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A law paper written by matthew stone, a student at chicago kent school of law and a rabbinical student. The paper explores the absence of a clear statement of the freedom of speech in jewish law compared to american law. The author examines the value of speech in both jewish theology and american philosophy, and discusses specific case studies in jewish law that illustrate the differences in approach to free speech. Jewish law is more willing to limit speech that criticizes the government, while american law prioritizes nearly all speech to avoid censorship.
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Matthew Stone Chicago Kent School of Law
I write this paper as two kinds of student – I am at the same time a law student and also a rabbinical student. In law school, I need not look very far to see the tremendous importance that American law has placed on the fundamental freedom of speech. The framers placed so much emphasis on the right to free speech that they made it the very first amendment to the United States Constitution. So it was a natural question to ask coming from law school to my rabbinic studies: where does the Torah^1 discuss the freedom of speech? The answer, surprisingly, is that it does not. In the all the annals of Jewish law, there does not appear anywhere to be a clear statement of the freedom of speech held so important by the American people. The subject of this paper is to ask why that clear statement is missing and to ultimately compare American and Jewish law to discover what the Jewish approach to free speech is and how it differs from American law. Talmudic law is much more comfortable regulating what it considers harmful speech than American law is. To understand the difference between the two systems’ approach, one must examine each system’s view of speech and government and each system’s notion of how laws are made. Part I of this paper more fully defines what speech means to each philosophy, thus
(^1) Throughout this paper I reference the Torah, Talmud and Jewish law relatively interchangeably. Torah refers to the five books of Moses, as well as to the body of Jewish law and philosophy as a whole. TheTalmud, organized by tractates, is a collection of debates among Jewish Rabbis during 14 generations around 200-400 C.E. Jewish or Talmudic law refers to that legal system which was practiced when therewas a religious Jewish state (as opposed to the modern, secular state of Israel). While some religious Jewish courts still perform legal functions today such as marriage and divorce as well as adjudicating civildisputes between Jewish litigants, there is no religious criminal court and there will not be one until the Jewish monarchy from the House of King David is restored (may it come speedily in our days).
further refining the paper’s scope. Part II will briefly discuss the origins and moral basis for the right to free speech in the First Amendment and contrast each point with a similar Jewish perspective. Building on that foundation, Part III will examine some specific case studies found in Jewish law, and explain why Jewish courts are often more willing to limit speech that criticizes the government. I. VALUING SPEECH A tempting explanation for the absence of a Jewish parallel to the First Amendment might be to suggest that Jewish law simply does not value speech as much as American law does. With that answer, Americans can continue their First Amendment jurisprudence and the Jewish courts can carry on without it because the right to free speech is not a right that Jewish courts value enough to protect. But that is not the rule – speech is equally important to both Jewish theology as it is to American philosophy. A. American Law - The Right to Reform Freedom of speech is arguably the most important right in American law. Protecting and defining that freedom has been the subject of countless Supreme Court opinions, law review articles and philosophical discussions. James Madison called free speech “one of the great bulwarks of liberty” and argued that it was directly tied to the “indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change [the U.S. Government] whenever it shall be found adverse to or inadequate to the purposes of its institution.” 2 Without freedom of speech, many would argue that the United States Constitution loses all credibility.^3 The reason for this is due to what Madison suggested; free speech leads to the
(^2) James Madison, “Speech to the House of Representatives on Amendments to the Constitution” (June 8, 1789). (^3) I make this statement after observing passionate debate from my fellow students in Professor Steve Heyman’s First Amendment Seminar, Spring Semester of 2008 at Chicago Kent School of Law. The
show that a vocal minority can achieve change so long as it can be heard. Speech is guarded more fiercely by Americans than almost any other right because speech is what gives legitimacy to those other rights. B. Jewish Law – The Spirit of Debate Initially, one may be surprised to learn that there is no naked right to free speech in Jewish law. The reason for this glaring omission is not that Jewish law does not value speech or that Jewish law does not protect and recognize the social benefits of the free exchange of ideas. On the contrary, Jewish law is characterized by debate (“Talmudic logic”^10 ) and the delicate balance between the sound majority and the perceptive minority. The clearest indication that the Talmud supports debate is the document itself – each tractate of the Talmud is arranged as a manuscript of arguments between Rabbis of various academies debating a myriad of subjects in Jewish law and theology. The Talmudic legal system is at least as staunchly supportive of the notion of a “marketplace of ideas” as the American system. Jewish thought also embraces speech for many of the same reasons and more. Jewish thinkers have often warned that speech is dangerous, so much so that the Chofetz Chaim, one of the most oft-quoted Rabbis from around the turn of twentieth century, wrote that the prohibition against speaking loshon hara – evil speech – is the most important commandment for a Jew to keep in the face of modern culture.^11 The Chofetz Chaim understood the power of words and placed more emphasis on vigilance in guarding one’s tongue than on any other commandment. Speech is so dangerous, one of the great Talmudic sages said that “in all my life, I have found nothing wiser than silence.”^12 Commentaries teach that contradicting one’s teacher is
(^10) An expression frequently used in American courts to refer to logical but often hair-splitting reasoning. See e.g. (^11) Rabbi Yisroel Meir (the Chofetz Chaim), U.S. v. Libby , 498 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2007). Shmirat HaLoshon. (^12) Ethics of Our Fathers 1:17.
