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René Descartes' philosophical journey to establish the reality of knowledge and the ultimate truth through analysis. Descartes employs doubt as a means to discover the ground of certainty and the criterion of truth. He emphasizes the importance of individual truth and the role of the Method in acquiring knowledge.
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ON THE
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH:
WITH AN INTRODUCTION.
EDINBURGH: SUTHERLAND AND KNOX. LONDON: 8IlIPKIN, IIAB8HA.LL, AND CO. HDCCCL.
J<nINBUnOH : T. CONSTABLII:, PIlINTER TO HI!:R llIAJE8TI.
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
sophical pursuits on the other works of its great Author. It is hoped, moreover, that the MBTBOD may prove a somewhat suitable accompaniment to the LOGIO of the PORT-RoYAL. These treatises pos- sess each, indeed, a separate utility: and, though the end sought by each is different, the realization of the ends of both is necessary to perfect know- ledge. For while the practical end of Logic is the right ordering of the matter of thought, the end of the DISOOURSE ON METHOD is mainly to mani- fest the reality, and determine the sphere of knowledge: and the latter process does not yield in importance or necessity to the former. With reference to' the translation, it is proper to state that, though the French work has been taken as the basis, the Translator has not con- sidered himself bound to adhere, ill: every in- stance, to its text. The first, or French edition has, indeed, been carefully compared throughout with the Latin; and, as this edition is declared by DBSCARTES to have been revised byhimself, and to contain amendments on the original from his own hand, the preference has been accorded to it in all cases in which it has appeared to the Translator that the meaning is more per- fectly given."
Latin.
TRANSLATOR'S PltEFACE. vii
The Translator is not aware of the existence of any previous English version of the METHOD.
The Translator willingly takes this opportunity of acknowledging his great obligations to Profes- sor MACDOUGALL. To his minute revision of the translation numerous improvements are due.
EDINBURGH, October 1850.
INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR.
THE DISOOURSE ON METHOD principally contains
Method.
Leyden, 1637. The Method, Dioptrics, and Meteoric&, were translated into Latin by Courcelles, and published at Amsterdam in 1644. There is also by DESCA.RTES a fragmentary treatise, the subject of which is kindred to that of the Method. It is entitled, Regul(JJ ad Directionem Ingenii;
Naturak. These were published posthumously.
2. Meditationes de prima Pkilosopki8., ubi de DBi ea;istentili, et ani- flUB immortalitate. Paris, 1641. 3. Principia PhilosopkiiS. Amsterdam, 1644. 4. Traite de, Passions de l'Ame. Amsterdam, 1649.
x (^) L.'VrRODUCTION.
but chiefly to the former, because, in the first place, a special reference to the Method itself is mainly relevant in an introduction to the DIS- COURSE ON METHOD, and because, in the second place, a formal though general discussion of the results of the Cartesian Method must far exceed the limits of the present introduction. Certain of the prominent results of the Method will, however, fall to be noticed as illustrative of the characters of the Method itself: and certain of the more general relations of DESCARTES to suc- ceeding philosophers will be indicated in conclu- sion,
OF THE METHOD OF DESCARTES.
the character of which it is necessary precisely to ascertain. The preliminary to the Method is Doubt. This leads us to inquire, in the first place, into the na- ture of the Cartesian Doubt.
decision, whether affirmative or negative, "respect- ing the relation of the subject and predicate of a judgment. Doubt is thus the suspension of the act of the faculty of judgment, in so far as the determination of the joining or disjoining of the terms of a proposition is concerned. This sus- pension arises in the absence of grounds adequate to determine either certain affirmation or nega-
xii INTRODUOTION.
Method, viz., Certainty. In this respect is the Cartesian doubt distinguished from the sceptical, the end of which is not the certainty of affirma- tion and negation, but continual doubt, and thence permanent indifference and indisturbance.s The Cartesian doubt, therefore, in so far as preliminary to the Cartesian Method, is simply equivalent to a resolution to accept such truths as the philosopher might determine to fall within the sphere of Science, of Philosophy, on their own evidence, and on that alone. Such is the nature and end of the Cartesian doubt. The manner in which DESCARTES avails himself of doubt to accomplish the end of his Method will be noticed in detail when we come to show how he manifests the reality of know- ledge. From what has been said of the Cartesian doubt its legitimacy is manifest. Doubt of this nature, though perhaps not in an unlimited generality and immediacy, is even obligatory as a means to knowledge, if we would not take our opinions on trust.
