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CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
BUCKLEY ET AL. V. VALEO, SECRETARY OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE, ET AL.
APPEAL FROM (^) THE UNITED STATES (^) COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT (^) OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 75-436. Argued November (^) 10, 1975- Decided January (^) 30, 1976*
The Federal Election (^) Campaign Act of (^1971) (Act), as amended in 1974, (^) (a) limits political contributions (^) to candidates (^) for federal elective office (^) by an individual or a (^) group to $1,000 and by a political committee (^) to $5,000 to any (^) single candidate per election, with an (^) overall annual limitation (^) of $25,000 by an individual contributor; (^) (b) limits expenditures (^) by individuals or groups "relative (^) to a clearly (^) identified candidate" (^) to $1,000 (^) per candidate per election, and by a (^) candidate from his personal (^) or family funds to various specified (^) annual amounts depending (^) upon the federal office (^) sought, and restricts overall (^) general election and primary (^) campaign expenditures (^) by candidates to various (^) specified amounts, again (^) depending upon the federal (^) office sought; (c) re- quires political (^) committees to keep detailed (^) records of contribu- tions and (^) expenditures, including the (^) name and address of each individual contributing in (^) excess of $10, and his occupation (^) and
*Together with No. 75-437, Buckley et al. (^) v. Valeo, Secretary of
the United States (^) Senate, et al., on appeal (^) from the United States District Court (^) for the District of Columbia.
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
Syllabus 424 U. S.
principal place of business if his contribution exceeds $100, and to file quarterly reports with the Federal Election Commission disclosing the source of every contribution exceeding $100 and the recipient and^ purpose^ of^ every^ expenditure^ over^ $100,^ and also requires every individual or group, other than a candidate or political committee, making contributions or expenditures ex- ceeding $100 "other than by contribution to a political committee or candidate" to file a statement with the Commission; and (d) creates the eight-member Commission as the administering agency with recordkeeping, disclosure, and investigatory functions and extensive rulemaking, adjudicatory, and enforcement powers, and consisting of two members appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, two by the Speaker of the House, and two by the President (all subject to confirmation by both Houses of Congress), and the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House as ex officio nonvoting members. Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC), as amended in 1974, provides for public financing of Presidential nominating conven- tions and general election and primary campaigns from general revenues and allocates such funding to conventions and general election campaigns by establishing three categories: (1) "major" parties (those whose candidate received 25% or more of the vote in the most recent election), which receive full funding; (2) "minor" parties (those whose candidate received at least 5% but less than 25% of the votes at the last election), which receive only a percentage of the funds to which the major parties are en- titled; and (3) "new" parties (all other parties), which are limited to receipt of post-election funds or are not entitled to any funds if their candidate receives less than 5% of the vote. A primary can- didate for the Presidential nomination by a political party who receives more than $5,000 from private sources (counting only the first $250 of each contribution) in each of at least 20 States is eligible for matching public funds. Appellants (various federal officeholders and candidates, supporting political organizations, and others) brought suit against appellees (the Secretary of the Senate, Clerk of the House, Comptroller General, Attorney Gen- eral, and the Commission) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the above statutory provisions on various constitu- tional grounds. The Court of Appeals, on certified questions from the District Court, upheld all but one of the statutory provisions. A three-judge District Court upheld the constitution- ality of Subtitle H. Held:
OCTOBER TERM,^1975
Syllabus 424 U.^ S.
