Chapter 1: Understanding Violent Conflict, Study notes of Conflictology

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CHAPTER 1:

UNDERSTANDING

VIOLENT CONFLICT

The Causes of Conflict

Conflict: Topic Guide , revised 2014, GSDRC 6

The Causes of Conflict

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 6

POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS .............................................................................. 7

IDENTITY POLITICS ......................................................................................................... 10

SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS ............................................................................................. 11

RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS ........................................................................ 14

Introduction

There is no single cause of conflict. Rather, conflict is context-specific, multi-causal and multi- dimensional and can result from a combination of the following factors:

 Political and institutional factors: weak state institutions, elite power struggles and political exclusion, breakdown in social contract and corruption, identity politics  Socioeconomic factors: inequality, exclusion and marginalisation, absence or weakening of social cohesion, poverty  Resource and environmental factors: greed, scarcity of national resources often due to population growth leading to environmental insecurity, unjust resource exploitation

Each of these factors may constitute a cause, dynamic and/or impact of conflict. New issues will arise during conflict which perpetuate the conflict. Identifying and understanding the interactions between various causes, dimensions, correlates and dynamics of conflict – and the particular contexts in which conflict arises, is essential in determining potential areas of intervention; and designing appropriate approaches and methods for conflict prevention, resolution and transformation.

The way in which a government or institution at an international or societal level addresses conflict between individuals, groups or nations can determine whether the parties to the conflict will resort to violence.

Ohlson, T., 2008, ‘Understanding Causes of War and Peace’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 133- 160 How are the causes of war and peace related? Is it possible to bridge the conceptual gap between causes-of-war theory and conflict resolution theory? This article puts forward a new conceptual framework to facilitate the analysis of the outbreak, conduct and resolution of armed conflict within states. This 'Triple-R' framework involves consideration of reasons, resources and resolve for engaging in violence.

Smith, D., 2004, ‘Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict’, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin This chapter provides a brief overview of what is known and understood about the causes of armed conflict. The emphasis is on an applied methodology for studying and analysing armed conflict, rather than on theory. It looks at both the variety and the different types of causes of armed conflict. It introduces the conceptual pairing of justice and mobilisation as a way of linking the long and short term issues leading to conflict. See full text

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Elite power struggles and political exclusion

Colonialism and liberation struggles in Africa, the Middle East and Asia have left various legacies, including divisive and militarised politics and fierce struggles for power and land. Post-liberation leaders in some countries have sustained these dynamics, retaining power through neo- patrimonial networks, state capture, militarisation and coercion. Studies have shown that in some cases, they have promoted ideologies of ‘Us versus Them’, excluding and marginalising other groups.

The domination of access to state structures and resources by any one leader, group or political party to the exclusion of others exacerbates social divisions. It may provide incentives for excluded leaders to mobilise groups to protest and engage in violent rebellion. In contrast, inclusive elite bargains that seek to address social fragmentation and integrate a broad coalition of key elites can reduce the chances of violent rebellion.

Van Wyk, J-A., 2007, ‘Political Leaders in Africa: Presidents, Patrons or Profiteers?’, Occasional Paper Series, vol. 2, no. 1, The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), South Africa What impact has leadership had on the development of African states? This paper analyses the multiple layers of formal and informal political leadership in post-colonial Africa. Political leaders are the primary holders, controllers and distributors of power and resources in a particular institution and/or territory. Contemporary African leaders operate in an environment constrained by colonial legacies and instability. Leadership is characteristically neo-patrimonial, featuring presidentialism, clientelism, the use of state resources and the centralisation of power.

Lindemann, S., 2008, ‘Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for Understanding the Causes of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Discussion Paper, no. 15, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London Sub-Saharan Africa is the world’s most conflict-intensive region. But why have some African states experienced civil war, while others have managed to maintain political stability? This paper argues that the ability of post-colonial states in Sub-Saharan Africa to maintain political stability depends on the ability of the ruling political parties to overcome the historical legacy of social fragmentation. Creating inclusive elite bargains can bring stability while exclusionary elite bargains give rise to trajectories of civil war.

