long as there is some (however slight) potential for improvement in an other, wise bleak set of conditions, as when we "hope against all hope.,, Thus hope springs from the conviction, which may well be a characteristic of some personalities, that even under dire cir, cumstances there is still a chance that things could get better (Lazarus et al., 1980). The analyses above require several quali, fications. First, the emotions examined do not include all the emotions in the human reper,
toire, but are illustrative of some of the most important. They help us demonstrate how a more complete cognitive-relational theory of emotion might look. The richness of our En, glish vocabulary of emotions (see Averill, 1975; Ortony et al., 1987; Shaver et al., 1987) suggests that there are many more emotional states, each produced by distinctive appraisals, than the few we have considered. For example, we have not analyzed a number of positive emotions, including happiness, pride, relief, and gratitude, that arise under various con,
ditions of appraised benefit (Ellsworth &
Smith, 1988b; Lazarus et al., 1980). A full theoretical statement must address positive or benefit,related emotions as well as those flow, ing from conditions of harm, and decisions must be made about which states should be considered bona fide emotions, nonemotions, · or marginal instances. Second, in discussing the primary appraisal of motivational relevance that gives rise to emotion, we have not considered the potential role of particular goals or stakes in providing emotional differentiation beyond what we have depicted. Stake,specific differentiation can sometimes occur between broad emotional categories such as guilt and shame. For in, stance, in guilt the stake is a moral value, while in shame it is an ego ideal. Moreover, con, sideration of particular stakes is likely to be especially important when attempting to differ, entiate among affective states within the broad emotion categories we have outlined here. For instance, many forms of anger specifically in, volve some sort of insult to one's personal identity, while others, such as annoyance, may be less stake,specific. Similarly, feelings of abandonment appear to involve a particular type of loss involving one's relationships with others, while the broader category of sadness is · not specific with regard to the particular stake
that has been lost or irreparably harmed ( cf.
Ortony et al., 1987). Third, although we have given a relatively
static description of the structural relations be,
tween appraisal and emotion, we do not mini, mize the importance of thinking about and studying emotion as a dynamic process (see Folkman & Lazarus, 1988b; Lazarus, 1989b). The theory of appraisal indicates how at any given moment the person's specific appraisals will produce a particular emotional state. Knowing these structural relations is, we be, lieve, a crucial first step to unde~standing the
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emotion process in cognitive-relational terms. However, as an encounter unfolds-as the per, son attempts to cope with the adaptive im, plictions of the circumstances and the envi, ronment reacts to those coping efforts-the adaptive significance of the encounter is likely to shift, and as the appraisal shifts so will the emotional state. Fourth and last, emotion is a much richer and broader construct than stress, and should supersede stress in the study of coping and adaptation (see Lazarus, 1968, in press; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus & Launier, 1978). The concept of stress is largely unidimensional, and expresses little beyond the idea that the person-environment relationship is adapta, tionally significant and motivationally in, congruent. In contrast, emotion is a multi, dimensional construct that reveals a wealth of information about the adaptational encounter, the reaction to it, and the personality of the individual. Thus, the observation of anger in contrast with anxiety, guilt, shame, and so on tells us much more than merely knowing that a person is undergoing stress. Although the dis, tinction among harm, threat, and challenge (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), or between eu, stress and distress (Selye, 1974), modestly en, larges the scope of stress beyond its traditional unidimensional character, even this usage pales in richness and clinical significance compared with emotion.
