Download Understanding Criminal Intent, Concurrence, and Causation in Criminal Law and more Study Guides, Projects, Research Criminal Law in PDF only on Docsity!
Introduction
One of the common law’s great contributions is to limit blameworthy individuals’ criminal guilt to “morally blameworthy” individuals.
Mens Rea
A. A criminal offense requires a criminal intent. B. The requirement of a criminal intent is based on “moral blameworthiness,” a conscious decision to intentionally or knowingly engage in criminal conduct or to act in a reckless or negligent fashion. C. Mens rea consists of four states of mind. The most serious or culpable is purposely, and then knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. D. Strict liability offenses require an actus reus, but do not incorporate a mens rea requirement. These typically are public welfare offenses or crimes that protect public
safety and security by regulating food, drugs, and transportation.
Concurrence
A. There must be a concurrence between a criminal intent and a criminal act that causes a prohibited harm or injury.
Causality
A. A criminal act must be the cause in fact or “but for” cause of a harm or injury, as well as the legal or proximate cause. B. A coincidental intervening act does not break the chain of causation caused by a defendant’s criminal act unless the intervening act was unforeseeable. C. A responsive intervening act does not break the chain of causation caused by a defendant’s criminal act unless the intervening act was both abnormal and unforeseeable.
5 MMeennss RReeaa,,
Concurrence, Causation
Should the defendant have known that
his pet tiger cats endangered his daughter?
By June 6, 1999, the tigers were two years old. Lauren was ten. She stood 57 inches tall and
weighed 80 pounds. At dusk that evening, Lauren joined Hranicky in the tiger cage. Suddenly, the
male tiger attacked her. It mauled the child’s throat, breaking her neck and severing her spinal cord.
She died instantly... Hranicky testified... [that] he did not view the risk to be substantial
because he thought the tigers were domesticated and had bonded with the family.... Thus, he
argues, he had no knowledge of any risk.
Core Concepts and Summary Statements
Introduction
I
n the last chapter we noted that a criminal act or actus reus is required to exist in unison with a criminal intent or mens rea, and as you soon will see, these two components must com- bine to cause a prohibited injury or harm. This chapter completes our introduction to the basic elements of a crime by introducing you to criminal intent, concurrence, and causation. One of the common law’s great contributions is to limit criminal punishment to “morally blameworthy” individuals who consciously choose to cause or to create a risk of harm or injury. Individuals are punished based on the harm caused by their decision to commit a criminal act rather than because they are “bad” or “evil” people. Former Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson observed that a system of punishment based on intent is a celebration of the “freedom of the human will” and the “ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.” Jackson noted that this emphasis on individual choice and free will assumes that criminal law and punishment can deter people from choosing to commit crimes, and those who do engage in crime can be encouraged to develop a greater sense of moral responsibility and avoid crime in the future.^1
MMeennss RReeaa
Y
ou read in the newspaper that your favorite rock star shot and killed one of her friends. There is no more serious crime than murder, yet before condemning the killer you want to know “what was on her mind?” The rock star may have intentionally aimed and fired the rifle. On the other hand, she may have aimed and fired the gun believing that it was unloaded. We have the same act, but a different reaction based on whether the rock star intended to kill her friend or acted in a reckless manner. As Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. famously remarked, “even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.”^2 As we have seen, it is the bedrock principle of criminal law that a crime requires an act or omission and a criminal intent. The appropriate punishment of an act depends to a large extent on whether the act was intentional or accidental. Law texts traditionally have repeated that Actus non facit rum nisi mens sit rea: “there can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind.” The “mental part” of crimes is commonly termed mens rea (“guilty mind”) or scienter (“guilty knowledge”) or criminal intent. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the requirement of a “rela- tion between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child’s familiar exculpatory (not responsible) plea, ‘But I didn’t mean to.’”^3 The common law originally punished criminal acts and paid no attention to the mental ele- ment of an individual’s conduct. The killing of an individual was murder, whether committed inten- tionally or recklessly. Canon, or religious law, with its stress on sinfulness and moral guilt, helped to introduce the idea that punishment should depend on an individual’s “moral blameworthiness.” This came to be fully accepted in the American colonies and, as observed by the U.S. Supreme Court, mens rea is now the “rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles... of American criminal jurisprudence.” There are some good reasons for requiring “moral blameworthiness.”
- Responsibility. It is just and fair to hold a person accountable who intentionally chooses to commit a crime.
- Deterrence. Individuals who act with a criminal intent pose a threat to society and should be punished in order to discourage them from violating the law in the future and in order to deter others from choosing to violate the law.
- Punishment. The punishment should fit the crime. The severity of criminal punishment should depend on whether an individual’s act was intentional, reckless, or accidental.
The concept of mens rea has traditionally been a source of confusion, and the first reaction of students and teachers has been to flee from the topic. This is understandable when it is realized that in 1972, United States statutes employed seventy-six different terms to describe the required mental element of federal crimes. This laundry list included terms such as intentionally, knowingly, fraudu- lently, designedly, recklessly, wantonly, unlawfully, feloniously, unlawfully, willfully, purposely, felo- niously, negligently, wickedly, and wrongfully. These are what Justice Jackson termed “the variety, disparity and confusion” of the judicial definition of the “elusive mental element” of crime.^4
MMeennss RReeaa,, CCoonnccuurrrreennccee,, CCaauussaattiioonn 119
Constructive intent is a fourth type of common law intent. This was applied in the early twentieth century to protect the public against reckless drivers and provides that individuals who are grossly and wantonly reckless are considered to intend the natural consequences of their actions. A reckless driver who caused an accident that resulted in death is, under the doctrine of constructive intent, guilty of a willful and intentional battery or homicide. In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court complained that the common law distinction between general and specific intent had caused a “good deal of confusion.”^8 The Model Penal Code attempted to clearly define the mental intent required for crimes by providing four easily under- stood levels of responsibility. All crimes requiring a mental element (some do not, as we shall see) must include one of the four mental states provided in the Model Penal Code. These four types of intent, in descending order of seriousness, are:
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, negligently.
