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Introduction
Mapping critical security studies, and travelling
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Introduction
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From ‘traditional’ to ‘critical’
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Introduction
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From Cold War to War on Terror
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Introduction 13
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.HLWK .UDXVH DQG 0LFKDHO & :LOOLDPV Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases /RQGRQ 8&/3UHVV $ODQGPDUNDUWLFXODWLRQRIDQGFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKH¿HOGRIFULWLFDOVHFXULW\ VWXGLHV %DUU\%X]DQDQG/HQH+DQVHQ 7KH(YROXWLRQRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HFXULW\6WXGLHV &DPEULGJH &DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV 2IIHUVDFRPSUHKHQVLYHLQWHOOHFWXDOKLVWRU\RIVHFXULW\VWXGLHV 6WHYH6PLWK μ7KH,QFUHDVLQJ,QVHFXULW\RI6HFXULW\6WXGLHV &RQFHSWXDOL]LQJ6HFXULW\LQWKH /DVW7ZHQW\<HDUV¶LQ6WXDUW&URIWDQG7HUU\7HUULII HGV &ULWLFDO5HÀHFWLRQVRQ6HFXULW\DQG Change /RQGRQ )UDQN&DVV 3URYLGHVDFRPSUHKHQVLYHRYHUYLHZRIFULWLFDOVHFXULW\VWXGLHVDVLW VWRRGDWWKHWXUQRIWKHPLOOHQQLXP &$6( &ROOHFWLYH μ&ULWLFDO $SSURDFKHV WR 6HFXULW\ LQ (XURSH $ 1HWZRUNHG 0DQLIHVWR¶ Security Dialogue ± $ GHWDLOHG RYHUYLHZ RI WKH VWDWH RI FRQWHPSRUDU\ FULWLFDO DSSURDFKHVWRVHFXULW\WKDWDOVRDWWHPSWVWRRXWOLQHQHZDYHQXHVRILQTXLU\ -HI+X\VPDQV μ6HFXULW\:KDWGR\RXPHDQ"¶ (XURSHDQ-RXUQDORI,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQV , ±)RFXVHVRQWKHLVVXHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKGH¿QLQJWKHFRQFHSWRIVHFXULW\ IRUFRQWUDVWLQJ GLVFXVVLRQVRQDVLPLODUWKHPHVHH:ROIHUV DQG%DOGZLQ GHWDLOVLQ%LEOLRJUDSK\
1 Critical Theory and security
Abstract $PRQJ WKH PXOWLSOH FULWLFDO DSSURDFKHV WR VHFXULW\ RQH VSHFL¿F YDULDQW ± &ULWLFDO 6HFXULW\ 6WXGLHV &66 RU WKH μ:HOVK 6FKRRO¶ DSSURDFK ± KDV VRXJKW WR H[SOLFLWO\ OLQN WKH VWXG\ RI VHFXULW\WR&ULWLFDO7KHRU\7KLVFKDSWHUORFDWHVWKHNH\LQWHOOHFWXDORULJLQVDQGGHYHORSPHQWV LQWKLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI&ULWLFDO6HFXULW\6WXGLHVEHIRUHPRYLQJRQWRGLVFXVVLQPRUHGHWDLO LWVFHQWUDOLGHDV+HUHSDUWLFXODUDWWHQWLRQLVSDLGWRWKHFRQFHSWRIμHPDQFLSDWLRQ¶DVYLHZHG IURPD&66SHUVSHFWLYHDQGWKHLVVXHRIKRZVHFXULW\WKHRU\DQGVHFXULW\SUDFWLFHVDUHUHODWHG WRRQHDQRWKHUZLWKLQ)URPKHUHWKHFKDSWHUJRHVRQWRGLVFXVVVRPHRIWKHPRVWSURPLQHQW FULWLFLVPVRI:HOVK6FKRRO&66EHIRUHHYDOXDWLQJWKHFRQWULEXWLRQVOLPLWDWLRQVDQGSRWHQWLDOL- WLHVRIWKLVSDUWLFXODULQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ&ULWLFDO7KHRU\DQGVHFXULW\
Introduction
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cance appending the word ‘critical’ to ‘security studies’ has been interpreted in several dif- ferent ways. One particular school of thought – known variously as ‘Critical Security Studies’, ‘CSS’ (upper case), or sometimes as the ‘Welsh School’ of security studies (see %R[ ±DUJXHVWKDWUHODWLQJWKHVWXG\RIVHFXULW\WRμ&ULWLFDO7KHRU\¶JHQHUDWHVDVSHFL¿F range of theoretical, methodological, and normative implications. One proponent has summed up these implications as entailing the ‘Broadening’, ‘Deepening’, ‘Extending’, and ‘Focusing’ of security studies (Wyn Jones 1999: 166): ‘Broadening’ refers to a con- ception of security studies that includes a range of issues beyond military force under the rubric of security. ‘Deepening’ implies a theoretical approach to security that connects our understandings of security to deeply rooted assumptions about the nature of political life more generally. ‘Extending’ denotes the expansion of the security studies agenda to recog- nise not only a multiplicity of issues, but also a multiplicity of actors beyond the state as sites of insecurity including, most fundamentally, individual human beings. Finally, CSS claims to provide an approach to security that is ultimately ‘focused’ in the sense that it is grounded in a particular normative goal: that of human ‘emancipation’. This self-styled Critical approach to security departs radically from more conventional (or ‘traditional’) approaches to security for reasons that are discussed in more detail later in the chapter. However, while some of the moves made by the Welsh School’s Critical Security Studies/CSS-project are shared by the other approaches gathered under the critical umbrella, other commitments entailed in its relation of Critical Theory and security have
