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Criminal procedure outline for final exam
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interpret and review federal law; Congress can change law here
law or action is constitutional; Congress cannot change here
charges.
( Hicks)
( Katz )
must have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy (subjective) and, (2) that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
home, and
without physical intrusion.
reasonable. (STANDING) (Minnesota v. Carter )
Minnesota v. Olson [1990]. Almost all social guests have standing to object to a search.
the item seized (Rakas ) and can’t be fleeting (Rawlings ).
in White
and curtilage)
around the area
the areas is put; and
exclude others from the area
examinations than visual observations. ( Bond F 0 E 0officer squeezed and manipulated bag on bus)
articulated and measured against an objective standard.
the basis of knowledge prong.
knowledge or veracity
circumstances that there is a fair probability that a person or contraband will be present in a particular place at a particular time or that a particular person committed the crime.
has PC justifying a particular intrusion, the fact that the officer may have acted for ulterior reasons is irrelevant; i.e. the objective facts, not the subjective intent of the officer define PC.
unreasonable due to the sanctity of the home and it is constitutionally preferable to have a neutral and detached magistrate to review the PC.
long as the arrest takes place in public and as long as there is PC to arrest.
efforts to “ferret out crime.”
searched and the items or persons to be seized. ( Andersen )
the place to be searched and the items to be seized and leave nothing to the discretion of the officers.
the case, less particular vs. a robbery where the victim says my diamond ring, watch, and $10K were stolen, the warrant would need to state all of these specific things. (Warrant couldn’t say “search for items stolen from victim.”
triggering condition will occur and that the occurrence of the triggering condition creates PC. ( United States v. Grubbs [2006]).
reading of Chimel and says that the possibility of discovery of evidence or officer safety weren’t the only reasons supporting the authority for a full search incident to a lawful arrest.
Robinson isn’t extended to this situation. ( Knowles v. Iowa [1998])
this jacket because the articles were within the area of the automobile that the arrestee could reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item.
but can search any containers whether open or closed in the car. But, this search must be contemporaneous with the arrest. (Here, 20 minutes was contemporaneous.)
had gotten out of his car and had searched the car after he had been handcuffed and placed in a police car, the search was deemed reasonable under Belton.
arrested student without a warrant because “it is not ‘unreasonable’ under the 4th A for a police officer, as a matter of routine, to monitor the movements of an arrested person, as his judgment dictates, following the arrest.”
Brennan opinion; 1967]
belief that the suspect will escape or evidence will be destroyed, they may enter the house without a warrant under the exigency. Then, while they are searching for the suspect, any evidence found in plain view is admissible. But, the officers are not allowed to search the whole house generally.
circumstance of hot pursuit.
that the suspect is armed must be considered as factors in assessing the urgency of the situation.
the dwelling
factors above to have an exigency.
under exigent circumstances where the suspect is sought for minor crimes.
of the warrant process under those circumstances for drunk driving that was a minor crime under Wisconsin law.
2006] F 0 E 0DUI=misdemeanor with jail time, so exigency did exist here.
warrants for Vale’s arrest. There is no reason that they couldn’t have gotten a search warrant as well.
that the search was exigent since other people could destroy the evidence. For example, his drug trade partner already swallowed some of the drugs. Also, his mother and brother showed up.
because Vale couldn’t have destroyed the evidence himself since he was already in custody.
a warrant?
seize the premises and not let anyone in or out, and then get the warrant to search.
exception justified an extensive four-day warrantless search of a homicide scene. Not questioning the right of police to make warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe a person inside is in need of immediate aid ( dire medical treatment) or when they come upon a homicide scene and promptly survey the immediate area for victims or the perpetrator, the Court concluded that the search far exceeded the necessities of the moment.
exception” that allows a general search every time a murder happens. When the community caretaking activities morph into an investigative search, there must be a search warrant.
search the entire car, including containers, as long as there is PC to believe items related to crime will be found in the place to be searched. ( Chambers; Acevedo )
first to give automobile exception F 0 E 0no warrant is needed due to mobility of cars and cars have a diminished expectation of privacy due to regulations and licensing, etc.)
stopped on the road, but was searched subsequently at the police station after it had been seized and its occupants taken into custody was constitutional.
car contained evidence of a recent robbery, and thus could have lawfully searched it on the road, it was constitutionally permissible to conduct the delayed search as well.
police have right to search on the roadway, then can search at the station.
says it did F 0 E 0instead it held that the police officers with PC to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant when it was reasonable to take the car to the station house in the first place. (Here, the arrest took place at 1:30 p.m. ….no indication that an immediate search would have been either impractical or unsafe for the arresting officers.)
standard procedures can inventory at stationhouse and can search any container or article in his possession( Lafayette )
otherwise be valid and according some kind of standardized procedures. ( Bertine , Florida v. Wells )
Lafayette occurred at the stationhouse during booking and carried with it the rationales of booking procedures. (The same rationales don’t apply here.)
