The Evolution and Classification of Basic Emotions: A Historical Perspective, Study notes of Psychology

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Basic Emotions: Classification and construction in the late

nineteenth century

Examination Number: B M.Sc. History and Theory of Psychology The University of Edinburgh August 2011

Table of Contents

• Acknowledgements................................................................................................................
• Abstract.....................................................................................................................................
• Introduction .............................................................................................................................
• Sources ......................................................................................................................................
• Chapter 1: The Basic Emotions of Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer ..................
• Chapter 2: Varieties of Classification at the End of the Nineteenth Century ...........
• Chapter 3: Scientific Psychology and Basic Emotions as Instincts .............................
• Conclusion .............................................................................................................................
• References ..............................................................................................................................

Abstract

This is an historical study looking at the notion of basic emotions and emotions classifications as they were formulated throughout the late nineteenth century. Emotions have been, and are, classified into those viewed as basic and complex by philosophers and Psychologists, but this way of organising emotions has been criticised as not being useful to the understanding of emotion. As a result, it has been argued by Solomon(2002) that a historical examination of the concept of basic emotions is required in order to contextualise the way in which it is now defined. This study shows how the concept of basic emotions, and the classifications which were based on it, altered during the late nineteenth century from those which had a moral basis to those which were defined by evolutionary and physiological notions of emotion. Further, it shows that it was framed differently by theorists depending on how they viewed the mind and the methodology they advocated. It argues that the basic emotions concept and the classifications which are based on it are constructed in particular ways at particular times and are subject to both academic and social assumptions about human behaviour.

Introduction

I would argue that the notion of ‚basic emotions‛ is neither meaningless nor so straightforward as its critics and defenders respectively argue, but it is historical and culturally situated and serves very different purposes in different contexts, including different research contexts<It is a subject with a rich history, and it is not one that can be readily understood within the confines of a technical debate in the Psychological Review .‛ (Solomon, 2002, p. 124)

The idea that emotions can and should be classified has pervaded philosophical conceptions of feeling for centuries (Solomon, 2002). Descartes, for example, considered the six primitive passions to be wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness and many other taxonomies of emotions were produced throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (e.g. Browne, Hamilton and Spencer cited in Bain, 1865; McCosh, 1880; Ladd, 1893). This notion of classification has also been embraced by many emotions theorists in Psychology as a way of imposing some structure on a psychological phenomenon which might otherwise prove theoretically unmanageable (e.g. McDougall, 1910; Izard, 1977; Panskepp, 1982; Ekman et al. , 1982; Frijda, 1986). Classifications of emotions then provide frameworks in which the breadth of human emotional experience can be fitted, and explanations as to how emotions may be related to each other. Definitions of the basic emotion concept are often the basis for classifications; a way of separating out those which are primary and those which are secondary in terms of particular attributes (Ortony and Turner, 1990; Solomon, 2002; Prinz, 2004). The primary emotions vary but are generally seen as simple and psychologically or biologically indivisible and in various combinations together make up the secondary emotions; for example, ‘anger’ and ‘fear’ together making ‘jealousy’.

Panskepp, 2004; Prinz, 2004). Fear, for example, is seen as response to danger which prepares us to fight or run and ensures that we respond to a threat. It is therefore an adapted physiological response which promotes survival (Prinz, 2004).

Despite the acceptance by most theorists of the above view, the continuing lack of

consensus in lists of basic emotions has led certain psychologists and philosophers

to question the usefulness of this concept and to call either for its abandonment (Ortony and Turner, 1990; Sander et al. , 2007) or for the redefinition of what is essentially a materialistic view to incorporate cultural influences (e.g. Solomon, 2002; Prinz, 2004). However, the biological-evolutionary conceptualisation appears to become ever more entrenched as the discipline of affective neuroscience is currently viewed by many theorists as providing the most likely methodological paradigm in Psychology from which the evidence for basic emotions will emerge (e.g. Panskepp, 1992; Davidson, 2003; Izard, 2007). This paradigm continues then to inform lists of classifications of emotions and basic emotions as it is taken up and used by successive theorists using different methodological approaches as they seek to move towards greater refinement (Tomkins, 1984; Panskepp, 1992; Izard, 2007). But as science makes progress as much away from past theories as it does towards final solutions (Kuhn cited in Hacking, 2001) so also do the definitions of its concepts emerge from previous definitions. As Solomon’s statement at the beginning of the chapter shows, there is a need for an examination of the history of the basic emotions concept in order that a deeper understanding of its current meaning is reached and through which current research can be better understood and contextualised.