PERSONALITY, SOCIETY, AND
BIOLOGY IN EMOTION
A general theory of emotion must take into account the respective contributions of per, sonality, culture, social structure, and biology to the emotional process. Most theories take one of two extreme positions, considering emo, tions to be either largely innate--that is, fun, damentally fixed products of our biological heritage and subject to only modest cultural influences--or largely socioculturally defined. Many proponents of the biological position speak of an innate "affect program" for each emotion, which organizes the emotion process (e.g., Ekman, 1984; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1962, 1963). When the appropriate eliciting conditions for a particular affect program are present the program fires reflexively and runs its course, which includes preprogrammed action tendencies, physiolog,
ical changes, and subjective experiences. In support of this view, proponents cite evidence for cross,culturally universal associations be, tween particular facial expressions and auto, nomic nervous system and hormonal response
patterns for each emotion (e. g., Ekman &
Friesen, 1971; Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen,
1969; Izard, 1971, Levenson, 1988). Proponents of the cultural position regard emotions as socially defined phenomena fol, lowing conventional rules, or scripts, that vary widely across cultures (e.g., Averill, 1968, 1980; Hochschild, 1979; Sarbin, 1985). Evi, dence for this position typically includes observations of considerable cross,cultural di, versity in both the conditions giving rise to particular emotions and the expressive and in, strumental coping behaviors accompanying emotions that have been evoked. Our view of emotion occupies a middle ground between these extremes. By tracing its evolution to the sensorimotor reflex we have assumed a substantial biological influence on the emotion process. Yet by emphasizing the loosening of reflexive ties between stimulus and reaction, and the importance of both cognitive activity and sociocultural learning factors, we have left much room for the influence of per, sonality in emotion, which in turn is partially a product of developmental experience with the sociocultural environment (see Ryff, 1987; Shweder & LeVine, 1984). Emotion theory must go beyond the banal assertion that there is merit to both perspectives by offering specific proposals about the respective contributions of biology and the society.
The Biological Core of Human Emotion
Figure 23.1 depicts our overall theoretical mod, el. The emotional response is at the innate biological center of the cognitive-motivation, al-emotive system. We assume that human beings (and, we believe, animals too) are con, structed biologically to be constantly engaged in appraisals of ongoing and changing rela, tionships with the environment. These rela, tionships are evaluated in terms of a relatively small set of specific, innately determined appraisal issues, which we have identified above. Appraisals promote the detection and evaluation of adaptationally relevant conditions requiring action. They determine the emotional state, which prepares and motivates one
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624 RESEARCH^ TOPICS^ ·
adaptational demands implied by the continu~ ing appraisal (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1968; Smith, 1989). They also reflect changes in the organismic state resulting from a changed adap~ rational condition, as in relief or contentment after a threat has been removed. The correlations between the appraisal and these response components appear to have two distinct levels of organization corresponding to the distinction we have drawn between core relational themes and appraisal components. The molar level of organization consists, as we have said, of core relational themes, and is parallel to the concept of affect programs. Par~ ticular action tendencies are probably emotion~ specific and linked to specific relational themes. For example, "other~blame" generates anger and the impulse to attack the blamewor~ thy agent, whereas an ambiguous threat gener~ ates anxiety and the impulse to avoid or escape the threat. In addition, some of the innately determined motor-physiological consequences in emotion may be tied to molecular appraisal components. For example, Smith (1989) has provided evi~ dence that activity of the corrugator supercilii muscles to pull the eyebrows together and down into a frown is associated with appraisals of motivational incongruence, and this associa~ tion may extend over a broad range of emo~ tions. It is possible that secondary appraisals having direct implications for subsequent cop~ ing (e. g., evaluations of coping potential) may have direct autonomic and postural effects con~ sistent with the coping requirements. The aspects of the emotional response de~ scribed so far-the appraisals that define adap~ rationally significant core relational themes, and the subjective, physiological, and motiva~ tional consequences initiated by these evalua~ tions-are, in our view, universal in our spe~ cies. In considering this innate organization, which has yet to be detailed and demonstrated,
it is important to consider what we have not
included. The biologically fixed portion of the emotion system starts with the appraisal pattern arid ends with the action tendency, leaving considerable flexibility and biological indeter~ minacy as to which stimulus configurations will result in which appraisals, and which actions (as opposed to action tendencies) will follow any given cognitive-motivational-emotive configuration. It is precisely at these two points--the process of appraisal and the translation of emotion into coping-
that personality and culture intersect with biol~ ogy and play fundamental roles in the function~ ing of the cognitive-motivational-emotive system. These points of intersection give emo~ tion the flexibility that differentiates it from reflexes and physiological drives and provides it with much of its adaptational power. One way in which the sociocultural and biological points of intersection can be clarified is to make a statement with the following for~
mal character: If a person appraises his or her
relationship to the environment in a particular way,
then a specific emotion that is tied to the appraisal
always results. Furthermore, if two individuals
make the same appraisals they will experience the
same emotion, regardless of the actual circum~
stances.
