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CONCEPTUAL DIVERSITY IN EPISTEMOLOGY
RICHARD FOLEY
Rational belief belongs to a cluster of normative concepts that also includes reasonable, justified, and warranted belief. Each of these notions is commonly used by epistemologists, and along with the notion of knowledge, they form a central part of the subject matter of epistemology. However, there is no generally agreed way of understanding these notions. Nor is there even agreement as to whether they are equivalent. Some epistemologists employ them interchangeably; other epistemologists choose to express their conclusions using only one of the above notions and avoid making use of the other notions; yet other epistemologists distinguish among two or more of the notions.
It is generally agreed, however, that beliefs are the appropriate focus for epistemological investigations into these notions, or for some epistemologists, degrees of belief. Decisions, actions, plans, intentions, strategies and many other phenomena are assessed in terms of how rational, reasonable, justified, or warranted they are, but when doing epistemology, the aim is to understand what it takes for a belief to be rational, reasonable, justified, or warranted. To be sure, epistemologists also often refer to propositions, statements, claims, hypotheses, and theories as being rational, reasonable, justified, or warranted, but in general these uses are best understood as derivative. To say, for example, that a theory is reasonable is to say (very roughly) that the relevant evidence is such that were an individual acquainted with this evidence, it would be reasonable for the individual to believe the theory.
Despite the centrality of the above notions for epistemology (again, along with the notion of knowledge), there is an under appreciation of the fact that these notions are often used in the literature in strikingly different ways and a corresponding lack of explicit discussion of what desiderata the accounts of these notions should be satisfying. I will be attempting to correct these deficiencies In particular, I will be making recommendations for how to distinguish these notions; I will be arguing that what is implicitly assumed in much of the literature to be a key desideratum for accounts of some of the above notions is not in fact a genuine desideratum; on the other hand, I will be identifying several desiderata which have not been adequately recognized in the literature; and finally, I will illustrate how the conceptual distinctions I am recommending fit together in an interlocking system that holds out the hope for a well-integrated and philosophically respectable general theory of rationality.
- Rational (reasonable, justified, warranted) belief and knowledge.
The enormous impact of Edmund Gettier=s 1963 article, ?Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?@ 1 was dependent on the assumption, common at the time, that
Edmund L. Gettier, ?Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?@ Analysis , XXV (1963), 121-
1 Edmund L. Gettier, ?Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?@ Analysis, XXV (1963), 121-
knowledge could be adequately defined as justified true belief. Gettier presented a pair of counterexamples designed to illustrate that such a definition is not adequate. On the other hand, nothing he said cast doubt on the assumption that justification is one of the necessary ingredients of knowledge. Indeed, his article and the responses to it have cemented this assumption more firmly than ever into the literature.
The basic idea behind Gettier=s counterexamples is that one can be justified in believing a falsehood P from which one deduces a truth Q, in which case one has a justified true belief in Q but does not know Q. Gettier=s article inspired a host of similar counterexamples, and the search was on for a fourth condition of knowledge, one that could be added to justification, truth, and belief to produce an adequate analysis of knowledge. The search thus presupposed that justification is a indispensable component of knowledge. In particular, the presupposition was that although justification, when added true belief, is not necessary and sufficient for knowledge, it in conjunction with some fourth condition designed to handle Gettier problems, when added to true belief, is necessary and sufficient.
In the aftermath of Gettier=s article, various fourth conditions were proposed, many of which were variants of the idea that knowledge requires one=s justification to be either nondefective or indefeasible, where a justification is nondefective if (roughly) it does not justify any falsehood, and a justification is indefeasible if (roughly) it cannot be defeated by the addition of any true statement. However, a secondary but ultimately more influential response to Gettier=s counterexamples was to wonder whether something less explicitly intellectual than justification, traditionally understood, is better suited for elucidating knowledge. Justification is traditionally associated with having or at least potentially being able to generate an argument in defense of one=s beliefs, but in many instances of knowledge, nothing resembling an argument seems to be involved.
externalist account of epistemic justification. By contrast, most foundationalists and their traditional rivals, coherentists, are internalists, whose accounts of epistemic justification emphasize the ability to marshal considerations in defense of one=s beliefs. The proposals by Goldman and others provoked an enormous literature on the relative advantages and disadvantages of externalism and internalism in epistemology. 3 Most of this literature assumes that externalists and internalists are defending rival theories and that, hence, both cannot be right. However, a more interesting reading of the dispute is that t $6 Santa Droppings APPLPJ01 Ϊ
For a summary and discussion of the relevant issues, see William Alston, Epistemic Justification (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), especially chapters 8 and 9. Also see Robert Audi, ?Justification, Truth and Reliability,@ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 49 ((1988), 1-29; Laurence Bonjour, Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge,@ in French, Uehling, Wettstein, eds., M idwest Studies in Philosophy , Vol. V (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 53-71; Richard Fumerton, ?The Internalism-Externalism Controversy,@ in J Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives , Vol. 2 (Atasacadero: Ridgeview, 1988); Alvin Goldman, ?Strong and Weak Justification,@ in Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives , Vol. 2 (1988); and Ernest Sosa, ?Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue, in E. Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective , 225-244.
