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Public Perception of Toronto Van Attack: Role of Past VRA Incidents and Terrorism Frames, Lecture notes of Religion

How the public perceived the 2018 Toronto Van Attack through the lens of past VRA incidents and terrorism frames. The study reveals insights into the urgent desire for information and the spread of disinformation on social media, as well as the impact of media frames on public perception. The literature review covers vehicle weaponization, framing terrorism, risk perception, and social media analysis.

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Major Research Paper
Master in Disaster & Emergency Management
York University
Supervisor: Dr. Ali Asgary
Second Reader: Dr. Aaida A. Mamuji
January 2020
Submitted by: Barlu Dumbuya
Vehicle'Weaponization:'A'Social'Media'
Analysis'of'the'2018'Toronto'Vehicle'
Ramming'Attack'
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Download Public Perception of Toronto Van Attack: Role of Past VRA Incidents and Terrorism Frames and more Lecture notes Religion in PDF only on Docsity!

Major Research Paper

Master in Disaster & Emergency Management

York University

Supervisor: Dr. Ali Asgary

Second Reader: Dr. Aaida A. Mamuji

January 2020

Submitted by: Barlu Dumbuya

Vehicle Weaponization: A Social Media

Analysis of the 2018 Toronto Vehicle

Ramming Attack

Abstract

There is a dearth of information on non-terror related vehicle weaponization and the public’s perception of this emerging phenomena. The recent unprecedented 2018 Toronto vehicle ramming attack (VRA) incident captured the attention of the public who turned to social media to seek and tweet information about the incident, show solidarity for the victims and stand with the City of Toronto. This research investigated the public perception of the 2018 Toronto VRA using Twitter. The tweets were used to examine the public’s perception of the Toronto van attacks of April 23, 2018, and how the attributes of VRAs and terrorism frames shaped how the public without verified information, perceived the perpetrator’s motive as terrorism and identity as Muslim. Analyses performed on the Twitter dataset revealed that the public perceived the motive as terrorism and identity as Muslim even after the facts of the incident was revealed that the suspect was of Armenian descent and his motive was incel-inspired. Six related overarching themes were discussed perceived identity, perceived motive, confirmed identity, confirmed motive, international incidents, Canadian incidents and community and support. The study reveals insights into public perceptions of the 2018 Toronto Van Attack, identifying that perceptions were formed based on terrorism frames from past events. The study highlights the need for emergency management professionals to have strategies on social media to consistently disseminate information to counter dis/misinformation.