The Model Penal Code
Section 2.02. General Requirements of Culpability
(1) Minimum Requirements of Culpability.... [A] person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently... with respect to each material element of the offense.
(2) Kinds of Culpability Defined. (a) Purposely. A person acts purposely with respect to material elements of an offense when: (i)... [I]t is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result.... (b) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly... when: (i) If the element involves the nature of his conduct... he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist; and (ii) If the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. (c) Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circum- stances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation. (d) Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his con- duct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actors’ situation.
Analysis Purposely. “You borrowed my car and wrecked it on purpose.” Knowingly. “You may not have purposely wrecked my car, but you knew that you were almost certain to get in an accident because you had never driven such a powerful and fast automobile.” Recklessly. “You may not have purposely wrecked my car, but you were driving over the speed limit on a rain soaked and slick road in heavy traffic and certainly realized that you were extremely likely to get into an accident.”
MMeennss RReeaa,, CCoonnccuurrrreennccee,, CCaauussaattiioonn 121
Negligently. “You may not have purposely wrecked my car and apparently did not under- stand the power of the auto’s engine, but I cannot overlook your lack of awareness of the risk of an accident. After all, any reasonable person would have been aware that such an expensive sports car would pack a punch and would be difficult for a new driver to control.”
Purposely
T
he Model Penal Code established purposely as the most serious category of criminal intent. This merely means that a defendant acted “on purpose” or “deliberately.” In legal terms, the defendant must possess a specific intent or “conscious object” to commit a crime or cause a result. A murderer pulls the trigger with the purpose of killing the victim, the burglar breaks and enters with the purpose of committing a felony inside the dwelling, and a thief possesses the purpose of permanently depriving an individual of the possession of his or her property.
122 General Criminal Law: Principles Of Criminal Responsibility
DDiidd tthhee ddeeffeennddaanntt iinntteenndd ttoo eennggaaggee iinn eetthhnniicc iinnttiimmiiddaattiioonn??
COMMONWEALTH V. BARNETTE 699 N.E.2D 1230 (MASS.APP. 1988) OPINION BY: LENK , J.
Facts
This case arises out of an altercation between next door neighbors in Lexington. The victims, Maria Acuna and her son Israel Rodriguez, are Mexican-American. The defendant is predominately African-American. During the incident, the defendant allegedly threatened to kill Acuna and Rodriguez, calling them, among other things, “damn Mexicans” and telling them to “Get out of here.” After trial, a jury convicted the defendant of two counts of assault or battery for the purpose of intimidation... and two counts of threatening to commit a crime... We affirm.
Facts
In the early evening of September 21, 1995, Maria Acuna was working at her computer on the second floor of her home in Lexington, where she had been living with her son, Israel Rodriguez (Rodriguez), since May,
- The defendant was next door at his sister’s house babysitting his niece. Acuna heard a loud noise, like someone banging or shaking a wooden fence, looked out her window, and saw the defendant trying to enter her back yard to retrieve his niece’s ball. Concerned that the defendant was going to break her fence, Acuna called through the window to the defendant to please not trespass, and that she would come downstairs to help him out. The defendant shouted, “You b__ I just came to pick up my ball.” Acuna went downstairs and walked into her backyard, and observed that the defendant had entered
her yard, and was turning to leave. As the defendant left her yard, he repeatedly called her a “b__” and told her that she could keep the ball the next time. Acuna walked towards the fence to latch the gate and the defendant said: “You b__. You don’t fit here. What are you doing here, you damn Mexican. Why don’t you go back to your country? All of you come and get our jobs and our houses. Get out of here. You don’t fit here. I’ll kill you, and your son.” While standing next to the fence shouting at Acuna, the defendant thrust his fist towards her face so that she “could almost feel the hit of his fist” in her nose and face. The defendant then threw his fingers in a forking motion towards her, coming to within an inch of her eyes. The defendant was yelling at Acuna so loudly that Rodriguez awoke from his nap and came outside to the backyard. Rodriguez testified that he could hear the defendant shouting “f__,” “s__,” and “Mexican,” “Get the hell out of the country,” “You don’t belong here,” and “Mexicans don’t belong here” at his mother. He pulled his mother away from the fence and demanded to know from the defendant what was going on. The defen- dant now attempted to hit Rodriguez with his fists, from the other side of the fence, rattling the gate, trying to enter the backyard, and saying: “You little s_. Come up here. I’m going to take the f___ing s__ out of you and your mother together. I will beat you both to death.” The defendant continued saying, “Damn Mexicans. What are you doing here?” Acuna and Rodriguez both testified that they felt afraid and threatened by the defendant’s rage and determination to hit them. At the time of the incident, the defendant’s neigh- bor, Michael Townes, was barbecuing in his backyard, approximately twenty feet away. Townes heard the defendant yell at Acuna and Rodriguez “You should go back to where you’re from,” and refer to “whupping” Rodriguez’s ass. Townes came over and, smelling alcohol on the defendant’s breath, told the defendant to “Let it go” and to go home and “sleep it off.” Townes put his hands on the defendant and led him away. Rodriguez