DFID, 2009, ‘Building the State and Securing the Peace’, Department for International Development (DFID), London How can support for state-building and peace-building be integrated? This Emerging Policy Paper outlines a strategic framework for DFID’s engagement in situations of conflict and fragility, plus operational implications. DFID’s integrated approach to state-building and peace-building aims primarily to promote inclusive political settlements. This facilitates the further goals of: (i) addressing causes of conflict and building resolution mechanisms; (ii) developing state survival functions; and (iii) responding to public expectations. Support across all four of these interrelated areas is necessary to help create a positive peace- and state-building dynamic.

Breakdown in social contract and corruption

A social contract is a framework of rules that governs state-society relations and the distribution of resources, rights and responsibilities in an organised society. How a government spends public revenue, regardless of whether it comes from taxes or from natural resources, is significant. If it spends it equitably on social welfare and satisfying basic needs, conflict is less likely than if it

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appropriates revenues for corrupt or fractional purposes. Corruption undermines public trust in government, deters domestic and foreign investment, exacerbates inequalities in wealth and increases socioeconomic grievances. Equally, the inability of states to provide basic services, including justice and security, to all its citizens reduces state legitimacy and trust in state institutions, weakening or breaking the social contract.

In some cases, ruling groups may resort to violence to prolong their rule and maintain opportunities for corruption. This can in turn provoke violent rebellion by marginalised groups. In other situations, research has found that “buying off” opposition groups and belligerents may facilitate transitions to peace.

Murshed, S. M. and Tadjoeddin, M. Z., 2009, ‘Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict’, Journal of International Development, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 87- 111 This article assesses two recent explanations for the onset of internal conflict: greed and grievance. The former reflects elite competition over valuable natural resource rents. The latter argues that relative deprivation, and the grievance it produces, fuels conflict. However, this article argues that neither the presence of greed or grievance is sufficient for the outbreak of violent conflict. Violent conflict requires institutional breakdown, or the failure of the social contract.

Chandhoke, N., 2005, ‘Of Broken Social Contracts and Ethnic Violence: The Case of Kashmir’, Working Paper, no. 75, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London Are identity politics to blame for the outbreak of violence in Kashmir? This paper, based on research carried out in Srinagar, argues that this is not the case. It concludes that the outbreak of militancy has been caused by the failure of political institutions and organisations, and the violation of the social contract.

Addison, T. et al., 2008, ‘Ending Violent Conflict and Building a Social Compact’, Chapter 6 in Escaping Poverty Traps, Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Manchester This chapter looks at the links between poverty, injustice and violence and argues that, to build lasting peace, societies must build a viable social compact. A viable social compact is one in which the state acts to reduce people’s risks – through law and order, services and infrastructure – in return for their commitment to the state. The chapter includes a discussion of the links between state fragility, poverty and violent conflict. There is also an examination of how viable social compacts are built and the role the international community has to play. See full text

Le Billon, P., 2003, ‘Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts’, Journal of International Development, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 413 - 426 What is the relationship between corruption and the outbreak, duration and termination of conflicts? Donors and analysts consider corruption a primary explanation for a whole range of development problems. Yet this study suggests that corruption is partially driven by internal processes of capital accumulation and global structural forces. Corruption may have a corrosive effect on economies and rule-based institutions, but it also forms part of the fabric of social and political relationships. This endogenous character means that conflict may be engendered more by changes in the pattern of corruption than by corruption itself.

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of case studies of Bolivia, Peru, Tajikistan and Yemen and recommends the application of regional and country context when analysing countries prone to political violence.

Kadayifci-Orellana, S. A., 2009, ‘Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution’, in The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, eds., J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk, and I. W. Zartman, SAGE, London, pp. 264- 280 How can the religious texts, values and beliefs used to incite conflict be harnessed to promote peace-building and reconciliation? What contributions can faith-based actors make to conflict resolution? This chapter examines the ways in which religion can be used to inspire both war and peace. The revival of religiously motivated conflicts, and the increasing involvement of religious actors in resolving them, requires understanding of their dynamics.

Cocodia, J., 2008, ‘Exhuming Trends in Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation in Africa: Some Selected States’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 9- 26 Why are certain parts of Africa characterised by ethnic conflict while other parts remain relatively calm? This paper argues that equity, justice, literacy levels and external threats are key factors which determine the likelihood of conflict. Case studies of both conflict and cooperation situations are examined – from Tanzania, Botswana, South Africa, Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire.