Table of Contents

  • ABSTRACT
  • ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
  • TABLE OF CONTENTS..............................................................................................................................................
    1. INTRODUCTION
    • 1.1 PURPOSE
    • 1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
    • 1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
    • 1.4 BACKGROUND: THE TORONTO VAN ATTACK
    • 1.5 THE RESPONSE
  • LITERATURE REVIEW
    • 2.1 VEHICLE WEAPONIZATION
    • 2.2 FRAMING TERRORISM
    • 2.3 RISK PERCEPTION
    • 2.4 SOCIAL MEDIA
  • 3 METHODOLOGY..........................................................................................................................................
    • 3.1 KEYWORD AND HASHTAGS
    • 3.2 USER TYPES
    • 3.3 TWEET CONTENT
    • 3.4 LIMITATIONS..........................................................................................................................................
    1. RESULTS......................................................................................................................................................
    • 4.1 HASHTAGS
    • 4.2 TWITTER USER TYPE CATEGORIES
    • 4.3 TWITTER USER TYPE ACTIVITY
    • 4.4 OVERALL TWEET TYPE ACTIVITY..................................................................................................................
    • 4.5 6 - HOUR TEMPORAL ANALYSIS
    • 4.6 SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF TWEETS
    • 4.7 TWITTER CONTENT ANALYSIS
    • 4 .8 OVERALL PATTERNS
    1. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS........................................................................................................................
    • 5.1 PAST INCIDENTS
    • 5.2 PERCEIVED AND CONFIRMED PERPETRATOR MOTIVATION
    • 5.3 PERCEIVED AND CONFIRMED PERPETRATOR IDENTITY
    • 5.4 COMMUNITY & SUPPORT
    1. CONCLUSION
    1. BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................................................
  • TABLE 1. KEYWORDS USED FOR THEMATIC CODING List of Tables
  • TABLE 2. ACCOUNT USER-TYPE CATEGORIES
  • TABLE 3. USER-TYPE CATEGORIES TWEET ACTIVITY
  • TABLE 4. TWEET ACTIVITY BY UNIQUE USERS APRIL 23 - 29,
  • TABLE 5. 2018 TORONTO VRA THEMES
  • TABLE 6. TWEETS OF CANADIAN AND INTERNATIONAL VRA INCIDENTS
  • TABLE 7. PERCEIVED AND CONFIRMED MOTIVATION FOR THE TORONTO VRA - NEWS MEDIA & INDIVIDUAL USER CATEGORY
  • TABLE 8. PERCEIVED AND CONFIRMED IDENTITY THEME
  • TABLE 9. COMMUNITY AND SOLIDARITY..........................................................................................................................
  • FIGURE 1. TIMELINE OF THE 2018 TORONTO VAN RAMMING ATTACK INCIDENT. List of Figures
  • FIGURE 2. TWEETS CAPTURED USING STUDY SPECIFIC HASHTAGS AND KEYWORDS
  • FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF THE 2018 TORONTO VRA HASHTAGS
    • USING NVIVO. FIGURE 4. A FREQUENCY WORD CLOUD SUMMARIZING HASHTAGS OF THE 2018 TORONTO VRA. THE WORD CLOUD WAS GENERATED
  • FIGURE 5. TWITTER ACTIVITY BY USER-TYPE CATEGORY
  • FIGURE 6. MOST ACTIVE USERS THAT TWEETED AFTER THE 2018 TORONTO VRA
  • FIGURE 7. 2018 TORONTO VRA TWEETS AND RETWEETS
  • FIGURE 8. 2018 TORONTO VRA TWEETS AND UNIQUE USERS PER DAY
  • FIGURE 9. 2018 TORONTO VRA TWEETS AND UNIQUE USERS PER EVERY 6 - HOUR
  • FIGURE 10. 2018 TORONTO VRA 6 - HOUR INTERVAL PER TWEET TYPE WITH KEY EVENTS MAPPED
  • FIGURE 11. SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF 2018 TORONTO VRA (RE)TWEETS
    • ANALYSIS FIGURE 12. A POINT DENSITY ANALYSIS SHOWING HOTSPOTS OF GEOLOCATED TWEETS, GENERATED USING ARCGIS ONLINE SPATIAL
  • FIGURE 13. POPULARITY OF 2018 TORONTO VRA TWEET THEMES OVER TIME
  • FIGURE 14. PAST INTERNATIONAL AND CANADIAN VRA INCIDENTS
  • FIGURE 15. TORONTO VRA PERCEIVED AND CONFIRMED MOTIVATION (RE)TWEETS
  • FIGURE 17. CONFIRMED IDENTITY OF SUSPECT BY INDIVIDUAL AND NEWS MEDIA USER TYPE CATEGORY
  • FIGURE 18. COMMUNITY AND SUPPORT

presumptions reverberates across national boundaries, and communities come together in solidarity and support both offline and online (Eriksson, 2016). An important concern for emergencies and crises is information. The period immediately after emergencies is often characterized by an information vacuum with lack of complete details about the incident (Imran, Castillo, Diaz & Vieweg, 2015). Stakeholders – the public, emergency management, government officials, victims, family, media - seek and provide information to satisfy a diversity of information needs. Emergency managers and responders need critical information – the who, what, where and why - about the event for response and recovery. The media seeks the same information for the purposes of reporting on the incident. The public seeks information about loved ones, and to determine their level of personal risk in order to take appropriate action (Gray, Weal & Martin, 2017). As with most violent crimes, the public’s need to know takes on a high urgency. And with the internet and online news, the public does not have to wait for news and updates from mainstream media or press conferences from public safety officials. Instead, they actively seek information and updates about the event from a myriad of social media sources from their internet connected devices (Shklovski, Palen & Sutton, 2008; Gray et al, 2017), and make their own judgement and opinions about the event, whether justified or factual (Westerman, Spence & Van Der Heide, 2014; Shklovski, Palen & Sutton, 2008). The initial phase of a crisis is characterized by disinformation. Disinformation and rumors can affect the public’s perception and seriously hinder risk communications and management (Gray, Weal and Martin, 2017 ; Gray et al, 2016). For example, the immediate aftermath of the 2013 Boston marathon bombings was chaotic and characterized by disinformation - a manhunt ensued