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3 For a summary and discussion of the relevant issues, see William Alston, Epistemic Justification
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), especially chapters 8 and 9. Also see Robert Audi,
?Justification, Truth and Reliability,@ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49 ((1988),
1-29; Laurence Bonjour, Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge,@ in French, Uehling,
Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. V (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1980), 53-71; Richard Fumerton, ?The Internalism-Externalism Controversy,@ in J
Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 2 (Atasacadero: Ridgeview, 1988); Alvin Goldman,
?Strong and Weak Justification,@ in Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 2 (1988); and
Ernest Sosa, ?Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue, in E. Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, 225-244.
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yuyOA@ * 6 temporary file aaa 9Ε·$θΡ·$θΡ BINA???? m, that epistemic justification be explicated in such a way that it turns out to be one of the key components of knowledge. Internalists, by contrast, are principally interested in explicating a sense of justification that captures what is involved in having beliefs that are defensible from one=s perspective, but along the way they see themselves as also providing the materials for an adequate account of knowledge, because they too assume that justification is by definition that which has to be added to true belief to get knowledge, with some fillip to handle Gettier problems. So, for internalists, the primary desideratum for an account of epistemic justification is that it provide an explication of internally defensible believing, and it is a secondary benefit that it also capture what has to be added to true belief in order to get a good candidate for knowledge.
The result is two very different ways of thinking about epistemic justification, which are easy to conflate, especially since some of the most influential figures in the history of epistemology thought that one and the same notion could capture both ideas. Descartes, for example, recommended that we believe only that which is altogether impossible to doubt and, hence, internally beyond the possibility of criticism. However, he also thought by doing so we could be altogether assured of acquiring knowledge. Few epistemologists are so sanguine anymore. Descartes= search for an internal procedure that would provide a guarantee of knowledge of one=s external environment proved not to be feasible, but the lesson is not that either the internal or external aspect of Cartesian project has to be abandoned. The lesson, rather, is that there are different, equally legitimate projects for epistemologists to pursue. One project, roughly put, is that of exploring what is required for one to put one=s own intellectual house in order. Another, again roughly put, is that of exploring what is required for one to stand in a relation of knowledge to one=s environment. It is not unusual in the epistemological literature for the results of both kinds of explorations to be reported using the language of justification and rationality, but the terms <justified belief= and <rational belief= have different senses when used by externalists than when used by internalists. The externalist sense tends to be closely connected with knowledge, whereas the internalist sense tends to be closely connected with internally defensible believing. Confusion occurs when epistemologists slide back and forth between the two, sometimes using the language of justified and rational belief to report what has to be added to true belief to get a serious candidate for knowledge and other times to report what is involved in having beliefs that are defensible given the believer=s perspective.