Miklian, J., 2009, ‘Nepal's Terai: Constructing an Ethnic Conflict’, South Asia Briefing Paper, no. 1, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo Recent ethnic violence in Nepal has polarised citizens along ethnic issues that were largely unaddressed during the civil war and the subsequent peace agreement. This paper traces the history of Nepali post-war ethnic violence and the current difficulties implementing peace agreements. Reducing the risk of future armed conflict involves targeting grassroots opinion, preventing demonisation of specific ethnic groups and recognising long-standing discrimination of the Madhesi people of the Terai region.

Melvin, N. J., 2007, ‘Conflict in Southern Thailand: Islamism, Violence and the State in the Patani Insurgency’, SIPRI Policy Paper, no. 20, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm What is behind the recent return to violence in southern Thailand and how can the conflict be resolved? This paper outlines interpretations of conflict in the Patani region. These focus on historical grievances, the role of violent Islamism, modern Thai politics and the ‘global war on terror’. Measures to address two longstanding sources of grievance – language and education –

could help improve the situation.

For resources on the role of religion and religious actors in peacemaking, see the direct prevention mechanisms section of this guide.

Socioeconomic factors

Inequality, exclusion and marginalisation

There is increasing recognition that it is the nature of inequality, rather than the extent of inequality, that determines the likelihood of violent conflict. Research has found that inequalities that align with cultural, ethnic or religious identities (‘horizontal inequalities’) are more likely to result in violence. This is especially the case when there are ‘multidimensional horizontal inequalities’ – where culturally defined groups experience multiple forms of exclusion from political, economic, social, security, justice, and cultural realms. Often these forms of inequality,

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exclusion and marginalisation interact and compound one another: unequal access to land and natural resources, for example, may result from the lack of access to power and decision-making.

A strong sense of collective injustice, due to actual or perceived exclusion based on social or cultural identity, can increase a group’s feelings of alienation from the wider society. This may lead to animosity and resentment. Over time, such tensions can foster group mobilisation and fuel violent conflict. It is not only the relatively deprived who may instigate violence, however, but also the privileged who fear losing power and benefits.

Government responses are important in determining whether dissatisfaction turns violent. If the state reacts harshly to non-violent protests, as opposed to seeking to address exclusion, then the chances of violent conflict are more likely. Exclusion and inequality as a cause of conflict may be connected to the breakdown of the social contract, discussed under political and institutional factors.

Brinkman, H.-J., Attree, L., and Hezir, S., 2013, ‘Addressing inequalities as horizontal drivers of conflict in the post-2015 development agenda’, PBSO and Saferworld What is the impact of inequalities on the likelihood of violent conflict? This paper analyses how inequalities, violent conflicts, and the relations between them are holding back development, supporting the arguments for addressing inequalities in the post-2015 framework. Horizontal inequalities – including economic, political, cultural, gender and those related to security, justice and social services – can heighten group grievances and increase the risk of violent conflict. Inequality can be addressed through inclusion, fairness, responsiveness, accountability to all social groups, and measures to strengthen intergroup relations. This will mitigate the divisions that can lead to conflict, violence and underdevelopment. See full text

Cederman, L-E., Gleditsch, K. S. and Buhaug, H., 2013, ‘Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War’,

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Do grievances cause civil war? This book argues that political and economic inequalities following group lines – horizontal inequalities – generate grievances that in turn can motivate civil war. The authors develop new indicators of political and economic exclusion at the group level. Political and economic inequalities afflicting entire ethnic groups are especially likely to fuel resentment and justify attempts to fight perceived injustice. The best way to break the cycle of violence driven by political exclusion and economic inequality is to involve groups that have been marginalised by giving them a real stake in their country’s future. See details on publisher’s website

Kanbur, R., 2007, ‘Poverty and Conflict: The Inequality Link’, International Peace Academy, New York How do poverty and inequality causally interact with conflict? While there is a general view that poverty and inequality can lead to conflict, the nature of the links are less well appreciated. This paper draws out the links based on the recent economics literature and discusses their implications for policy. While inequality is a natural concomitant of economic processes, particularly those driven by the market, its implications for security emerge when unequal outcomes align with socio-political cleavages.