&ULWLFDO7KHRU\DQGVHFXULW\ 19
_ 3UREOHP6ROYLQJ7KHRU_ , Cox argued, takes the nature of world politics as a ‘given’. In other words, it assumes that there are a number of actors and issues that we should always focus upon. In security studies, this was traditionally manifested in the assumption that states are key actors in world politics, and that war between states is the central problem to be ‘solved’ in world politics. Cox argued that _&ULWLFDO7KHRU_ , by contrast, should critically interrogate the Traditional DVVXPSWLRQVPDGHE\SUREOHPVROYLQJWKHRU\:K\VKRXOGZHGRWKLV"&R[DUJXHGWKDWE\ assuming that world politics is simply a range of problems – such as the problem of war between states – to be resolved, we risk missing out on key dimensions of world politics WKDWGRQ¶W¿WVTXDUHO\LQWRDSUREOHPVROYLQJPLQGVHW0RUHWKDQWKLVZHDOVRHPEHGDQG legitimate the ‘problems’ we set out to study. What we should be doing is critically interro- gating the way that the SUREOHP is set up. Fundamentally, Cox argued, Problem-Solving and Critical Theory can also be distin- guished by their approaches to knowledge (Cox 1981). Whereas Problem-Solving Theory assumes that scholars can attain and produce knowledge of the world in an objective and value-neutral fashion, Critical Theory assumes that because academic analysts are neces- sarily embedded within the social world they seek to analyse, knowledge has an inherently social character. Hence there is no easy distinction that can be made between ‘facts’ and ‘values’. When building a theory or presenting an argument, we necessarily concentrate on some ‘facts’ and not others, highlight certain issues, and cover others in less detail or not at all. All of these decisions will be affected by our own social position, education, beliefs, and so on. The way that we as analysts choose to piece these elements together to either IUDPHRUDGGUHVVDVSHFL¿FμSUREOHP¶LQZRUOGSROLWLFVLVWKHUHIRUHQRWDQHXWUDODFW LWLV an act that is, consciously or not, built upon a series of choices as to what counts as import- ant and what does not. In turn, the ways that particular theories interpret and present the world will have consequent effects for how others view it, how decisions get made, where we devote our attention, how resources get distributed, and so on. This led Cox, drawing on the ideas of Antonio Gramsci (see Box 1.4), to make his now famous pronouncement that ‘theory is always IRU someone and IRU some purpose’ (1981: 128). If we apply this perspective to the discipline of security studies, it has far-reaching implications. Security studies originally developed with the explicit mandate of solving the problem of war and instability in world politics. It had clear objects of analysis – states – and a clear goal – explaining why states go to war. One of the key exponents of this vision of security studies, Stephen Walt, has succinctly argued that ‘security studies may be GH¿QHG DV WKH VWXG\ RI WKH WKUHDW XVH DQG FRQWURO RI PLOLWDU\ IRUFH ¶ 0RUH VSHFL¿FDOO\ Walt advised that security studies was best understood as the study of ‘the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states DQGVRFLHWLHVDQGWKHVSHFL¿FSROLFLHVWKDWVWDWHVDGRSWLQRUGHUWRSUHSDUHIRUSUHYHQWRU engage in war’ (1991: 212, emphasis in original). This view of security studies, which originates from Neo-Realist International Relations theory, is what has become known to its critics in CSS as ‘Traditional Security Studies’. As in Problem-Solving theory, the central problem to be addressed (war) is already assumed in this view, as are the key actors (states). Although Walt makes reference to individuals and societies, he leaves us in no doubt that their security is predicated upon the policies adopted by states and that states should, by consequence, be the primary area of concern for secur- ity studies. In keeping with the Coxian approach, critics of the ‘Traditional’ approach argue that this narrowly focused problem-solving approach has several weaknesses. They claim