Defendant Raul Perez-Gonzalez was arrested for transporting individuals whom he knew to be illegal aliens “in furtherance” of their illegal presence in the United States. His car was stopped by an Ohio State police officer, who discovered fifteen Spanish- speaking illegal aliens in the rear of the vehicle. Perez-Gonzalez had a roster indicating that each indi- vidual paid $250. He explained that he worked for the company that owned the van, and his job was to drive people from Texas to New York. Perez-Gonzalez claimed that this was his first trip for the com- pany and he was being paid $350. The vehicle had no external markings to indicate that it was a com- mercial vehicle. The van left early in the morning and had taken a complex route, apparently designed to avoid states that are heavily patrolled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The vehicle also had darkened windows that concealed the occupants. Only three or four passengers were permitted to exit the van at rest stops in order to avoid calling attention to the group. Perez-Gonzalez contended that he suspected, but did not know, that his passengers were illegal aliens. He merely intended to transport them to New York, where they apparently hoped to find employment. The government, on the other hand, contended that Perez-Gonzalez acted purposely to assist individuals whom he knew to be illegal aliens in furthering (supporting) their illegal presence in the United States. What evidence sup- ports the conclusion that Perez-Gonzalez knew that the passengers were illegal aliens? How does trans- porting illegal aliens to New York further their illegal presence in the United States? On the facts presented in this problem, should a jury find Perez-Gonzalez guilty of “furthering” the presence of illegal aliens? See United States v. Perez-Gonzalez, 307 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2002). What if Perez-Gonzalez testified that he believed the passengers were fleeing political persecution in their home countries and he was driving them to the liberally minded New York immigration office to apply for political asylum status (this status permits individuals who are able to demonstrate a well- founded fear of political persecution to remain in the United States). Would he be guilty of “further- ing” their illegal presence? See United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1985). You can find the answer at http://www.sagepub.com/lippmanstudy
5.1. You Decide
124 General Criminal Law: Principles Of Criminal Responsibility
International Perspective
TT
he 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide punishes individuals who commit certain acts with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such. Five specific acts of genocide are listed, including killing members of a group and imposing conditions on members of a group calcu- lated to lead to their extermination. Other acts include causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, imposing measures intended to prevent births, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. The U.S. Congress ratified the convention in 1989 and adopted a law making genocide a crime when com- mitted within the United States. The prosecution must establish that a defendant committed one of the acts listed in the convention with the specific intent or purpose of
exterminating an entire group. It is sufficient that the intent to exterminate extends to members of a group within the defendant’s immediate environ- ment; there is no requirement that he or she intend to kill every member of a group in the world, let alone within a country. In the Jelisic case, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia convicted defendant Goran Jelisic of murder and acquitted him of genocide at the same time. Jelisic left his home in May, 1992, to work at the Luka concentration camp where Serbian military forces had detained the male Muslim inhabitants of the town of Brcko in north- east Bosnia. Jelisic claimed the title of “Serbian Adolf Hitler” and proclaimed it was only after killing twenty Muslims in the morning that he was able to enjoy a cup of coffee. At various times, Jelisic bragged about the number of Muslims he killed; at one point he claimed he had exterminated as many as 150 Muslim prisoners. According to wit- nesses at the trial, Jelisic’s ultimate goal was to kill seventy percent of the detainees under his control
Knowingly
A
n individual satisfies the knowledge standard when he or she is “aware” that circumstances exist or a result is practically certain to result from his or her conduct. An example of knowl- edge of circumstances is to “knowingly possess” narcotics or to knowingly “receive stolen property.” It is sufficient that a person is aware that there is a high probability that property is stolen, he or she need not be certain. An illustration of a result that is practically certain to occur is a terrorist who bombs a public building knowing the people inside are likely to be maimed, injured, or die. The commentary to the Model Penal Code uses the example of treason to illustrate the dif- ference between purpose and knowledge. In United States v. Haupt, Chicago resident Hans Haupt was accused of treason during World War II based on the assistance he provided to his son, whom he knew was a German spy. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that treason requires a specific intent (purpose) to wage war on the United States. Haupt claimed that as a loving father, he knowingly assisted his son, who unfortunately happened to be sympathetic to the German cause, and he did not possess the purpose to injure the U.S. government. The Supreme Court, however, pointed to Haupt’s statements that “he hoped that Germany would win the war” and that “he would never permit his son to fight for the United States” as indicating that Haupt’s “son had the misfortune of being a chip off the old block.”^9 In the next case in the chapter, State v. Nations, the defendant remained “willfully blind” or deliberately unaware of the criminal circumstances and claims that she did not knowingly violate the law. This type of situation typically arises in narcotics prosecutions in which drug couriers claim to have been unaware that they were transporting drugs.^10
MMeennss RReeaa,, CCoonnccuurrrreennccee,, CCaauussaattiioonn 125
and severely beat and subject the remaining thirty percent to janitorial duties. Jelisic also reportedly remarked that he wanted to sterilize Muslim women to prevent the growth of the Islamic popu- lation, and that in the short term, he would begin to kill Muslim male detainees in order to halt the growth of the Muslim population. The International Trial Court noted that Jelisic possessed a disturbed personality and that his exercise of authority over the Muslim prisoners provided him with a sense of power, satisfaction,
and personal fulfillment. Jelisic was described as enjoying the exercise of power over the prisoners and unpredictably spared some detainees while killing others. The tribunal concluded that Jelisic lacked a clear purpose to destroy all Muslims under his control in the camp. The trial court illus- trated this by pointing out that Jelisic released a prisoner who he had forced to play “Russian roulette” and permitted several others to leave the camp after severely beating them. See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-10 (1999).
DDiidd tthhee ddeeffeennddaanntt kknnooww tthhee ddaanncceerr’’ss aaggee??
STATE v. NATIONS 676 S.W.2D 382 (MO.APP. 1984) OPINION BY: SATZ , J.
Issue
Defendant, Sandra Nations, owns and operates the Main Street Disco, in which police officers found a scantily clad sixteen year old girl “dancing” for “tips.” Consequently, defendant was charged with endangering the welfare of a child “less than seventeen
years old,” Defendant was convicted and fined $1,000.00. Defendant appeals. We reverse. Specifically, defendant argues the state failed to show she knew the child was under seventeen and, therefore, failed to show she had the requisite intent to endanger the welfare of a child “less than seventeen years old.” We agree.
Reasoning
The pertinent part of § 568.050 provides:
(1) A person commits the crime of endangering the welfare of a child if:
....