Personality factors arising in the course of psychological development, as well as environ~ mental variables (e. g., the immediate social structure), combine to influence the molecular appraisals-in effect, the specific meanings-- that result in each core relational theme. These influences shape the "if' of the formal state~ ment above. "If' means, in effect, that different individuals can appraise their relationships with the environment differently, or that the same individual can do so at different times or occasions. However, once a given appraisal pattern with its core relational theme has taken place, a particular emotion, with its subjective feeling state, action tendency, and motor- physiological response pattern, is generated as
a biological principle. Each core relational theme
has its own universal biological emotional out~ come, which is invariant as long as the in~ dividual continues to appraise what is happen~ ing in a given way. The appraisal can, of course, change (1) as the·person-environment relationship changes; (2) in consequence of self~protective coping activity (e.g., emotion~ focused coping); (3) in consequence ofchang~ ing social structures and culturally based values and meanings; or (4) when personality changes, as when goals or beliefs are abandoned as unserviceable. Stated in a slightly different way, the "if' in the formula above provides for the flexibility and complexity made possible by intelligence and culture; the "then" provides the biological universal linking cognition to the emotional response. Change the "if' and the response configuration is also changed. Personality and environmental variables are the antecedents in this model, their emotional consequences
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s Chapter 23. Emotion and Adaptation 625 being mediated by appraisals (influenced recur, sively by coping and its effects) whose biologi, cally determined consequences constitute the emotional response. Knowledge, Appraisal, Culture, and Personality It will now be useful to examine more closely some of the intersections implied above be, tween personality, culture, and biology. The upper portion of Figure 23.1 depicts some ?er, sonality factors that contribute to the emotton, al response at two levels. First, they influence the cognitive representation, or knowledge about the person-environment relationship being appraised, which is identified as a situa, tional construal in the figure; second, they make contributions to the appraisal process it, self. The figure identifies two distinct types of personality factors. One consists of motivation, al characteristics, which include the values, goals, and commitments that a person brings into every encounter. These characteristics have parallels in other concepts, such· as "cur, rent concerns" (Klinger, 197 5), "personal pro,
jects" (Little, 1983; Palys & Little, 1983), and
"personal strivings" (Emmons, 1986). The second factor consists of the person's knowl, edge base, which includes generalized beliefs, both concrete and abstract, about the way things are, how they work, the nature of the world, and the person's place in it. It also includes attitudes, expectations, and intuitive theories about the self (including self,concept) and the world (see Epstein, 1983; Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Lewis & Michalson, 1983; Ross, 1977). We suggest that the two personality factors have distinctive but interactive in, fluences on both the way a person construes what is happening and the appraisal of that construal. Personality Contributions to Knowledge about the Encounter Cognitive representations of our relationships with the environment often go far beyond the perceptual data directly available. ·Certain aspects of the encounter are ignored; others are emphasized; missing information is filled in; and any number of inferences are made regard, ing the possible causes, intentions, and motiva, tions underlying observed events (see Jones et al., 1971; Lewis, 1935, 1936; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Ross, 1977, 1987; Shaver, 1977). With, in the social,psychological and personality literatures, there is ample documentation that these constructive, inferential processes are sys, tematically influenced by the motivations, knowledge, and expectations the person brings into an encounter. Goals often have an important role in de, termining the aspects of the situation that are noticed, encoded, and emphasizep; one is likely to look for and notice things that are motiva,
tionally relevant (cf. the "New Look" percep,
tion research movement of the 1940s and 1950s; e.g., Postman, Bruner, & McGinnies, 1948). For example, partisans on both sides of a rough football game will tend disproportion, ately to notice penalties committed by the op, posing team, thereby strengthening their view of the other team as consisting of undeserving cheaters (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954). Similarly, pro,Arab and pro,Israeli viewers watching the very same news coverage of the 1982 Beirut massacre came away convinced that the other side received a greater number of favorable re, ferences and a smaller number of negative ones than their side did, in support of their view of the media as biased against them (Ross, 1987; Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985). Even when strong motivations are not in, volved, prior knowledge and expectations in, fluence the interpretation and encoding-of sub, sequent information. Thus, initial information about a person can produce a "halo effect" that influences how subsequent information about that person is interpreted (Asch, 1946), and facts and events consistent with one's "schema" or mental model of an episode are likely to be assumed to be present in the encounter, and to be incorrectly remembered subsequently as having been directly observed (e.g., Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Owens, Bower, & Black, 1979). Although they have seldom outlined the specific beliefs and motivations underlying them, clinical and personality researchers have documented the existence of relatively stable individual differences in characteristic ways of construing certain types of encounters, often referred to as "attributional biases" (e. g., Dodge & Coie, 1987; Nasby, Hayden, & dePaulo,