This confusion is encouraged by the methodological assumption mentioned above, the assumption that the properties which make a belief justified or rational are by definition such that when a true belief has those properties, it is a good candidate to be an instance of knowledge, with some other condition added to handle Gettier-style counterexamples. This assumption has unfortunate consequences for both the theory of rational belief and the theory of justified belief, which I will be later distinguishing, because it places them in service to the theory of knowledge. Given the assumption, a theory of rational or justified belief can be regarded as adequate only if it contributes to a successful theory of knowledge. The theories of rational and justified belief are in this way tied more closely to the theory of knowledge than to a general theory of rationality. Correspondingly, the assumption has the effect of divorcing the theories of rational and justified belief from theories of rational and justified decisions, plans, actions, strategies,
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epistemic justification be explicated in such a way that it turns out to be one of the key components of
knowledge. Internalists, by contrast, are principally interested in explicating a sense of justification that
captures what is involved in having beliefs that are defensible from one=s perspective, but along the
way they see themselves as also providing the materials for an adequate account of knowledge,
because they too assume that justification is by definition that which has to be added to true belief to get
knowledge, with some fillip to handle Gettier problems. So, for internalists, the primary desideratum for
an account of epistemic justification is that it provide an explication of internally defensible believing, and
it is a secondary benefit that it also capture what has to be added to true belief in order to get a good
candidate for knowledge. The result is two very different ways of thinking about epistemic justification,
which are easy to conflate, especially since some of the most influential figures in the history of
epistemology thought that one and the same notion could capture both ideas. Descartes, for example,
recommended that we believe only that which is altogether impossible to doubt and, hence, internally
beyond the possibility of criticism. However, he also thought by doing so we could be altogether assured
of acquiring knowledge. Few epistemologists are so sanguine anymore. Descartes= search for an
internal procedure that would provide a guarantee of knowledge of one=s external environment proved
not to be feasible, but the lesson is not that either the internal or external aspect of Cartesian project has
to be abandoned. The lesson, rather, is that there are different, equally legitimate projects for
epistemologists to pursue. One project, roughly put, is that of exploring what is required for one to put
one=s own intellectual house in order. Another, again roughly put, is that of exploring what is required
for one to stand in a relation of knowledge to one=s environment. It is not unusual in the epistemological
literature for the results of both kinds of explorations to be reported using the language of justification
and rationality, but the terms <justified belief= and <rational belief= have different senses when used by
externalists than when used by internalists. The externalist sense tends to be closely connected with
knowledge, whereas the internalist sense tends to be closely connected with internally defensible
believing. Confusion occurs when epistemologists slide back and forth between the two, sometimes
using the language of justified and rational belief to report what has to be added to true belief to get a
serious candidate for knowledge and other times to report what is involved in having beliefs that are
defensible given the believer=s perspective. This confusion is encouraged by the methodological
assumption mentioned above, the assumption that the properties which make a belief justified or rational
are by definition such that when a true belief has those properties, it is a good candidate to be an
instance of knowledge, with some other condition added to handle Gettier-style counterexamples. This
assumption has unfortunate consequences for both the theory of rational belief and the theory of
justified belief, which I will be later distinguishing, because it places them in service to the theory of
knowledge. Given the assumption, a theory of rational or justified belief can be regarded as adequate
only if it contributes to a successful theory of knowledge. The theories of rational and justified belief are
in this way tied more closely to the theory of knowledge than to a general theory of rationality.
Correspondingly, the assumption has the effect of divorcing the theories of rational and justified belief
from theories of rational and justified decisions, plans, actions, strategies,
etc., and it likewise has the effect of even divorcing them from our everyday concerns about the rationality and justifiedness of opinions, which tend to emphasize who has been responsible in their beliefs rather on who has satisfied the prerequisites of knowledge.
The remedy is for epistemologists, at least at the beginning of their enterprise, to be wary of simply assuming that knowledge can be adequately understood in terms of rational or justified true belief plus some condition to handle Gettier problems, and, correspondingly, to be wary also of the idea that there is a simple, necessary tie between the theories of rational and justified belief and the theory of knowledge. As the theory of knowledge and the theories of rational and justified belief are independently developed, interesting and even surprising connections among them may be revealed, but it should not be simply taken for granted at the start of the enterprise that justified belief or rational belief is by definition a component of knowledge.
Relaxing the tie between knowledge on the one hand and rational or justified belief on the other hand is potentially liberating for both sides. It frees the theory of knowledge from an overly intellectual conception of knowledge, thus smoothing the way for treatments that give due recognition to the fact that most people cannot provide adequate intellectual defenses for much of what they know, and without the need for awkward attempts to read back into the account of knowledge some duly externalized notion of justified or rational belief. Simultaneously, it creates space for the theories of rational and justified belief to be embedded in a general theory of rationality. These notions ought not be cordoned off from other notions of rationality, as if the conditions that make a belief rational or justified had little to do with the conditions that make a decision, strategy, action, or plan rational or justified. The way we understand the rationality and the justifiedness of beliefs ought to be of a piece with the way we understand the rationality and justifiedness of other phenomena.
- ???Epistemic and non-epistemic rationality of beliefs???
The first step towards a well-integrated theory of rationality is to recognize that rationality is a goal oriented notion. Whether the question is one about the rationality of beliefs, decisions, intentions, plans, or strategies, what is at issue is the effective pursuit of goals. Questions about the rationality of a decision, for example, are in the first instance questions about how effectively the decision seems to satisfy some presupposed set of goals. I say 'seems" because it is too stringent to insist that the decision is rational only if it in fact satisfies the goals. Rational decisions can turn out badly. Likewise, it is too stringent to insist that a
decision is rational only if it is probable that the plan will satisfy one =s goals, since it may be that no one could be reasonably expected to see that the decision was likely to have unwelcome consequences. Considerations such as these suggest a general schema of rationality: A decision (plan, action, strategy, belief, etc.) is rational for an individual if it is rational to believe that it will satisfy his or her goals.