inappropriate whether in private or in the public discourse, 13 and that one should not speak ahead of someone who is wiser.^14 Yet at the same time, the Chofetz Chaim does not discourage speech totally and frequently states that a person should speak up, even at the expense of a third party’s reputation, in order to prevent harm or financial loss.^15 Another Talmudic sage, qualified the earlier praise of silence by stating “do not practice false modesty” which the commentaries interpret to mean “if someone asks you your legal opinion, and you are qualified to answer, do not pretend to not know what to say.”^16 Indeed, the sages in Ethics of Our Fathers praise the study of Torah above all else and state that the best way to learn is through debate. Learning by oneself, they say, is like blunting a knife against a stone. This clear affirmation of the benefits of speech demonstrates the Talmud’s acceptance of and encouragement of some version of the marketplace of ideas – although the Talmud’s marketplace has a few more rules about how vendors may peddle their wares. Chassidic philosophy takes the analysis a step further. Citing Kabalistic^17 sources, the Chassidic masters say that the power of speech is the power to rule.^18 Anybody can have plans or desires, but it takes a ruler to make them happen. Anybody can think about social reform, but (^1314) Commentary of Rashi to Numbers 25:6-7. 15 Ethics of Our Fathers 5:9.Rabbi Yisroel Meir (the Chofetz Chaim), Shmirat HaLoshon , E.g. The Laws of Speech by Parents to their Children. (^16) Ethics of Our Fathers 6:6. (^17) “Kabalistic” sources, strictly speaking, means the Zohar (a book whose origins are of some debate, but was written some time between 200 C.E. and 1200 C.E.) and its progeny in Jewish mysticism. Whilemost Kabala scholars do not engage in much practical legal analysis, there are many Jewish Legal experts who incorporate mysticism into their response. One such expert is Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi, whofamously rewrote his own codification of Jewish law according to kabalistic sources though large portions of that manuscript were lost in a fire.*** The term Kabala has been abused in recent media. By using the term here I give no legitimacy to the Kabala Center in Los Angeles or its most famous practioner Madonna. Under Jewish law, the statementsby that organization have no basis in fact and may indeed constitute heresy. But as we live under American law, they are welcome to say what they want. (^18) Rabbi Shmuel Dov Ber Shneerson, RaNaT , 3-4.
