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Theory of Demographic

CHAPTER - 111

THEORY OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

Introduction

The demographic history of the human race malres it evident that it has

maintained its existence at a near balance through out most of the time, characterized by fluctuation about a very gradual rate of natural increase, was maintained generally until two centuries ago. Various levels of fertility and mortality pattern formed a near stability between high rates of birth and high rates of death. Nevertheless, stable population is the outcome of high birth and death rates as well as low birth and death rates. This theory relates the type of population growth to the level of socio-cultural, economic and technological development of the society and examines the periods of stability and periods of different rates of exponential growth.

Even though population growth averaged close to zero, over the extended periods of human history, there were also periods during which population size increased across generations. The population problem in traditional societies was maintaining some sort of rough equilibrium between births and deaths, If population decline could threaten community survival, a long period of increasing population numbers would likely outpace the expansion of food and other resources, often, there were moments of demographic implosion, or mortality due to calamities, that brought population numbers to former subsistence levels. These catastrophes were viewed by Thomas Malthus as positive checks, which he considered as unavoidable, given the tendency for populations to grow faster than the means of subsistence.

The theoretical task of explaining modern fertility transitions as a

consequence (or a delayed consequence) of declines in mortality and the

socioeconomic changes that have transformed rural agrarian societies into

modern industrial has been the central question of the scientific field of

demography. Until the 1970s, the theory of the demographic transition was almost universally accepted by demographers and was widely disseminated in introductory textbooks through stylized graphs and an interpretation of declining fertility in response to the modern forces of industrialization, urbanization, and literacy. These processes have occurred in many Western countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and were presumed to be on the near term horizon of many developing countries.

The idea emerged as early as 1929, when Warren Thompson gathered data from some countries for the period 1908-27 and showed that the

countries fell into three main groups, according to their patterns of population

growth. In the first group i.e., Group A (northern and western Europe and the

United States). From the latter part of the nineteenth century to 1927 they

had moved from having very high rates of natural increase to having very low

rates of increase and will shortly become stationary and start to decline in

numbers. The second group i,e., Group B (Italy, Spain and the "Slavic" peoples

of central Europe):Thompson notices evidence of a decline both birth rates and death rates but predicted that the death rate would decline as rapidly or even

more rapidly than the birth rate for some time. The condition in these Group

B countries is much the same as existed inatheGroup A countries thirty to fifty

years ago. The third group i.e., Group C (the rest of the world): In the rest of

the world Thon~psonsaw little evidence of control over either births or deaths.

Thon~psonobserved that the Group C countries (which included about 70 to 75

percent of the population of the world a t the time) would continue to have their growth determined largely by the opportunities they have to increase their means of subsistence1.

Franlr W. Notestein presented the theory of demographic transition in

a conventional form with explanations for the changes in fertility. In that sense

he may be credited with as the expounder of the theory. He advocated that the

development of positive forces resulting from modernization contribute to the decline in mortality as seen from the experiences of Western Europe. Modernization involved rising standards of living, rising incomes and advances in sanitation and medical knowledge. Indeed Notestein did not use the term transition for his classification. The first to use this expression was Adolphe Landry and some years later Davis in 1943.

The work of Thompson was followed by Landry's which was roughly comparable to Thompson's classification, although the latter's analysis was

much more depth in relation to fertility and mortality rates. Three

demographic regimes was put forth by Landry based on the relationship

between production and consumer's preference. In the first stage i.e,, Primitive

regime, population increases with the increase in availability of food and vice-versa. Death rates are directly related to increase and decrease in food

supply. Total production form the upper limit of population growth. The second

Thompson, Warren S., (1929) "Population" American Journal of Sociology, 34 : 959-975.

Notestein characterized three types of population on the basis of the

stages of demographic evolution: (1)population in the stage of "Incipient

Decline", where fertility had fallen below the replacement level or those

approaching this stage (population of Europe, the United States, Australia and

New Zealand); (2) Population in the stage of "Transitional Growth", where

birth and death rates are still high and growth is rapid, but the decline of the

birth rate is well established. (population of the Soviet Union, Japan and some

countries in Latin America); and (3) Population in the stage of "High Growth Potential" where mortality is high and variable and is the chief determinant of growth, while fertility is high and thus far has shown no evidence of a downward trend. In these populations, rapid growth is to be expected just as soon as technical developments make possible a decline in mortality (Population in most countries of Asia, Africa and Latin A~nerica)~.