An obvious drawback of this schema is that it makes reference to the notion of rational belief, thus leaving us within the circle of notions we wish to understand and, hence, without an adequate general account of rationality. I will return to this problem later, but I want first to look at some other questions about the schema that also need to be addressed. For
the significance of the car pulling the boat going north, he himself would admit that taking the north road is the reasonable choice. Indeed, he himself would be critical of any other decision."
In scene three, neither my friend nor I have been on any of the four roads, but we are both aware that most people in the community know that the shore is to the south and that Smith is a member of the community. As Smith turns east, I say to my friend, A It=s common knowledge that the shore is to south. So, if he wants to get to the shore, he has reasons to take the southern road, not the eastern road. It =s what a rational person would do in his situation. @
In scene four, my friend and I see Smith take the eastern road and shake our head in disapproval, since we are both aware that it is common knowledge that the beach is to the south. We then go off to the local cafe, where later over coffee we hear that the southern road has been closed by a rock slide and that the slide occurred prior to Smith =s decision at the intersection. Being aware that Smith was desperate to get to the beach today, I say, AWell, what do you know. The western road turned out to be the only route open to the shore today. So, contrary to what we thought, Smith had good reasons to take the western fork. Only it stood any chance of getting him to the shore today. Neither he nor we knew it, but it was rational for him to take the western road. @
In each of the above scenes, I am evaluating Smith's decision in a way which we commonly evaluate the decisions of others, and in each of the scenes I report this evaluation using the language of rationality and reasonability. In none of the scenes am I using that language in an extraordinary way. What I say, given the context, is not unnatural, nor is it clearly and unambiguously mistaken. And yet, in one scene I say it is rational for Smith to take the east road; in another, I say it is rational for him to take the north road; in a third, I say it is rational for him to take the south road; and in the fourth, I say it is rational for him to take the west road.
Each of these claims can be appropriate, because claims of rationality are best interpreted as presupposing not only a goal (or set of goals) but also a perspective which can vary with the context. There are a variety of concerns, interests, and purposes that we bring to our evaluations of the decisions (plans, strategies, etc.) of other people, and these concerns, interests, and purposes help fix the perspective from which the decision is being evaluated. When we express these evaluations using the language of rationality, we are making a claim about whether from the given perspective, it is rational to believe that the decision effectively satisfies a goal (or a set of goals).
Sometimes we are interested in evaluating decisions, plans, strategies, etc. from the person's own current perspective. In the first of the above scenes, for example, I am concerned to point out that relative what else Smith believes, it is appropriate for him to take the east road. He believes that the shore is to east and, thus, relative to this belief, it is rational for him also to believe that taking the east road will satisfy his goal of getting to the shore and that taking any of the other roads will not satisfy this goal. I express this observation by saying that it is rational for him, in this radically subjective sense, for him to take the east road.
Other times we are not content with merely pointing out that the person's decisions, plans, strategies, etc. make sense given his current
perspective. We want also to evaluate that perspective. An especially effective way of doing this is to point out that the person is not meeting standards that he himself would acknowledge were he to be reflective. This is the way I am evaluating Smith's decision in the second of the above scenes. I point out that he has information that on reflection he himself would regard as indicating that the shore is to the north. Thus, were he to be reflective, he himself would believe that taking the north road holds out the best hope of achieving his goal, and he thus would be critical of his decision to take the east road. Once again, I make this point using the language of rationality. I say that it is rational for him to take the north road, because this is the only decision that does not make him vulnerable to self-criticism on reflection.
Still other times we are not so concerned with evaluating a person's decisions, plans, strategies, etc. in terms of his own perspective and standards, not even those that he would have were to be reflective. We are instead interested in looking at his decision in terms of the perspective of his community and in terms of standards that are Ain the air @ in that community. In legal contexts, for example, what often matters is whether the defendant has exercised reasonable care and diligence, and the various legal
arguments about the defendant=s actions are often framed in terms of what a hypothetical reasonable individual would have done in the circumstances at issue. This hypothetical individual is conceived as someone who has abilities and information which are relatively standard in the community. We make judgements of this sort outside of legal contexts as well. In the third scene above, for instance, both my friend and I are aware that it is common knowledge that the beach is to south. Thus, relative to this perspective, it is appropriate to believe that the best way for Smith to achieve his goal is to take south road. I express this observation by saying it is rational for him to drive south; it is what a standard, reasonable person in his community would do.