To streamline the analysis, this paper will only focus on what is the key type of speech contemplated by the framers of the First Amendment: political speech. The laws of slander, fighting words, incitement, loshon harah, and other sometime exceptions to the First Amendment are important areas of speech law because they sometimes may become political speech. But core political speech – opinions about the current government or the current law, opinions about how the law should be and statements of general philosophy – are the subject of the analysis henceforth. II. FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN THE TWO APPROACHES Jewish law differs radically from American law in the way its legal framework is designed, so it makes sense to compare the two systems before diving into specific cases. The systems diverge in the type of governments they represent – American law espouses a Democracy; Jewish law espouses a theocracy, in many ways a monarchy. American statutes, even the Constitution, are passed through a public vote or through publically elected officials. Talmudic law is rooted in the Torah, a set of laws sent down by G-d, and supplemented by decrees of Jewish courts that appoint their own successors. American law protects rights; Jewish law assigns duties. Both systems find strength in the marketplace of ideas and the power of words, but differ as to how they allow those words to be expressed. A. Governmental Structure The American Constitution sets forth a system of democratic government, driven by the will of the people, and then follows that system with a Bill of Rights guaranteed to the people by virtue of their identity as citizens of the United States.^22 The document begins “We the people”
(^22) U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment §1. Some would argue that the rights in the Constitution extend to everyone that the United States government has dealings with, though the recent GuantanamoBay cases suggest that citizenship does garner some extra privileges. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
and names as a primary goal “to secure the Blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”^23 The opening line “We the people” rather than “We the representatives” or “We the government” reads like the beginning of contract between all the members of society – the Social Contract. And the goal of that contract is not to push the people toward any specific common objectives beyond “domestic tranquility,” “common defense” and “general welfare,”^24 but to maintain as much individual freedom as possible – allowing each person to decide his or her own objectives.^25 In American law, the government is, ideally, simply a proxy for the people deciding their own fate. The people vote often to ensure that laws are being made to further their personal agendas, and, in the event of a runaway leadership, the people have the power to “throw the rascals out.” In Jewish government, on the other hand, there are three crowns: the crown of kingship, the crown of priesthood and the crown of Torah.^26 Each creates a position of leadership which carries divine authority. The Jewish King inherits his throne from his father, and if no heir is available, then a prophet anoints a new King.^27 The Jewish high priest, the Kohen Gadol, is appointed from among the other priests,^28 whose status is strictly hereditary –all of the priests authorized to carry out temple duties (“Kohanim”) are from a small cross-section of the Jewish population and one may only be a member of this group if he is born to a father who is also a
(^2324) U.S. Constitution, Preamble. 25 Id. One may argue that, especially with the advent of Medicare and Social Security, we are shifting as a nation away from libertarianism and toward more social-welfare ideals. While this may be the caseregarding other areas of law, First Amendment jurisprudence remains a “bulwark” of freedom, as evidenced by the 102 Supreme Court decisions making reference to the First Amendment since January 1,2000. (^2627) Ethics of Our Fathers §4:13. 28 Maimonedes,Tractate Sanhedrin, 2a.^ Mishneh Torah , Laws of Kings and Their Wars, Chapter 1.
American Constitution is thus to protect the natural rights of the people from those who would infringe them. That goal corresponds to the Preamble’s stated goals of providing “common defense” and “securing the blessings of liberty.” Liberty means the enjoyment of one’s natural rights and autonomy subject only to the natural rights of others. Common defense means the protection of those rights from outsiders or citizens who would trample them. Freedom of Speech is one such natural right. First Amendment jurisprudence only limits the rights of a speaker or speakers in the face of a compelling social interest. For example, Justice Holmes’s example of shouting fire in a crowded theater compares the right of speech with the need for public safety – safety that could be threatened in a mad dash for the door.^37 The Westborough Baptist funeral protest debate centers on the rights of the protesters to express their religious views against an arguably compelling interest in privacy or dignity at a funeral.^38 In each of these cases, the Court does not directly discuss the duties owed by each party to fellow Americans or fellow human beings – only to social interests in limiting certain behavior. Jewish law, by contrast, embraces that every Jew has a set of duties he owes to other Jews and to G-d. The foundation for Jewish law comes from the 613 mitzvot – or commandments – found in the Torah.^39 Mitzvot come in two varieties: positive commandments – duties to do something
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”); 9Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). th^ Amendment (“The enumeration in the (^3738) Schenck v. United States , 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919). 39 St. David's Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc. Maimonedes, Mishneh Torah , Introduction. See also id. Book of Mitzvot., 22 Kan.App.2d 537 (Kan. App. 1996).