for the persons responsible at the same time as rumors that the perpetrators were of Arab descent was going virile (Starbird, Maddock, Orand, Achterman, & Mason, 2014). Three days after sufficient information from eyewitness accounts and surrounding surveillance had been collected, public officials published photographs of the suspects (Starbird, Maddock, Orand, Achterman, & Mason, 2014). The police later revealed that the urgency to publish the identity of the suspect was driven by the need to stymie the disinformation that had been spreading on social media and to prevent retaliation against other persons (Starbird et al., 2014; Klontz & Jain, 2013 ). The tweet from @NatasFatah above presumes that the 2018 Toronto VRA was an act of terrorism committed by an “angry and Middle Eastern” person. This incorrect eyewitness account continued to propagate on Twitter long after the police confirmed the suspect’s identity and motive for the attack. Disinformation can be detrimental for the public and for emergency response. The spread of disinformation about the motive and identity of the perpetrator can be explained by: 1) the information gap (the period between the event occurring and when the facts about the who, what and why become known) during which the public had an urgent desire to get more details, 2) the extreme fear and outrage deliberate violent incidents engender and the need for someone to be punished and, 3) recall of similar past events. Furthermore, the media - local, national and international - framing of the incident as “deliberate” was on the presumption that if the incident is violent and deliberate, then it must be an act of terrorism committed by a person of Middle Eastern descent, whose hatred of the West drives them to cause harm.

To gain an insight into the public’s perception of VRAs, tweets are analyzed and coded. In relation to terrorism frames, I want to see whether past VRA or violent incidents factor in the public’s tweets about the incident being studied. Tweets are therefore coded using framing analysis particularly terrorism frames which reference Muslim extremism or terrorist groups associated with Muslim organizations like ISIS. In addition, to understand the context and make comparisons, tweets are coded for the suspect’s confirmed motive and identity. Furthermore, sense of community solidarity and support are considered because these types of events tend to bring people together.

1.2 Research Questions

The objective of this study is to investigate the public perception of the non-terror related VRAs. The following research questions will be addressed:

  • What does the analysis of Twitter tell us about how the public perceived the 2018 Toronto VRA incident in terms of the motive and identity of the perpetrator?
  • What does Twitter tell us about the perception of the diversity of users?
  • What media frames were present on Twitter and did they shape the public’s perception of the VRA incident?

1. 3 Structure of the Paper

This study has been organized into five chapters:

  • an introduction
  • a theoretical framework and literature review section
  • a methodology section
  • a results section
  • a discussion section
  • and a conclusion section.

The introduction section outlines the case study of Toronto Van attack tweets. The literature review outlines VRA incidents as an emerging risk; how risk perception and terrorism framing may have shaped public perception of the 2018 Toronto VRA incident; and how social media analysis specifically Twitter can be used to understand public perception of VRAs. The Methodology section is about the data collection and methods used for the study. The Results section outlines the results of the content analysis of the 2018 Toronto van attack tweets. The discussion and conclusion provides an analysis of the results and gives a conclusion to the study.

1. 4 Background: The Toronto Van Attack

On April 23rd 2018, around lunch time on Yonge street, one of the City of Toronto’s busiest streets was struck by an unprecedented act of violence. It caught Torontonians, Canadians and the rest of the world by surprise. Canada had been relatively immune to violent attacks of this nature, but now had its first major vehicular ramming attack. On this fateful day, a man in a white rental cargo van from the rental company Ryder, drove indiscriminately along Yonge street and the sidewalks, plowing pedestrians in his path. At approximately 1:25 pm, he started driving the truck south on Yonge street, North York for approximately one kilometre at speeds of 60 to 70 km/hour according to eyewitness accounts. He came to a stop minutes later, exiting the truck and confronting police, pointing something he took out of his pocket (which later turned out to be his wallet) at police Const. Ken Lam. After a very brief standoff, Const. Lam arrested the suspect without incident. Const. Lam received a lot of praise for arresting the suspect without incident. Hours later, the police updated the public confirming that 10 people were deceased and 16 injured as a result of this incident. The suspect was later identified as 25 - year-old Richmond

