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The differences between direct and circumstantial evidence in the context of new york law. Direct evidence is based on a witness's personal knowledge of a fact acquired through their senses, while circumstantial evidence is indirect and allows for the inference of a fact. Examples of both types of evidence and their significance in proving guilt or liability in criminal and civil cases. It also discusses the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence in terms of weight and importance, and the role of a jury in determining the applicable burden of proof.
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Subdivisions (1) and (2) are derived from CJI2d(NY) Evidence— Circumstantial Evidence and PJI 1:70 (General Instruction—Circumstantial Evidence). Those definitions summarize the law of New York, beginning with People v Bretagna (298 NY 323, 325-326 [1949]):
“Evidence is direct and positive when the very facts in dispute are communicated by those who have the actual knowledge of them by means of their senses. * * * Circumstantial evidence... never proves directly the fact in question. In other words, direct... evidence, as the term is commonly used, means statements by witnesses, directly probative of one or more of the principal... facts of the case, while circumstantial evidence puts before the tribunal facts which, alone or with others, are in some degree but indirectly, probative of one or more of those principal... facts, and from which one or more of those principal facts may properly be inferred” ( id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Hardy , 26 NY3d 245, 251 [2015] [“This Court has described circumstantial evidence as evidence that never proves directly the fact in question. ( People v Bretagna , 298 NY 323, 325 [1949]). By contrast... direct evidence... requires no inference to establish (a particular fact)” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)]; Schneider v Kings Hwy. Hosp. Ctr ., 67 NY2d 743, 744 [1986] [“To establish a prima facie case of negligence based wholly on circumstantial evidence, ‘(i)t is enough that (plaintiff) shows facts and conditions from which the negligence of the defendant and the causation of the accident by that negligence may be reasonably inferred.’ The law does not require that plaintiff’s proof ‘positively exclude every other possible cause’ of the accident but defendant’s negligence. Rather, her proof must render those other causes sufficiently ‘remote’ or ‘technical’ to enable the jury to reach its verdict based not upon speculation, but upon the logical inferences to be drawn from the evidence” (citations omitted)]; Markel v Spencer , 5 AD2d 400 [4th Dept 1958], affd without op 5 NY2d 958 [1959]).
In Hardy , the defendant was charged with larceny of a purse. A surveillance video inside a club showed the defendant positioning himself between the complainant and her purse; putting the purse underneath him; and, when the complainant left, “rifling through its contents” and walking away with the purse in hand (26 NY3d at 248). The surveillance video therefore was direct evidence, proving the actus reus, that is, the “taking” element, of larceny. That the “defendant offered the jury an alternative explanation of his behavior, one that was inconsistent with [the element of] larcenous intent, does not change the character of the evidence from direct to circumstantial” ( id. at 251). As Hardy explained, “a particular piece of evidence is not required to be wholly dispositive of guilt in order to constitute direct evidence, so long as it proves directly a disputed fact without requiring an inference to be made. In other words, even if a particular item of evidence does not
Subdivision (4) is derived from People v Bretagna (298 NY 323, 326 [1949] [“a confession of guilt by a defendant in a criminal cause... is not circumstantial evidence” but an admission “not amounting to a confession because not directly acknowledging guilt, but including inculpatory acts from which a jury may or may not infer guilt, is circumstantial, not direct evidence”]) and People v Hardy (26 NY3d 245, 249-250 [2015]):
“[The defendant’s] statement to the prosecution witness that he did not have the purse but could get it was not direct evidence of his guilt. A defendant’s statement is direct evidence only if it constitutes a relevant admission of guilt....
“By contrast, where the defendant makes an admission that merely includ[es] inculpatory acts from which a jury may or may not infer guilt, the statement is circumstantial and not direct evidence....
“Here, defendant’s statement—that he did not have the purse but could get it—was not a direct admission of his guilt of larceny. Rather, defendant’s statement was also consistent with an inference that although he did not steal the purse, he knew where the purse was located and thought he could obtain it. Inasmuch as his statement merely included inculpatory facts from which the jury may or may not have inferred guilt, his statement was circumstantial rather than direct evidence” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).