CCaasseess aanndd CCoommmmeennttss
1. Willful Blindness. The Missouri Court of Appeals decision in Nations does not reflect the majority view con- cerning “willful blindness.” In Florez, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Antoinette Rose Florez was aware that her former husband Tyrone Crawford had engaged in extensive real estate fraud schemes in the past. Crawford was prohibited by a court order from opening a bank account in his own name for one year; Florez agreed to open an account in her name. to which she gave Crawford full access, including control over the check- book and bank card. Florez accompanied Crawford to the bank whenever he wanted to withdraw funds from the account. She claimed that she was unaware that Crawford
was once again engaged in a series of complex illegal transactions, and that she did not know that this was the source of the $100,000 that he asked her to withdraw from the account. The jury found Florez guilty of aiding and abetting the laundering of money (this involves hid- ing the fact that money came from an illegal enterprise). The Court of Appeals held that the evidence taken as a whole indicates that even if Florez did not have actual knowledge that Crawford was using the bank account for illegal activities, “it was only because she chose not to investigate and effectively buried her head in the sand.” Is there a distinction between this case and Nations? See United States v. Florez, 368 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2004).
MMeennss RReeaa,, CCoonnccuurrrreennccee,, CCaauussaattiioonn 127
Defendant Andy Hypolite is a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago. His cousin and his cousin’s friend offered him a round-trip airline ticket to fly to New York and trans- port $70,000 back to Trinidad. Hypolite was to receive $6,000 on his return. At the airport in Trinidad, his cousin’s friend gave Hypolite “drink packets” that appeared to be milk products. U.S. Customs officials in New York found that the “milk products” actually contained 2.9 kilograms of cocaine and arrested Hypolite. Hypolite claimed that he was unaware that he was transporting illegal drugs. He conceded that he had a “strong suspicion” that the milk products contained narcotics, but did not ask whether the packages contained drugs because he “blanked it out” and tried “not to pry too much.” Was Hypolite guilty of knowingly importing illegal drugs into the United States? See United States v. Hypolite, 81 Fed.Appx. 751 (2003). You can find the answer at http://www.sagepub.com/lippmanstudy
Recklessly
W
e all know people who enjoy taking risks and skirting danger and who are confident that they will beat the odds. These reckless individuals engage in obviously risky behavior that they know creates a risk of substantial and unjustifiable harm and yet do not expect that injury or harm will result. Why does the law consider individuals who are reckless less blameworthy than individuals who act purposely or knowingly?
- Individuals who act purposely deliberately create a harm and individuals who act know- ingly are aware that injury is certain to follow.
- Individuals acting recklessly, in contrast, disregard a strong probability that harm will result.
Recklessness is big, bold, and outrageous. Recklessness involves a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. This must constitute a gross deviation from the standard of
5.2. You Decide
- How does the Missouri statute differ from the Model Penal Code in regards to “willful blindness”? What is the impact of the court decision for offenses involving the possession of narcotics? 5. How would you amend the Missouri statute to eliminate the “willful blindness” defense? 6. If you were a judge, how would you rule Nations?
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in a similar situation. The reckless individual speeds down a street where children usually play, builds and sells to an uninformed buyer a house that is situated on a dangerous chemical waste dump, manufactures an automobile with a gas tank that likely will explode in the event of an accident, or locks the exit doors of a rock club during a performance in which a band ignites fireworks. The Model Penal Code provides a two-fold test for reckless conduct:
- A Conscious Disregard of a Substantial and Unjustifiable Risk. The defendant must be personally aware of a severe and serious risk. Unjustifiable means that the harm was not created in an effort to serve a greater good, such as speeding down the street in an effort to reach the hospital before a passenger who was in auto accident bleeds to death.
- A Gross Deviation From the Standard That a Law-Abiding Person Would Observe in the Same Situation. The defendant must have acted in a fashion that demonstrates a clear lack of judgment and concern for the consequences. This must clearly depart from the behavior that would be expected of other law-abiding individuals. Note this is an objective test based on the general standard of conduct.
In Hranicky v. State, the next case in the chapter, the court is confronted with the challenge of determining whether the defendant recklessly caused serious bodily injury to his stepdaughter.
128 General Criminal Law: Principles Of Criminal Responsibility
WWaass tthhee ddeeffeennddaanntt aawwaarree ooff tthhee rriisskk ppoosseedd bbyy tthhee ttiiggeerrss ttoo hhiiss ddaauugghhtteerr??
HRANICKY v. STATE 13-00-431-CR (TEX. APP. 2004) OPINION BY: CATILLO, J.
Bobby Lee Hranicky appeals his conviction for the second- degree felony offense of recklessly causing serious bodily injury to a child. A jury found him guilty, sentenced him to eight years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and assessed a $5,000 fine. On the jury’s recommendation, the trial court suspended the sentence and placed Hranicky on commu- nity supervision for ten years.