pendent contributions^ and^ expenditures,^ as^ narrowly^ construed to apply only^ (1)^ when^ they^ make^ contributions^ earmarked^ for political purposes or^ authorized^ or^ requested^ by^ a^ candidate^ or his agent to some^ person^ other^ than^ a^ candidate^ or^ political^ com- mittee and (2)^ when^ they^ make^ an^ expenditure^ for^ a^ communi- cation that expressly^ advocates^ the^ election^ or^ defeat^ of^ a^ clearly identified candidate is^ not^ unconstitutionally^ vague^ and^ does^ not constitute a prior restraint but^ is^ a^ reasonable^ and^ minimally restrictive method^ of^ furthering^ First^ Amendment^ values^ by pub- lic exposure^ of^ the^ federal^ election^ system.^ Pp.^ 74-82. (c) The extension of^ the^ recordkeeping^ provisions^ to^ con- tributions as^ small^ as^ those^ just^ above^ $10^ and^ the^ disclosure provisions to^ contributions^ above^ $100^ is^ not^ on^ this^ record overbroad since^ it^ cannot^ be^ said^ to^ be^ unrelated^ to^ the^ informa- tional and^ enforcement^ goals^ of^ the^ legislation.^ Pp.^ 82-84.
- Subtitle H^ of^ the^ IRC^ is^ constitutional.^ Pp.^ 85-109. (a) Subtitle H^ is^ not^ invalid^ under^ the^ General^ Welfare Clause but, as^ a^ means^ to^ reform^ the^ electoral^ process, was^ clearly a choice within^ the^ power^ granted^ to^ Congress^ by^ the^ Clause^ to decide which expenditures^ will^ promote^ the^ general^ welfare.^ Pp. 90-92. (b) Nor^ does^ Subtitle^ H^ violate^ the^ First^ Amendment. Rather than abridging, restricting,^ or^ censoring^ speech,^ it^ repre- sents an effort to use public^ money^ to^ facilitate^ and^ enlarge public discussion and participation^ in^ the^ electoral^ process.^ Pp. 92-93. (c) Subtitle H, being^ less^ burdensome^ than^ ballot-access regulations and having^ been^ enacted^ in^ furtherance^ of^ vital governmental interests^ in^ relieving^ major-party^ candidates^ from the rigors^ of^ soliciting^ private^ contributions,^ in^ not^ funding candidates who^ lack significant^ public^ support,^ and^ in^ eliminating reliance on^ large^ private^ contributions^ for^ funding^ of^ conventions and campaigns, does not^ invidiously^ discriminate^ against^ minor and new parties^ in^ violation^ of^ the^ Due^ Process^ Clause^ of^ the Fifth Amendment. Pp.^ 93-108. (d) Invalidation of the^ spending-limit^ provisions^ of^ the^ Act does not^ render^ Subtitle^ H^ unconstitutional,^ but^ the^ Subtitle^ is severable from such provisions^ and^ is^ not^ dependent^ upon^ the existence of^ a^ generally^ applicable^ expenditure^ limit.^ Pp.^ 108-109.
- The Commission's^ composition^ as^ to^ all^ but^ its^ investigative and informative^ powers^ violates^ Art.^ II,^ §^ 2,^ cl.^ 2.^ With^ respect to the Commission's^ powers,^ all^ of^ which^ are^ ripe^ for^ review,
BUCKLEY v. VALEO
Syllabus
to enforce the Act, including primary responsibility^ for^ bringing civil actions against^ violators,^ to^ make^ rules^ for^ carrying^ out^ the Act, to temporarily disqualify federal candidates for failing^ to^ file required reports, and to authorize convention expenditures^ in excess of the specified limits, the^ provisions^ of^ the^ Act^ vesting such powers in the Commission and the prescribed method of appointment of members of the Commission to the extent that a majority of the voting members are appointed^ by the^ President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House,^ violate the Appointments Clause, which provides in pertinent part that the President shall nominate,^ and^ with^ the^ Senate's^ advice^ and consent appoint, all "Officers of the United States," whose appoint- ments are not otherwise provided for, but that^ Congress^ may vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as it deems proper, in the President alone, in^ the^ courts,^ or^ in^ the^ heads^ of^ depart- ments. Hence (though the Commission's past acts are accorded de facto validity and a stay is granted permitting it to function under the Act for not more than 30 days), the Commission, as presently constituted, may^ not^ because^ of^ that^ Clause^ exercise^ such powers, which can be exercised only by "Officers of the United States" appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause, although it may exercise such investigative and informative powers as are in the same category as those powers that Congress might delegate to^ one^ of^ its^ own^ committees.^ Pp.^ 109-143.