positive duty to believe in G-d and a negative duty to refrain from worshipping other gods.^40 There is an understood right to life 41 and property^42 in Jewish law^43 but there is no expressly stated list of fundamental rights like in the American Bill of Rights. Since Jewish law focuses on duties, it requires some logic to discover what rights the law espouses. Generally, rights can be found either (1) because the absence of a duty implies a right to the opposite; or (2) an existing duty on one party creates a corresponding right in another. To discover a freedom of speech in Jewish law, since none is explicitly stated, there would have to be either (1) the absence of a duty not to speak; or (2) some general duty that individuals may not interfere with another’s speech. The best example of the first case will be discussed later in the case of a Rebellious Sage, who has a duty not to state law contrary to the Court, but no duty to refrain from arguing that the Court’s ruling was poorly reasoned. As for the second case, it seems forced to discover a right by way of a duty “not to interfere with another’s right to free speech.” Such an argument would be somewhat circular – stating a duty not to interfere with speech requires almost explicitly assuming the existence of a right to free speech. But the real obstacle to discovering a right to free speech through the second method is that the right to free speech has no obvious corresponding duty. Most rights do have obvious corresponding duties: the right to life creates the duty not to kill; the right to a fair (^4041) Exodus 20:2-3.
action. A more esoteric proof is the oft quoted verse “And you shall live by them,” which is used toA somewhat crass proof for the right to life is availability of monetary damages in wrongful death nullify duties that would put the actor’s life at risk.Keeping the Sabbath Chapter 14. See e.g. Maimonedes, Mishneh Torah , Laws of (^42) There is lengthy discussion of the rights of ownership in tractates Bava Kamma, Bava Metzia and Bava Basra. Bava Metzia, for example, discusses the method for taking possession of a lost object. The term“Baal” – meaning owner – is frequently used when discussing monetary loss. (^43) Liberty is somewhat more complicated for reasons not relevant here. There is a general preference that a person not sell himself into indentured servitude (slavery), and there are certain punishments on thosewho choose to give up their freedom, but there is no prohibition on doing so. The reason, however, for this preference is that a man should not serveG-d. Hence, in one sense Judaism would not call everyone truly free, and in another Judaism allows two masters – Jewish law considers everyone a servant of everyone an extra measure of freedom through serving G-d and not any other master.
circumstances to support religious, political or judicial leadership even in the face of a reasoned dissent. The reason for this difference stems from another key value in Talmudic law that is absent from modern readings of the US Constitution – trust and faith in G-d and the leadership that He has appointed. The injection of faith into Talmudic law creates a very different approach to speech that criticizes the government or threatens the rule of law. III. Case Studies Each of the following is a specific case study in Jewish law, and my own attempt to explain why that case differs from American law. The first study is the general concept of tortious speech and harmful words. The second is the law of a false prophet, one whose words may undermine G-d’s leadership of the people. The third is the law of a rebellious sage, who does not accept that the will of G-d follows the majority. The fourth is the law of a Jewish King, who represents G-d’s will to the people and may execute any who directly disobeys him. A. Tortious Speech American law makes a clear distinction between verbal injury and physical injury and is much quicker to grant redress for the latter. If A intentionally strikes B, no matter how lightly, B can usually carry a tort action for battery and recover at least nominal damages.^48 If A makes mean comments toward B, the likelihood of recovery is significantly lessened. States generally do not recognize a valid tort action where A made disparaging remarks toward B unless A had intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress upon B through conduct that was extreme and outrageous.^49 Where a physical tort accompanies the harm, emotional harm is included in nearly
(^4849) Rest 2d Torts § 13 (1965). See e.g. Doe v. Calumet City , 641 N.E.2d 498 (Ill. 1994).
every damages discussion. Likewise, several states have declined thus far to adopt so called “privacy torts” where A reveals ill-gotten secret information about B to the public.^50 Jewish law is similarly cold toward tort claims based purely on verbal injury. The Talmud lists five 51 types of damages for which a person may recover when injured including emotional distress (referred to as embarrassment).^52 One example of a viable case mentioned by the Talmud is if someone spits at another person and the spittle strikes his body. If the spittle does not reach the persons body, however, there is no recovery available.^53 The sages derive from this that verbal insults alone, no matter how embarrassing, are not recoverable harms. 54 The Talmud does have strong words for one who verbally embarrasses his friend though, stating that he has no share in the world to come. 55 According to one opinion, the Court therefore may put one who makes derogatory language into cherem^56 until the speaker makes restitution, but this opinion is not a universal opinion because cherem would still qualify as a punishment.^57 Another exception mentioned in the Talmud is one who curses his fellow,^58 but this is a special case where the speech carries with it some resulting action, in this case a “hex” similar to the “evil eye.” (^50) See e.g. Howell v. New York Post Co. Inc. , 81 N.Y.2d 115 (1993). New York’s privacy law is governed by two statutes: N.Y. Civ. Rights L. § 50-51 (McKinney 2007). (^51) The five are actual injury, pain, medical costs, lost wages and embarrassment. (^5253) Tractate Bava Kamma, Page 83b
standard award of damages of the sample cases brought, though the award may be adjusted by a court.Tractate Bava Kamma, Page 90a. Spitting, along with certain other injuries, is afforded the highest (^54) Tractate Bava Kamma, Page 91a. Rav Pappa rules that if spittle only strikes a person’s garment, there is no reward. From this precedent, Rabbi Yose bar Avin explains that since spitting like that wouldcertainly be equivalent to a verbal insult, no recovery is available for verbal insults. (^5556) Tractate Bava Metzia, 59a.