Sen, A., 2008, ‘Violence, Identity and Poverty’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 45, pp.5- 15 How do we explain the cause of violence in the world today? This article argues that approaches to explaining violence should avoid isolationist programmes that explain violence solely in terms of social inequality and deprivation, or in terms of identity and cultural factors. The coupling between

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Justino, P., 2009, ‘The Impact of Armed Civil Conflict on Household Welfare and Policy Responses’, HiCN Working Paper, no. 61, Households in Conflict Network, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton How does armed conflict impact on households and how do they respond to and cope with it? This paper examines the direct and indirect effects of conflicts and shows that the indirect effects are channelled through markets, political institutions and social networks. Until there is more research on the fundamental processes linking armed civil conflict and household welfare, it will be difficult to develop effective policies for preventing and resolving conflicts.

Resource and environmental factors

Greed and opportunity in war

Regardless of the beliefs, ideologies and grievances involved, all armed conflicts must be funded. Such funding often comes from illicit sources and activities. Economic relations may become coercive during armed conflict and peacetime economic activities may be looted by belligerents. Illicit trade in commodities (see next section on resource exploitation ) during conflicts can reinforce other causes of conflict, including state weakness and lack of accountability.

While many conflicts are clearly motivated by political or social issues, others are mainly economically motivated. Some conflicts start due to political and social motives but are prolonged due to economic motivations (‘greed’), which creates disincentives for peace. In the current conflict in Columbia, for example, it is unclear whether groups continue fighting due to the original political reasons or due to the income generated from war-related illicit drug trade. These complexities have led recent authors to challenge the simplistic “greed versus grievance” framework as both elements are often found in conflict situations.

Berdal M. and Keen D., 1997, ‘Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, London, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 795- 818 This article analyses conflicts and peace efforts in several African, Asian and Central American countries, revealing the crucial role played by economics. The pursuit of ‘rational’ economic goals by conflict participants is often a major factor behind the continuation of a war that otherwise seems illogical. People at all levels of society can profit from conflict to the extent that peace seems unattractive. Or violence may offer a degree of economic security that is preferable to the uncertain prospects of peace. Conflict can only be tackled by taking into account the non-political functions of violence and the economic benefits it can bring.

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., 2000, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, World Bank, Washington, DC Are civil wars really caused by political repression, inequality, or religious and ethnic differences? What roles do factors other than grievance play in rebellion? This paper looks at the causes of civil war, using a new data set of wars during 1960-99. Civil wars are now more common than international conflict. Of 25 armed conflicts in 2000, 23 were internal. Rebellion needs both motivation and opportunity. Political science explains conflict in terms of motive. When grievances are sufficiently acute, here is violent protest. Such grievances include inequality, oppression, religious and ethnic tensions. A much smaller literature from economic theory models rebellion as an industry that generates profit from looting. Greed, not grievance, is the driving force, and opportunity is more important than motive.

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Cramer, C. and Hanlon, J., 2006, ‘Greed versus Grievance: Conjoined Twins or Discrete Drivers of Violent Conflict’, Civil War, Civil Peace, Yanacopulos, H. and Hanlon, J., Open University in association with James Currey, Oxford and Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio The debate within neoclassical economics on the main sources of civil war has crystallised around a simple dichotomy between ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’. This chapter argues that it is questionable whether the ‘greed versus grievance’ debate is useful as a means of understanding violent conflict. These terms are difficult to separate and, moreover, it is unlikely that there can be a clear ‘either/or’ explanation of the causes of war.

Resource exploitation

Research has demonstrated connections between lootable resources and conflict. Control and exploitation of natural resources can be involved in all phases of the conflict cycle, contributing to: the outbreak of conflict through inequitable resource and wealth sharing; the perpetuation of conflict, through the exploitation of ‘high-value’ resources to finance armed forces; and the undermining of conflict resolution and peace agreements by parties that could lose access to resource revenues. Extractable resources are most likely to provoke conflict when resource exploitation becomes linked to social or political exclusion. These issues also often arise where there is a shortage of non-lootable resources and where resources are located inside the conflict zone.