No. 75-436, 171 U. S. App. D.^ C.^ 172,^519 F.^ 2d^ 821,^ affirmed^ in part and reversed in part; No. 75-437,^401 F.^ Supp.^ 1235,^ affirmed.
Per curiam opinion, in the "case or controversy" part of which (post, pp. 11-12) all participating Members joined; and as to all other Parts of which BRENNAN, STEWART, and^ POWELL,^ JJ.,^ joined; MARSHALL, J., joined in all but Part I-C-2; BLACKMUN,^ J.,^ joined in all but Part I-B; REHNQUIST, J., joined in all^ but^ Part^ III-B-1; BURGER, C. J., joined in Parts I-C and IV (except insofar as it accords de facto validity for the Commission's past acts); and WHITE, J., joined in Part III. BURGER, C. J., post, p. 235, WHITE, J., post, p. 257, MARSHALL, J., post,^ p.^ 286,^ BLACKMUN,^ J.,^ post, p. 290, and REHNQUIST, J., post, p. 290,^ filed^ opinions^ concurring in part and dissenting in part. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the eases.
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., pro hac vice, Joel M. Gora, and
BUCKLEY v. VALEO
Per (^) Curiam
The (^) Court of Appeals, in sustaining (^) the legislation (^) in large (^) part against (^) various constitutional (^) challenges,' viewed it as (^) "by far the most (^) comprehensive (^) reform legis- lation [ever] (^) passed by Congress (^) concerning (^) the election of the President, (^) Vice-President, (^) and (^) members of (^) Con- gress." (^171) U. (^) S. App. D. C. (^) 172, 182, (^519) F. 2d 821, 831 (1975). (^) The statutes (^) at issue (^) summarized in (^) broad terms, (^) contain the (^) following provisions: (^) (a) (^) individual political (^) contributions (^) are limited (^) to $1,000 to (^) any single candidate (^) per election, (^) with an overall (^) annual limitation of (^) $25,000 by any (^) contributor; (^) independent (^) expenditures by individuals (^) and groups (^) "relative (^) to a clearly (^) iden- tified (^) candidate" (^) are limited (^) to $1,000 a (^) year; cam- paign spending by candidates (^) for various federal offices and (^) spending for national (^) conventions (^) by political (^) parties are subject (^) to prescribed (^) limits; (b) (^) contributions (^) and expenditures (^) above certain (^) threshold (^) levels must be (^) re- ported and publicly disclosed; (^) (c) a (^) system for public funding of Presidential (^) campaign (^) activities (^) is established by Subtitle H (^) of the Internal (^) Revenue (^) Code;' and (d) a (^) Federal Election (^) Commission (^) is established (^) to ad- minister and enforce (^) the legislation. This (^) suit was (^) originally filed (^) by appellants (^) in the United States (^) District Court (^) for the District (^) of Colum- bia. Plaintiffs (^) included a (^) candidate for (^) the Presidency of the United (^) States, a United States Senator (^) who is (^) a candidate for (^) re-election, (^) a potential (^) contributor, the
2 171 U. S. App. (^) D. C. 172, 519 F. 2d (^821) (1975). 3 The Revenue (^) Act of 1971, (^) Title VIII, (^85) Stat. 562, as amended, 87 Stat. (^) 138, and further (^) amended by the Federal Election (^) Campaign Act Amendments (^) of 1974, (^) § 403 et seq., (^) 88 Stat. 1291. (^) This Sub- title consists (^) of two parts: (^) Chapter (^95) deals with funding (^) national party conventions (^) and general (^) election campaigns (^) for President, (^) and Chapter (^96) deals with (^) matching funds (^) for Presidential (^) primary
campaigns.
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
Per Curiam 424 U. S.