various other restrictions on the defendant’s life – in some extreme cases even forbidding anyone to sellA minor form of exile where the Court decrees that no-one should do business with a person and places food to the defendant. (^57) Commentary of the Rosh to Bava Kamma Chapter 8 § 14, citing the opinion of Rabbeinu Sherira Gaon as a source for putting the defendant into(stating that one who only embarrasses another is free from judgment, but mentioning the opinion of cherem. See also Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 420: Rabbeinu Sherira Gaon (^58) Tractate Sanhedrin 66a. as a minority).
from granting a remedy for hurtful speech, but Talmudic law places often strict sanctions on those who oppose the will of the majority or disrespect the ruling bodies. B. Cursing One’s Parent The Talmud 65 lists several specific individuals who are liable for death by strangulation 66 including a kidnapper, a child who physically attacks or curses^67 his or her parents, a rebellious sage and various categories of false prophet. Of this list, only a kidnapper carries the same stigma in American society, frequently meriting long prison terms and the wrath of the nation with such legislation as Megan’s Law. 68 The Talmud explains that kidnappers who put their victims into slavery are liable for the death penalty; certainly American society has voiced its disapproval for the practice of slavery through the 13th^ Amendment ban and through the Civil War which arguably was motivated by anti-slavery sentiments. What is significant in this Talmudic teaching is that all the other items listed relate to offensive speech, and the Talmud equates kidnapping with crimes, making each a capital offense. American law, on the other hand, does not outlaw the majority of these acts because, as speech crimes, they would generally be protected under the First Amendment. The first such law is the prohibition against cursing one’s parents. Initially, the Talmud makes a statement similar to that in American law that a child who strikes his parent is criminally liable. American law does follow the Talmud’s example of defining a special offense
(^6566) Tractate Sanhedrin 84b.
strangulation and burning. A different set of crimes applies to each and it is the subject of some debateThere are four types of death penalty available in Jewish law including stoning, beheading, which punishments are considered the most severe. See Tractate Sanhedrin, 49b and commentaries fordiscussion. (^6768) Striking one’s parents is part of the initial list at 84b; cursing is first mentioned at 85a.
demonstrates the nation’s higher standard of punishment for crimes against children)42 U.S.C. § 13701 (Law relates specifically to sex offenders, arguably the worst type of kidnappers, but
for violence against a parent,^69 but the notion that offenders should be punished is universal to both systems. In American law, the offending child would be liable for assault, battery or some other similar statute.^70 There is no law in the United States making it a crime to curse one’s parents, but the expectation in most states is that parents should police such conduct themselves.^71 The Talmud, on the other hand, steps in to specifically punish children for crimes against their parents, even beyond those they would normally be liable for against any other person. The Talmud would also hold a minor liable for cursing another,^72 but that offense would only carry a civil remedy and therefore only warrant monetary restitution or at worst corporal punishment (in the face of aggravating factors).^73 A child who strikes or curses his parent is liable for death. The reason for this increased penalty is because of the message the child is sending through his criminal act – he is disrespecting one of the main authority figures in his life. Jewish law places a tremendous emphasis on respecting G-d and includes respect for other authority figures in that obligation. The fifth of the Ten Commandments states “Honor your father and your mother.”^74 Commentaries explain that the first five Commandments are between man and G-d and are ordered in correspondence with the last five Commandments between man and his fellow man. 75 The obligation to honor one’s parents is akin to the
(^6970) Sanhedrin, 84b.