this stage to show what the Cartesian doubt, viewed in its general aspect, involves, in respect of the Principle of Truth and Certainty. II. This is manifestly the denial of the jurisdic- tion of authority in the sphere of the true and
INTRODUCTION. xiii
the false. DBSCARTES doubted, withheld his as- sent from the judgments bequeathed to him by education and authority, that he himself might determine which, and how many of these were true. By this act he implicitly asserted a right to decide upon the truth or falsity of what author- ity had laid down, and, therefore, the superiority to authority of another principle in the sphere of truth. This new principle was none other than Human Thought itselt:-thought.unfettered except by its own laws,-the intelligence acting within the limits prescribed to it by its own na- ture and constitution. But to proclaim free re- flection as a principle superior to authority in the search after causes or reasons, was to proclaim .the independence of philosophy,-to affirm that the deliverances of human thought were superior to the decrees of the Church. By his doubt, there- fore, did DESCARTBS challenge the propriety, and consummate the ruin of that philosophy known as Scholastic, whose foundations for the last two centuries had been gradually giving way, and chiefly under the influence of independent phy- sical research. Under Scholasticism the human mind had other laws than its own,-thought was subordinated to authority, at first absolutely, then partially, and the whole activity of the mind was limited to the deduction of conclusions from principles which authority furnished. But in the new and pure philosophy of DESOARTES, the mind was set free to seek alike its principles and con- clusions; authority was subordinated to thought.
INTRODUCTION. xv
prevent anyone, who shall have accurately ob- served them, from ever assuming what is false for
In accordance with this declaration, it is mani- fest that procedure by a Method is a fixed proce- dure, for it is a procedure according to rule. It is thus opposed to procedure by chance or at random. Such procedure supposes, it is plain, the pre- vious determination of some end which in thus proceeding we design, and exclusively design, to realize. Procedure by Method, as a procedure in accordaace with certain rules, which we have laid down with a view to the realization of an end, is therefore a reflective procedure. As a Method is thus a sum of precepts, the observance of which is calculated to enable us to realize .a given end, it is plain that the kind and character of the precepts of which a method is the sum will be determined by the kind and character of its end: hence Methods will- differ .aeeording to their ends. The character of philo-
the nature of the end of Philosophy. Now, Philosophy or Science is possible, and is necessary, because of our possession of faculties of knowledge: hence the end of philosophy is the end of these faculties, that is, is Knowledge.
xvi INTRODUCTION.
Again, as we only really know when we know a thing as it is, that is, when our knowledge is true, the end of philosophy of science may be said to be Truth: hence philosophical or scientific Method will be a procedure so regulated as to enable the seeker to reach Truth. It is thus that DESCARTES makes True Know.. ledge (vera cognitio), or Truth, the end of philoso- phical or scientific Method. The mind, in proceeding by Method, while it manifests, likewise concentrates its activity. It seeks • through the action of the faculties of knowledge, specially directed, more perfect know- ledge than is passively afforded in the spontane- ous presentations of sense and self-consciousness. The activity of the faculties of knowledge is con- centrated on objects, and is only manifested in accordance with certain rules. The cognitive power, by being thus limited to a determinate channel, is prevented from being wasted or thrown away in irregular exercise. The activity of the mind is subordinated to the realization of a given end; the mind itself has another rule than its own impetuosity. DESCABTBS, therefore, to reach truth, and for the right conduct of the mind, that is, to prevent it from wasting its powers in capricious activity, instituted a, Method. Such is the end, and such the need of Method. It will be necessary, however, in the fourth place,
of DESCARTES; and, first, of the Method in its prior halt
xviii INTRODUCTION.
INTRODUCTION. xix
On the hypothesis that knowledge by Method is possible, it is plain that there must be some knowledge, some truth, which is superior to doubt, and capable of affording other knowledge, other troth whose certainty is dependent on the higher knowledge, that is, on principles. In accordance with the nature of his instru- ment, the whole Philosophy of DESOAATES is but an attempt to find the Principles or Principle which, as absolutely ultimate in the order of Analysis, and, therefore, absolutely primary in the order of the reverse process, that is, of Syn- thesis, affords the conditions and possibility of Science, of Philosophy, or of Methodical Know-
troth which, itself contained in no higher, con- tains, or at least affords the condition of our reach- ing, all other truths.
as ultimate, be self-evidencing, that is, stand in need of no proof, of no higher knowledge as its guarantee; and the degree of its evidence must be such as to determine in the knower absolute and indestructible assurance. The first truth must, therefore, be approached through the High- est Certainty. Again, as the absolutely certain is wholly superior to doubt; as of such doubt in truth is impossible, DESOARTES makes Doubt the means of establishing the Ultimate Truth, by constitut- ing it the regulative principle of his Analysis. DESCARTES thus not only commences with a
INTRODUOTION.
xxii .mTBODUcnON.
latively prior. If the latter be correct, this know- ledge is a, first principle; it is not inferred from any higher knowledge. Now that this knowledge is mediate, is inferen- tial, DESOARTES has repeatedly and explicitly de- nied.- It is, therefore, according to DESOARTBS immediate and underived. But though incapable
is arrived at, is found, or supposed to be found, in the way of Reflective Analysis. To place the whole matter in a clear light, we have, in the first place, to attend to the following points. It ought to be considered:-
In thinking anywhat as existing, we must think
Existence apart from the Mode in which it appears to us, we have no positive, no immediate know- ledge.