On yet other occasions, we are not interested in evaluating a person's decisions, plans, strategies, etc. in terms of his own perspective or even those of his community. We are instead interested in determining which of the alternatives has the best objective probability of achieving the goals in question, regardless of what the decision-maker himself or others believe and even regardless of what information is available to them. In effect, we want to evaluate the decision from the perspective of a verific believer, that is, one who has only true beliefs about the relevant circumstances. If it would be rational for such a verific believer to regard one of the alternative as having a better chance than the others of achieving the goals in question, then there are good objective reasons to prefer that alternative over the others. In the fourth scene, for instance, I want to emphasize that unbeknownst to Smith and other people in the community, taking the western road provided Smith with the best chance of getting to the beach. Once again, I report this observation using the language of rationality. I say it is rational, in this objective sense, for him to take the south road.
In the above example, I have assumed that the only relevant goal is that of getting to the shore, but of course in many instances we are interested in evaluating a decision, plan, strategy, etc. with respect to how effectively it promotes a set of goals, not all of which are equally important. In such cases, the rationality of a decision is a matter of its estimated desirability, where this is a function of both of what it is rational to believe about the effectiveness of the decision in promoting these goals and of the relative value of these goals. But in these cases as in the simpler
cases, 'it is rational = is to be understood in terms of a perspective.
rationality. For example, we may want to evaluate someone=s actions with respect to goals that concern his or her economic well-being. If we judge that doing A would be an effective means of promoting this subset of goals, we can say that A is rational, in an economic sense, for the individual. We can say this even if, with respect to all the person=s goals, both economic and non-economic, it is not rational to do A.
Thus, the general schema of rationality can be refined: A decision (plan, strategy, etc.) is rational in sense X for an individual if it is rational from perspective P to believe that the plan will do an acceptably good job of satisfying his or her goals of type X.
This distinction among different types of rationality is especially important for epistemology. When assessing each other =s beliefs, we are typically not interested in the total constellation of our goals. Rather, our interest is typically in those goals that are distinctly intellectual. For example, as a rule, in assessing what it is rational for you to believe, we would typically regard as irrelevant the fact (if it is one) that were you to believe P, it would make you feel more secure. More notoriously, in assessing whether it might be rational for you to believe in God, we are unlikely to join Pascal in regarding as relevant the possibility that you might increase your chances of salvation by being a theist. Or consider another example. Believing that the workmanship on American automobiles is better than that on other automobiles would presumably increase the likelihood of my buying an American car and thus encourage at least in a small way the prospering of the American economy, which we can stipulate is one of my goals. Even so, if you and I are discussing what it is rational for me to believe about the workmanship on American cars, we would ordinarily regard these potential benefits of belief as irrelevant. We might be willing to grant that the goal of promoting the American economy gives me at least a weak reason to buy American cars, but we are unlikely to take this goal into account when we are discussing what I have reasons to believe.
Examples of this sort can be multiplied indefinitely. I have a friend who is convinced there is life elsewhere in the universe,, because he thinks that not all of the reported sightings of extraterrestrials can be explained away. By contrast, I do not think that these sightings are strong evidence for there being life elsewhere, and the two of us have had friendly arguments over the issue. But in addition, my friend has remarked more than once that his belief that there is life elsewhere in the universe has had various beneficial effects upon him. He says that it has made very long-term scientific projects seem more natural to him; it has heightened his environmental sensitivity, including his appreciation for the diversity of life on earth; and in general it has proven an effective antidote to what he regards as his general tendency to parochialism. In making these remarks in an off-handed way, it was clear that he was not offering them as reasons in defense of his belief that there is life elsewhere in the universe. Nor did he intend to be offering them as reasons for me to believe this. Of course, it may well be that my friend was exaggerating the impact that his belief has had on him, but still, it is at least arguable that the belief has had these beneficial effects for him. Moreover, it might well be the case that the belief would produce similar benefits for me. Nevertheless, it never occurred to either of us to regard these possible benefits as either a reason for him or a reason for me to believe there is life elsewhere. But why not? Why is it that in our deliberations and discussions about what to believe, we so rarely consider the practical benefits of belief, even though in principle there seems nothing amiss in doing so?