20 Approaches
that Traditional security studies tends to accept the world ‘as it is’, assuming that analysts simply produce knowledge about the world ‘out there’. Traditional security studies assumes a number of ‘enduring features’ of world politics, most prominently it assumes war between states as the enduring recurrent feature of the international system. So in other words, Traditional security studies accepts (i) the state, (ii) the ‘anarchic’ nature of the international system (the idea that there is no higher authority or actor above the state level), and hence that (iii) wars between states are an inherent feature of the international system. During the Cold War in particular, these factors tended to be taken-for-granted starting points for the study of security. Scholars operating within the CSS framework argue that accepting war as the fact of international life LVSDUWRIWKHSUREOHP. Think about the logic here: if we begin from the assumption that war is a natural feature of international life, then we are perpetually limited to efforts to constrain it. Following the broader critical move within Critical International Relations theory espoused by Cox, what CSS argues is that we need to be sceptical about WKHDFWXDOEHQH¿WVRIDQH[FOXVLYHIRFXVRQZDUDQGFRQÀLFWZKLFKWKRXJKVWLOORIJUHDW importance, are but one among a multitude of contemporary security issues. Instead of the ‘problem-solving approach’ proponents of CSS have called for a study of security that ‘goes beyond problem-solving ZLWKLQ the status quo and instead seeks to help engage with the problem RI the status quo’ (Booth 2005a: 10). A primary objection to the traditional approach is that it is too narrowly focused on the military security of states (what is often referred to as ‘state-centrism’ or ‘statism’). In doing so it paints a static picture of international life that claims to simply portray the world ‘as it is’, but also makes a powerful political statement in assuming that fundamental change in the nature of world politics is virtually impossible. After the end of the Cold :DUZKLFKUDGLFDOO\XQGHUPLQHGFRQ¿GHQFHLQWKLVWUDGLWLRQDODSSURDFKEHFDXVHRILWVSUH- FOXVLRQ RI VLJQL¿FDQW LQWHUQDWLRQDO FKDQJH D QXPEHU RI FULWLFLVPV HPHUJHG RI WKLV VWDWH centric security focus and these have helped inform the emergence of CSS. First the contention is that state-centrism is HPSLULFDOO\XQKHOSIXO : in other words, that it is an incomplete description of the nature of contemporary world politics. Following the &ROG:DUFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQVWDWHV±WKHFHQWUDOWUDGLWLRQDOIRFXV±ZDVDUJXDEO\QRORQJHU the biggest issue in world politics. In the 1990s, the frequency of wars ZLWKLQ (rather than between) states led some to coin the concept of ‘New Wars’ (Kaldor 1999), to describe con- ÀLFWVVXFKDVWKRVHWKDWKDYHRFFXUUHGZLWKLQ the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, and later in Sudan. In this context the Traditional focus on wars between states seemed poorly equipped to grasp either the localised nature of new wars or the ways in which they are HPEHGGHGZLWKLQJOREDOFRPSOH[HVRIPLOLWDULVPDLGDQGGHYHORSPHQW 'XI¿HOG Second was that state-centrism often acts as a MXVWL¿FDWLRQRIWKHVWDWXVTXR : in other words LWMXVWL¿HVWKHSUHVHUYDWLRQRIWKHVWDWHV\VWHP,QWKHμGHYHORSHGZRUOG¶VWDWHVPLJKWZHOOEH argued to uphold the liberty of their citizens; but in many parts of the ‘developing world’ states can be the biggest threat to the liberty, human rights, and lives of their citizens. Some peace theorists have argued that in many cases, states can be a source of VWUXFWXUDOYLROHQFH – that states are often a major cause of poverty and repression for their citizens (Galtung 1996). Drawing on this line of thinking, scholars such as Richard Wyn Jones argue that we should approach the traditional assumption of the state as protector of its citizens with caution:
Even if a very narrow, military understanding of security is applied, it is apparent that the arms purchased and powers accrued by governments in the name of national secur- ity are far more potent threats to the liberty and physical safety of their citizens than