Aspinall, E., 2007, ‘The Construction of Grievance’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 51, no. 6, pp. 950- 972 When and under what circumstances does natural resource extraction give rise to violent conflict? This article analyses the separatist conflict in Aceh, Indonesia. It argues that natural resource exploitation promoted conflict in Aceh only because it became entangled in wider processes of identity construction and was reinterpreted back to the population by ethnic political entrepreneurs in a way that legitimated violence. Rather than any intrinsic qualities of natural resource extraction, the key factor was the presence of an appropriate identity-based collective action frame.

Snyder, R. and Bhavnani, R., 2005, ‘Diamond, Blood and Taxes: A Revenue-Centred Framework for Explaining Political Order’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 563- 597 Why are lootable resources such as alluvial diamonds linked to civil war in some cases and peace in others? This article suggests that to answer this question the focus must shift from rebels to rulers, to state spending and to the constraints on the rulers' ability to earn revenue. It argues that in countries rich in lootable resources, the ability of rulers to achieve political order depends on the availability of non-lootable resources, the mode of extraction of lootable resources and patterns of state spending.

Lujala, P., 2010, ‘The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 15- Why is armed civil conflict more common in resource-dependent countries than in others? This article seeks to address this question by concentrating on the issue of how rebel access to natural resources affects conflict. The results show that the location of resources is crucial to their impact on conflict duration. If resources are located inside the actual conflict zone, the duration of conflict is doubled. See full text

Ikelegbe, A., 2006, ‘The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria’, African and Asian Studies, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 23-

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Poor societies will be less able to protect themselves from environmental scarcities and the social crises they cause.

Smith, D. and Vivenkananda, J., 2009, 'Climate Change, Conflict and Fragility: Understanding the Linkages, Shaping Effective Responses', International Alert, London What effect will climate change have on violent conflict? This report argues that climate change is most likely to provoke conflict in poor, badly governed countries with a recent history of violent conflict. Adaptation policies must respond to the links between climate change, state fragility and conflict, and must begin by focusing on as local a level as possible. Further, a large-scale systematic study is needed of the likely costs of adaptation. This should address the social and political dimensions as well as economic sectors.

Forsyth, T. and Schomerus, M., 2013, ‘Climate change and conflict: a systematic evidence review’, JSRP Paper 8, Justice and Security Research Programme, London What is the evidence for climate change causing violent conflict? This systematic review looks at what the evidence says about the connections between climate change and violent conflict and assesses the quality of that evidence. Connections between climate change and violent conflict have not been proven yet. Connecting climate change and conflict depends on how people assume environmental change impacts on violent conflict and what people assume inevitably drives

violent conflict. While climate change is likely to have various impacts, the challenge is to understand how these impacts will occur rather than basing responses on various assumptions. See full text

Smith, D. and Vivenkananda, J., 2007, 'A Climate of Conflict: The Links Between Climate Change, Peace and War', International Alert, London What are the likely social and human consequences of climate change? Many of the world’s poorest places face a double-headed problem: climate change and violent conflict. This report finds that in fragile states the consequences of climate change can interact with existing socio- political and economic tensions, compounding the causal tensions underlying violent conflict. It argues that conflict-sensitive climate change policies can promote peacebuilding, whilst climate- proof peacebuilding and development policies can be effective climate change adaptation policies.

Barnett, J. and Adger, W., 2007, ‘Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict’, Political Geography, vol. 26, no. 6, pp. 639- 655 Does climate change increase the risk of violent conflict? This paper integrates three bodies of research on the vulnerability of local places and social groups to climate change, livelihoods and violent conflict, and the role of the state in development and peacemaking. Climate change reduces access to natural resources and undermines state capacity to help people sustain livelihoods. These impacts may in certain circumstances increase the risk of violent conflict, but further investigation is needed.

Lind, J. and Sturman, K., 2002, ‘Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts’, African Centre for Technology Studies and Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria This book contains cases studies of African conflicts and looks at the role that resources, both scarce and abundant, play among other variables in the onset and escalation of violent conflict in these countries. Its attention to the ‘ecological variable’ contributes to the debate around the causes of conflict. See full text

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Houdret, A., 2008, ‘Scarce Water, Plenty of Conflicts? Local Water Conflicts and the Role of Development Cooperation’ INEF Policy Brief, no. 3, Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg How can water scarcity lead to conflict? How can these conflicts be avoided? This Policy Brief analyses the causes of water conflict and suggests corresponding policy options. Water allocation often reflects social, political and economic inequalities, especially in countries where water is scarce. Water management is increasingly a question of fair distribution and political legitimacy.