This need is for two particular reasons. First, because past contexts within which meanings of the concept were established and evolved are relevant to how it is now used. Foucault (2010)^2 states in Archaeology of Knowledge, ‚The history of a concept is

(^2) Archaeology of Knowledge was first published in 1969

not wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement, its continuously increasing rationality, its abstraction gradient...but successive rules of use and the theoretical contexts in which it developed and matured.‛ (p.5). Historical evidence can provide what Foucault calls the ‚genealogy‛ of a concept (Foucault, 1980, p.140), from which the contemporary use of a term has emerged. It can do so by showing past usages and debates over use which are a part of current conceptualisations but knowledge of which has been forgotten over time. As Danziger (1982) says, ‚scientific development cannot take off from a theoretical vacuum but must make use of the conceptual equipment bequeathed to it‛ (p.142). An understanding of past usages are relevant to an understanding of the present use. A second reason why there is a need for an examination of the history of basic emotions is because, psychological knowledge is constructed by taking particular forms at particular times, as the concepts it uses are shaped by the thoughts and actions of theorists (Lamont, 2010). An examination of the history of the classification of emotions and of the definition of basic emotions, can reveal how these classifications and definitions have changed over time; that they are not independent of the ontological position of the researcher or their methodological approach, and that further, they are not independent of the historical context in which they are conceived. Therefore, although claims are made by some contemporary theorists that basic emotions are ‘natural kinds’ (Izard, 2007), their history can reveal that often a particular theorist’s assumptions, sometimes tied to the social norms of time and place, has a profound effect on the way in which they are studied and understood.

Solomon (2002) argues that the latter half of the nineteenth century was particularly important for the basic emotions concept, because there was an alteration during that period from a metaphysical understanding, of those emotions required for a complete life, towards the physicalist, one which more closely resembles the current definition. Dixon (2003) also suggests that the nineteenth century was a time of transformation in academic views of the role of affect in people’s lives and that during that time the term ‘emotion’ came to be used almost exclusively to denote the

three related issues : first, the extent to which the definition of the concept of basic emotions was influenced by particular theorists’ ontological views of the mind; secondly, how the methodological approaches theorists advocated affected the way in which they classified emotions and thirdly, the extent to which classifications of emotions altered during this time in relation to the changing conceptualisations of basic emotions and methodologies.

Sources

This is an historical investigation using predominantly primary but also secondary sources. Starting from the application of evolutionary theories to emotion by Spencer in The Principles of Psychology in 1855 up to the definition of basic emotions as connected to evolutionary instincts by, the influential English psychologist, William McDougall in 1910 in An Introduction to Social Psychology 3 , a systematic analysis of the emotions literature from Britain and the U.S.A. will be conducted. These texts have been chosen as the beginning and ending points of the study because, as has been stated, the late nineteenth century was a time of particular change in the understanding of emotions and these are both important contributions to emotions research by prominent theorists at that time. Spencer’s work is particularly significant in that it is the first to address the issue of emotions in terms of evolutionary adaptation (Young, 1990). A large body of literature was produced on the subject of emotions during this period by philosophers, physiologists and psychologists in Britain and the U.S.A^4. There are some theorists who were particularly celebrated at this time, and who are considered as being of the greatest

(^3) An Introduction to Social Psychology was first published in 1908. For the purposes of this study the 3rd edition(1910) has been used but is not significantly different from the first. Twenty-three editions of 4 An Introduction to Social Psychology were published in the U.S.A. between 1908 and 1936. At this time there was much work done also on emotions and classifications of emotions by theorists in France and Germany. Some of these are described in Bain, 1865.

influence on the emotions literature. The works of Spencer (1855), Bain (1859), Charles Darwin (1872), William James (1890) and McDougall (1910), for example, were widely read and highly persuasive. However, this study will also include the ideas of those who were not so prominent, such as James McCosh (1880), G.T. Ladd (1893) and Charles Mercier (1884a; 1884b;1885). These latter three, according to Dixon (2003), were instrumental in producing comprehensive theories and classifications of emotions but are rarely mentioned in histories of Psychology. This period was one during which several Psychology journals were founded, a reflection of the increasing importance of discussion about psychological matters at the time. The dates on which they were founded are shown in brackets: Mind (1876); the American Journal of Psychology (1887); the Psychological Review (1894); and the Psychological Bulletin (1904). The articles relating to emotion in these are examined and discussed if relevant.