To say that in deliberating and debating over a claim we rarely take into consideration the pragmatic benefits that would accrue to us from believing it is not to say that such benefits do not play a significant role in shaping what we believe. They often do. It is just that they typically exercise their influence in a less than fully explicit way. Think of issues which are relevant to our own self-image. It is a commonplace that about such issues many people have a tendency to believe that which is most reassuring to them. They do so not so much because they have consciously decided that this is a good policy. On the contrary, if asked, they would probably reject such a policy as ill-advised, but it nonetheless does seem to be a policy that many people unconsciously follow. Indeed, there is empirical evidence of their
doing so. Studies of so-called <overconfidence bias= document that in wide variety of circumstances subjects consistently overestimate their own abilities. In an enormous survey of one million high school seniors, students were asked to evaluate themselves as average, below average, or above average in leadership ability. Accurate self-assessments would be expected to result in roughly equal percentages of students in the highest and lowest categories, but the actual self-assessments were strikingly different. A full 70% of the students viewed themselves as being above average in leadership ability, whereas only 2% regarded themselves as being below average. Even more remarkably, when asked to rate their ability to get along with others, virtually all the students thought they were above average, with 60% evaluating themselves in the top 10% and 25% evaluating themselves in the top 1%. Similar studies have been conducted on adults with similar results. For example, a hugely disproportionate percentage of adult drivers rate themselves as better than average drivers. Yet another survey, with special relevance to academia, revealed than a stunning 94% of university professors assessed themselves as better at their jobs than their average colleagues. 4
So, pragmatic benefits do seem to play a significant role in determining what people believe, even if the people themselves are often unaware of this role. This is an interesting point, but in itself it is not terribly suprising, given that people are often not fully aware of the reasons which motivate their behavior and opinions. What is surprising, and indeed even puzzling, is that in our discussions and deliberations about what it is rational to believe, the working assumption seems to be that the practical benefits of belief are not even relevant to the issue of what it is rational for us to believe. There is no comparable assumption at work in our discussions and deliberations about what it is rational for us to do. We commonly decry those who act in a narrowly self-interested way, but we pointedly do not assume that self-interested considerations are beside the point. However, in discussions about what it is rational for us to believe, we ordinarily do assume this. Indeed, we assume that even the social usefulness of a belief is beside the point.
Thomas Gilovich, How We Know What Isn=t So (New York: McMillan, 1991), 75-87. For a summary of research that has been conducted on illusions about one=s self, and an argument that these illusions are often psychologically useful, see S.E. Taylor, Positive Illusions: Creative Self Deception and the Healthy Mind (New York:Basic Books, 1989).
interest to epistemologists, in which it is not rational for me to believe P. Moreover, the point of this example is not affected by shortening the time period in which the benefits are forthcoming. It would not be rational, in this sense, for me to believe P if we were instead to imagine that believing P would somehow improve my prospects for having accurate and comprehensive beliefs in the next few weeks, or in the next few hours, or even in the next few seconds. The precise way of making this point is to say that in such a situation, it is not rational in a purely epistemic sense for me to believe P, where this purely epistemic sense is to be understood in terms of the present tense goal of now having accurate and comprehensive beliefs.
I am assuming here that goals can be concerned with current states of affairs as well as future states of affairs. However, if this usage to thought to stretch the standard meaning of <goal= too far, it is easy enough
to devise alternative terminology. <Goal= can be replaced with <desideratum =
or <value,= and epistemic rationality can then be understood in terms of what it is appropriate, or fitting, to believe, insofar as it is a desideratum (that is, a valuable state of affairs) for one now to have accurate and comprehensive beliefs.
There are different views about what exact properties a belief must have in order to be epistemically rational, but for my immediate purposes, what matters most is that it is a desideratum that the notion of epistemically rational belief be explicated without reference to any other notion of rationality (or any related notion, such as justified, warranted, or reasonable belief. In general, it is implicitly accepted in the literature that this is a desideratum. For example, foundationalists try to understand epistemic rationality in terms of a notion of basic belief and a set of support relations by which other beliefs are supported by the basic ones, and they would view it a defect if in their explication they had to make reference to a notion of rational belief (or justified, warranted, or reasonable belief)in characterizing basicality or the support relations. Coherentists try to provide an explication of epistemic rationality in terms of a set of deductive and probabilistic relations among beliefs and properties such as simplicity, conservativeness, and explanatory power, but they too would view it a defect if their explication smuggled in any reference to a notion of rational belief. Similarly for proponents of other accounts of epistemically rational belief.
This point is relevant to the general schema of rationality, according to which, a plan, decision, action, strategy, etc. is rational in sense X for an individual if it is rational from perspective P to believe that the plan will do an acceptably good job of satisfying his or her goals of type X. This schema makes use of the notion of rational belief, and it thus leaves us within the circle of notions we wish to understand. However, precisely because accounts of epistemically rationally standardly do not, and should not, themselves make use of the notion of rational belief or any of its close cognates, they provide the schema with a potential escape route from circularity.
In particular, with an account of epistemically rational belief in hand, the general schema of rationality can be further refined: A plan, decision, action, strategy, etc. is rational in sense X for an individual just in case it is epistemically rational to believe from perspective P that the plan, decision, action, strategy, etc. will do an acceptably good job of satisfying goals of kind X.