( Bustamonte )
consent ( Bustamonte )
circumstance, if consent for the car search was given voluntarily, then 4th A protection is waived.
but it cannot be gained by coercion.
circumstances and these factors:
there? (Large # tends more towards coercion.)
request consent after an initial refusal?
state, and ethnicity of the suspect.
(Such as a gun, etc. that basically coerced the suspect to consent.)
a factor, but is not by itself determinative.
can seek consent thereafter. Also post-arrest consent may be considered voluntary based on the totality of the consequences. ( Watson )
“You may search the kitchen.” Then, they only consenting to a search of the kitchen, and anything beyond that would be unreasonable. ( Florida v. Jimeno [1991])
space ( Matlock ) or apparent authority—reasonable belief of authority to consent ( Rodriguez )
Randolph )
functions as a justification for a warrantless seizure .)
her activities to the permissible scope of that intrusion (sometimes referred to as a lawful right of access to the object itself), and
contraband or evidence of crime , without the necessity for any further examination or search.
inadvertence requirement because it added no significant privay protection beyond the other requirements for plain view seizure and because it required unworkable
judicial inquiries into the subjective state of mind of the officers. So, after Horton , the fact that agents anticipated finding guns above and beyondjewerly listed in the warrant, does not violate the PVD.)
( Hicks F 0 E 0had to pick up the stereo to get the serial numbers…not readily apparent that’s its contraband)
because his movement is restrained by physical force or a show of authority to which the suspect actually submitted? ( Mendenhall; Hodari D. )
is not determinative.
irrelevant to the inquiry.
the officer’s request for consent or otherwise terminate the encounter? ( Bostick ) [This test is broader and can be applied to more situations than the Mendenhall test because the Mendenhall test doesn’t apply to situations when freedom of movement is determined by a voluntary choice or circumstance.]
facts. ( Terry )
on the totality of the circumstances. ( Terry, Alabama v. White )
the situation must lead a reasonable prudent person to believe that (1) criminal activity is afoot, and (2) the suspect is armed and dangerous.
permitted under the 4th A where there is reasonable belief [RS] that criminal activity is afoot and there is RS that the person is armed and dangerous.”
seizure and a frisk is in fact a search. The 4th A is definitely implicated, but the Court was balancing two very important and competing interests: the safety and protection from harassment by police during the Civil Rights Movement and the obligation of the police to conduct investigations.
preponderance of the evidence, but considerably more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.
view, mere association with known narcotics addicts did not give rise to a reasonable fear of life or limb.” As a result, the Court held that is was unconstitutional for the officer to stop and frisk Sibron.
may be a factor along with flight from police. ( Wardlow )
without RS or PC, approaches an individual he/she has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.”
depends on the quantity and quality of evidence provided ( Alabama v. White; Florida v. J.L. )
violation of school rules or law by a student.
of the student and nature of the infraction.
and the labeling as a “special need” is to get around PC or RS ( Ferguson F 0 E 0pregnant drug addicts)
positions involving drug interdiction, firearms or classified material is permissible. ( Von Raab )
he looked suspicious and they wanted to ascertain his identity.
test:
cases.
driving is more important to deal with than the minimal intrusion in individual’s privacy. ( Sitz )
checkpoints were chosen pursuant to written guidelines and the police were directed to stop every approaching vehicle—the officers themselves did not decide whom to stop.
motorists to inspect license and registration violated the 4th A.
trafficking checkpoint stuck down. (Much more investigative) ( Edmond )
does not include situations where the objective is to ask the car’s occupants about “others” who have committed offenses. ( Lidster )
checking for illegal immigrant ( Martinez-Fuerte)
patrols. ( Brignoni-Ponce )
near the border and occupants briefly questioned about their immigration status only upon RS that the vehicle contains illegal aliens.
especially if, like here, it was conducted at night with surprise, and too much police officer discretion.
border includes the authority to remove, disassemble and reassemble the fuel tank. ( Flores-Montano )
***** The 5th A prohibits compelled self-incriminating testimonial statements. *The 6th A provides right to counsel once the adversarial proceedings begin.
there is a presumption of coercion in custodial interrogations. Further, “[t]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the F 0 4 4unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”
immediately cease; if he requests an attorney, interrogation must cease until one is present.
is a risk to public or officer safety and the limited questioning only involves protection of this safety, there is an exception and Miranda rights don’t need to be read right away.
had no power to overrule Miranda in §3501.
invitation to overrule the controversial 1966 Miranda decision.