These new ways of looking at the mind were altering how emotions were defined and studied, as physiological views were challenging metaphysical and religious concepts(Dixon, 2003). Two of the main proponents of these scientific approaches were Alexander Bain, a Scottish philosopher and physiologist, and Herbert Spencer, a philosopher and biologist. Both were, what Richards(1996) calls, ‚pioneer psychologists‛ (p. 16). This chapter will look at the debate between these two theorists to show how their approaches produced different constructions of basic emotions and of classifications. First, it will describe how they differed in terms of how they understood the mind and in so doing produced different understandings, and descriptions, of basic emotions. Further, it will examine the methods they advocated in producing classifications and at how these were tied to the academic and social assumptions of the time Finally, it will compare Spencer’s and Bain’s classifications to show how these were shaped by their understandings of basic emotions and the methods they advocated.

Alexander Bain was a Scottish philosopher and physiologist whose approach was to classify and describe psychological phenomena(Richards, 2002) by producing a systematic exposition of the physiology of the nervous system and the mind allied with the ideas of associationist philosophy 5 (Dixon, 2003). In The Emotions and the Will, Bain (1859) 6 describes the emotions using a mixture of physiological, psychological and philosophical thought, and, despite his basic, or special emotions, being described in terms of physiological reactions, the list of emotions he bases on those, he views as having ‚<a certain unity and distinctness as respects their origin in the human constitution‛ (Bain, 1865, p.39). They are those therefore which can be clearly demarcated in terms of their effect on the body and the circumstances in which they arise. Bain’s(1859) basic, or special, emotions then are the law of

(^5) Associationist philosophy is the view that the mind was composed of elements, or ideas organised by various associations 6 Three further editions of The Emotions and the Will were published in 1865, 1875 and 1899 and will also be referred to throughout this chapter.

harmony and conflict; the law of relativity, e.g. wonder and curiosity; terror; tender affections; emotions of self; power; the irascible emotion or anger; emotions of action; the exercise of the intellect. These are the classes of emotions, which he, having reflected upon the range and variety of human affect, observes in himself and others as being most distinct and which best describe the most significant modes of feeling.

The descriptions of individual emotions are distinctly physiological. Thus, ‘terror’ is described as ‚<the cerebral force that was circulating at an ordinary pace through the usual channels...suddenly stimulated to an unusual discharge, withdrawn from these usual paths and vented at once upon the features, the gestures, the utterance and on the spasmodic utterance of volition‛(p.76). The related physical and expressional accompaniments to this ‘diffusion’ are also detailed; for example, ‚derangement of secretions‛, and ‚trembling of the lips and the muscles on the sides of the cheek‛(p.77), However, the psychological character too is described as ‚<a massive and virulent state of misery‛(p.78). These conceptions are in line with much scientific study at the time which had the purpose of providing systematic and detailed descriptions of natural phenomena (Bain, 1859).

In contrast Spencer’s 1855 Principles of Psychology takes a very different, and, at the time, radical view of the mind. In it he was the first to ally associationist ideas about the mind with the application of evolutionary principles of observation of the natural world and adaptation to the environment (Young, 1990). Emotions are described as being on a continuum from those that are primitive and simple to those that are complex and intellect based. The language he uses to describe the basic emotions then relate to emotions as experienced in animals or, what he terms, ‘savages’. Fear is described as:

<nothing else than an impulse, an emotion, a feeling, a desire. To have in a slight degree those psychical states accompanying the reception of wounds,

His use of that word is telling as it points to the nature of scientific knowledge, at how it alters over time and is dependent on the context and time in which it is produced. In relation to the mind this is particularly salient, because of its complexity, its intangibility and of the many ways of understanding and framing it and, therefore, the choices that must be made about what are the most valuable ways of explaining mental phenomena. These choices also are subject to context and time. Bain’s formulation of the basic emotions could be said to be transitional in that it is clear that there is still much to discover about the physiology of the body. Spencer, however, is going further in suggesting that Bain’s understanding of emotions although useful has been overtaken by a new understanding, based on evolutionary ideas; that the concept of basic emotions would be more usefully constructed in a way which reflects these ideas. The definition of the concept then is in transition during the debates between these theorists, each formulating it according to their own views. This is further highlighted by Bain’s and Spencer’s advocacy of alternative methods of study.

As well as combining various views of emotions in his descriptions, Bain also combine’s two methods in the production of his classification. First, he states that he is using the natural history method that has been used in the hard sciences of botany and zoology and gives examples of its usefulness in cataloguing and dividing animals and plants into genera and species. In using this method to classify emotions there is an assumption by Bain that non-physical objects like emotions are characteristically distinct, and that these characteristics can be scrutinised and used to categorise them in some way, despite the fact that they cannot be observed like the physical elements of the natural world. Further, this method provides a way of framing emotions in a way which allows them, like elements in the periodic table, to be discovered and classified systematically in relation to other emotions. This has two consequences. First, discovery rather than understanding of emotions becomes the focus, and secondly, their complexity is lost as they are viewed with regard to particular criteria in order to fit the classification.