- or "attributional" or "explanatory styles" (e. g., Peterson & Barrett, 198 7; Peterson et al., 1982). These differences have been reliably
Chapter 23. Emotion and Adaptation 627
symptoms of psychological dysfunction than the peripheral hassles. In addition to motivation, which is most closely tied to primary appraisal, a second type of personality factor-beliefs and expecta, tions-is crucial for emotional differentiation and acts as an antecedent of secondary apprais, al. For example, beliefs about what is norma, tively appropriate, feasible, legitimate, or ex, cusable in a given situation should strongly influence whether and to what extent an appraisal of accountability for a noxious event will be made and result in anger, say, instead of sadness. Beliefs also affect expectations about the probable effectiveness of various courses of ac- tion and one's ability to perform those actions, which contribute to judgments of self,efficacy
(Bandura, 1977, 1982; Maddux, Norton, &
Stoltenberg, 1987), and therefore to evalua, tions of coping potential and future ex, pectancy. Evaluations of efficacy partially de, termine whether an encounter will be appraised as a harm, threat, or potential gain, and in consequence contribute to anxiety, sadness, or hope (see also the research and analyses of Antonovsky, 1987, and Scheier & Carver, 1987). Expanding on his well,known studies of selfefficacy as a factor in performance, persis, tence, and the emotional reaction, Bandura (in press) has also recently provided a rich over, view of the role of self,efficacy beliefs in the development of competence and incompe, tence. Knowledge and beliefs can also contribute to primary appraisal by helping us define what is relevant to our goal commitments and what constitutes harm or benefit. For example, be, liefs and expectations about a necessary but aversive encounter (e.g., how much pain it is normal to experience during a particular dental procedure and the gains that result from un, dergoing it) can significantly influence the de, gree to which an encounter is appraised as motivationally incongruent, and also influence appraisal~ of coping potential and future ex, pectancy. In· our own recent work (Smith, Novacek, Lazarus, & Pope, 1990), we have been at, tempting to develop measures that reflect stable individual differences in "appraisal style." We have used the measurement strategy employed by Peterson et al. (1982) in the Attributional Style Questionnaire. Respondents are asked to report their probable reactions to an
assortment of one,sentence descriptions of hypothetical situations. However, instead of asking about causal attributions in each situa, tion, we ask about their appraisals along each of our six appraisal components, from which we hope to derive stable measures of an in, dividual's characteristic appraisal style for each appraisal component. We conceive of these measures as reflecting the individual differences most proximal to the appraisal process, and they should enable predictions about the con, textual appraisals that directly produce the emotional state. Research by others (e. g., Re, petti, 1987; Solomon, Mikulincer, & Hobfoll,
- has demonstrated that proximal mea, sures involving subjective appraisals are better predictors of emotional reactions than are (dis, tal) objective measures.
Cultural Contributions to Appraisal
We have emphasized the contributions of per, sonality to appraisal because emotions are re, sponses of an individual person. Individuals, not cultures, perceive, construe, and appraise. Moreover, an individual's personal goals and beliefs should be important in shaping apprais, als and their consequent emotions. Culture, however, significantly shapes an individual's beliefs and motivations over the course of per, sonality development (see Ryff, 1987;: Shweder
& LeVine, 1984) by providing culturally shared
meanings about what is socially important, what various circumstances imply for personal well,being, and therefore which emotions are appropriate under those circumstances (see, e.g., Hochschild, 1979). It is common to contrast two broad forms of social influence: the living culture into which a person is born, and the social structure. "Cul, ture" provides a set of meanings and symbols, many of which are internalized and carried with the person into transactions with the social and physical environment. The "social structure" produces a set of immediate demands, con, straints, and resources that operate contempo, raneously in adaptive transactions, though they can also be internalized and become part of an individual's personality. This contrast is well drawn by Schneider (1976, pp. 202-203):
Culture contrasts with norms in that norms are oriented to patterns of action, whereas culture constitutes a body of definitions, premises, state,
(^628) RESEARCH TOPICS
ments, postulates, presumptions, propositions, and perceptions about the nature of the universe and man's place in it. Where norms tell the actor how to play the scene, culture tells the actor how the scene is set and what it all means. Where norms tell the actor how to behave in the pres, ence of ghosts, gods, and human beings, culture tells the actor what ghosts, gods, and human be, ings are and what they are all about.