Committee for a Constitutional Presidency-McCarthy '76, the Conservative Party (^) of the State of New York,
the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party,
the New York Civil Liberties Union, Inc., the American
Conservative Union, the Conservative Victory Fund, and
Human Events, Inc. The defendants included the Sec-
retary of the United States Senate and the Clerk of the
United States House of Representatives, both in their official capacities and as ex officio members of the (^) Fed- eral Election Commission. The Commission (^) itself was
named as a defendant. Also named (^) were the Attor-
ney General of the United States and the Comptroller General of the United States. Jurisdiction was asserted under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 2201,
and 2202, and § 315 (a) of the Act, 2 U. S. C. § 437h (a)
(1970 ed., Supp. IV).' The complaint sought both a
4 § 437h. Judicial review. "(a) (^) ...
"The Commission, the national committee of any political party, or any individual eligible to vote in any election for the (^) office of President of the United States may institute such actions in the appropriate district court of the United States, including actions for declaratory judgment, as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision of this Act or of section 608, 610, 611, (^) 613, 614, 615, 616, or 617 of Title 18. The district court im- mediately shall certify all questions of constitutionality of this Act or of section 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, or 617 of Title 18, to the United States court of appeals for the circuit involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc. cc(b) ... "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, (^) any decision on a matter certified under subsection (a) of this section shall be review- able by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. Such appeal shall be brought no later than 20 days after the decision of the court of appeals. "4(c) (^) ...
"It shall be the duty of the court of appeals and of the Supreme Court of the United States to advance on the docket (^) and to expedite
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
Per Curiam 424 U. S.
Judge entered a memorandum order^ adopting^ extensive findings of fact arid transmitting the augmented record
back to the Court of Appeals.
On plenary review, a majority of the Court of Appeals
rejected, for the most part,^ appellants'^ constitutional
attacks. The court found "a clear and compelling
interest," 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 192, 519 F. 2d, at 841,
in preserving the^ integrity^ of^ the^ electoral^ process.^ On that basis, the court upheld, with one exception,' the sub-
stantive provisions of^ the^ Act^ with respect^ to^ contribu- tions, expenditures, and disclosure. It also sustained the
constitutionality of the newly established Federal Elec-
tion Commission. The court concluded that, notwith-
standing the manner of selection of its^ members^ and^ the breadth of its powers, which included nonlegislative func- tions, the Commission is a constitutionally authorized agency created to perform primarily legislative functions.'
- 171 U. S. App. D. C.^ 168,^ 170, 519^ F.^ 2d^ 817,^819 (1975). The case was argued simultaneously to both the Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, and a three-judge District Court. The three-judge court limited its consideration to issues under Subtitle H. The three-judge court adopted the Court of Appeals' opinion on these questions in toto and simply entered an order with respect^ to^ those matters. 401 F. Supp. 1235. Thus, two judgments are before us- one from each court-upholding the constitutionality of Subtitle H, though the two cases before the Court will generally be referred to hereinafter in the singular. Since the jurisdiction of this Court to hear at least one of the appeals is clear, we need not resolve the jurisdictional ambiguities that occasioned the joint^ sitting^ of^ the Court of Appeals and the three-judge court. The court held one provision, (^) § 437a, unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on the ground that the provision is " 'susceptible to a reading necessitating reporting by groups whose only connection with the elective process arises^ from^ completely^ nonpartisan^ public discussion of issues of public importance.'" 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 183, 519 F. 2d, at 832. No appeal has been taken from that holding. " The court recognized that some of the powers delegated to the
BUCKLEY v. VALEO
(^1) Per (^) Curiam
