DISCOURSE
ON
THE
METHOD
OF
RIGHTLY
CONDUCTING
THE
REASON,
AND
SEEKING
TRUTH
IN
THE
SCIENCES.
BY
DESCARTES.
TRANSLATED
FROM
THE
FRENCH:
WITH AN
INTRODUCTION.
EDINBURGH:
SUTHERLAND
AND
KNOX.
LONDON:
8IlIPKIN,
IIAB8HA.LL, AND CO.
HDCCCL.
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Descartes' Quest for Absolute Truth: The Role of Doubt and Analysis, Study notes of Literature
René Descartes' philosophical journey to establish the reality of knowledge and the ultimate truth through analysis. Descartes employs doubt as a means to discover the ground of certainty and the criterion of truth. He emphasizes the importance of individual truth and the role of the Method in acquiring knowledge.
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DISCOURSE
ON THE
METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON,
AND SEEKING TRUTH IN THE SCIENCES.
BY DESCARTES.
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH:
WITH AN INTRODUCTION.
EDINBURGH: SUTHERLAND AND KNOX. LONDON: 8IlIPKIN, IIAB8HA.LL, AND CO. HDCCCL.
J<nINBUnOH : T. CONSTABLII:, PIlINTER TO HI!:R llIAJE8TI.
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
sophical pursuits on the other works of its great Author. It is hoped, moreover, that the MBTBOD may prove a somewhat suitable accompaniment to the LOGIO of the PORT-RoYAL. These treatises pos- sess each, indeed, a separate utility: and, though the end sought by each is different, the realization of the ends of both is necessary to perfect know- ledge. For while the practical end of Logic is the right ordering of the matter of thought, the end of the DISOOURSE ON METHOD is mainly to mani- fest the reality, and determine the sphere of knowledge: and the latter process does not yield in importance or necessity to the former. With reference to' the translation, it is proper to state that, though the French work has been taken as the basis, the Translator has not con- sidered himself bound to adhere, ill: every in- stance, to its text. The first, or French edition has, indeed, been carefully compared throughout with the Latin; and, as this edition is declared by DBSCARTES to have been revised byhimself, and to contain amendments on the original from his own hand, the preference has been accorded to it in all cases in which it has appeared to the Translator that the meaning is more per- fectly given."
* Compare, e.g., Rule III., METROD, Part II., in the French and
Latin.
TRANSLATOR'S PltEFACE. vii
The Translator is not aware of the existence of any previous English version of the METHOD.
The Translator willingly takes this opportunity of acknowledging his great obligations to Profes- sor MACDOUGALL. To his minute revision of the translation numerous improvements are due.
EDINBURGH, October 1850.
INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR.
THE DISOOURSE ON METHOD principally contains
two things:-
- An account of the Philosophical Method of
its author."
2. A summary of the Ohief Results of the
Method.
- DESCARTES was born at La Haye, in Touraine, in the year 1596, and died at Stockholm in 1650. Of the particulars of his life, it is unnecessary to say anything, as a knowledge of them is easily acces- sible. The Dilcourse on M etkod contains, moreover, an account of the rise and progress of his speculations; and it is in his character of thinker and philosophical reformer that we have now to deal with him. The principal works of DESCARTES are-
- The four Treatises originally published in & single volume with the following title, Discours de la Methode pour bi8n conduire sa Raison, et ckercker la Verite dans l§ Sciences. Plus, la Dioptrique,
Ia Meteores, et la Geomune, qui ,ant del ElBa" de eeue Methode.
Leyden, 1637. The Method, Dioptrics, and Meteoric&, were translated into Latin by Courcelles, and published at Amsterdam in 1644. There is also by DESCA.RTES a fragmentary treatise, the subject of which is kindred to that of the Method. It is entitled, Regul(JJ ad Directionem Ingenii;
and to it is annexed another entitled, Inquiritio Veritatis per u'men
Naturak. These were published posthumously.