Davis calls the transitional growth of Notestein by the term population explosion where the country is moving from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates, from high growth to incipient decline and there will be rapid growth. Viewed in the long run, earth's population has been like a long, thin powder fuse that burns slowly and haltingly until it finally reaches the charge and explodes4.

Notestein, F. (1945) "Population the Long view", In: T.Schultz (ed.) "Food for the World", Chicago, 1945, p.36-61. Davis, Kingsley (1945) "The World Demographic Transition". The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 237:l-11.

If a society shifts from an agrarian base to an industrial base, then the demographic pattern of high vital rates shifts to a regime of low vital rates. All nations in the modern era, which have moved from a traditional, agrarian based economic system to a largely industrial, urbanized base, have also moved from a condition of high mortality and fertility5. The changing structure of production with a declining importance of the family as a production unit, with the growth of impersonal systems for the allocation of jobs, and with the development of economic roles of women outside of the home, tends to increase the possibility of economic mobility that can better be achieved with small families and tends to decrease the economic advantages of a large family. One of the features of economic development is typically increasing urbanization and children are usually more of a burden and less of an asset in an urban setting than rural. The whole process of economic change, moreover, weakens the force of traditional customs and beliefs. I n most countries that have undergone the economic transition from an agrarian to an industrialized, market oriented economy, the custom of the small family has started in the urban groups a t the higher end of the socio-economic scale and has spread to smaller cities, lower income groups, and eventually to rural areas6.

The five phases of the demographic transition was given by C.P.Blacker. They were (1) Stage of high birth rate and high death rate: Population

Stolniz, 1964, "The Demographic Transition :From High to Low Birth Rates and Death Rates". Chapter 2 in Population : THe Vital Revolution, edited by R,Freedman, Anchor Book, Garden City, 1964. Coale, A.J, & Hoover, E.M. (19631, Population Growth and Economics Development in Low- income Countries" Princeton University Press, Princeton. 53

The theory relates to the stages of population growth with the level of

socio-cultural, economic and technological development of the society. The

biological determinants of fertility are limited gradually by a process of rational decision-making.

Fertility Transition

The study of fertility decline is more intricate logically rather than the mortality decline. Individuals may assume that societies will try, if given resources and a choice, to minimize mortality levels, but it seems that there

is no need that societies have an inherent, orientation towards low fertility or

any specific fertility level.

Davis' (1963) "Theory of Change and Response in Modern Demographic

History" aimed to broaden the scope of the theory from declines in marital fertility (the standard empirical focus) to include the variety of ways that populations respond to population pressure (because of declining mortality) in a context of possibilities for socio-economic mobilityT. Although declines in mortality and modernization typically reduce marital fertility (through increasing use of contraception and higher rates of abortion), Davis noted that marital postponement, increasing rates of celibacy, and out migration were also part of the demographic repertoire of adaptation to population pressure. Davis suggested that the timing of the onset and the pace of fertility declines vary

across societies (and regions in a society) depending on the relative quantities

of these responses, Although there have been a few empirical tests of Davis's hypotheses, his systems approach to demographic theory is more admired than empirically addressed.

Davis, Kingsley, (1963). "TheTheory of Change and Response in Modern Demographi History". Population Index 29:346-366. 56

When mortality declines, more children survive through adulthood, putting greater pressure on family resources, and people have to reorganize their lives in an attempt to relieve that pressure i.e., to people respond to the demographic change. A first response, non-demographic in nature, is to try to increase resources by worlung more hours. The alternative response is the migration of family members. The second one-Davis' concern is with the interaction of the causes and consequences of population growth, on the assumption that in order to do anything about the consequences, we have to know the causes. Third point is that the survived children of the second generation if, there is a chance for social or economic improvement, will try to take advantage of those opportunities by avoiding the larger families that causes problems for their parents. Davis suggests that the most powerful motive for family limitation is not fear of poverty or avoidance of pain as said by the classical theorists, rather it is the prospect of rising prosperity that will mostly motivate people to find the means to limit the number of children,