“constitutional decision,” has “constitutional origins,” and “constitutional underpinnings.”
the same time won’t allow Congress to overrule it, the Court has basically created a new realm of constitutional law outside of their supervisory power and outside their constitutional interpretation and application power.
there is no Miranda violation unless the gov’t seeks to introduce the statement at a criminal trial.
curtailed to such a degree as associated with a formal arrest. ( Berkemer ) (police dominated environment)
determine whether a person is in custody under Miranda ( Berkemer , Yarborough F 0 E 0age doesn’t come into the reasonable person standard though.)
suspects the individual of a crime and intends to take him into custody, unless that intention is communicated to the suspect. (Stansbury )
stop. ( Berkemer )
questioning as to facts surrounding a crime is not custodial.
treated the second round as continuous with the first.
questions and answers in the first round of interrogation.
statements.
second interrogations.
unless dealing with a deliberate situation)
question-first method
distinct topics
understood the rights and waiver of Miranda (substantial break in time, or what you’ve just said can’t be used against you)
stage interrogations. Justice Kennedy would only bar the second statement if the technique was intentional.
involuntarily given.
to remain silent only if his rights are scrupulously honored—apply Mosley factors:
significant
cease until the attorney arrives or until the suspect re—initiates conversation. (Edwards )
suspect?
happen to me?” counted as re-initiation, but asking for water, access to the phone wouldn’t count.
invoking his rights does not mean that the official can reinitiate the interrogation. ( Minnick )
it is as if a protective shield surrounds him or her, and the suspect may not be questioned about any crime unless the suspect’s attorney is present and a valid waiver is obtained or unless the suspect initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police and a valid (knowing, intelligent, and voluntary) waiver was obtained.
(police cannot make affirmative misrepresentation to a suspect—compare to withholding info) ( Burbine )
invoked applies even if the second interrogation would concern an offense unrelated the subject of the initial arrest. ( Roberson.)
counsel, the police may ignore the remark and continue the interrogation.
equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, the interrogator may ignore the reference and proceed with the questioning. ( Davis F 0 E 0”Maybe I should talk to a lawyer” wasn’t a request for counsel.)
( Davis )
false confessions in these situations, the police should obey the laws while enforcing them, and our system is an accusatorial system rather than an inquisitorial system.
involuntary confessions can’t be used to impeach a F 0 4 4on the stand.
unrelenting interrogation is coercive.)
were and the characteristics of the interrogation were) to see if the facts suggest coercion [police misconduct]. ( Spano , Mincey F 0 E 0asked questions while F 0 4 4was in ICU=coercive)
questions by the prosecutor.
circumstances even applies.)
police knew or should have known of the impairment. ( Connelly )
counsel for his defense.”
indigent (applies in federal and state courts). It is fundamental to a fair trial to have counsel. ( Johnson v. Zerbst and Gideon v. Wainwright ).
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily in the opinion of the court. ( Faretta v. California)
mere possibility of it. ( Scott F 0 E 0still the federal rule); uncounseled suspended sentences are unconstitutional.
test.
deficient, when measured against an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that the F 0 4 4was prejudiced in the sense that there was a reasonable probability that,
second statement was made voluntarily and not as a product of coercion. Nothing about giving the first statement leads the second to be involuntary (rejects the “Cat out of the Bag” argument.)
F of PT to apply and so Wong Sun doesn’t apply to this case because a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution.
statement is presumptively coerced? The Court makes a distinction between actual coercion and presumptive coercion….you must show actual coercion to suppress the second statement.
voluntary statement in violation of Miranda because the 5th A only protects against compelled self-incrimination, not voluntary incrimination.
at trial. (Goes against Miranda ’s general premise.) So, physical fruits are admissible.
are also legal acts that leads to evidence and the illegality hasn’t interfered with the gaining of evidence, then the latter evidence is admissible.
have come from an independent source. ( Silverthorne )
Holmes opinion; 1920]
an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.
by the illegality OR
the magistrate and the information effected his/her decision.
magistrate that he has PC, but the magistrate isn’t affected, then it is still an Independent Source.
of the poisonous tree—evidence that can be traced directly back to the initial illegality and for which there is no Independent Source—suppression can nonetheless be avoided if the prosecution establishes that the evidence would have ultimately been discovered anyway by lawful means.
this case, by proceeding with the planned grid-search of the area) the evidence will be admissible. ( Nix ); lately courts have argued this to be the case in inventory searches too
the connection between the illegality and the challenged evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. (Wong Sun )
warrant, but procured after failure to knock and announce is not
connected to the 4th A violation and therefore admissible. ( Hudson v. Michigan )
exclusionary rule does not bar the State’s use of a statement made by a F 0 4 4outside of his home, even if the statement is made after a Payton violation, because that statement is not the product of the unconstitutional entry. ( New York v. Harris)
( Ceccolini )
should not be discouraged from coming forward based on their own free will; so the constitutional violation must be really closely linked to the discovery of the witness for the Court to allow the witness’s testimony to be excluded and to hold that attenuation wasn’t present.
dissipate the taint of a 4th A violation. It is not sufficient alone and per se to show an act of free will that will dissipate the taint, but is one factor. ( Brown )
facially valid warrant and have acted in good faith based on a reasonable well- trained police officer standard. (Leon ; Sheppard )
information that they knew was false or would have known was false if they had not recklessly disregarded the truth.
his/her neutral and detached role.
have believed that PC existed.
unreasonable for officers to have resumed that it was valid.
statutory authority that were later deemed unreasonable, but there was good faith reliance on the statute and the Court found that was reasonable.
on erroneous computer records; a reasonable police officer would rely on the computer records and that the good faith exception applies.