Facts
A newspaper advertisement offering tiger cubs for sale caught the eye of eight-year-old Lauren Villafana. She decided she wanted one. She expressed her wish to her mother, Kelly Dean Hranicky, and to Hranicky, her stepfather. Over the next year, the Hranickys investi- gated the idea by researching written materials on the subject and consulting with owners of exotic animals. They visited tiger owner and handler Mickey Sapp sev- eral times. They decided to buy two rare tiger cubs from him, a male and a female whose breed is endangered in the wild.... Sapp trained Hranicky in how to care for and handle the animals. In particular, he demonstrated the risk adult tigers pose for children. Sapp escorted Hranicky, Kelly
Hranicky, and Lauren past Sapp’s tiger cages. He told the family to watch the tigers’ focus of attention. The tigers’ eyes followed Lauren as she walked up and down beside the cages. The Hranickys raised the cubs inside their home until they were six or eight months old. Then they moved the cubs out of the house, at first to an enclosed porch in the back and ultimately to a cage Hranicky built in the yard. The tigers matured into adolescence. The male reached 250 pounds, the female slightly less. Lauren actively helped Hranicky care for the animals. By June 6, 1999, the tigers were two years old. Lauren was ten. She stood 57 inches tall and weighed 80 pounds. At dusk that evening, Lauren joined Hranicky in the tiger cage. Suddenly, the male tiger attacked her. It mauled the child’s throat, breaking her neck and severing her spinal cord. She died instantly. The record reflects four different versions of the events that led to Lauren’s death. Hranicky told the grand jury Lauren and he were sitting side-by-side in the cage about 8:00 p.m., petting the female tiger. A neighbor’s billy goat cried out. The noise attracted the male tiger’s attention. He turned toward the sound. The cry also caught Lauren’s attention. She stood and looked at the male tiger. When Lauren turned her head toward the male tiger, “that was too much,” Hranicky told the grand jury. The tiger attacked. Hranicky yelled. The tiger grabbed Lauren by the throat and dragged her across the cage into a water trough. Hranicky ran after them. He struck the tiger on the head and held him under the water. The tiger released the child. Kelly Dean Hranicky testified she was asleep when the incident occurred. She called for emergency
child should never enter a tiger cage in the first place, Boller testified. Taking a child into a tiger cage “during a high activity time for the animal is going to increase your risk dramatically.” Dr. Richard Villafana, Lauren’s biological father, told the jury he first learned of the tigers when his daughter told him over the phone she had a surprise to show him at their next visit. When he came to pick her up the following weekend, he testified, she took him into the house and showed him the female cub. Villafana described his reaction as “horror and general- ized upset and dismay, any negative term you care to choose.” He immediately decided to speak to Kelly Hranicky about the situation. He did not do so in front of Lauren, however, in an effort to avoid a “big argu- ment.” Villafana testified he later discussed the tigers with Kelly Hranicky, who assured him Lauren was safe.
... As the tigers matured, no one told Villafana the Hranickys allowed Lauren in the cage with them. Had he known, he “would have talked to Kelly again” and “would have told her that [he] was greatly opposed to it and would have begged and pleaded with her not to allow her in there.” He spoke to his daughter about his concerns about the tigers “almost every time” he saw her. Kelly Hranicky told the jury Lauren was a very obedient child. Villafana agreed. Lauren would not have gone into the tiger cage that evening without Hranicky’s permission.
Issue
... Did Hranicky act in a reckless fashion?
Reasoning
The record reflects that each of the witnesses who came into contact with Hranicky in connection with the tigers testified they told him that: (1) large cats, even those raised in captivity, are dangerous, unpredictable wild animals; and (2) children were particularly at risk from adolescent and adult tigers, especially males. Expert ani- mal handlers whom Hranicky consulted and written materials he claimed to have read warned Hranicky that the risks increased with adolescent male tigers, with more than one person in the cage, with more than one tiger in the cage, at dusk during the animals’ heightened activity period, and when diminishing one’s size by
sitting or crouching on the ground. They each cautioned that tigers attack swiftly, without warning, and are pow- erful predators. Further, Hranicky’s initial story to Sapp that Lauren had sneaked into the cage evidences Hranicky’s aware- ness of the risk. The jury also could have inferred his awareness of the risk when he concealed from Sapp that the family was purchasing the tigers for Lauren. The jury also could have inferred Hranicky’s consciousness of guilt when he gave several different versions of what happened. On the other hand, the record shows that before buying the tigers, Hranicky researched the subject and conferred with professionals. He received training in handling the animals. Further, Kelly Hranicky testified she also understood the warnings about not allowing children in the tiger cage to apply to strangers, not to Lauren. Hranicky told the grand jury he did not think the warnings applied to children, like Lauren, who had helped raise the animal. He said he had seen other handlers, including Sapp and McAda, permit Lauren and other children to go into tiger cages. He testified Currer told him it was safe to permit children in tiger cages. Further, while the State’s witness described zoo policies for handling tigers, those policies were not known to the general public. Finally, none of the significant figures in Lauren’s life fully appreciated the danger the tigers posed for Lauren. Hranicky was not alone in not perceiving the risk....
Holding
Hranicky testified to the grand jury he did not view the risk to be substantial because he thought the tigers were domesticated and had bonded with the family. He claimed not to have any awareness of any risk. The tigers were acting normally. Lauren had entered the cage numerous times to pet the tigers with no inci- dent. Further, he asserted, other than a minor scratch by the male as a cub, the tigers had never harmed anyone. Thus, he argues, he had no knowledge of any risk. Viewing all the evidence neutrally, favoring neither Hranicky nor the State, we find that proof of Hranicky’s guilt of reckless injury to a child is not so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury’s determination. Nor do we do not find that the proof of his guilt is greatly outweighed by contrary proof.
130 General Criminal Law: Principles Of Criminal Responsibility
◆ Questions for Discussion
- Did Hranicky’s disregard constitute a substantial and unjustifiable risk? Did his actions constitute a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in a similar situation?
- Why does the court consider it to be a “close call” as to whether Hranicky was aware of the risk posed by the tigers to Lauren? 3. Would the result be the same in the event that the tigers attacked Lauren when they were tiger cubs and were first living in the home? 4. What if Bobby Lee Hranicky had been mauled and killed by the tiger? Would a court convict Kelly Hranicky of recklessly causing Bobby Lee’s death?