Coale (1973), in an endeavor to settle the range of circumstances under which fertility declines have been observed to occur, identified three major conditions for a major fall in fertility: (i) Fertility must be within the calculus

of conscious choice. Parents must consider it as an acceptable mode of thought

and form of behavior to balance the advantages and disadvantages of having another child.(ii) Reduced fertility must be viewed as socially or economically

advantageous to couples. (iii) Effective techniques of birth control must be

available. Procedures to prevent births must be known, and there must be

sufficient communicationbetween spouses and mutual sustained will to employ

them successfully8.

Coale, Ansley (19731, "The Demographic Transition". In International Popu1a;tion Conference, Vol.l:53-73, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Liege. 56

mortality may also have other consequences for fertility rates. As mortality declines, the fertility decisions of couples are often influenced by the logic of maintaining the survival of family members by changing health and living practices such as hygienic habits and good diet.

Couples begin to calculate the costs and benefits of children and consider consciously the number of children they would prefer and then take steps to achieve that goal. High mortality societies are often characterized by archaic technology in the manufacture of goods and the children may be economically useful to perform low-skilled work tasks. Parents have an incentive to bear children, or, at the minimum, they have little incentive not to bear children. However, high technology societies place a greater premium on labour skills and often require extended periods of education. Children will have few

economic benefits and may become quite costly as they are educated and fed

for long periods of time.

Another major factor that may foster fertility decline is the transfer of

functions from the family unit to the state. In low technology societies, the

family or kin group is often the fundamental unit, providing support for its members in times of economic distress and unemployment and for older members who can no longer contribute to the group through work activities. Children may be viewed as potential contributors to the unit, either in their

youth or adulthood. In high technology societies, some of the family functions

are transferred to the state through unemployment insurance, welfare

programs, and old age retirement systems. The family functions much more as

a social or emotional unit where the economic benefits of membership are less

tangible, thus decreasing the incentive to bear children.

The importance of social change was also emphasized in tihe process of development of the theory by Notestein as relevant to explain the determinants of fertility and mortality. The development of a rational and secular point of view; the growing awareness of the world through popular education; improved health and raising the age a t marriage.

In addition, fertility rates may vary quite widely across societies due to factors that have little relationship to conscious desires such as the effectiveness of birth control methods. Consequent to these methodical issues scholars seem to have less consensus on the social factors that might produce fertility than mortality decline. The combination of effective family planning efforts and a favorable socioeconomic setting produce conditions most likely to lead to lowered fertilitylO.Sorting out the independent and joint efforts of setting and policy has been remarkable elusive. The initiation of family planning programs tends to the endogenous to the process of development itself, and it is difficult to obtain independent empirical assessments of each. Successful governnlents tend to have effective public programs, including well-managed family planning programs.

There is considerable evidence that socio-economic development is associated with fertility change in many societies except a few There has been a rapid diffusion of fertility transition to almost every region and country, which are at varied levels of socio economic development. The declines in mortality are the most likely common cause. The impact of pubIic intervention,

and of family planning programs in particular, on fertility trends continues to

be debated.

lo (^) Feedman, Ronald and Benand Berelson, (1976) "The Record of Family Planning Programms" Studies in Family Planning 7 (i) " 1-40,

conscious awareness of the relationship. Rather the desire for high levels of childbearing was woven into the cultural fabric and the social institutions of traditional societies", In all societies, fertility (or infant survival) is held in check not only by customs of delayed age at marriage and the proportion ever marrying, but also by long periods of breast feeding and cultural proscriptions that affect the patterns and timing of sexual intercourse, abortion, and infanticide.