A friend of mine was a witness. The driver was heard screaming praise Allah! JustinTrudeau Absolutely disgusting this is happening in Canada #terrorism ?!AndrewScheer realDonaldTrump https://t.co/16cDxq61o — CanadianBorn (AlexandraRaeNem) April 23, 2018. (@TwitterMoments,

These are familiar media frames of terror related incidents that the media uses to condition the public to make links and connect disparate events such that the current incident is viewed as an extension of past incidents. Figure 1 is a timeline of key events as they unfolded in the first 24 hours of the van attack. It was later confirmed that the suspect was incel-inspired and reportedly Minissian, the suspect, had posted on Facebook earlier in the morning before the rampage, “The incel rebellion has already begun! We will overthrow all Chads and Stacy’s” (Zimmerman, Ryan and Duriesmith, 2018). The first tweet about the incident was posted at 1:34 pm: Collision, numerous pedestrians have been struck by a white van on Yonge St and Finch area. further when I get more. #GO725711 ^gl (TPSOperations, 2018)

(Source: Global News, 2018, retrieved at https://globalnews.ca/news/5177737/toronto-van- attack-anniversary-timeline/) Van drives south on Yonge street. First passenger struck Perpetrator was arrested by Const. Lam Service diversion away from closest subway by Toronto Transit Commission Segment of Yonge street closed. Service diversion away from closest subway by Toronto Transit Commission Segment of Yonge street closed. Prime Minister Trudeau gives a public statement about the incident Official update about fatalities and injuries from the incident Prime Minister Trudeau gives a public statement about the incident Official update about fatalities and injuries from the incident Mayor of Toronto, John Tory gives a public statement Official update on fatalities and injuries 12:30 PM 1:25 PM 1:32 PM 1:47 PM 1:58 PM 2:09 PM 2:43 PM 4:45 PM 4:47 PM 8:00 PM 8:19 PM 10:00 AM Figure 1. Timeline of the 2018 Toronto Van Ramming Attack Incident.

2009; Woods, 2011; Norris et al., 2004). A majority of Americans perceived that they were at an increased risk of a terrorist attack and reported that it was a source of major worry. The weaponization of vehicles is not a novel phenomenon. Vehicles have been used and continue to be used to commit a myriad of violent and criminal acts. For the purpose of this study, vehicle weaponization is defined as the use of a vehicle - outside its normal use as a mode of transportation - as a weapon to commit a crime that includes breaching buildings and killing and injuring people (Jenkins, 2006). Vehicles have been weaponized by both individuals and organized groups. They have been used by criminals for vandalism; by drivers consumed with road rage to run down fellow drivers - for example in New Brunswick, Canada, a man was charged and found guilty of driving his vehicle into a pedestrian (The Canadian Press, 2017); by robbers and burglars to ram vehicles into banks, bank machines and store fronts (Rothe, 2008); and by terrorists who either modify vehicles into vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) or just drive vehicles into pedestrians and other public spaces (TSA, 2017; Jenkins & Butterworth, 2018). While all of these incidents sometimes result in fatalities, injuries and/or damag, it is the use of a vehicle as a weapon and tool for terrorism that draws the most attention (Jenkins & Butterworth, 2018; Rothe, 2008). Vehicles as weapons of terror have evolved from their use as VBIEDs to their use as plowing machines. VBIEDs involve the modification of a vehicle with explosive devices which can either be detonated remotely or by a suicide bomber. VBIEDs, however, involves taking the modified vehicle as close to the target as possible which is quite difficult to pull off without getting caught. It also involves a particular skill set and time to plan and execute. For these reasons, the