UNEP, 2009, ‘From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment’, United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi Conflicts associated with natural resources are twice as likely to relapse into violent conflict. Yet, less than a quarter of peace negotiations for conflicts linked to natural resources have addressed resource management mechanisms. This study argues that the recognition of the contribution of environmental issues to violent conflict underscores their potential as pathways for cooperation and the consolidation of peace. Integrating environment and natural resources into peacebuilding strategies is now a security imperative.

Aning, K. and Atta-Asamoah, A., 2011, 'Demography, Environment and Conflict in West Africa', Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, Ghana Many West African countries have had to grapple with the mutually reinforcing destabilising factors of economic down-turns, population changes (particularly 'youth bulges' and migration), and resource scarcity. This paper examines West African conflicts and argues that demographic, economic and environmental factors require greater consideration in attempts to promote peace. It finds that the political exploitation of young people has contributed to the role of the youth 'bulge' in conflict. Migration and competition for environmental resources have added to social tensions, and conflict has caused environmental damage. Recommendations include youth development interventions and greater emphasis on environmental protection in security strategies.

USAID, 2005, ‘Land and Conflict Toolkit’, USAID, Washington, DC This toolkit provides a practical introduction to the relationship between land and violent conflict. This relates to land issues as a causal or aggravating factor in conflict, as well as to land issues which arise in the aftermath of violent conflict. The toolkit offers a rapid appraisal guide that can help determine which land issues are most relevant to conflict in a particular setting. The toolkit is also designed to familiarise practitioners with a range of programmatic interventions and to sensitise officers to the fact that development activities, such as infrastructure projects and the exploitation of underground resources, can inadvertently cause land conflicts to erupt. See full text

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political authority; the effects of globalisation, and powerful economic incentives for dissidents to take up arms against the state. They are generally struggles for control over, or access to, state power rather than against substantive grievances. Most current wars are also based on identity, using pre-existing cleavages (racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious) for political mobilisation. Military victories are now difficult and rare. Post-Cold War conflicts predominantly involve a wide range of global and regional actors: Major powers; international agencies; neighbouring states; diaspora groups; arms salesmen; mercenaries and criminal networks. Greater access to global and regional institutions could provide greater accountability of external actors to local populations.

Malešvić, S., 2008, ‘The Sociology of New Wars? Assessing the Causes and Objectives of Contemporary Violent Conflicts’, International Political Sociology, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 97– 112 Are recent wars completely different to their predecessors? What are the purposes and causes of new wars? This paper looks at sociological accounts of warfare and uncovers weaknesses in their explanation of new wars. It challenges the notion that there has been a dramatic shift in the causes and objectives of contemporary violent conflict. What has changed is reliance on technology and the social, political and ideological context in which recent wars are fought.

Bailes, A.J.K., Krause, K. and Winkler, T. H., 2007, ‘The Shifting Face of Violence’, Policy Paper, no. 18, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces’, Geneva How has the nature of violence changed in the post-Cold War era? What can be done to stop, or at least reduce, the potential for increased violence? This paper presents a variety of different perspectives on recent trends in conflict and security.

Sub-national conflict

Parks, T., Coletta, N. and Oppenheim, B., 2013, ‘The Contested Corners of Asia: Sub-National Conflict and International Development Assistance’. San Francisco: The Asia Foundation Subnational conflict is the most widespread, enduring, and deadly form of conflict in Asia. The authors show that large-scale, armed violence can occur and endure in strong states as well as weak ones. Most subnational conflicts areas in Asia have a functioning system of government, though central state authority may be contested and weak in some areas. While many areas are relatively under-developed, they are generally not the poorest regions. To help end subnational conflict, international development assistance needs to build the confidence of key actors in the transition to peace; and transform institutions that are directly related to the sources of conflict. See full text

Urbanisation

Beall, J., 2007, ‘Cities, Terrorism and Urban Wars of the 21st Century’, Working Paper no. 9, Crisis States Research Centre, London What impact do acts of terror have on cities in the global South? This paper examines the largely negative implications of terrorist activities for development and the potential of cities for propelling reconstruction and peacebuilding. While specific challenges faced by cities in the global South cannot be under-estimated, urban terrorism is breaking down any sense of a rigid binary between the 'developed' and 'developing' worlds. The 'them' and 'us' attitude is misleading and damaging to both development cooperation and global security.