Besides strong cultural inducements for marriage and childbearing, the well being of the family in traditional societies was dependent on having several children who survived to adulthood. Families were the primary economic units as well as reproductive unions. Children were a valued source of household labor and were also the preferred means to guarantee the old age

security of parents. In societies without formal schools, mass media, and

modern transportation, family relationships and interactions were the center of social and cultural life. Larger extended families provided more

companionship, a wider circle of trust, more protection in times of trouble, and

more status honor for patriarchs and matriarchs than did smaller families. Such customs, especially those of delayed age at marriage, reduced fertility in many traditional Western European societies to moderately high levels of only four to five births per woman. The variations in "high fertility" across societies and over time suggests that fertility was regulated in response to socio-economic conditions and ecological constraints, although most couples may not have been consciously controlling family size1'.

l2 Code 1974, Op, cit, l3 (^) Vanlandingham, Mark and Charles Hirschman, (2001). "PopuIation Pressure and Fertility in he-transition Thailand". Population Studies 55:233-248.

The major break through in world demographic history, was the constant decline in fertility that began in Western European countries and North America in the late nineteenth century, which led to small fanlilies of about two births per couple by the middle of the twentieth century.

Demographers perceive a fertility rate of about two births per woman

as replacement level fertility because two children, in the modern context of low mortality, are sufficient to replace their parents in the next generation. The evolution from high to low fertility was not only an unprecedented demographic evolution, but also a cultural revolution with profound implications for definition of the family and the extended roles of both men and women. The contemporary societies are in the process of adapting new institutions and gender roles following the relatively recent transition to low fertility.

Following the fertility decline which started about a hundred years ago in Western Europe and North America, a comparable course began in the developing countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The subsequent wave of fertility transitions began in the late 1950's and in a few East Asian countries. By the 1990s, signs of declining fertility had reached almost every part of the world including areas of persistently high fertility in South Asia

and sub-Saharan Africa.

The present knowledge of the process of fertility transition is primarily

based upon research at Princeton University on the European fertility

transition that took place during the 70-year period between 1870 and 1940.

The findings from Princeton European Fertility Project, initially noted in an

The next challenge to delnographic transition theory came in the form

of colnparative analyses of data from the World Fertility Survey (WFS)

project'! The WFS project consisted of cross sectional studies of individual level correlates of fertility behaviors, attitudes, and contraceptive practice in many of developing countries around the globe. In general, fertility was correlated in the expected direction with female education, urban residence, and other socioeconomicvariable, the relationships were often meek and there were many exceptional cases.

One of the most influential is Jolin Caldwell's theory of

intergenerational wealth flows. Whether high or low fertility is economically

rational is determined by social conditions; primarily by the direction of the

intergenerational wealth flow, This flow has been from younger to older

generations in all traditional societies; and it is apparently impossible for a

reversal of flow- at the great divide- to occur before the family is largely nucleated both emotionally and econ~mically~~.

Demographic transition theory is a body of observations and explanations on which our interpretation of past population movements and expectations about future trends restsz0,Caldwell's theory is developed on the premises that there are two types of fertility regimes: first, where there is eventually economic gain to individuals from restricting fertility and the second where there is no economic gains from such restrictions. Thus his

theory is based on the behaviour is not only rational but also economically

la (^) Cleland, John and Chris Wilson, (1987). "Demand Theories of the Fertility Transition : An Iconoclastic View", Population St;udies 41 : 5-30, l9 (^) Caldwell, J., (1976) Towards a Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory. Population & Development Review, no.2, p, 321-366.

rational. There is not a whole range of economically rational levels of fertility in different societies, but instead only two situations the first where the economically rational response is an indefinitely large number of children and the second where it is to be childrenz1.

In many societies at different times there is not a steep economic gradient between different levels of fertility. However, maximum and minimum family sizes in these societies are determined by personal, social and physiological reasons, It is also posited that the movement from a society characterized by economically unrestricted fertility to a society is essentially the product of social rather than economic change, although with economic interpretations.

Fertility in pre-modern countries has been high, due to the maintenance of a whole series of props: religious doctrines, moral codes, laws, education, communities, customs, marriage habits and family organization- all focussed towards maintaining high fertility, High fertility was necessary for survival because otherwise the very high mortality rate would have led to population decline and extinctionz2.

Caldwell felt that mass education and Westernization values communicated through the mass media and cinema have popularized the idea of child-centered families that reduce the flow of wealth, services, and other valued resources up the generational ladder. Since these changes have made children less valuable, there are fewer incentives to have large families.

Ibid,., 22 Ibid.,