Norma Surarez left home with her son P and her daughters N.E. and A.E. in the car. She stopped to visit Michelle Dominguez and then drove to the home of Violanda Corrral, P’s grandmother. Suarez left P at Corral’s home and started toward home. N.E. was in the front passenger seat and A.E. was in the back seat. Suarez arrived home to find that A.E. was not in the auto. It later was learned that A.E. had fallen from the car as the vehicle crossed the Continental Bridge, was struck by another car, and died of head injuries. Suarez was convicted of reck- lessly endangering A.E., who was three years old at the time, by failing to properly supervise her child. It was a crime in Texas at the time of this incident for the operator of a motor vehicle to fail to secure a child over two and younger than four years of age by a seat belt or child seat. An investigating police officer testified that A.E. fell out of the front passenger window. The officer also found that the seat belt clips in the back seat were “pushed down... along the crease” indicating “non-use.” Suarez contended that A.E. put the belt on herself when they left home. Dominguez testified that she later buckled A.E. in the car. Corral stated that she told Suarez to “make sure you buckle up the girls” and testified that she saw Suarez look toward the backseat and then put N.E. in the front seat. Corral indicated that she had no doubt that A.E. was properly secured with a seat belt. There was testimony that A.E. could unbuckle the seat belt herself. Other evidence indicated that Suarez stopped at a red light before driving across the bridge to insure that A.E. was still asleep. Did Suarez recklessly cause A.E.’s death? See Suarez v. State, Tex.App. LEXIS 10799 (2003). You can find the answer at http://www.sagepub.com/lippmanstudy
Negligently
R
ecklessness entails creating and disregarding a risk. The reckless individual consciously lives on the edge, walking on a ledge above the street. Negligence, in contrast, involves engaging in harmful and dangerous conduct while being unaware of a risk that a reasonable person would appreciate. The reckless individual would “play around” and push someone off a cliff into a pool of water that he or she knows contains a string of dangerous boulders and rocks. The negligent individual simply does not bother to check whether the water conceals a rock quarry before pushing another person off the cliff. Recklessness involves an awareness of harm that is lacking in negligence and for that reason is considered to be of greater “moral blameworthiness.” In considering negligence keep in mind:
- Mental State. The reckless individual is aware of and disregards the substantial and unjustifiable risk; the negligent individual is not aware of the risk.
- Objective Standard. Recklessness and negligence ask juries to decide whether the indi- vidual’s conduct varies from that expected of the general public. The reckless individual grossly deviates from the standard of care that a law-abiding person would demonstrate in the situation; the negligent individual grossly deviates from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exhibit under a similar set of circumstances.
It is not always easy to determine whether a defendant was unaware of a risk and is guilty of negligence rather than recklessness. In Tello v. State, the defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide after a trailer that he was pulling came unhitched, jumped a curb, and killed a pedestrian. Tello argued that he had not previously experienced difficulties with the trailer and claimed to have been unaware that safety chains were required or that the hitch was clearly bro- ken and in need of repair. The court convicted Tello of negligent homicide based on the fact that a reasonable person would have been aware that the failure to safely secure the trailer hitch con- stituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would have exhib- ited and posed a substantial risk of death. Is it credible to believe that Tello regularly used the trailer and yet lacked awareness that the trailer was secured so poorly that a bump in the road was able to separate the trailer from the truck?^11 People v. Baker illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing negligence from recklessness.
5.3. You Decide
MMeennss RReeaa,, CCoonnccuurrrreennccee,, CCaauussaattiioonn 131
the circumstances are not of a type from which it can be inferred without a doubt that a person of even ordinary intelligence and experience would have perceived a severe risk of serious injury or death.... A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when he or she recklessly causes the death of another person and of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of another person. Reckless criminal conduct occurs when the actor is aware of and consciously disre- gards a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and criminal negligence is the failure to perceive such a risk. As we have noted, there is no support for a finding that defendant perceived and consciously disregarded the risk of death which was created by the combination of the “runaway” furnace and her failure to release the victim from her bedroom. None of defendant’s proven conduct reflects such an awareness and the fact that she subjected herself to the excessive heat is plainly incon- sistent with a finding that she perceived a risk of death.
Holding
However, the evidence was sufficient to establish defen- dant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of criminally negligent homicide. A jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that defendant should have per- ceived a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the exces- sive heat, in combination with her inaction, would be likely to lead to the victim’s death.... Since defendant was the victim’s caretaker, this risk was of such a nature that her failure to perceive it constituted a gross devia- tion from the standard of care that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would observe in such a situ- ation. Thus, defendant’s conduct was shown to consti- tute criminal negligence and such a finding would not be against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we reduce the conviction from depraved indifference mur- der to criminally negligent homicide and remit the matter to County Court for sentencing on the reduced charge.
MMeennss RReeaa,, CCoonnccuurrrreennccee,, CCaauussaattiioonn 133
◆◆ Questions for Discussion
- Explain the court’s factual basis for determining that the defendant should be held liable for negligent rather than reckless homicide.
- Should the appellate court overturn the verdict of the jurors who actually observed the trial?
- As a judge, what would be your ruling in this case?
See more cases on the study site: Koppersmith v. State http://www.sagepub.com/lippmanstudy
The fifty-seven-year old defendant Strong emigrated from Arabia to China and then to the United States. He testified that he was a member of the Sudan Muslim religious faith since birth and became one of the sect’s leaders. The three central beliefs of the religion are “cosmetic consciousness, mind over matter and psysiomatic psychomatic consciousness.” Mind over matter empowers a master or leader to lie on a bed of nails without bleeding, walk through fire or on hot coals, perform surgical operations without anesthesia, raise people off the ground, and suspend a person’s heartbeat, pulse, and breathing while the individual remained conscious. The defendant claimed that he could stop a follower’s heartbeat and breathing and plunge knives into an adherent’s chest without injuring the person. Strong testified that he performed this ceremony count- less times over the previous forty years. On January 28, 1972, Strong performed this ceremony on Kenneth Goings, a recent recruit to the sect. The wounds from the hatchet and three knives that Strong inserted into Goings proved fatal. Prior to being stabbed, Goings objected and the defendant stated that “It will be all right, son.” The defendant and one of his adherents testified that they perceived no danger and, in fact, the adherent had volunteered to participate. Another member of the sect claimed that Strong had performed this ritual on another occasion without harming the individual involved in the ritual. The defendant was convicted of reckless manslaughter at trial and appealed the refusal of the trial judge to instruct the jury to consider a conviction for criminally negligent homicide. Should the judge remand the case for a new trial and instruct the trial court judge to permit the jurors to decide for themselves whether the defendant is guilty of either reckless or negligent homicide? See People v. Strong, 338 N.E.2d 602 (N.Y. 1975). You can find the answer at http://www.sagepub.com/lippmanstudy
5.4. You Decide
Strict Liability
W
e all have had the experience of telling another person that “I don’t care why you acted in that way, you hurt me and that was wrong.” This is similar to a strict liability offense. A strict liability offense is a crime that does not require a mens rea, and an individual may be convicted based solely on the commission of a criminal act. Strict liability offenses have their origin in the industrial development of the United States in the middle of the nineteenth century. The U.S. Congress and various state legislatures enacted a number of public welfare offenses that were intended to protect society against impure food, defective drugs, pollution, unsafe working conditions, trucks, and railroads. These malum pro- hibita offenses (an act is wrong because it is prohibited) are distinguished from those crimes that are malum in se (inherently wrongful, such as rape, robbery, and murder). The common law was based on the belief that criminal offenses required a criminal intent to insure that offenders were morally blameworthy. The U.S. Supreme Court has pronounced that the requirement of a criminal intent, although not required under the Constitution, is “uni- versal and persistent in mature systems of law.”^12 Courts, however, have disregarded the strong policy in favor of requiring a criminal intent in upholding the constitutionality of malum pro- hibita laws. Congress and state legislatures typically indicate that these are strict liability laws by omitting language such as “knowingly” or “purposely” from the text of the law. Courts look to several factors in addition to the textual language in determining whether a statute should be interpreted as providing for strict liability:
- The offense is not a common law crime.