Coping and Emotion
] ust as the top part of the model in Figure 23. depicts personality factors as influencing appraisal, the bottom portion depicts them as determinants of coping. The emotional re, sponse includes an action tendency-that is, an urge to respond to the encounter in a par, ticular way: to attack in anger, cry in sadness, flee or avoid in anxiety, and so on. Neverthe, less, at all.but the most extreme levels of emo, tional arousal, people have the ability to sup, press the action tendency and select from a wide array of coping options; this illustrates the flexibility of the emotion process. For example, we are free to engage in any of a number of problem,focused coping activities that reflect active attempts to influence the person-environment relationship and to main, tain or increase its degree of motivational con, gruence. We are also free to engage in any of a number of emotion,focused coping strategies that attempt to regulate the emotional response itself (cf. Folkman & Lazarus, 1980, 1985; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). We are not con, strained to a single coping strategy, and under stressful circumstances it appears that people most often engage in a ·combination of many problem,focused and emotion,focused strat, egies (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Of the personality factors identified and discussed above, we suspect that beliefs are especially influential in affecting the actual coping activities to be engaged in, parti, cularly beliefs about the coping options avail, able and their probable effectiveness. Beliefs about the social appropriateness of the actions, which are often culturally defined-for ex, ample, the display rules about when and how it is appropriate to express an emotional state openly or to mask it behind some other expres, sion (Ekman, 1984)-undoubtedly play a role too. Explicit research on coping in the context of emotion theory is a neglected area of research, verhaos because the concept of coping has been
used traditionally in stress theory and research and not in emotion (see Folkman & Lazarus, 1988b). Although specific action tendencies are almost universally assumed to flow from certain emotions such as anger and fear, biolog, ically based action tendencies in coping and the consequences of beliefs for the coping pro, cess have received little research attention. Averill ( 1983) has even argued from his data on college students that attack is relatively un, common in anger encounters, despite the usual expectation that it is a biologically generated action tendency. A basic unanswered question is this: What happens when the person copes in ways that run directly counter to the specific thrust of the action tendency itself? This would be the case when the impulse is to attack, but it is inhibited and perhaps even responded· to by denial or suppression. Studies of the role of this pattern in stress,related disorders such as hypertension have been common but inconclu, sive. The model portrayed in Figure 23.1 does not stop at coping, but is continuous (see Lazarus, 1968, 1989b), and depicts coping as influenc, ing subsequent appraisal and emotion by at least two types of mechanisms: First, problem, focused coping consists of active attempts to alter the existing problematic relationship (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). If the coping at, tempts are effective, and harm or threat is alleviated or removed, the change is likely to be reflected in subsequent appraisals, with con, sequent changes in emotion away from distress and toward positive states (see Folkman & Lazarus, 1989a). Ineffective attempts can in, fluence subsequent appraisal as well, as when a nonresponsive environment alters the person's beliefs and expectations about both the nature or type of an encounter and the future sense of efficacy. Encounters originally appraised as sub, ject to beneficial change can be reappraised as irremedial harms, producing corresponding emotional changes from hope to sadness or res, ignation. Second, emotion,focused coping consists of managing distressing emotions that arise in any given encounter when the circumstances are refractory to change. Some forms of emotion, focused coping alter the emotional response directly without changing the meaning of what is happening (e. g., by affecting autonomic arousal through relaxation or exercise, or avoiding thinking about the appraisal, etc.). Other forms alter the appraised meaning of the encounter (e. g., by denial or distancing).
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