2. Meditationes de prima Pkilosopki8., ubi de DBi ea;istentili, et ani- flUB immortalitate. Paris, 1641. 3. Principia PhilosopkiiS. Amsterdam, 1644. 4. Traite de, Passions de l'Ame. Amsterdam, 1649.
x (^) L.'VrRODUCTION.
To these I propose to advert in their order;
but chiefly to the former, because, in the first place, a special reference to the Method itself is mainly relevant in an introduction to the DIS- COURSE ON METHOD, and because, in the second place, a formal though general discussion of the results of the Cartesian Method must far exceed the limits of the present introduction. Certain of the prominent results of the Method will, however, fall to be noticed as illustrative of the characters of the Method itself: and certain of the more general relations of DESCARTES to suc- ceeding philosophers will be indicated in conclu- sion,
OF THE METHOD OF DESCARTES.
The Method of DESCARTES has a preliminary,
the character of which it is necessary precisely to ascertain. The preliminary to the Method is Doubt. This leads us to inquire, in the first place, into the na- ture of the Cartesian Doubt.
I. Doubt in general, and the Cartesian doubt in
particular, is equivalent aimply to the absence of any
decision, whether affirmative or negative, "respect- ing the relation of the subject and predicate of a judgment. Doubt is thus the suspension of the act of the faculty of judgment, in so far as the determination of the joining or disjoining of the terms of a proposition is concerned. This sus- pension arises in the absence of grounds adequate to determine either certain affirmation or nega-
xii INTRODUOTION.
Method, viz., Certainty. In this respect is the Cartesian doubt distinguished from the sceptical, the end of which is not the certainty of affirma- tion and negation, but continual doubt, and thence permanent indifference and indisturbance.s The Cartesian doubt, therefore, in so far as preliminary to the Cartesian Method, is simply equivalent to a resolution to accept such truths as the philosopher might determine to fall within the sphere of Science, of Philosophy, on their own evidence, and on that alone. Such is the nature and end of the Cartesian doubt. The manner in which DESCARTES avails himself of doubt to accomplish the end of his Method will be noticed in detail when we come to show how he manifests the reality of know- ledge. From what has been said of the Cartesian doubt its legitimacy is manifest. Doubt of this nature, though perhaps not in an unlimited generality and immediacy, is even obligatory as a means to knowledge, if we would not take our opinions on trust.
But, in the second place, it may be proper at
this stage to show what the Cartesian doubt, viewed in its general aspect, involves, in respect of the Principle of Truth and Certainty. II. This is manifestly the denial of the jurisdic- tion of authority in the sphere of the true and
- See the Method, Part II!., p. 71; also Part IV.; and the ]st Meditation, passim; compare HypotYP08es of S. Emplricus, Book I., chap. iv,
INTRODUCTION. xiii
the false. DBSCARTES doubted, withheld his as- sent from the judgments bequeathed to him by education and authority, that he himself might determine which, and how many of these were true. By this act he implicitly asserted a right to decide upon the truth or falsity of what author- ity had laid down, and, therefore, the superiority to authority of another principle in the sphere of truth. This new principle was none other than Human Thought itselt:-thought.unfettered except by its own laws,-the intelligence acting within the limits prescribed to it by its own na- ture and constitution. But to proclaim free re- flection as a principle superior to authority in the search after causes or reasons, was to proclaim .the independence of philosophy,-to affirm that the deliverances of human thought were superior to the decrees of the Church. By his doubt, there- fore, did DESCARTBS challenge the propriety, and consummate the ruin of that philosophy known as Scholastic, whose foundations for the last two centuries had been gradually giving way, and chiefly under the influence of independent phy- sical research. Under Scholasticism the human mind had other laws than its own,-thought was subordinated to authority, at first absolutely, then partially, and the whole activity of the mind was limited to the deduction of conclusions from principles which authority furnished. But in the new and pure philosophy of DESOARTES, the mind was set free to seek alike its principles and con- clusions; authority was subordinated to thought.