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Radicalisation and terrorism

Brynjar, L. and Skjølberg, K., 2004, ‘Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature’, FFI/RAPPORT-2004/04307, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Kjeller Why are some societies more exposed to terrorism than others? What are the common theories and hypotheses concerning the causes of terrorism? This paper surveys theories on the causes of terrorism, as well as those for explaining terrorism on an international or world system level of analysis.

Okumu, W. and Botha, A. (eds.), 2006, ‘Understanding Terrorism: In Search for an African Voice’, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria The report analyses terrorism in Africa and presents the ‘African voice’ in the global debate on terrorism. See full text

European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, 2008, ‘Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism’ Submitted to the European Commission Understanding the origins of violent radicalisation requires understanding that terrorist groups consist of different types of disaffected individuals who undergo different paths of radicalisation. This report analyses empirical facts on violent radicalisation, recent academic literature and the link between external conflicts and violent radicalisation. More research on individuals who join terrorist groups, terrorist recruitment, indoctrination and training, and types and development of current radicalisation processes, would inform future state response strategies.

Non-state actors

Cunningham, D., Gleditsch, K. S., and Salehyan, I., 2013 , Non-state actors in civil wars: A new dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science, vol. 30 , no. 5 Our understanding of conflict processes has been hindered by insufficient attention to the attributes of the actors involved. Who are the actors involved in civil wars and what are their characteristics? This paper introduces the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (NSA), which contains detailed information on the attributes of rebel groups. It contains variables on rebel strength, territorial control, organizational structures and external support, among other factors. The project is designed to allow extensions to the NSA to be easily incorporated into the existing data. This will deepen understanding of the dynamics of civil war. See full text

Transnational politics and role of diaspora

The role that diasporas can play in fuelling conflict has received increasing attention in recent years. The traditional focus has been on the role that remittances play in funding violent conflicts. Yet, diasporas also play a key political role in conflict in their countries of origin and can reinforce, exacerbate and prolong violent conflict.

Diaspora groups, and group members, cannot be treated uniformly, however. Groups evolve distinctly and adopt varying outlooks on homeland politics, different levels of involvement, strategies and methods of recruitment, mobilisation and participation. In general, diaspora groups have the potential to contribute to conflict escalation as well as to peace processes. They may also change their positions over time. An understanding of such transnational politics is essential in conflict analysis.

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Mobilisation into violence

Processes of mobilisation

People or groups do not haphazardly fight each other, even if stark inequalities or other grievances prevail in a society; rather, they need to be mobilised. An understanding of these processes of mobilisation is critical to understanding and preventing violent conflict.

Research has demonstrated that some form of ideology or legitimising narrative is usually required to mobilise people into collective action – including of a violent nature. Many authors argue that identity-based ideologies are particularly effective: it is easier for leaders to mobilise followers based on ethnicity or religion, as targets are more easily identifiable; loyalties are more fixed and unambiguous; and (in the case religion in particular) there are often ready-made networks that can be used for mass recruitment for war efforts. Others stress, however, that identities are socially constructed (see section on identity politics ) and that processes of ethnic or religious mobilisation are similar to those in other types of conflict, such as class conflicts. Most authors agree, however, that to be effective, legitimising ideologies must resonate with existing narratives in a society. For example, in Rwanda, research has found that mobilisation required the existence of a collective memory among the Hutu population of a history of oppression at the hands of the Tutsi population, which was then utilised and distorted in the genocidal propaganda.

Kalyvas, S. N, 2008, ‘Ethnic Defection in Civil War’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 41, no. 8, pp. 1043- 1068 How common is ethnic defection during civil war? This study examines the relationship between ethnic identity and civil war and points to instances of fluidity in the expression of ethnic identities within civil war. It argues that ethnic defection is best predicted by the extent of territorial control exercised by the main political actors and the level of prior insurgent violence. Ethnic defection is a function of the resources available to political actors. It is important therefore to analyse the internal dynamics of civil wars.