This refined schema still leaves for room for ambiguity with respect to the perspective. If we substitute into the schema the perspective of an
omniscient observer, the result will be an account of when, from a fully objective perspective, it is epistemically rational to believe P. If we substitute into the schema a perspective which is associated with the individual himself (his current perspective, the one he would have were he to be reflective, etc.), the result is an account of when, from the perspective of the individual himself, it is epistemically rational to believe P. For the moment, I will simply assume that we are interested in the perspective of the individual himself, so that I can focus on another point. Namely, according to this refined schema, other kinds of rationality are understood in terms of epistemic rationality, whereas epistemic rationality does not itself presuppose any other kind of rationality. The refined schema thus illustrates how epistemic rationality can serve as an anchor for other kinds of rationality. Moreover, the schema is perfectly general. It applies to all phenomena (plans, decisions, strategies, and so on) and to all forms of rationality for these phenomena (economic rationality, rationality all things considered, and so on). Most relevant for my present purposes, the rationality of belief is itself an instance of the schema. Even epistemically rational belief is an instance. For example, inserting the epistemic goal into the general schema for <goals of type x= results in the following: Believing P is rational in an epistemic sense if it is epistemically rational for one to believe that believing P would acceptably contribute to the epistemic goal of one =s now having accurate and comprehensive beliefs.
This instantiation of the general schema is compatible with all the major theories of epistemically rational belief. Every belief which satisfies the requirements of the proposed account of epistemic rationality is also an instance of the general schema, where the relevant goal is that of now having accurate and comprehensive For example, according to coherentists, it is epistemically rational for one to believe that believing P would acceptably contribute to the epistemic goal of one =s now having accurate and comprehensive beliefs only when the proposed coherentist conditions are met with respect to the proposition P, that is, only when P coheres appropriately with one =s other beliefs and hence it is epistemically rational to believe that P is true. According to foundationalists, it is epistemically rational for one to believe that believing P would acceptably contribute to the epistemic goal only when the recommended foundationalist conditions are met with respect to P and hence it is epistemically rational to believe that P is true; and similarly for other views.
- Epistemic and non-epistemic rationality of belief reconsidered
A decision, plan, strategy, etc. is rational in sense X if it is epistemically rational for one to believe it will do an acceptably good job of satisfying goals of kind X. Recall, however, that >X= here can refer to all of one=s goals or only a subset of them. This creates a risk of confusion. If we take into consideration only economic goals, for instance, we may judge that it is rational (in an economic sense) for one to do X, but if we take into consideration all of one=s goals, both economic and non-economic, we may well conclude that it is not rational (all things considered) for one to do X.
These same possibilities for confusion arise when it is the rationality of beliefs which are at issue. Beliefs can be assessed in terms how well they promote the epistemic goal, but in principle they also can be assessed in
A decision, plan, strategy, etc. is rational in sense X if it is epistemically rational for one to believe it will do
an acceptably good job of satisfying goals of kind X. Recall, however, that >X= here can refer to all of
one=s goals or only a subset of them. This creates a risk of confusion. If we take into consideration only
economic goals, for instance, we may judge that it is rational (in an economic sense) for one to do X, but if
we take into consideration all of one=s goals, both economic and non-economic, we may well conclude
that it is not rational (all things considered) for one to do X. These same possibilities for confusion arise
when it is the rationality of beliefs which are at issue. Beliefs can be assessed in terms how well they
promote the epistemic goal, but in principle they also can be assessed in
not interested in the pragmatic reasons she has to believe the proposition C namely, it is normally pointless to cite them, given that they are not the kind of reasons that normally generate belief. Similarly, in our own deliberations about what to believe, we ordinarily do not consider what practical reasons we might have for believing something, and the explanation for this is similar to the third-person case. Deliberations concerning our practical reasons for belief are ordinarily inefficacious and hence pointless. Hence, our practice is to ignore them in deliberations about what to believe.
This is not an idiosyncratic practice. We have analogous practices with respect to deliberations about what to choose, try, or intend. Just as the reasons we cite for believing P are ordinarily ones that purport to show that P is true, so the reasons we cite for intending to do X are ordinarily ones that purport to show that doing X is worthwhile. Still, there can be reasons for intending to do X that do not even purport to indicate that doing X is worthwhile, just as there can be reasons for believing P that do not even purport to indicate that P is true. Imagine a situation in which the intention to do X will itself produce benefits, that is, it will produce these benefits even if in fact you do not do X. Consider an extreme example. suppose someone offers me a million dollars if tomorrow I form an intention to drink a toxin on the day after tomorrow. If I form the intention tomorrow, I will get the money whether or not I actually drink the toxin on the day after tomorrow. 7 Something analogous, even if less dramatic, can be true of everyday intentions. They too can have consequences that are independent of the intended acts, and if these consequences are sufficiently beneficial, they provide us with reasons to form the intentions in question. Nevertheless, our general practice is not to take such reasons into account when we are forming intentions or in arguing with others about the rationality of their intentions.