Bain’s other method is that of introspection, used for generations by philosophers to study the mind and emotional states. In The Emotions and the Will he describes the value of introspection to the understanding of emotion:

Our own consciousness, formerly reckoned the only medium of knowledge to the mental philosopher must therefore be still referred to as the principal means of discriminating the varieties of human feeling. We have the power of noting agreement and difference among our conscious states, and on this can raise a structure of classification. (Bain, 1859, p. 57)

Spencer (1868) is critical of the process by which Bain observes the emotions in order to classify them. He says ‚ <Mr Bain in confining himself to an account of the emotions as they exist in an adult civilised man has neglected those classes of facts out of which the science of the matter must chiefly be built.‛(p 257). Bain’s introspective method is seen by Spencer as constructing a particular version of the emotions that is exclusive to the mind of people in one sphere of society. However, whilst Spencer criticises Bain for describing the emotions of a particular class of person, the method he advocates for their study is rooted in the assumed position of that very class. Evidence of the more primitive emotions, he says, will be found in studying the behaviour of ‘savages’. He states that:

<we may note the emotional differences between the lower and higher human races – may regard as earlier and simpler those feelings which are common to both, and as later and more compound those which are characteristics of the most civilized. (Spencer, 1868, p. 250)

That a hierarchy of intellectual and emotional states exist, running from the simple to the complex and represented by the social hierarchy running from animals, ‘savages’, the mentally ill, children, women, men, to civilized intellectual European men, is an assumption prevalent at the time (Richards, 2002). It is one which was

Spencer and Bain, therefore, approach the examination of emotions with different questions in mind. Spencer’s method is looking to answer the questions, ‘Which emotions serve in the survival of the species and what purpose do they serve?’. Bain, on the other hand is asking, ‘How are individual emotions experienced and which ones are easily demarcated through the feeling they produce?’. The knowledge about the basic emotions that Bain and Spencer produce therefore is bound to differ. Unlike Bain, Spencer did not put his method into practice in producing a detailed classification. However he does propose one which he sees as ‚in harmony with the results of detailed analysis aided by development‛(1868, p.142) He divides the feelings into presentative feelings, or sensations; presentative-representative feelings, or emotions which arise in response to an immediate event; representative feelings, which are brought about by thinking of an emotion; and re-representative feelings, or emotions which are produced by thinking about events. His classification represents the idea of increasing abstraction and complexity of the emotional state.

Bain’s(1865) classification, as has been stated, is based on his own consciousness, and the phenomenological divisions he finds in his own emotional life. He, however, in responding to Spencer’s criticisms, states that:

It appears therefore, that I have given a classification as nearly agreeing with Mr Spencer’s, as two independent minds can be expected to agree in so vast a subject; (1865, p.605)

The vagueness of Spencer’s classification perhaps accounts for some of the ease of the agreement noted by Bain. The structures of these classifications and the way in which emotions are understood within these classifications, however, are very different. Indeed Bain largely resists entertaining the evolutionary hypothesis in subsequent editions of The Emotions and the Will (1865; 1875; 1899) and adheres to almost the same classification as he proposed in the first edition, whilst looking at the question of evolution in a separate chapter conceding:

< I have fully discussed the bearing of the Evolution hypothesis on the Emotions. The only question here considered is – Do the facts, when viewed in the light of this hypothesis, gain in clearness? As regards, more especially, the great antagonistic couple Love and Anger – I think the effect is happy. (Bain, 1875, p. viii)

Bain does not fully embrace the evolutionary hypothesis with regard to his classification. It cannot easily be incorporated into an existing theory which has been constructed under very different assumptions regarding the study of the mind. It is clear, however, that if it is to be embraced by psychologists as the view of how emotion should be understood and studied it will always provide a particular, not necessarily the only, definition of basic emotions and basis for classification.

The debate between Bain and Spencer then illustrates the irreconcilability of the variations in the basic emotions concept and in the classifications of emotions. For Bain the basic emotions are to be demarcated using introspection and classified using the natural history method; for Spencer, the evolutionary hypothesis is used to separate out emotions in terms of their developmental aspects and comparative psychology used to study them. These theorists therefore construct the idea of the basic emotions and their classifications in relation to their own understandings and assumptions about the most salient aspects of human emotional states, and further, in relation to certain social and academic assumptions of the time.