INTRODUCTION. xv
prevent anyone, who shall have accurately ob- served them, from ever assuming what is false for
what is true, and by which, with flO effort of
mind uselessly consumed, but always by degrees
increasing science, a, person will arrive at a true
knowledge of all those things which he will be
capable of knowing." -(Beg. ad direct. in genii-
Reg. iv.)
In accordance with this declaration, it is mani- fest that procedure by a Method is a fixed proce- dure, for it is a procedure according to rule. It is thus opposed to procedure by chance or at random. Such procedure supposes, it is plain, the pre- vious determination of some end which in thus proceeding we design, and exclusively design, to realize. Procedure by Method, as a procedure in accordaace with certain rules, which we have laid down with a view to the realization of an end, is therefore a reflective procedure. As a Method is thus a sum of precepts, the observance of which is calculated to enable us to realize .a given end, it is plain that the kind and character of the precepts of which a method is the sum will be determined by the kind and character of its end: hence Methods will- differ .aeeording to their ends. The character of philo-
sophical Method will therefore be determined by
the nature of the end of Philosophy. Now, Philosophy or Science is possible, and is necessary, because of our possession of faculties of knowledge: hence the end of philosophy is the end of these faculties, that is, is Knowledge.
xvi INTRODUCTION.
Again, as we only really know when we know a thing as it is, that is, when our knowledge is true, the end of philosophy of science may be said to be Truth: hence philosophical or scientific Method will be a procedure so regulated as to enable the seeker to reach Truth. It is thus that DESCARTES makes True Know.. ledge (vera cognitio), or Truth, the end of philoso- phical or scientific Method. The mind, in proceeding by Method, while it manifests, likewise concentrates its activity. It seeks • through the action of the faculties of knowledge, specially directed, more perfect know- ledge than is passively afforded in the spontane- ous presentations of sense and self-consciousness. The activity of the faculties of knowledge is con- centrated on objects, and is only manifested in accordance with certain rules. The cognitive power, by being thus limited to a determinate channel, is prevented from being wasted or thrown away in irregular exercise. The activity of the mind is subordinated to the realization of a given end; the mind itself has another rule than its own impetuosity. DESCABTBS, therefore, to reach truth, and for the right conduct of the mind, that is, to prevent it from wasting its powers in capricious activity, instituted a, Method. Such is the end, and such the need of Method. It will be necessary, however, in the fourth place,
to show more particularly the nature of the Method
of DESCARTES; and, first, of the Method in its prior halt
xviii INTRODUCTION.
The determination of such troths or truth is,
according to DESOARTES, to be reached by Analysis.
The Philosophical Procedure of DESOARTBS is
thus, in the first instance, Analytic.
Analysis, in general, consists in the resolution
of the complex into the simple and constituent.
The main, the ruling Analysis of DBSCARTES is
essentially the Analysis of Geometry. The end
of DESOARTES is to reach Principles or Reasons.
In pursuance of this end, he proceedsalways from
the judgment of the truth of which he is un-
certain, and seeks to find whether the other judg-
ments, which the one in question involves, are
true, and through these to determine the truth
of the proposition from which he starts. Such is
the nature of his general procedure.
The matter of our knowledge, viewedI in the
light of this Analysis, is not considered with re-
ference to the purposes of classification (non in
quantum ad oliquod. gen'U8 entis referuntur), but
with reference to its capability for consequence;
to the relation of the determining and deter-
mined (in quantum unre6tJ) aliis cogn08ci P088'U'nt).
The knowledge sought is thus, when reached, ob-
tained through other knowledge, through other
truth.
The Analysis of DESOARTBS thus manifestly
supposes doubt as its essential preliminary; for,
as the end of the Analysis is to manifest truth,
it is plain, since we have recourse to it, that truth
is concealed,-that we are in ignorance, need de-
termining reasons; in a word, are in doubt.