“intentionally or knowingly without legal justification and by any means, (1) causes bodily harm to an See e.g.^ 720 ILCS 5/12-3 (Illinois battery statute making a person guilty of a class A misdemeanor who individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual.”) (^71) 705 ILCS 405/5-101 (2008) (“The Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1987,” stating a preference that the “care and guidance” needed to secure the “moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare” of a delinquentchild is best obtained “in [the minor’s] own home”). (^7273) Tractate Bava Kama 66a. 74 The standard penalty is 39 lashes. See Tractate Makkos (“lashes”) for details.Exodus 20: (^75) See e.g. Haamek Davar commentary to Deuteronomy 5:16.
curse.”^79 So the way that scripture derives a prohibition on cursing is by comparing the Jewish people to royalty. As such, cursing is permitted against someone who is not a “prince among your people,” namely one who is condemned to die. But, a child may still not curse a parent who has been condemned to die because while the parent is not a “prince among your people,” the parent still deserves respect under the separate ruling dealing with respect for parents. 80 In either case, the prohibition against cursing stems from an inherent respect for authority. The one exception to this second ruling is where a parent is guilty of instigating others to idolatry. In that case, the parent’s blasphemy against the religious government allows the child’s duty to G-d to supersede even loyalty to his parent.^81 The case of a child cursing his parent thus forms a good beginning for analyzing the Talmudic approach to limiting speech. In this case, the punishment for cursing a parent was more severe than for other curses because the child had an extra legal obligation to honor his parent. The following cases will discuss other specific obligations to respect authority figures, including the Prophet, the High Court or the King. In each of these cases as well, the Talmud introduces a restriction not present in American law based on the inherent respect for authority built into the Talmudic system of law. D. False Prophet Another of the parties listed who are liable to death by strangulation is a false prophet.^82 The definition of false prophet includes one who falsely claims to have received prophecy from G-d (the true G-d) and one who claims to have received prophecy from another god (not the true G-d). The reasoning behind these laws is scriptural, there are specific commandments to put (^7980) Exodus 22: 81 Tractate Bava Kama 85a.Tractate Bava Kama 85b. Noting the proof verse “you shall not be compassionate nor conceal him” concerning an idolater. Deuteronomy 13:9 (^82) Tractate Sanhedrin 84b
such individuals to death,^83 but there is also an ethical basis for this punishment based on the Jewish approach to leadership. The Jewish faith, especially in its formative years, was primarily practiced through allegiance to a prophet. The first such prophet was Moses, whom the people famously recognized as G-d’s prophet at the same time they fully realized their faith in G-d.^84 When the Jewish people received commandments from G-d, it was typically though Moses, and in subsequent generations the people were led by other prophets such as Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Mordechai (whose leadership is recorded in the Book of Ester). While a Jewish King is prohibited from serving on a Jewish Court,^85 the Prophet was usually the head of the court and a source of spiritual guidance in trying times.^86 Because the Prophet plays such an important role for the Jewish people, the concept of prophecy is held to a higher standard in speech. If a false prophet makes the same statement that was given to another prophet – a true prophecy – but does so as if he were the prophet who received the message from G-d, then that person is liable to death.^87 If a person claims to be a prophet, but is merely lying and telling a false prophecy, that person is liable to death.^88 If a person claims to be a prophet of another G-d, that person is liable to death.^89 Each of these false prophets is usurping the authority of a true prophet to speak on behalf of G-d. Since the words of
(^8384) Deuteronomy 18:
reveredExodus 13:31 “And the people of Israel saw the great hand that G-d had used on Egypt; and the people G-d and believed in G-d and Moses his servant.” (^85) Maimonedes, Mishneh Torah , Laws of the Sanhedrin and the Judgments Given Over to Them, 2:5. (^86) Perhaps the most famous example of this is Isaiah 40:1, read on the Sabbath after the anniversary of the destruction of the First Temple and known aspeople, says your G-d.” Shabbos Nachamu for the verse “Comfort, comfort my (^8788) Tractate Sanhedrin 89a; Maimonedes, Mishneh Torah , Laws of the Foundations of Scripture; 9:1-5. 89 Id.Id.