- A single violation poses a danger to a large number of people.
- The risk of the conviction of an “innocent” individual is outweighed by the public inter- est in preventing harm to society.
- The penalty is relatively minor.
- A conviction does not harm a defendant’s reputation.
- The law does not significantly impede the rights of individuals or impose a heavy burden. Examples are the prohibition of acts such as “selling alcohol to minors” or “dri- ving without a license.”
- These are acts that most people avoid and individuals who engage in such acts generally possess a criminal intent.
The argument for strict liability offenses is that these laws deter unqualified people from par- ticipating in potentially dangerous activities, such as the production and selling of pharmaceu- tical drugs, and that those who engage in this type of activity will take extraordinary steps to insure that they proceed in a cautious and safe fashion. There is also concern that requiring prosecutors to establish a criminal intent in these relatively minor cases will consume time and energy and divert resources from other cases. There is a trend toward expanding strict liability into the non-public-welfare crimes that carry relatively severe punishment. Many of these statutes are criticized for imposing prison terms without providing for the fundamental requirement of a criminal intent. For instance, in State v. York, the defendant was sentenced to one year in prison in Ohio after he was convicted of having touched the buttocks of an eleven-year-old girl. The appellate court affirmed his con- viction for “gross sexual imposition” and ruled that this was a strict liability offense and that the prosecutor was only required to demonstrate a prohibited contact with an individual under thir- teen that could be perceived by the jury as sexually arousing or gratifying to the defendant.^13 The U.S. Supreme Court indicated in Staples v. United States that it may not be willing to continue to accept the growing number of strict liability “public welfare” offenses_._ The National Firearms Act was intended to restrict the possession of dangerous weapons and declared it a crime punishable by up to ten years in prison to possess a “machine gun” without legal regis- tration. The defendant was convicted for possession of an AR-15 rifle, which is a semiautomatic weapon that can be modified to fire more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger. The Supreme Court interpreted the statute to require a mens rea, explaining that the imposition of a lengthy prison sentence has traditionally required that a defendant possess a criminal intent.
134 General Criminal Law: Principles Of Criminal Responsibility
Reasoning
The provision of the statute applicable to the instant case makes no reference to intent. In order then to deter- mine whether the requirement of specific intent is nonetheless implied from the nature of the statute, we turn again to the classic test which Judge (now Justice) Blackmun announced for our court:....
[W]here a federal criminal statute omits men- tion of intent and where it seems to involve what is basically a matter of policy, where the standard imposed is, under the circumstances, reasonable and adherence thereto properly expected of a person, where the penalty is rela- tively small, where conviction does not gravely besmirch, where the statutory crime is not one taken over from the common law, and where congressional purpose is supporting, the statute can be construed as one not requiring criminal intent. The elimination of this element is then not violative of the due process clause....
1. Policy. In 1961 Congress adopted certain amend- ments to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, for the pur- pose of “extend[ing] Federal criminal laws to certain acts committed on board aircraft—in particular, such acts as aircraft hijacking, murder, manslaughter, assault, maim- ing, carrying concealed deadly or dangerous weapons, and stealing personal property.” Nowhere in the report [accompanying the law] is found any inference of a congressional purpose or policy that intent to conceal must be demonstrated in order to prove the fact of concealment.... 2. Standard. We cannot say that the standard expressed in the plain meaning [of the statute] is unrea- sonable. A demonstrated need to halt the flow of weapons on board aircraft, which had exposed to peril large numbers of passengers and jeopardized the integrity of commercial travel, justified a stringent rule, adherence to which was properly expected of all persons traveling by air, for their mutual safety. 3. Penalty. The statutory penalty, a maximum fine of $1000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, makes the offense a misdemeanor... and is thus “relatively small.”... 4. Effect of Conviction. Little need be said of the fourth requirement. Conviction of this offense does not gravely besmirch; it does not brand the guilty person as a felon or subject him to any burden beyond the sentence imposed. 5. Source of Statute. It is argued that the statute makes into a federal offense that which was an offense at common law: carrying a concealed weapon. The com- mon law offense required proof of an intent to conceal; hence, defendant argues, the statute impliedly contains the same requirement.... The thrust of the federal statute, a misdemeanor, is to prohibit entry of an airplane
with such weapon concealed upon one’s person. The offense is not simply carrying the concealed weapon about one’s person, but in boarding or attempting to board an aircraft with it.