increasing tactic of choice is vehicle ramming by targeting large crowds for impact which requires zero planning or skills to execute. Terrorists’ weaponization of vehicles as IEDs has evolved to a more simplistic use as weapons to ram into soft targets - people and property (Jenkins and Butterworth, 2017). Recent increase in vehicle ramming attack incidents has made it an emerging risk (Eriksson Krutrök & Lindgren, 2018). The most recent widely covered VRA incident took place in Nice, France in 2016 where 86 people died and 458 were injured, the most VRA related fatalities and injuries since 2006 (CEP, 2019; Corporate Risk Services (CSR), 2017 ; Bouchard, 2018; Jenkins & Butterworth, 2017; Criminol, 2019; Miller & Hayword, 2018). Subsequent incidents have taken place in other countries including United Kingdom, Spain, the United States, Israel and Palestine. The use of vehicles for ramming into pedestrians has gained popularity for terrorists and other radicalized individuals. This rising popularity can be attributed to their ubiquity, easy accessibility, little to no advance planning or skills required like the levels to develop IEDs, no coordination required, individualized nature which is very attractive for “lone wolf” incidents (Jenkins & Butterworth, 2018). A lone wolf is an individual who plans and commits crimes without assistance (Perry, Hasisi & Perry, 2018). Because vehicular attacks are opportunistic and individualistic, they are very difficult to predict or counter and is an increasing challenge for public safety officials (Jenkins & Butterworth, 2018). These crimes of opportunity are carried out by a diversity of perpetrators in terms of their ideology, background, mental state and geographic location (Miller and Hayword, 2018; Jenkins & Butterworth, 2018), the primary aim of which is to induce fear and dread in the general public and cause fatal injuries (Jenkins & Butterworth, 2018).

the public or any segment of the public, causes substantial property damage, whether to public or private property. VRAs can be classified as terrorist acts because they share similar attributes including illegal use of force and violence with the primary aim to induce fear and dread in the general public and cause fatal injuries. Second, VRAs is a recommended tactic in a manifesto published by ISIS (Jenkins & Buttersworth, 2018; Witherspoon, 2017; Counter Extremism Project CEP, 2019). As a result, research about VRA incidents has been from the terrorism discourse. Vehicle weaponization dramatically increased since 2006 (CEP, 2019). According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (START, 2012), the incidence of VRAs are on the rise in urban areas in Europe, Middle East and North America (Jenkins & Butterworth, 2018). The GTD (START, 2012) shows 53 VRA incidents since 20 13 , 35 (60%) of which were terrorist related had a combined fatality of 197 people and 1078 injuries (CEP, 2019; TSA, 2017 ; START, 2012; Witherspoon, 2017). The years 2014 to 2017 were the most lethal with 17 vehicle attacks accounting for 173 fatalities and 667 injuries (CEP, 2019). Canada has experienced very few VRAs since this rising global trend. A majority of Canadians perceive their risk to terrorism or related incidents as less likely acknowledging that the risk of terrorism is uncertain, out of their control and unacceptable (Lemyre et al, 2006 ). The few incidents that have taken place in Canada were localized with very low fatalities and injuries. The 2014 Quebec vehicle attack was jihadist inspired resulting in the deaths of two Canadian solders. The other vehicle attack took place in Edmonton in 2017 and resulted in zero fatalities but injured one police officer (CEP, 2019). The assailant in this incident, on two separate

occasions used a car and a truck to ram into pedestrians, injuring a total of five people. The April 23 rd^ VRA incident is the largest of its kind in fatalities and injuries, and demonstrates this rising trend of VRA incidents where vehicles are used to violently and willfully attack pedestrians and damage property. The attributes of VRAs makes it difficult to predict and protect against VRAs. Several counter measures to help reduce the impact of VRAs have been suggested by experts. The challenge with VRAs, according to the experts is that they cannot be prevented (Witherspoon, 20 17; Jenkins & Butterworth, 2018), therefore the best alternative is to protect pedestrians by limiting vehicle access to pedestrian areas. Mitigation and countermeasures recommendations requires risk and emergency managers to understand the public’s risk at public gatherings and open spaces (Jenkins & Butterworth, 2017; Jenkins, 2017). Counter measures are often recommended based on the type of target. Recommendation for public gatherings in open spaces include: placing barriers or large vehicles at entrances to these spaces, increased surveillance and monitoring, additional police presence, positioning of protected concrete posts or bollards, or planting of trees at entrances or in front of public spaces and buildings (Jenkins & Butterworth, 2018). The challenge is that some of these mitigation measures are quite expensive, limiting and intrusive for the public.

2.2 Framing Terrorism

Framing is the intentional presentation of an incident such that certain facts are more salient. Entman (1996) states that frames purposely cover an incident in a way that emphasizes some facts while obscuring others in order to skew the public’s understanding of the events, that is, how the event ought to be understood instead of what the facts are. They can be described as