The Problem of Evil: An Argument for Atheism - Mackie's Perspective, Study notes of Logic

Download The Problem of Evil: An Argument for Atheism - Mackie's Perspective and more Study notes Logic in PDF only on Docsity!

The Problem of Evil

An Argument for Atheism

The Logical Problem (Mackie)

The following three propositions form an

inconsistent triad:

There is an omnipotent being.

There is an omnibenevolent being.

There is evil.

How inconsistent?

Some Adequate Resolutions Give up one of the three constituent propositions. Logic, by itself, gives us no reason to prefer one or the other among them. So, e.g., one might concede that any omnibenevolent being there may be is not also omnipotent. Or vice versa. Or, one might conclude that evil is an illusion—that is, that despite all indications to the contrary, there is no evil.

Careful, though... According to Mackie, sometimes inadequate solutions try to masquerade as adequate solutions: It’s a mystery. Retort: no it’s not. It’s all too clear. Evil is merely a privation of good. Retort: if we’re really merely renaming evil, then there is evil, otherwise named. (If we decide to call all blue things red, that won’t make all the blue things disappear by turning them into red things.) ‘Everything had a name, but although every name was nothing without the thing named, the thing cared nothing for its name, had no need of a name, and was itself only.’—John Banville, Doctor Copernicus If, though, we’re not merely renaming evil, but denying its existence, then we have, from a logical point of view, a perfectly adequate solution. In that case, however, we must somehow believe that there is no evil.

No Evil, No Good First, this implicitly restricts God’s omnipotence. Perhaps, though, this merely says that it is intrinsically impossible for there to be goodness without evil? God can do only what is intrinsically possible: it hardly impugns God’s omnipotence that she cannot create a round-square. But why should this be intrinsically impossible? Observe the difference: There is a round-square. There is an all good world. Second, this implicitly redefines goodness: we took it to involve the view that a good being will always desire to eliminate evil when it is able to do so. Or is it rather a way of saying that the proponent of this inconsistency had a false view about omnibenevolence? Be that as it may, why could the world not be all good, as it might, for instance be all red?

Some Evil is Better than None Two flavours: (i) contrastive and (ii) progressive. Involves an implicit distinction between first- and second-order evil. cf. harmony: a discordant chord may enhance the overall beauty and harmony of a piece. Instances of first-order evil include pain and suffering; instances of first-order goodness include pleasure and happiness. Basic claim: God maximizes goodness by maximizing second-order goodness; first- order evil, far from detracting from the total amount of goodness in the world, actually augments it. Problem: If there is second-order goodness, so too is there second-order evil: so, one need only state the problem as a problem about second-order evil.

Construed as an Atheistic Argument

1. If God exists, there is a being who is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent.
2. If a being is omniscient, it will know of all the evil in the universe.
3. If a being is omnibenevolent, it will want to eliminate evil whenever it is able to do so.
4. If a being is omnipotent, it will be able to eliminate evil wherever it resides.
5. So, if God exists, there is a being who wants to eliminate evil whenever it is able to do so, knows where evil resides, and is able to eliminate the evil of which it knows.
6. So, if God exists, there is no evil.
7. There is evil.
8. So, there is no God.

The Free-will Defence II The place to begin “is with an examination of the word ‘want’.” —Van Inwagen ( RR ,

First point: sometimes we have reasons not to do what we want to do, even though we know we can do them. So, as far as the logic of the situation goes, evil is consistent with God’s existence. Perhaps the omnibenevolent being wants to eliminate evil and certainly could do so— —but has reasons to avoid acting on those desires. Query: which premiss of our argument does this show to be false? Or is it supposed to be a point about invalidity?

A Further Challenge (6) is true only if God (or any other rational being) has reasons to avoid doing a. What might those reasons possibly be? One might offer a theodicy—as Milton does.

Milton’s Purpose And chiefly Thou O Spirit, that dost prefer Before all Temples th' upright heart and pure, Instruct me, for Thou know'st; Thou from the first Wast present, and with mighty wings outspread Dove-like satst brooding on the vast Abyss And mad'st it pregnant: What in me is dark Illumin, what is low raise and support; That to the highth of this great Argument I may assert Eternal Providence, And justifie the wayes of God to men. ( Paradise Lost , i 17-26)

Thus, the Free-will Defence In a nutshell, possibly (as a credible possibility ): God fails to eliminate evil in the world because there are good reasons involving the desirable existence of free will to forbear from doing so. N.b. It will not suffice merely to say that God could credibly decide that the goodness pertaining to freedom of the will merely outweighs a world without such freedom. It will have to be shown in addition that God is unable to bring about some greater good without evil. Compare: A parent might let her child suffer some harsh consequences so that he might learn a valuable lesson, but she would be culpably bad if she let the child (or, worse, forced the child to) suffer deleterious, debilitating consequences if he might have learnt the same lesson by suffering only less bad consequences.

Some Initial Contentions It would be intrinsically impossible to create a world populated by creatures with free will whose choices could be ensured to be good- directed. If so, then on the assumption of omniscience, God would have foreseen—would have known in advance, so to speak—that certain agents would choose to do evil things. Finally, it is worth noting that this defence makes sense only if the notion that human beings have free will makes sense, that is, that genuine freedom of the will is in fact possible. (This will be an issue for us to explore separately.)

Some Responses The amount of evil: if, as various stories allege, human beings were raised to rationality but then separated themselves from God, it would be entirely reasonable to expect evils to be distributed randomly, according to no plan. The amount of evil, then, is not at all as bad as it could be; but there is no reason to suppose that it should or must be less than it is. Natural evil: In a state of union, rational beings might well have been in a position to shield themselves, by superior knowledge and advance planning, from such natural evils as might accrue in a material world such as ours.

A Reminder This story is not introduced as a theodicy, but as a defence. It is meant to open up possibility space—a credible possibility space—for withholding the allegation of guilt. We are meant to see, then, that the existence of free will offers a credible reason for S ’s (i.e. God’s) forbearing from doing a (eliminating all the evil in the world), even though S (again, God) let us agree, wants to do a (wants to eliminate all the evil in the world) and could do a (could eliminate all the evil in the world) were she so disposed.