The provisions (^) for (^) public funding (^) of (^) the three stages (^) of the Presidential (^) selection process (^) were (^) upheld as a valid exercise (^) of (^) congressional power under (^) the General (^) Wel- fare Clause (^) of the (^) Constitution, (^) Art. I, (^) § 8. In (^) this Court, (^) appellants (^) argue (^) that the (^) Court of Appeals (^) failed to (^) give this legislation (^) the (^) critical scrutiny demanded (^) under (^) accepted (^) First Amendment (^) and equal protection (^) principles. (^) In appellants' (^) view, (^) limiting (^) the use of money for political purposes (^) constitutes (^) a restric- tion (^) on communication (^) violative (^) of the First (^) Amend- ment, (^) since (^) virtually all (^) meaningful (^) political (^) communi- cations (^) in the (^) modern setting (^) involve (^) the expenditure (^) of money. (^) Further, (^) they (^) argue that (^) the reporting (^) and dis- closure provisions (^) of the Act (^) unconstitutionally (^) impinge on (^) their right (^) to freedom (^) of association. (^) Appellants also view (^) the federal (^) subsidy provisions (^) of Subtitle (^) H as violative (^) of the General (^) Welfare (^) Clause, (^) and as incon- sistent (^) with the (^) First and (^) Fifth Amendments. (^) Finally, appellants (^) renew their attack (^) on the Commission's (^) com- position (^) and powers. At the outset (^) we must (^) determine (^) whether (^) the case before us (^) presents a (^) "case or (^) controversy" (^) within (^) the meaning (^) of Art. (^) III of the (^) Constitution. (^) Congress (^) may not, (^) of course, (^) require (^) this Court (^) to render (^) opinions in matters (^) which (^) are not "cases (^) or controversies." (^) Aetna Life Ins. Co. (^) v. Haworth, (^) 300 U. S. (^) 227, 240-241 (^) (1937). (^) We must (^) therefore (^) decide (^) whether appellants (^) have (^) the "per- sonal (^) stake (^) in the outcome (^) of the (^) controversy" (^) necessary to meet (^) the requirements (^) of (^) Art. III. (^) Baker v. Carr, (^) 369 U. S. (^) 186, (^204) (1962). It (^) is clear that (^) Congress, (^) in en-
Commission, when (^) exercised (^) in a concrete context, may (^) be predom- inantly (^) executive (^) or judicial or (^) unrelated to (^) the Commission's (^) legis- lative (^) function; (^) however, since (^) the Commission (^) had not yet exercised most (^) of these challenged (^) powers, (^) consideration (^) of the (^) constitution- ality (^) of those grants (^) of authority (^) was postponed. (^) See (^) n. 157, infra.
BUCKLEY v. VALEO
1 Per Curiam
tions on political contributions (^) and expenditures that
apply broadly to all phases of and all participants in (^) the election process. The major contribution and expendi- ture limitations (^) in the Act prohibit individuals from contributirg more than $25,000 in a single year or more than $1,000 to any single candidate for an elec- tion campaign " and from spending more than $1, a year "relative to a (^) clearly identified candidate." 13 Other provisions restrict a candidate's use of personal and family resources in his campaign " and limit the overall amornt that can be spent by a candidate in campaigning for federal office." The constitutional power of Congress to regulate fed- eral elections is well established and is not questioned by any of the parties in this case.' Thus, the critical con-
12See 18 U. S. C. §§ 608 (b) (1), (3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), set forth in the (^) Appendix, infra, at 189. An organization registered as a political committee for not less than six months which has re- ceived contributions from at least 50 persons and made contributions to at least five candidates may give up to $5,000 to any candidate for any election. 18 U. S. C. § 608 (b) (2) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), set forth in the Appendix, infra, at 189. Other groups are limited to making contributions of $1,000 per candidate per election. "1 See 18 U. S. C. § 608 (e) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), set forth in the Appendix, infra, at 193-194. 14 See 18 U. S. C. § 608 (a) (1970 (^) ed., Supp. IV), set forth in the Appendix, infra, at 187-189. 1 See 18 U. S. C. § 608 (c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), set forth in the Appendix, infra, (^) at 190-192. 16 Article I, § 4, of the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate elections (^) of members of the Senate and House of Repre- sentatives. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 (1932); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1884). Although the Court at one time indicated that party primary contests were not "elections" within the meaning of Art. I, § 4, Newberry (^) v. United States, 256 U. S. 232 (1921), it later held that primary elections were within the Constitution's grant of authority to Congress. United States v.