6. Congressional Purpose Supporting. The Congress, as demonstrated sought to promote safety in aircraft by extending the federal criminal laws to aircraft- related acts as a deterrent to crime. This purpose sup- ports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to impede the deterrent effect of its statute by imposing upon the government prosecutor the added burden of showing the state of mind of the person found attempt- ing to board an aircraft with a deadly or dangerous concealed weapon. If conviction depended upon proof of misrepresentation at the security gate or some other furtive act inconsistent with innocence, then the con- gressional purpose to keep weapons out of the passenger section of aircraft would depend entirely upon the thor- oughness of the inspection, since in almost every case a person who presented his bags for inspection would thereby have rebutted in advance a claim that he pos- sessed a specific criminal intent to conceal. To the con- trary, we think the congressional purpose of keeping weapons from being taken on board airplanes by pas- sengers fully supports the conclusion that intent to con- ceal is not an essential element of the offense. While intent to conceal is not an essential element of the offense and therefore need not be established in order for the prosecution to make a submissible case, the fact of concealment is an essential element and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The classic definition of a concealed weapon is one which is hidden from ordinary observation.... A sub- missible case is made when the government establishes that a person has attempted to board an aircraft with a dangerous or deadly weapon on or about his person which is hidden from view. We do not intimate that the weapon must in all cases be in open view prior to inspection. The trier of the fact could consider, for example, evidence offered on behalf of the defendant that he had informed the inspec- tor of the presence and location of a deadly or dangerous weapon among his belongings. The obviousness of the weapon is a factor to be taken into consideration under all of the relevant facts and circumstances. Concealment under subsection (1) of the statute is measured by what a defendant did or failed to do, not by his intent. The inspection process in a particular case may be an objective fact to be considered with other objective facts on the issue of concealment. Not every inspection will uncover a concealed weapon, and no congressional purpose to let the fact of a security inspec- tion operate as an absolute defense to the charge can be found in either the statute or its legislative history. Each case must stand upon its own facts.
Holding
While defendant submitted his bags and belongings to an inspection, as he was required to do, this objective fact
136 General Criminal Law: Principles Of Criminal Responsibility
was insufficient to overcome as a matter of law the find- ing of the District Court that the knives were concealed, a finding which is fully supported by the evidence. It will be argued that the statute thus construed may operate harshly upon passengers boarding aircraft with articles which potentially are deadly or dangerous weapons. Balanced against the heavy risks to large numbers of passengers, including those who would carry such weapons on board with no evil purpose, we cannot say that the resulting effect is too severe. It requires no recitation of recent history to remind us that such risks are real, and in comparison, the statute—broad though its reach may be—is a reasoned response to a demon- strated need.
Dissent, HHeeaanneeyy,, JJ..
The decision of the majority permits imposition of crim- inal liability upon the housewife who carries scissors in her sewing bag; the fisherman who carries a scaling knife in his tackle box; the professional who carries a letter opener in his briefcase; the doctor who carries scalpels in his medical bag; and the tradesman who carries a hammer in his tool kit. The majority attempts to avoid this problem by pointing out that concealment is always a factual ques- tion and that all facts and circumstances can be consid- ered in determining whether a weapon has been concealed. This ambiguous language may be taken by some as requiring that an intent to conceal be found, but I am not willing to leave the matter in such an ambigu- ous state. I agree that an oral disclosure of the weapon and the obviousness of its presence upon the physical search rebut the criminal act. They also rebut the crimi- nal intent. The understandable failure to orally disclose
the existence of a weapon, when momentarily the con- tents of the hand luggage will be subjected to a full search, or the fortuitous manner in which a passenger packs his hand luggage should not be the sole factors determining guilt. Only by preserving the defendant’s opportunity to put before the jury evidence that the act of concealment was without culpability will the inno- cent be protected. Easing the prosecutor’s burden cannot be justified when the result is injustice. It is not the imposition of criminal liability upon those who innocently carry weapons in their hand lug- gage but the preflight boarding searches that will “halt the flow of weapons on board aircraft.” This extraordi- nary procedure is the practical method Congress has chosen to insure flight safety. The requirement of intent as an essential element... will not undermine that procedure or its purpose. The intent requirement will only insure that prosecutions under the statute will be limited to those persons who would be deterred thereby. The statute should not be construed to serve a purpose it cannot achieve. The troublesome problem of selective enforcement is also aggravated by the majority’s decision. As revealed in the Federal Aviation Administration’s First Semi- Annual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of Passenger Screening Procedures, 67,710 weapons were detected in 1974. As a result thereof, however, only 1,147 arrests for weapons related offenses were made. The percentage of arrests made to weapons detected was 1.69%. It is apparent that the security officer possesses an enormous amount of unreviewable discretion. The decision of a majority of this Court increases that discre- tionary power and places the determination of inno- cence in the hands of the police.
MMeennss RReeaa,, CCoonnccuurrrreennccee,, CCaauussaattiioonn 137
◆ Questions for Discussion
- Why does the federal court establish that the statute does not require a criminal intent?
- What are the reasons Congress has made the prohibition on bringing a deadly or dangerous weapon onto a plane a “strict liability offense?” Do you believe that this results in significant injustice to the flying public? 3. Summarize the argument of the dissent. Do you agree that public safety can be adequately protected and still require a “criminal intent?” 4. As a judge, would you vote with the majority or the dissent?
CCaasseess aanndd CCoommmmeennttss
1. Hand Guns. A Virginia statute, §18.2-308.1(B), makes it a felony for an individual to possess “any firearm designed or intended to expel a projectile... while such person is upon... any public... elemen- tary... school, including buildings and grounds... .” Deena Estaban, a fourth-grade elementary school teacher, left a zippered yellow canvas bag in a classroom that was found to contain a loaded .38 caliber revolver. She taught a class in the room earlier in the day that was
primarily comprised of children in wheelchairs. The defendant claimed that she inadvertently left the gun in the bag that she used to carry various teaching aids. After teaching in the classroom, Esteban took the teaching aids with her but left the yellow bag. Esteban explained that she placed the gun in the bag and took it to the store on the previous Saturday and then forgot that the pistol was in the bag and inadvertently carried it into the school. The trial court interpreted the statute as providing for a strict liability offense and ruled that the prosecution