McDoom, O., 2005, ‘Rwanda's Ordinary Killers: Interpreting Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide’, Working Paper, no. 77, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London The theory that state influence alone can trigger genocide is an insufficient explanation of the 1994 genocide of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda. This paper reports on a research project that examines the question of why so many ordinary Hutus participated in the genocide. The bottom- up factor of a Hutu mindset of historic grievances against Tutsis was a necessary pre-condition for genocide of this scale and execution to occur.

Eck, K., 2009, ‘From Armed Conflict to War: Ethnic Mobilisation and Conflict Intensification’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 369 – 388 Are conflicts in which rebels mobilise along ethnic lines more likely to see intensified violence than nonethnically mobilised conflicts? This article argues that the ease of attribution of qualities or characteristics to ethnic groups helps with the identification of potential rebels and facilitates a rebel group’s growth, leading to an increased risk for war. Ethnically mobilised armed conflicts are shown to have a 92 percent higher risk for intensification to war. The article also looks at intensification of conflict over time, the most intense period being the first year.

Harpviken, K. B. and Røislien, H. E., 2008, ‘Faithful Brokers? Potentials and Pitfalls of Religion in Peacemaking', Conflict Resolution Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 351- 373

Conflict Characteristics, Dynamics and Impact

Conflict: Topic Guide , revised 2014, GSDRC 24

What potential do religious actors have for acting as constructive peacemakers? How does the fundamental identity of the peace broker affect the chances of success? This article examines the role of religious actors in peacemaking. Three facets of religion – norms, identity, and organisation

• are analysed. Each may feed into the emergence or escalation of conflict, and each is in itself transformed through exposure to armed conflict. Similarly, each facet forms part of the peacemaking potential of religious actors. Religious brokers may be of three distinct types: the 'liaison', the 'coordinator', and the 'representative'. Religious actors should not be assumed to have inherent peacemaking capability, but religion is an integral dimension of most attempts to foster peace and must not be neglected.

For additional discussion and resources on ethno-religious mobilisation, see identity politics under causes of conflict.

For discussion and resources on the role of religious actors in peacemaking and peacebuilding, see ‘religious peacemaking’ in direct prevention mechanisms and ‘religious actors’ in non-state actors

and peacebuilding.

Micro-dynamics of armed groups

Greater attention has been paid in recent years to micro-level analysis of violent conflict, in particular: why individuals decide to fight, incentive structures, how armed groups are formed and how they function. While such research can be challenging and time-consuming, an understanding of these motivations and micro-dynamics is critical in designing strategies to deter individual and group participation in violence and to influence conflict management and peace processes with armed groups.

On an individual level, recent research on participation in civil war (based on surveys of fighters in Sierra Leone) finds that socioeconomic grievances, the expectation of material incentives and personal safety, and social pressures linked to family and community, are all important motivations. Involuntary participation – the abduction or coercion into service - is also a critical issue. It is important to recognise that the determinants of individual participation and mobilisation are dynamic and vary over time. It is especially challenging for armed groups to motivate people to participate when the risks are high and returns uncertain.

On a group level, the development of armed groups often relies on pre-existing structures and institutional settings. Recent research on the formation of armed groups identifies three key mechanisms through which such groups come into existence: the resort to armed action by opposition that has been violently repressed by government forces; resort to armed action by individuals who feel excluded from neo-patrimonial networks organise; the evolution of state- supported irregular forces into free actors. These differently formed groups vary in their legitimacy and their ability to attract and sustain members and popular support, with the first type of formation having the most legitimacy and stability.

Humphreys, M., and Weinstein, J. M., 2008, 'Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War', American Journal of Political Science, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 436- 455 Why do individuals choose to participate in civil war? Why do some individuals fight against the government while others defend the status quo? This study tests the three major theories relating to participation using testimony from ex-combatants who participated in Sierra Leone's civil war. The results indicate the relevance of all three theories: grievance, selective incentives, and social sanctions, directing attention to the interaction between them. Factors such as poverty, a lack of access to education, and political alienation prove to be important in determining participation but