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
Per Curiam 424 U. S.
stitutional questions presented here go not to the basic
power of Congress to legislate^ in^ this^ area,^ but^ to whether
the specific legislation that^ Congress^ has^ enacted^ inter-
feres with First Amendment freedoms or invidiously dis-
criminates against nonincumbent candidates and^ minor
parties in contravention of the Fifth Amendment.
A. General Principles
The Act's contribution and^ expenditure^ limitations
operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amend-
ment activities.^ Discussion^ of^ public^ issues^ and^ debate
on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government established by
our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression in order
"to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people." Roth^ v.^ United^ States,^^354 U.^ S.^ 476,^484 (1957). Although First Amendment protections are not confined to "the exposition of ideas," Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948), "there is practically uni- versal agreement that a major purpose of that Amend- ment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs,... of course includ[ing] discussions of candi-
dates. ... " Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966).
This no more than reflects our "profound national com- mitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964). In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candi-
Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941). The Court has also recognized broad congressional power to legislate in connection with the elections of the President and Vice President. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534 (1934). See Part III, infra.
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
Per Curiam 424 IT.^ S.
that those provisions should be viewed as^ regulating
conduct, not speech, the Court^ of^ Appeals relied^ upon United State's v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). See 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 191, 519 F. 2d, at 840. The O'Brien case involved a defendant's claim that the First Amend- ment prohibited his prosecution for burning his draft card because his act^ was^ "'symbolic^ speech'"^ engaged^ in^ as a "'demonstration against^ the^ war^ and^ against^ the^ draft.'" 391 U. S., at 376. On^ the^ assumption^ that^ "the^ alleged communicative element^ in^ O'Brien's^ conduct^ [was]^ suffi- cient to bring into play the First Amendment," the Court sustained the conviction because it^ found^ "a^ sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non- speech element" that was "unrelated to the^ suppression of free expression" and that had an "incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms... no greater than [was] essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id., at 376-377. The Court expressly emphasized that O'Brien was not a case "where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct arises in some measure be- cause the communication allegedly integral to the con- duct is itself thought to be harmful." Id., at 382. We cannot share^ the^ view^ that^ the present^ Act's^ con- tribution and expenditure limitations are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in O'Brien. The ex- penditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card. Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spend- ing of money involve speech alone, some involve con- duct primarily, and some involve a combination of^ the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the de- pendence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce^ the^ exacting^ scrutiny^ required^ by^ the First Amendment. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809,
BUCKLEY v. VALEO
1 Per Curiam
820 (1975); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra,
at 266. For example, in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965), the Court (^) contrasted picketing and parading with a newspaper comment and a telegram by a citi- zen to a public official. The parading (^) and picketing activities were said to constitute conduct "intertwined with expression and association," whereas the newspaper comment and the telegram (^) were described as a "pure form of expression" involving "free speech alone" rather than "expression mixed (^) with particular conduct." Id., at 563-564. Even if (^) the categorization of the expenditure of money as conduct were accepted, the limitations challenged here would not meet the O'Brien test because the govern- mental interests advanced in support of the Act involve ''suppressing (^) communication." (^) The (^) interests (^) served by
the Act include restricting the voices of people and inter- est groups who have money to spend and reducing (^) the overall scope of federal election campaigns. (^) Although the Act does not focus on the ideas expressed by persons or groups subject to its regulations, (^) it is aimed in part at equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes by placing a ceiling on expenditures for political expression by citizens and groups. Unlike O'Brien, where the (^) Selective Service System's admin- istrative interest in the preservation of draft cards was wholly unrelated to their use as a means of communica- tion, it is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged "conduct" of giving or spending money "arises (^) in some (^) measure because (^) the communication (^) al-
legedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful." 391 U. S., at 382. Nor can the Act's contribution and expenditure (^) limita- tions be sustained, as some of the parties suggest, by reference to the constitutional principles reflected in such
BUCKLEY v. VALEO
Per Curiam
A restriction on (^) the amount of money a person or
group can spend on political communication during a
campaign (^) necessarily reduces the quantity of expression
by restricting the number of issues (^) discussed, the depth of
their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. 8
This is because virtually (^) every means of communicating
ideas in today's mass society requires (^) the expenditure of
money. The distribution of (^) the humblest handbill or
leaflet entails printing, paper, and (^) circulation costs.
Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring (^) a hall and publicizing the event. (^) The electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, (^) and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive
modes of communication indispensable instruments of
effective political (^) speech. The expenditure limitations contained in the Act rep- resent substantial rather than merely (^) theoretical re- straints on the quantity and diversity of political (^) speech. The (^) $1,000 ceiling on spending "relative to a clearly identified candidate," 18 U. S. C. § 608 (e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), would appear to exclude (^) all citizens and groups except candidates, political parties, (^) and the insti-
tutional press (^) 19 from any significant use of the most
1s Being free to engage in unlimited (^) political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one (^) desires on a single tank of gasoline. 19 Political parties that (^) fail to qualify a candidate for a position on the ballot are classified as "persons" and are subject to the $1,000 independent expenditure ceiling. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 591 (g), (i), 608 (e) (1), (f) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Institutional press facili- ties owned (^) or controlled by candidates or political parties are also subject (^) to expenditure limits under the Act. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 591 (f) (4) (A), 608 (c) (2) (B), (e) (1) (^) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Unless otherwise indicated all (^) subsequent statutory citations in Part i of this opinion are to Title 18 of the United (^) States Code, 1970 edition, Supplement IV.
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
Per Curiam 424 U. S.
effective modes of communication.2 0^ Although the Act's
limitations on expenditures by campaign organizations
and political parties provide substantially greater room
for discussion and debate, they would have required re-
strictions in the scope of a number of past congressional
and Presidential campaigns 21 and would operate to con-
strain campaigning by candidates who raise sums in ex-
cess of the spending ceiling.
By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for
political expression, a limitation upon the amount that
any one person or group may contribute to a candidate
or political committee entails only a marginal restriction
upon the contributor's ability to engage in free com-
20 The record indicates that, as of January 1, 1975, one full-page advertisement in a daily edition of a certain metropolitan newspaper cost $6,971.04-almost seven times the annual limit on expenditures "relative to" a particular (^) candidate imposed (^) on the vast majority of individual citizens and associations by § 608 (e) (1). 21 The statistical findings of fact agreed to by the parties (^) in the District Court indicate that 17 of 65 major-party senatorial candi- dates in 1974 spent more than the combined primary-election, general-election, and fundraising limitations imposed by the Act. §§ 591 (f)(4)(H), 608 (c)(1)(C), (D). The 1972 senatorial figures showed that 18 of 66 major-party candidates ex- ceeded the Act's limitations. This figure may substantially underestimate the number of candidates who exceeded the limits provided in the Act, since the Act imposes separate ceilings for the primary election, the general election, and fundraising, and does not permit the limits to be aggregated. § 608 (c) (3). The data for House of Representatives elections are also skewed, since statistics reflect a combined $168,000 limit instead of (^) sepa- rate $70,000 ceilings for primary and general elections with up to an additional 20% permitted for fundraising. §§ 591 (f) (4) (H), 608 (c) (1) (E). Only 22 of the 810 major-party House candi- dates in 1974 and 20 of the 816 major-party candidates in 1972 exceeded the $168,000 figure. Both Presidential candidates in 1972 spent in excess of the combined Presidential expenditure ceilings. §§ 608 (c)(1)(A), (B).