The puzzle, like the corresponding puzzle for belief, is why this should be so. Moreover, the solution to this puzzle is similar to the solution sketched above for the puzzle about belief. Namely, becoming convinced that one has these kind of reasons is ordinarily not enough to generate an intention to do X. So, insofar as we are trying to persuade someone to have this intention, it will normally be pointless for us to cite such reasons. By contrast, if we convince the person that actually doing X is worthwhile (as opposed to its being worthwhile to intend to do X), this often is sufficient to generate an intention to do X. Consider again the toxin puzzle. Even if I know that I can win the million dollars by forming an intention tomorrow to drink the toxin the day after tomorrow, this will normally not be sufficient to generate a genuine intention to drink the toxin. It may well be sufficient to generate an intention to act as if I were going to drink the toxin (in hopes of fooling the sponsor) but not a genuine intention to actually take the toxin.
There is a second, reinforcing, explanation as to why in general we do not deliberate about the pragmatic reasons we have for believing something.
7 This is Gregory Kavka's example. See Kavka, "The Toxin Puzzle," Analysis 43 (1983), 33-36.
It is that such deliberations are ordinarily redundant. Although we do have pragmatic reasons as well as epistemic reasons for believing, ordinarily our overriding pragmatic reason with respect to our beliefs is to have and maintain a comprehensive and accurate stock of beliefs. All of us are continually faced with a huge variety of decisions. Since we do not know in advance in any detailed way the kinds of decisions that we will need to make, we likewise do not know in advance the kind of information we will require in order to make these decisions well. This might not be terribly important were it not for the fact that a large number of these decisions are ones that will need to be made quickly, without the luxury of time either to engage in lengthy research or seek expert opinion. Instead, we will be forced to draw upon our existing resources and in particular upon our existing stock of beliefs. If that stock is either small or inaccurate, we increase the likelihood that our decisions will not be good ones.
So ordinarily, the system of beliefs that is likely to do the best overall job of promoting our total constellation of goals is one that is both comprehensive and accurate. Only by having such beliefs are we likely to be in a position to fashion effective strategies for achieving our various goals. But then, since by definition beliefs which are epistemically rational for us are beliefs which are rational for us insofar as our goal is to have accurate and comprehensive beliefs, it is ordinarily rational, all things considered, that is, when all of our goals are taken into account, to believe those propositions which it is also epistemically rational for us to believe. Thus, for all practical purposes, taking this phrase literally, we can usually safely ignore pragmatic reasons in our deliberations about what to believe.
To be sure, there are conceivable cases in which our epistemic reasons and our overall reasons for belief are pulled apart. Suppose you are aware that a madman will kill your children unless you come to believe, and not merely act as if you believe, some proposition P which it is clearly epistemically irrational for you, that is, irrational insofar as your goal is to have accurate and comprehensive beliefs. In such a situation, it presumably is rational for you to find some way of getting yourself to believe P. The importance of saving your children overrides other concerns. However, in the vast majority of cases, where the benefits of belief itself, regardless of accuracy, are not so powerful, there are pressures that keep what it is rational to believe, all things considered, from being in conflict with what it is epistemically rational to believe. Moreover, these pressures are made all the more intense by the fact that typically it is epistemic reasons, not other kinds of reasons, which persuade us to believe something. So, if we are to find a a way of believing a proposition which is not epistemically rational, we may need to manipulate ourselves and our situation so that we eventually come to have what we take to be genuinely good evidence for the proposition. However, doing so may well involve maneuvering ourselves into what we would now regard as a misleading evidential situation. For example, suppose my friend convinces me that a belief in there being intelligent life elsewhere in the universe would have highly beneficial consequences for me, such as increasing my environmental sensitivity, enhancing my appreciation for the diversity of life on earth, and discouraging any tendency to parochialism. Then, I may well recognize that I have reasons to believe that there is intelligent life elsewhere, but even so, these reasons will ordinarily not be sufficient to prompt belief. So, how would I go about getting myself to believe this proposition?
The most straightforward approach would be to commit myself to an impartial investigation of the issue in hopes of eventually uncovering good evidence of life elsewhere. Unfortunately, insofar as I now lack good