INTRODUCTION. xix
On the hypothesis that knowledge by Method is possible, it is plain that there must be some knowledge, some truth, which is superior to doubt, and capable of affording other knowledge, other troth whose certainty is dependent on the higher knowledge, that is, on principles. In accordance with the nature of his instru- ment, the whole Philosophy of DESOAATES is but an attempt to find the Principles or Principle which, as absolutely ultimate in the order of Analysis, and, therefore, absolutely primary in the order of the reverse process, that is, of Syn- thesis, affords the conditions and possibility of Science, of Philosophy, or of Methodical Know-
ledge. In other words, DESCARTES seeks that
troth which, itself contained in no higher, con- tains, or at least affords the condition of our reach- ing, all other truths.
Now the ultimate principles or principle must,
as ultimate, be self-evidencing, that is, stand in need of no proof, of no higher knowledge as its guarantee; and the degree of its evidence must be such as to determine in the knower absolute and indestructible assurance. The first truth must, therefore, be approached through the High- est Certainty. Again, as the absolutely certain is wholly superior to doubt; as of such doubt in truth is impossible, DESOARTES makes Doubt the means of establishing the Ultimate Truth, by constitut- ing it the regulative principle of his Analysis. DESCARTES thus not only commences with a
INTRODUOTION.
But why is it impossible to doubt of the exist-
ence of thought 1 Because, replies DBSCARTES, to
doubt is to think. Hence in doubting itself we
think; let us 'doubt as we will we never escape
thinking.
But in affirming the fact of our thought, or
thinking, and in being necessitated to affirm it,
we affirm and are necessitated to affirm the fact
of Self-Existence. This fact is, according to DEs-
OARTES, above proof, as it is above doubt: our con-
sciousness of it is the first or fundamental, as it is
an absolute and indestructible, certainty. The·
place which this consciousness occupies in Oar-
tesianism, as its cardinal point, demands for it
special attention; while the diversity of opinions
concerning the nature of the Cartesian expression
in which the knowledge is embodied necessitates _
a special statement on the subject.
But to simplify the question, we must consider
that there are, as there can only be, two opinions
regarding the nature of the famous Cartesian
principle.
DESOARTES, in the expression" Cogito, Ergo Sum,"
must either be held to deduce the knowledge of
self-existence from a higher (more general) know-
ledge, as, e.g., What thinks, is,phrenomenon implies
a substance, or simply to affirm the fact, that is,
to enounce it as a knowledge immediately evident.
If the former alternative be true, it is manifest
that this knowledge is no longer primary, is no
longer fundamental, since there is a knowledge
(viz., that from which it is inferred) which is re-
xxii .mTBODUcnON.
latively prior. If the latter be correct, this know- ledge is a, first principle; it is not inferred from any higher knowledge. Now that this knowledge is mediate, is inferen- tial, DESOARTES has repeatedly and explicitly de- nied.- It is, therefore, according to DESOARTBS immediate and underived. But though incapable
of proof it is yet competent to show how the fact
is arrived at, is found, or supposed to be found, in the way of Reflective Analysis. To place the whole matter in a clear light, we have, in the first place, to attend to the following points. It ought to be considered:-
- That Existence is as nothing to us where it
is not manifested in some determinate Manner.
In thinking anywhat as existing, we must think
it existing in this or that Mode or Manner: of
Existence apart from the Mode in which it appears to us, we have no positive, no immediate know- ledge.
- Again, that, as in thinking a thing existing we must think it existing in this or that mode, 80 we cannot think of a determinate Modeof exist- ence, without at the same time and in the same indivisible act of thought, thinking that Some- what of which this Mode is a manifestation, exists. Wherefore :-
- That Self, that "I" in existing for self, for
- See K. Couain, S.r le twtJi MI. d. Oogito, Ergo Sum, in the Frag- mmla P1Iilosophiqua. But see especially DBSCARTES'RtJ8pofuio ad Secundas Ofdediona, p, 74 of the ed. 1663. See likewise SPINOZA'S PM. PAil. CarlM, vol. i. pan I. p. 4. (Ed. 1802.)